The U.S. Electoral College

1
The U.S. Electoral College

• N. R. Miller
• POLI 423

2
How the EC Works in Practice

• Instead of electing a President (and Vice
  President) in a single national election on
  Presidential election day,
• we have 51 separate state ( DC) elections,
• in which voters (reasonably enough but
  incorrectly) think they are voting directly for a
  Presidential/Vice Presidential ticket.
• the plurality winner in each state (except ME and
  NE) wins all of the states electoral votes
  (winner-take-all)
• which are equal in number to the states total
  representation in Congress,
• i.e., its House seats 2
• plus DC has 3 electoral votes, so
• total EV 538, and
• these electoral votes are added up to determine
  the winner of the election,
• with 270 required for election.
• Thus in practice (about 95 of the time), the EC
  is merely a vote counting system that
• takes the popular votes in each state,
• automatically translates them into nationwide
  electoral votes, and
• declares a winner.

3
Implication of the EC in PracticeBattleground/
Swing States

• The principal implication of the EC in practice
  is that it creates battleground (or swing)
  states, because
• it matters only which party ticket carries a
  state,
• and not what the margin of victory or defeat is.
• cf. marginal constituencies in the UK.
• Hence states that are expected to be close become
  battlegrounds while other are substantially
  ignored.
• Today (frequent and relatively accurate) state
  polls make it easier to identify battleground
  states.
• Until a decade or two ago, there were relatively
  few state (as opposed to national) polls.
• Contemporary campaign resources (especially TV on
  local channels and cable services) ads can be
  both
• focused on particular states, and
• can moved from one state to another,
• in contrast to
• party organization rooted in states and
  localities in the 19th century, and
• national TV advertising (mid- to later-20th
  century).

4
More Esoteric EC Details

• Lurking beneath electoral votes are real people
  called Presidential electors,
• who voters actually vote for on Presidential
  election day,
• who are actually elected on Presidential election
  day, and
• who actually cast the electoral votes (about six
  weeks later).
• Underlying the winner-take-all system is the
  fact that (in almost universal practice)
  Presidential electors are elected not
  individually but on statewide party slates
  (general ticket system).
• The Constitution gives state legislature the
  power to determine how their states electors are
  elected (or appointed).
• A variety of methods other than winner-take-all
  for selecting Presidential electors have been
  used by some states in the past, which could
  often produce split electoral votes from a state.
• Indeed, at the present time, ME (since 1972) and
  NE (since 1992) do not award electoral votes on a
  winner-take-all basis,
• but rather on the basis of the Modified District
  Plan,
• so their electoral votes may be split (though in
  fact this never happened until 2008 in NE).

5
Esoteric Details (cont.)

• Party nominees may occasionally be deprived of
  electoral votes by faithless electors,
• who cast electoral votes in a way that
  contradicts their pledge to support their party
  ticket, and
• in a way that does not reflect popular vote in
  the state
• and produces a split electoral vote from a state.
• If no candidate wins 270 electoral votes, either
  because
• a third candidate wins some electoral votes or
• there is a (mathematically possible) 269-269 tie,
  
• the election is thrown into the House of
  Representatives (which last happened in 1824),
• where voting by state delegation (one delegation
  one vote).
• A number of elections have other displayed
  electoral vote oddities --- for example
• President Truman received no votes in AL in 1948,
• President Johnson received no votes in AL in
  1964,
• because no elector candidates pledged to these
  Presidents were on the ballot.
• unpledged electors were elected in AL and MS in
  1960.
• Even presumptive experts (e.g., textbook authors)
  often mischaracterize esoteric features of the
  Electoral College.
• Adkinson and Elliot, The Electoral College A
  Misunderstood Institution, PS, March 1997

6
Evaluating the Electoral College

• Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 68
• The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate
  of the United States is almost the only part of
  the system, of any consequence, which has escaped
  without severe censure, or which has received the
  slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.
  . . . I venture somewhat further, and hesitate
  not to affirm that if the manner of it be not
  perfect, it is at least excellent.
• Actually there were some Antifederalist
  criticisms of the mode of appointment of the
  Chief Magistrate, but they were not among the
  leading arguments against the proposed
  Constitution.
• Many subsequent evaluations (and the many
  proposed constitutional amendments) suggest a
  less favorable assessment of the mode of
  appointment of the Chief Magistrate,
• Range of evaluations the Electoral College was
• part of a generally elitist and anti-democratic
  constitution or
• a last-minute jerry-built compromise or perhaps
• a well designed compromise among diverse
  considerations, or possibly
• the embodiment of well-thought-out selection
  criteria.

7
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)

• Today, as a rough generalization,
• liberals mostly criticize the Electoral College
  and advocate its replacement by a national
  popular vote, e.g.,
• George Edwards, Why the Electoral College is Bad
  for America, and
• Neal R. Peirce, The Peoples President,
• while conservatives mostly oppose a national
  popular vote and defend the existing Electoral
  College, e.g.,
• Judith Best, assigned reading on webpage and The
  Case Against Direct Election of the President,
  and
• Tara Ross, Enlightened Democracy The Case for
  the Electoral College (with an Introduction by
  George Will).

8
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)

• However, in the mid-20th century liberals
  mostly defended the existing Electoral College
  system, which they viewed as having features that
  
• enhanced the voting power of major constituencies
  of the New Deal, in particular,
• urban dwellers,
• racial and ethnic minorities, and
• union members,
• and which counterbalanced the rural and
  conservative advantage
• in the malapportioned House of the that era, and
• In the malapportioned Senate of every era.
• In that era, proposals to modify (but not
  abolish) the Electoral College (the Modified
  District and Proportional Plans) were supported
  mostly by conservatives.)

9
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)

• My own take on the Electoral College (Why the
  Electoral College Is Good for Political
  Science)
• The original EC was a compromise among diverse
  considerations that was cleverly designed but had
  a fatal flaw that had to be (and was) corrected
  by the 12th Amendment to the Constitution in
  1804.
• The original EC established a selection system
• that was designed to operate in a non-partisan
  environment, but
• did not operate satisfactorily once political
  parties formed to contest Presidential selection.
• The EC was rapidly transformed into an
  institution quite different from its designers
  had intended.
• So, even if you like the existing EC, you cant
  really give credit to the wisdom of the framers
  of the Constitution.
• Likewise, even if you dislike the existing EC,
  you cant really blame the framers.
• The transformed EC has proved to be a serviceable
  institution but is problematic in a number of
  ways.

10
Why the Electoral College is Good for Political
Science

• Moreover, the Electoral College is a terrific
  boon for political science research and teaching
  -- hence, my title (a play on the title of the
  Edwards book).
• the origins of the Electoral College and applied
  social theory
• unanticipated consequences in institutional
  design
• political strategy and institutional equilibrium
• voting power in weighted voting systems
• comparative institutional analysis
• individual voting power and the Electoral
  College
• election inversions
• Electoral College deadlock
• circumventing formal structure through commitment.

11
Problems with the EC in Practice

• It typically produces a disparity between popular
  and electoral vote proportions, which
• almost always exaggerates the winners margin,
  for example
• Popular Vote Electoral Vote
• 2008 Obama 53 365
• McCain 46 173
• But is this really a problem?

12
Problems with the EC in Practice (cont.)

• It disenfranchises voters in non-battleground
  states.
• On the other hand, are all voters
  disenfranchised in landslide elections?
• It produces a small state advantage resulting
  from the apportionment of electoral votes.
• Regardless of population, every state
• has two Senators, and
• at least one House seat, and therefore
• has at least three electoral votes.
• It produces a large state advantage resulting
  from the winner-take-all system (not fixed by the
  Constitution) in casting electoral votes.
• But can both of the problems be true?

13
Problems with the EC in Practice (cont.)

• An creates an incentive for disputes or fraud
  concerning vote counting in pivotal states,
• e.g., Florida in 2000.
• But with a close national popular vote, any such
  dispute would be nationwide.
• It tolerates an absence of national standards for
• voter qualifications,
• voter registration,
• voting technology,
• ballot access, etc.
• But imposing national standards might be
  controversial.
• It is subject to spoiler effects, so that
• the presence or absence of a third candidate who
  cannot win the election may tip the outcome
  between the two major candidates,
• e.g., Nader (and possibly Buchanan) in 2000.
• But in fact, every electoral system whatsoever is
  vulnerable in some degree to spoiler effects.

14
Problems with the EC in Practice (cont.)

• It can produces minority Presidents,
• who win less than a majority of the popular vote,
  but
• are elected on the basis winning a majority
  (270) of electoral votes, e.g.,
• Bush in 2000,
• Clinton in both 1996 and 1992,
• Nixon in 1968,
• Kennedy in 1960,
• Truman in 1948,
• Wilson in both 1916 and 1912.
• But many electoral systems do the equivalent.
• The British refer to such an effect as a
  manufactured majority.
• Every British election since WWII has produced a
  manufactured majority except the two (February
  1974 and May 2010) that did not produce any
  majority (that produced a hung Parliament),
  i.e.,
• in which the leading party held fewer than half
  the seats in House of Commons.

15
Problems with the EC in Practice (cont.)

• Most important, it produces election inversions
  (or reversals of winners, wrong winners, EC
  misfires, etc.) in which
• a candidate who wins less than a plurality of the
  popular vote
• is elected on the basis of electoral votes.
• Popular Vote Electoral Vote
• 2000 Bush (R) 47.87 271
• Gore (D) 48.38 267
• 1888 Harrison (R) 47.80
  233
• Cleveland (D) 48.63
  168
• 1876 Hayes (R) 51
  185
• Tilden (D) 48 184
• 1960(?) Kennedy (D) 49.464 (?)
  303
• Nixon (R) 49.548 (?) 219

16
Problems with the EC in Practice (cont.)

• The election inversion problem is usually
  regarded as the most serious flaw in the
  Electoral College.
• In fact, every districted electoral system is
  subject to election inversions.
• Election inversions occur in parliamentary
  systems as well as U.S. Presidential elections
  (but get less attention).
• Votes Seats
• UK 1951 Conservative 47.97 321
• Labour 48.78 295
• In fact, election inversions can occur under
  (list) proportional representation systems
• Netherlands 2010 VVDPVDCDA 49.55
  76
• All other parties 50.45
  74
• This coalition of parties actually formed the
  government.

17
Problems with Details of the EC

• Unpledged or faithless electors might determine
  the outcome of the election.
• But this is unlikely --- theyre looking for
  their 15 minutes of fame.
• State legislatures can manipulate the manner of
  selecting electors.
• Colorado Proposition 36 in 2004 (Democratic
  supported initiative)
• Republican efforts in CA in 2008 and PA in 2012
• If a state decides to select electors by
  district, the districts may be gerrymandered.
• A state legislature might decide to appoint
  electors.
• There is no constitutional right to vote for
  President (or even Presidential electors).
• The most problematic feature of the Electoral
  College is Contingent Procedure (when an election
  is thrown into the House).
• We have little understanding of how this would
  work in practice.
• State equality regardless of population appears
  to be unsupportable (especially today, e.g., CA
  vs. WY)
• A President would not be selected until about two
  weeks before Inauguration Day (if then).

18
Alternatives to the Existing Electoral College
System

• As we have noted, some changes in the EC system
  can by made by individual state legislatures,
• namely, how their electors are selected and thus
  how state electoral votes are cast
  (winner-take-all or otherwise).
• Other changes would require an amendment to the
  Constitution, e.g.,
• to change or abolish position of electors,
• change the apportionment of electors/electoral
  votes among the states, or
• abolish or change the contingent procedure.
• Of course, a constitutional amendment is also
  required to make nationally uniform changes in
  how electors are selected and electoral votes are
  cast.
• Congress cant direct change the EC by simple
  legislation however, it can
• change the size of the House or Representatives,
• admit new states (and thus increase the size of
  the Senate),
• both of which would change the size of the
  Electoral College and the magnitude of the small
  state advantage in the apportionment of electoral
  votes), and
• change the method of apportioning House seats
  among the states on the basis of the decennial
  census.

19
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)

• The Automatic Plan. Regularize the existing
  system by abolishing the position of elector
  while retaining electoral votes to be
  automatically awarded on a winner-take-all basis
  to the popular-vote winner in each state.
• This requires a U.S. constitutional amendment,
  which probably should abolish or revise the
  contingent procedure as well.
• The Pure District Plan. Select electors by
  plurality vote in single-member districts within
  states.
• This can be implemented on a state-by-state
  basis.
• But if it is effected by a constitutional
  amendment, it should probably revise the
  contingent procedure as well.
• The Modified District Plan. Select electors by
  plurality in the existing single-member
  Congressional Districts, with the two remaining
  (Senatorial) electors elected state-wide.
• This can be implemented on a state-by-state basis
  (as ME and NE have done).
• The Mundt-Coudert Plan proposed this as a
  constitutional amendment in the 1950s and in
  revised form in the 1960s.
• It modified the contingent procedure to a joint
  ballot of the whole Congress voting as
  individuals.

20
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)

• The (Pure) Proportional Plan. Award the
  electoral votes of each state to candidates
  precisely (out to three or more decimal places)
  in proportion to their popular votes within each
  state.
• Since fractional electoral votes would result,
  the office of elector would have to be abolished.
• This therefore requires a constitutional
  amendment, which should probably abolish or
  revise the contingent procedure as well.
• The Lodge-Gossett Plan proposed this as a
  constitutional amendment in the 1940s and 1950s,
• and it modified the contingent procedure to a
  joint ballot of the whole Congress voting as
  individuals.
• The Whole-Number Proportional Plan. Award the
  electoral votes of each state to candidates in
  whole numbers that are proportional as possible
  to their popular votes within the states.
• An established PR apportionment formula could be
  used.
• Since electors could be retained, this can be
  implemented on a state-by-state basis,
• e.g., Colorado Proposition 36 in 2004 (using an
  ad hoc PR formula).
• But if it is effected by a constitutional
  amendment, it should probably abolish or revise
  the contingent procedure as well,
• especially as minor candidate could more easily
  win electoral votes.

21
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)

• The National Bonus Plan. Retain the existing
  system (or use the Automatic Plan) but award an
  additional bonus of perhaps 102 electoral votes
  to the national popular vote plurality winner.
• This would require a U.S. constitutional
  amendment.
• Its obvious rationale is to preclude election
  inversions and it would effectively preclude the
  contingent procedure as well.
• Revision of Contingent Procedure. Many options
  exist, but these have received the most
  attention
• abolish the electoral vote majority requirement
  for election entirely, or
• reduce the majority requirement, and/or
• change the nature of the contingent procedure,
  i.e.,
• to election by a joint session of Congress,
  voting one-member, one-vote.
• But the problem of electoral vote ties (which
  also leads to the contingent procedure) remains
  so long as the number of electoral votes is even.
• The current problem was created by the 23rd
  Amendment giving DC three electoral votes
  (starting in 1964).

22
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)

• The Popular Vote Plan. Abolish the Electoral
  college in its entirety and hold a national
  direct popular election for President (and Vice
  President),
• with or without an runoff (instant or
  otherwise), and
• perhaps (if a runoff is used) using a 40 (rather
  than 50) quota for election in the first round.
• This would require a constitutional amendment.
• Such a national popular vote might/should entail
  national administration of Presidential (and
  Congressional, while were at it?) elections,
  including
• nationally uniform voter qualifications,
• national voter registration (and voter ID
  requirements,if any),
• nationally uniform ballot types and voting
  technology,
• nationally uniform rules for ballot access
  (listing of candidates), etc.

23
The National Popular Vote Plan
24
National Popular Vote Plan (cont.)

• This is a proposal to (in effect) enact a direct
  national popular election for President
• without using a constitutional amendment,
• which requires ratification by three-quarters of
  the states,
• and is therefore believed to be very difficult to
  obtain.
• Its starting point is the fact that, under the
  Constitution,
• state legislatures have sole power over how their
  Presidential electors are selected.

25
National Popular Vote Plan (cont.)

• NPVP proposes that states collectively
  controlling at least 270 electoral votes
• enter into an interstate compact
• that would commit them to select Presidential
  electors who would cast their electoral votes,
• not for the candidate who carries their state,
  but
• for the national popular vote winner.
• Note that national popular vote winner means
  plurality winner, so
• NPVP would also preclude the House contingent
  procedure
• barring a national popular vote tie.

26
Problems with the NPVP

• NPVP does not (and cannot) address the problems
  entailed by direct popular vote previously
  identified in particular,
• national rules for and administration of
  Presidential elections and
• runoff or related provisions
• There is no officially certified national
  popular vote winner.
• Would the compact hold, especially in the event
  of an extremely close/disputed (with respect to
  the national popular vote) election?
• In every election, some states in the compact
  would have to cast electoral votes for the
  candidate that lost the popular vote in that
  state.
• In some (close) elections, such electoral votes
  would be decisive.
• In particular, would the compact hold in the
  event that there would otherwise be an election
  inversion (the very event the NPVP is designed to
  preclude)?

27
Why Do We Have an Electoral College?

• The answer goes back to 1787 and the framing of
  the U.S. Constitution.
• The charge to the Constitutional Convention was
  to revise and strengthen the Articles of
  Confederation.
• Under the A of C, the only central government
  institution was Congress.
• Each state legislature appointed Congressional
  delegates.
• Each state delegation had one vote (the same rule
  was used in the Constitutional Convention).
• A 9/13 supra-majority was required for
  substantive matters.
• 13/13 unanimity was required to amend the A of C.
• Congress had very limited powers in particular,
• It could not lay and collect taxes, and
• It could not pass laws that directly exercised
  its powers.
• In both respects, Congress had to rely on the
  cooperation of state legislatures.
• There was no national executive or judiciary.

28
Why Do We Have an Electoral College? (cont.)

• The Constitution
• expanded the powers of Congress and
• allowed Congress to exercise its powers by
  passing laws that bound individuals directly, and
• that would be executed by a national executive
  (President), who also had other independent
  powers, and
• that would be enforced by a national court
  system.
• The executive (and judiciary) would also check
  and balance the naturally predominant
  legislature.

29
Designing The Original Electoral College

• Designing the mode of selecting the President was
  one of the most difficult tasks that confronted
  the framers.
• Their most famously difficult task was designing
  the scheme of representation for a new national
  legislature.
• The difficulty in the legislative case lay in the
  fact that most delegates knew what they wanted,
  but different delegates wanted different things
• small-state delegates wanted to preserve the
  principle of state equality, while
• large-state delegates wanted state representation
  proportional to state population (and/or wealth).
  
• In contrast, the difficulty in the executive case
  was that most delegates were not at all sure what
  they wanted,
• though the small-state versus big-state conflict
  remained a factor).

30
Designing The Original Electoral College

• The menu of options for Presidential selection
• Selection by states,
• But this would be too much like the Article
  Confederation
• Selection by the Congress,
• which was the default option found in both VA
  and NJ plans.
• But many feared it would make the President too
  dependent on and (if eligible for re-election)
  subservient to Congress.
• How would a bicameral Congress (as provided for
  by the Great Compromise) elect a President?
• House only
• Senate only
• concurrent ballot
• joint ballot
• Selection by some kind of popular election
• which presented many practical difficulties.
• Some kind of mixed system, which might
  distinguish between
• a first round of selection (nomination) and
• a second round of selection (election or
  runoff), and
• might use intermediate electors.

31
Designing The Original EC (cont.)

• The perceived advantages of an Electoral College
  of intermediate electors
• unlike Congress, the EC would perform a single
  task i.e., cast votes for President -- and
  would then disband, so
• the President would be subservient to neither
  Congress nor the Electoral College and
• unlike popular election, the EC
• avoided difficult questions about the extent of
  suffrage, and
• allowed a compromise between the large vs. small
  states through its fine details, and
• and public opinion could be informed and refined
  through representation.
• Since legislative election was the default
  choice, it is more accurate to say the framers
  settled on the EC
• as an alternative to legislative election, rather
  than
• as an alternative to popular election.

32
The Original Electoral College Rules

• Each state selects a number of electors equal
  in number to its total (House Senate)
  representation in Congress (H 2).
• The legislature of each state determines the mode
  of selection of the electors from its state, the
  most likely options being
• Election/appointment by the legislature itself,
• popular election from districts, and
• popular election on a state-wide general ticket.
• Congress has the power to determine
• when electors are selected, and
• when electors cast their votes (which must be the
  same day for all states).
• Originally, Congress gave the states a window of
  about 30 days within which to select electors.

33
The Original Electoral College (cont.)

• The Electoral College never meets as a group in
  one place.
• Rather electors meet and vote in their own state
  capitals
• Electors were originally required to
• cast two votes for two different candidates,
• at least one of whom had to be a resident of
  another state,
• In effect, electors could vote for one favorite
  son but were required also vote for at least one
  national candidate.
• Once cast, the electoral votes are each are
  transmitted to Congress,
• to be counted before a joint session presided
  over by the President of the Senate (Vice
  President of U.S.).
• To be elected by the Electoral College, a
  candidate was originally required to receive
• votes from a majority of electors and
• more votes than any other candidate.
• Given this double vote system, these requirements
  were logically distinct.
• In particular, more that one candidate could
  receive the required majority.

34
The Original Electoral College (cont.)

• If no candidate met both requirements, the
  election would be thrown into the House of
  Representatives.
• The House chooses
• between the two (or more) tied candidates, in the
  event both (or all) received votes from a
  majority of electors, or
• (in the original EC) among the top five
  candidates, in the event no candidate received
  votes from a majority of electors.
• Voting in the House is by state delegation, with
  each delegation casting one vote.
• Balloting continues until some candidate is
  supported by a majority of state delegations.

35
The Fatal Flaw in the Original Electoral College

• However, the Committee was concerned that some
  electors might throw away their second votes.
• It believed a second office had to be at stake to
  induce electors to take their second votes
  seriously.
• For this reason (only), it proposed the office of
  Vice President.
• The Vice Presidency was introduced only for the
  sake of a valuable mode of election which
  required two to be chosen at the same time,
• which largely explains the awkward and largely
  impotent place this office occupies in the
  overall constitutional scheme.
• This turned out to be a miscalculation that
  produced a fatal flaw in the original EC,
• and created what historian Richard McCormick has
  called a hazardous game of Presidential
  selection.

36
The Electoral College An Example

• THE ORIGINAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE BEFORE THE 12th
  AMENDMENT AND USING THE PROVISIONAL APPORTIONMENT
  OF HOUSE SEATS
• House Size 65
• Number of Electors 65 (2 13) 91
• Number of Electoral Votes 2 91 182
• Maximum Vote Any Candidate Can Receive 91 (one
  vote from every elector)
• Required Majority 46 (one vote from a majority
  of electors)
• If no one gets 46 votes or if there is a tie
  among those who do
• Required Vote in House 7
• In any event, the runner-up becomes Vice
  President
• Note these numbers were never actually used.

37
Expectations Concerning the Original EC

• This original Electoral College system was
  designed to operate in a non-partisan
  environment.
• It therefore was expected that
• typically there would be many potential
  Presidential candidates,
• who would not declare themselves as such, let
  alone actively campaign for the office, and
• electors would choose among these candidates on
  the basis of their character and connections, not
  party affiliation or policy promises.
• Therefore, it was also expected that electoral
  votes would be widely scattered and the House
  contingent procedure would be used 19 times out
  of 20 (George Masons estimate), so
• big states would have the dominant role in
  screening/nominating candidates (in the EC),
  while
• small states would have equal role in most
  final/runoff elections (in the House).

38
Expectations Concerning the EC (cont.)

• However, James Madison (a big-state advocate)
  thought/hoped that big state electors would
  coordinate their electoral votes so as to keep
  the election out of the House (where small states
  would have the advantage).
• Madison, not Mason, was correct in his
  expectation, but not for the reason he gave.
• It was generally hoped and expected that electors
  would typically be
• popularly elected
• from single-member districts (like most state
  legislators, delegates to the state ratifying
  conventions, members of the British House of
  Commons, and as was expected also for members of
  the new U.S. House) and
• that they would be well-informed local notables
  who would act as representative trustees of their
  states and districts.

39
The Hazardous Game President Selection under the
Original Electoral College

• There were problems from the very start.
• From the outset, electors and those who selected
  them (and most everyone else) thought of a
  presidential election, not as an occasion to cast
  two votes for two worthy presidential candidates,
  but as an occasion to elect a Presidential-Vice
  Presidential ticket.
• In the very first election of 1789, it was
  generally agreed that
• George Washington should be the first President,
  and
• John Adams should be the first Vice President.
• Most or all electors were expected to cast one
  vote for Washington and one vote for Adams.

40
The Hazardous Game (cont.)

• But this expectation was precarious
• If just one elector were to cast one vote for
  Adams and one vote for anybody but Washington,
  Adams would be elected President and Washington
  would be relegated to the Vice Presidency.
• On the other hand, if every elector did in fact
  cast one vote for Washington and one for Adams,
  there would be an electoral vote tie, sending the
  election to the House.
• Indeed, Alexander Hamilton (who disliked Adams)
  was afraid that some New England electors would
  withhold votes from Washington, thereby making
  Adams president.
• In anticipation of this, he urged some other
  electors to withhold votes from Adams.
• In fact, all electors voted for Washington but
  quite a few did not vote for Adams,
• so in fact the agreed upon ticket was elected.

41

• The Election of 1789
• Not literally unanimous
• Double-vote system
• NC and RI had not yet ratified
• NY failed to cast electoral votes
• Scattering of second votes
• Fears that northerners wanted to make Adams
  President

42
The Election of 1792

• We see beginnings of the Federalist-Republican
  two-party system in the second (Vice
  Presidential) votes

43
Schattschneiders Law

• The framers expectations did not anticipate the
  development of a national two-party system.
• Schattschneiders Law if you create a large
  popularly elected legislative body,
• party caucuses will arise in the legislature, and
  
• political parties will develop in the electorate.
  
• Caucuses and parties are organized attempts to
  win by concentrating votes (through a bloc vote
  in the legislature or nominating process in
  elections) on a few motions or candidates,
• They arise because ambitious politicians find it
  expedient to conspire with others to win these
  contests.

44
Duvergers Law

• Duvergers Law If you have single-winner
  elections, you get (in equilibrium) two political
  parties, i.e.,
• two rival organized attempts, each trying to
  concentrate votes on a single candidate.
• Conversely, parliamentary systems using
  proportional representation in large districts
  tend to produce and sustain multi-party systems.
• In part, Duvergers Law is driven by strategic
  (or tactical) voting by ordinary voters who are
  reluctant to waste their votes by voting for
  third candidates/parties that have no real chance
  of winning.

45
Duvergers Law (cont.)

• In much greater part, Duvergers Law is driven by
  the strategic calculations of ambitious
  candidates and parties.
• If a party splits and runs two (more or less
  clone) candidates, they will be spoilers against
  each other and throw the election to the other
  party.
• This prospect of electoral disaster creates a
  huge incentive for even a highly factionalized
  party to unite behind a single candidate.
• Conversely, if there are three significant
  candidates or parties are contesting an election,
  there is a huge incentive for two of them to
  make deal under which one makes a strategic
  withdrawal in favor of the other (in return for
  something).
• In general, each party in a competitive two-party
  system has a huge incentive to remain united and
  not split into rival factions that run candidates
  in general elections.
• With respect to the Electoral College system,
  Duvergers Law implies that (contrary to the
  Framers expectations) the House contingent
  procedure will be bypassed at least 19 times out
  of 20.

46
The Hazardous Game1796

• The first contested Presidential election
• Federalists John Adams (MA) Thomas Pickney
  (SC)
• Republicans Thomas Jefferson (VA) Aaron Burr
  (NY)
• They were nominated by their respective
  Congressional Caucuses.
• Note the regionally (North South) balanced
  tickets.
• Each party nominated elector candidates pledged
  to vote their partys candidates.
• Intra-Federalist maneuvering
• Hamilton (continuing to feud with Adams)
  unsuccessfully urged some Southern electors to
  vote for Pickney anybody but Adams
• However, some Northern electors learned about
  this and withheld votes from Pickney.
• The electoral vote outcome was very close
• Federalists won 71 electors, all of whom voted
  for Adams, giving Adams the required majority of
  70 for election as President.
• Republicans won 68 electors, all of whom voted
  for Jefferson.
• But the withholding of second votes from Pickney
  lowered his vote total to 59, dropping him to
  third place behind Jefferson,
• So the defeated Republican Presidential candidate
  became Vice President.
• Burr won only 30 votes.

47
The Election of 1796 (cont.)Electors 138
Electoral votes 276, Required majority 70
48
The Election of 1796 (cont.)

• Sectionalism is evident, despite the sectionally
  balanced tickets.
• Many states did not select electors by popular
  vote.
• Most state electoral votes are cast
  winner-take-all.

49
Lessons from the Hazardous Game

• Electors are expected to be party men,
• i.e., pledged electors.
• However, Samuel Miles (Fed., PA) violated his
  pledge (first faithless elector).
• An angry Federalist supporter complained What,
  do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me
  whether John Adams or Thomas shall be President?
  No! I chuse him to act, not to think.
• State legislative elections (perhaps coming a
  year or more in advance of Presidential
  elections), become very important for politicians
  with national ambitions, because
• legislatures chose how to select electors and may
  change the method from election to election and
• legislatures may choose to appoint the electors
  themselves.

50
Lessons from the Hazardous Game (cont.)

• A party that controls a state legislature may not
  want to risk a popular election for electors.
• States using legislative election increased to 10
  in 1800.
• And if a controlling party is confident it can
  win popular election, the particular mode of
  popular election can be manipulated (e.g., to
  winner-take-all) to short-term party advantage.
• Jefferson to Monroe (1800)
• All agree that an election by districts would be
  best if it could be general, but while ten states
  choose either by their legislatures or by a
  general ticket, it is folly or worse for the
  other six not to follow.

51
The Hazardous Game 1800

• Largely a repeat of 1796
• same candidates (except one Pickney replaced by
  another) and
• same battle lines.
• However, the strategic implications of the EC
  rules were (even) better understood
• manipulation of elector selection and
• danger of withholding too many votes.
• The election of 1800 was as close as 1796 but
  tipped the other way.
• Republicans won 73 electors vs. 65 for
  Federalists.
• The Republicans (unlike the Federalists) failed
  to withhold one Vice Presidential electoral
  vote.
• Jefferson 73
• Burr 73
• Adams 65
• Pickney 64
• Jay 1

52
(No Transcript)
53
The Hazardous Game 1800 (cont.)

• But the original EC rules did not distinguish
  between Presidential vs. Vice-Presidential
  electoral votes.
• So the election was thrown into House, under
  the contingent procedure,
• choosing between the tied candidates Jefferson
  and Burr only.
• Burr did not chose to withdraw.
• Four electoral votes from GA had been improperly
  certified but the intent of the voters was
  clear (four votes for each of Jefferson and
  Burr).
• Had they been disqualified as invalid, no
  candidate would have received the required 70
  electoral votes, in which case
• the House could have chosen any of the five
  candidates as President.
• But Vice President Jefferson, presiding over the
  counting of electoral votes, counted himself
  and Burr in.
• Note that the single Federalist elector who voted
  for Adams and Jay could have voted for Adams and
  Burr,
• in which case Burr would have immediately been
  elected President on the basis of electoral votes
  (with no House election) and
• Jefferson would have remained Vice President.

54
The Hazardous Game 1800 (cont.)

• Until 20th Amendment (1933), a newly elected
  Congress did not convene until late in the year
  following Congressional elections.
• So the 1800 Presidential election was thrown into
  the lame duck House elected in 1798, which was
  still controlled by the Federalists (55-50),
  though Republicans controlled the House elected
  in 1800.
• There were 16 state delegations, so 10 votes were
  required for election.
• Each delegation would decide how to vote by
  majority vote within the delegation.
• Republicans controlled 8 state delegations.
• Federalists controlled 6 state delegations.
• Two state delegation were equally split.
• Evidently, all Republican representatives
  supported Jefferson as the intended Presidential
  candidate.
• Likewise, all Federalist representatives
  supported Burr, in order to deny the presidency
  to more formidable Jefferson.
• The two internally tied delegations had to
  abstain.
• For 35 ballots, the House deadlocked Jefferson 8
  and Burr 6 with 2 abstentions.
• Ultimately, the four Federalists within in the
  tied delegations abstained, resulting in
  Jeffersons election on the 36th ballot.

55
Contingent Procedure in the House, 1801
56
The 12th Amendment

• After the 1800 fiasco, Congress proposed, and the
  states quickly ratified (in time for 1804
  election), the 12th Amendment to the
  Constitution.
• Electors now cast separate (single) votes for
  President and Vice President.
• The required electoral vote majority for
  President (and for Vice President) is a simple
  majority of votes cast ( number of electors),
  which at most one candidate can achieve.
• If no candidate receives the required simple
  majority for President, the House (still voting
  by state delegations) chooses from among the top
  three vs. top five candidates.
• If no candidate receives the required majority
  for Vice President, the Senate (voting
  individually) chooses from among the top two
  candidates.
• Early drafts of the amendment included a
  requirement that electors be popularly elected
  from districts, but this provision was later
  dropped.
• The 12th Amendment remains the constitutional
  language governing Presidential elections.

57
The Transformation of the Electoral College

• By the 1830s, the Electoral College, already
  formally modified by the 12th Amendment, had been
  further transformed into the kind of
  (essentially) automatic popular vote counting
  system that exists today.
• This transformation
• was driven largely by the development of a
  two-party system, and
• was brought about without any further
  constitutional amendments or (with one minor
  exception) change in federal law,
• but rather by changes in state laws and party
  practice.

58
Elements of the Transformation (cont.)

• In early elections, the mode of selecting
  Presidential electors was regularly manipulated
  by party politicians in each state, on the basis
  of partisan calculations.
• By 1832, Presidential electors were almost
  universally selected by popular (vs. legislative)
  vote (and by much expanded electorates).
• South Carolina was the lone hold out.
• By 1836, the mode of popular election in every
  state was (following Jeffersons strategic
  advice) the general ticket (or party slate),
  rather than election from districts (or by some
  kind of proportional representation).
• This induced the almost universal
  winner-take-all rule for the casting electoral
  votes at the state level.
• However, at the present time two small states (ME
  and NE) use the Modified District Plan.

59
Mode of Elector Selection
60
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)

• Why were state legislatures willing to give up
  the power to select Presidential electors?
• The intensity of party competition declined after
  1800.
• There was a minor split in Democratic-Republican
  ranks in 1812.
• DeWitt Clinton sought the Presidency as an
  Independent Democratic-Republic and was
  endorsed by the Federalists.
• Democrats did the same in 1872 when Horace
  Greeley ran as a Liberal Republican.
• Legislative appointment of electors was
  disrupting state legislative elections.
• cf. the willingness of state legislatures to
  ratify the 17th Amendment (popular election of
  U.S. Senators)

61
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)

• Why were state legislatures willing to give up
  the power to select Presidential electors?
• The intensity of party competition declined after
  1800.
• Legislative appointment of electors was
  disrupting state legislative elections.
• cf. the willingness of state legislatures to
  ratify the 17th Amendment (popular election of
  U.S. Senators)
• Why did election of electors by districts give
  way to election of electors at-large (usually on
  a slate or general ticket)?
• Partisan strategic considerations,
• as expressed by Jefferson to Monroe in 1800.
• More important state strategic considerations.
• No matter what other states may do, each state
  could enhance its influence in Presidential
  politics by casting electoral votes on a
  winner-take-all basis.
• There is no equilibrium until all states use
  the winner-take-all method.
• It turns out that this equilibrium results in a
  new balance of Electoral College voting power
  that is more favorable to the large states, more
  than counterbalancing the small-state advantage
  in apportionment of electoral votes.

62
Winner-Take-All

• Most states use a general ticket system in which
  votes chose among party slates of elector
  candidates.
• Vote for one slate of
  electors
• Democratic electors
• Republican electors
• Minor party electors
• This effectively guarantees that a states
  electoral votes are cast winner-take-all.
• However, earlier in some states electors ran as
  individuals on a generalized plurality basis.
• Vote for no more than four elector candidates
• D1 R1
• D2 R2
• D3 R3
• D4 R4
• Typically almost every voter would vote for all
  Democratic elector candidates or all Republican
  elector candidate, again producing a
  winner-take-result.

63
Almost Winner-Take-All

• However, when the Presidential contest within the
  state was very close, small discrepancies among
  the votes for elector candidates might produce a
  divided electoral vote
• D1 93,456 R1 91,993
• D2 93,381 R2 91,553
• D3 92,358 R3 90,852
• D4 91,679 R4 90,761
• In this case, the electoral vote would be divided
  3 for the Democratic ticket and 1 for the
  Republican ticket.
• By convention, the popular vote for President
  in this state would be recorded as
• Democratic ticket 93,456
• Republican ticket 91,993

64
Bypassing the Contingent Procedure

• Given a two-party system accommodated by the 12th
  Amendment, it is virtually assured that one or
  other Presidential (and Vice Presidential)
  candidate will receive the required majority of
  electoral votes.
• Thus Madison hope to keep the election out of the
  House is realized,
• not by coordination among the big states, but
• by coordination (a nominating process) within
  each of two political parties.
• In this way, the Electoral College system was
  transformed into something in two ways more
  favorable to large states than the Framers
  expected, i.e.,
• not only do large states gain more power in the
  first (electoral vote) stage (due to
  winner-take-all electoral votes), but also
• the second (House contingent election stage)
  stage (where small states have equal power) is
  almost always bypassed.

65
Inverse Duvergers Law and the Election of 1824

• The inverse of Duvergers Law implies that
• if one of the parties in a two-party system is
  greatly weakened, or is unable or unwilling to
  compete for votes effectively,
• the dominant party is very likely to break apart,
  because the external threat that otherwise keeps
  it together is removed.
• The election of 1824 (the second and last time an
  election was thrown into the House) is the
  exception that proved the rule that a two-party
  system bypasses the contingent procedure.
• The Federalist Party had collapsed and the
  Democratic-Republican Party was unchallenged.
• Consequently there was no longer pressure for
  D-Rs to unite behind a single Presidential-Vice
  Presidential ticket.
• Four candidates, all nominally belonging to the
  same D-R party, sought the Presidency.
• Unsurprisingly, no candidate received a majority
  of the electoral votes and the election was
  thrown into the House.

66
The Election 1824 (cont.)

• The four candidates were
• John Quincy Adams (Secretary of State)
• Henry Clay (U.S. Representative and Speaker)
• William Crawford (Secretary of the Treasury)
• Andrew Jackson (hero of the Battle of New
  Orleans and representative of the common
  man)
• Presidential election results (first
  round)
• Electoral Votes
  Popular Votes
• Jackson 99 41
• Adams 84 31
• Crawford 41 11
• Clay 37 13
• Others 0
  4
• Bear in mind that six states still appointed
  electors and that states that used popular
  election varied considerably with respect to the
  extent of franchise.

67
The Election of 1824 (cont.)

• The compromise candidate Clay (most everyones
  second choice, who probably could have defeated
  each other candidate in a straight fight) was
  squeezed out of third place in the electoral vote
  ranking by Crawford.
• Under the 12th Amendment, the House could chose
  only from among top three candidates.
• Clay probably would have been elected president
• if the House could still chose among the top five
  candidates or
• if Crawford had not been a candidate (i.e.,
  Crawford was a spoiler to Clay).
• Even if Adams or Jackson h