Demilitarisation of

1
Demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier 
Implementing and Monitoring the Process

• Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, IA (Retd.)
• Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New
  Delhi
• Visiting Senior Fellow, South Asian Strategic
  Stability Institute, London
• (A joint project with Brig Asad Hakeem, PA
  (Retd.) at CMC, 2005)

2
The Project Investigated Modalities for
Demilitarisation of the Siachen Conflict Zone

• Assumption Some form of political consensus
  will eventually be reached and the project
  focuses on the operational modalities and
  monitoring necessary to implement military
  disengagement
• Questions to be addressed
• What steps would constitute a practical and
  feasible disengagement process?
• What would be a viable time frame for
  demilitarization?
• What concept of unilateral or cooperative
  monitoring is likely to be acceptable to both
  India and Pakistan?
• Which current and future monitoring technologies
  and procedures can assist in the verification of
  demilitarisation?

3
Military Operations in the Siachen Conflict Zone

• Troops are arrayed along the Saltoro Range
  Indian troops are at advantageous positions
• Posts are typically manned by 6 18 troops
• Fire support and logistics camps are farther back
• Troops rotate between camps from low to high
  altitude and back
• The highest posts are over 20,000 feet
• Troops serve 1 to 3 months at the posts

Pakistani Forward Post and Artillery Position
Photographs used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
4
Operational Constraints on Siachen

• Operations are constrained by
• Terrain
• Altitude
• Climate
• Lack of navigable routes
• Acclimatisation to high altitudes is critical to
  survival
• A minimum of 48 to 72 hours needed per phase
• Phase I 9000 12000 feet
• Phase II 12000 15000 feet
• Phase III 15000 18000 feet
• Acclimatisation above 18000 feet is extremely
  difficult
• Attempts to operate without acclimatisation
  usually lead to pulmonary and cerebral oedema
• Need for acclimatisation makes it difficult to
  maintain reserves and impossible to send
  reinforcements from outside

5
Logistics are key to military operations in
Siachen

• Each side has road-served base camps that serve
  as logistics centers.

Pakistans Goma Base
Indias Dzingrulma Base Camp
Images from the Quickbird commercial satellite
6
Kumar Base serves as the forward Indian logistics
centre on the Glacier
Camp III on path from Base Camp to Kumar
Base Photo by Teru Kuwayama, Outside Magazine
Kumar Base Photo by Indian Air Force
7
Siachen logistics - transportation

• All supply to forward areas is done by aircraft,
  jeep, pack animal, or porter
• Fixed-wing aircraft and large helicopters drop
  supplies with parachutes only limited air
  operations possible in the winter
• Light helicopters used for evacuation carrying
  small loads to forward posts
• India has longer supply routes and relies more on
  aircraft for supply

Photographs used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
8
Summer is the critical period for logistics

• Supply caches are built on approaches to the
  Saltoro during the summer months for use during
  winter winter stocking
• Indian supply route from railheads at Pathankot
  and Jammu by truck through Srinagar, Kargil, to
  Partapur or Leh and then to the base camp at
  Dzingrulma.
• Fixed wing aircraft and large helicopters based
  at Thoise and Leh
• Pakistan supply route Skardu by road through
  the Shigar Valley to Askole (northern sector) and
  to Dansam and Goma (central and southern sectors)
• Helicopters are based at Skardu
• At base camps, supplies are broken into smaller
  loads for pack animal, porter, soldier, and light
  helicopter
• Units are rotated during summer months

9
Indias Strategic Perspective on the Conflict

• Pakistan illegally transferred 5,180 square km of
  territory just north of the Siachen area to China
  in March 1963
• Although the demarcated LOC ends at NJ 9842, by
  the late 1970s Pakistani maps began showing the
  LOC running in a northeasterly direction from NJ
  9842 towards the Karakoram Pass the Indian
  government called this cartographic aggression
• At the same time, Pakistan began issuing permits
  to international mountaineering expeditions to
  enter the Siachen area
• India occupied the Siachen Glacier in April 1983
  to pre-empt its occupation by the Pakistan army
• After the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Indian MoD
  finds it difficult to accept verbal Pakistani
  assurances that they will not occupy posts
  vacated by the Indian Army - joint physical
  demarcation of the present positions is
  considered essential

10
Pakistans Strategic Perspective on the Conflict

• The Indian occupation of Siachen is perceived as
  a major act of aggression and a violation of the
  1972 Shimla Agreement
• Pakistan had de facto control prior to 1984 based
  on
• Statements in 1960s by Indian PM Nehru
• Official Indian protests to China relative to
  their border dispute
• Orientation of glaciers between NJ 9842 and the
  Karakoram Pass
• Representation of the LoC past NJ 9842 in
  international maps and atlases
• There have been Pakistanis on expeditions to the
  area since 1962
• The line joining NJ 9842 and KKP is cartographic
  expression not aggression
• India uses negotiations to delay and deflect
  international pressure
• The dispute in Kashmir is not over territory but
  the right of self determination for Kashmiris

11
Outline of the Approach to Demilitarisation

• Formalise the Cease-fire understanding
• Establish communication links between Pakistani
  and Indian brigade HQs (Khapalu/Skardu and
  Partapur) and Division HQs (Gilgit and Leh)
• Establish a core Uninhabited Zone around
  Siachen and the Saltoro Range
• No permanent residents
• Environmental restoration work permitted
• International scientific research permitted
• Licensed mountaineering expeditions permitted
• Establish a Civilian Zone adjacent to the
  Uninhabited Zone
• Only civilian residents and their routine
  activities permitted
• Establish a Joint Liaison and Monitoring Center
  (JMC) where the LOC crosses the Shyok River (near
  Chalunka)
• Monitoring will focus on military logistics and
  access
• Augment Demilitarized Zone (DMZ-2) around NJ 9842
  later

12
Schedule for Disengagement

• Operational principles
• Establish a Joint Working Group chaired by the
  DGMOs with meetings at the Wagah border crossing
• Implement disengagement from higher to lower
  positions
• Must accept variability in process due to
  changeable weather conditions
• Weather forces disengagement to be conducted
  during the summer season (May September)
• Time frame
• Brig Hakeems view 1 season
• Take full advantage of political will to ensure
  irreversibility
• Brig Kanwals view 2 seasons
• India has more infrastructure and longer
  distances to travel

13
Disengagement Phases

• Phase 1 Withdraw medium artillery located near
  Base Camps (e.g., Dzingrulma, Gyari)
• Phases 2 4 Withdraw troops from Northern,
  Central, and Southern battalion sub-sectors,
  respectively
• Forward posts, including crew-served weapons
  posts
• Declare camps where troops from forward positions
  can concentrate
• Dismantle camps after withdrawal
• Phase 5 Withdraw from forward logistics camps on
  or near the Glacier
• Phase 6 Dismantle logistics camps
• Phase 7 Withdraw from base camps
• Phase 8 Dismantle or convert base camps to
  scientific/civil use

14
Map of the Conceptual Demilitarized Zone

• Demilitarized Zone Uninhabited Zone (UZ)
  Civilian Zone (CZ)
• DMZ is without prejudice to Pak-China border
  agreement and Indias position thereon
• DMZ does not affect Indias current patrolling in
  the area under its control

UZ
CZ
DMZ-2
CZ
15
Two phases of monitoring are necessary

• Phase 1 Monitoring disengagement during the
  establishment of the DMZ
• Verify that posts, logistics centers, and base
  camps vacated
• Phase 2 Post-disengagement monitoring of the
  DMZ
• Verify that military personnel and equipment have
  not re-entered the DMZ
• The primary monitoring mechanism will be
  bilateral and cooperative
• India has historically rejected third party
  participation
• Unilateral monitoring by national technical
  means will continue

16
Monitoring Disengagement

• Goal is to verify withdrawal and dismantlement of
  military facilities
• Visual The withdrawal from Indian and Pakistani
  posts within line of sight of each other is to be
  coordinated so each side can observe activities
  of the other. Ammunition and heavy weapons which
  cannot be moved will be destroyed in-place.
• Joint Aerial Reconnaissance A pair Indian and
  Pakistani helicopters rendezvous at an agreed
  location and then fly together along the Forward
  Battle Positions in the agreed sector to visually
  verify and photographically record withdrawal and
  dismantlement of post or logistics camp.
• On-site inspection Both sides have the right to
  request that its representative land by
  helicopter a at a location to confirm withdrawal
  and dismantlement.
• Unilateral activities Both sides should agree
  not to interfere with the others national
  technical means

17
Long-term Monitoring of the DMZ

• Goal of detecting illicit re-occupation of
  positions within the DMZ
• Monitoring considerations
• Nothing happens fast on Siachen logistics and
  weather drive everything
• The possibility of a quick stealthy reoccupation,
  absent an air bridge, is remote
• Aerial operations are obvious
• Small-scale intrusions are neither significant
  nor sustainable
• Monitoring should focus on logistics
• All Indian logistics flows through Dzingrulma
• Pakistani logistics has multiple paths through
  civilian villages

Photograph used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
18
Potential Access Control Point India

• Bridge crossing near Chumikchan on the road to
  Dzingrulma

Quickbird commercial satellite image
19
Potential Access Control Point - Pakistan

• The road junction at Dansam includes supply
  routes to central and southern sectors

Quickbird commercial satellite image
20
Remote Monitoring of Access Control Points

• Sensor-activated video camera transmits images of
  activity to the Joint Monitoring Center
• Solar-powered system with satellite communication
• Less intrusiveness than manned presence
• System records activity in/out of DMZ and
  identifies military activity
• Milder climate at lower elevations enables
  maintenance

Example of prototype camera system and microwave
sensor
21
Aerial / Satellite Monitoring

• Commercial satellite imagery is an objective way
  to detect large and medium size construction
  activities
• Coverage every 3 4 days
• Aerial Monitoring
• Conduct regularly scheduled overflights (paired
  aircraft or joint crew) of the UZ using video and
  thermal imaging cameras
• Hand-held thermal imagers have been used
  successfully in aerial search and rescue missions
• Option to request unscheduled flight to resolve
  questions of compliance that may arise

Hand-held Agema 550 thermal imager
Helicopter-mounted L3 Communications thermal
imager
22
On-site Inspections

• On-site inspection of dismantlement or conversion
  of military facilities in CZ
• Some Pakistani organizations/facilities support
  the local population
• Base camps on both sides can support scientific
  activities
• Resident observers may be maintained at some
  locations such as base camps
• Precedents in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
  Treaty inspections

23
Post-Disengagement Activities in Siachen UZ

• Establishment of a Siachen Science Center
• Center would serve international and regional
  science objectives
• International civilian staffing
• Environmental restoration of the Siachen Glacier
• Waste poses long-term threat to both countries
  through the shared Indus River watershed
• Bio-degradation is very slow in this climate
• International material aid likely required UNEP
  could coordinate
• A long-term remediation effort is necessary
• Indian Army conducted a study of waste on the
  Siachen Glacier
• 41,000 tons of solid waste
• Fuel spills
• Human and food waste
• Unexploded ordnance

24
Siachen DisengagementThe Precedent of Chumik
Glacier Disengagement

• Situation developed in April 1989
• Indian Army dumped supplies and established base
  camps for approach to Naveed peak
• A race for the top ensued
• Flag meetings held on May 6, 13 and 20 1989
• Agreement in principle achieved on May 13
• Successful withdrawal began on May 21
• Agreement holds to date

Chumik Glacier Naveed Peak
25
Conclusions and Observations

• Political will and innovative approaches are
  necessary to end the conflict on Siachen
• Disengagement is operationally feasible
• The Siachen Working Group needs to agree on
  options for disengagement and monitoring
  mechanisms

26
Conclusions and Observations

• The post-disengagement use of the Uninhabited
  Zone should be devoted to international
  scientific and mountaineering activities
• Post-conflict assessment and cleanup is needed
  the UN Environment Programme could help
• A joint India-Pakistan request is necessary
• Disengagement in the Siachen Conflict Zone will
  serve as a precedent for the entire LOC

27

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

28

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Pakistan Army must accept the reality on ground.
• Need for reference/ start point from which to
  begin implementation of agreement.
• Vital if agreement fails at a future date.

29

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• India could unilaterally hand over signed
  (high-resolution) annotated satellite photos of
  current Army positions of both sides on the AGPL
  to Pakistan.
• These could be combined with recent aerial
  photos.
• India could even consider sending copies of such
  photos to the UN Secretary General.

30

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• Pakistani View
• No desire to occupy Saltoro and subject
  Pakistani troops to adverse conditions that
  Indian troops have endured for two decades after
  it is vacated.
• If India does not wish to demilitarise, Pakistan
  Army is happy to let Indian Army sit there six
  to eight battalions are not available to India
  for internal security duties heavy annual
  expenditure.
• Indian View Post-Kargil conflict and in view of
  Gen Musharrafs book, Pakistan cannot be trusted.

31

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• Pakistani View
• No desire to occupy Saltoro and subject
  Pakistani troops to adverse conditions that
  Indian troops have endured for two decades after
  it is vacated.
• If India does not wish to demilitarise, Pakistan
  Army is happy to let Indian Army sit there six
  to eight battalions are not available to India
  for internal security duties heavy annual
  expenditure.
• Indian View Post-Kargil conflict and in view f
  Gen Musharrafs book, Pakistan cannot be trusted.

Pakistans sincerity is still doubted in India
they do not trust India either.
32

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Clearly state Indias right to open another
  front if the demilitarisation agreement is
  betrayed. (Skardu? Several other military
  options.)
• India could withdraw all pol-eco concessions,
  break diplomatic ties and threaten to walk out of
  treaties like Indus Waters Treaty begin work on
  Kishanganga hydel project.
• Squeeze Pakistan economically.
• Pakistan will be condemned as an international
  pariah.

33

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation?
• Or, will it be seen to be a sell out a
  political albatross?
• Nation ready for demilitarisation of Siachen.
• PM must seize political initiative and provide
  leadership to seek consensus.
• Perhaps a trade off with other sensitive issues
  is possible. Sir Creek?

34

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

Conflict has not paid dividends.
35

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

Its time to give peace a chance.
36

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

And, be prepared for the worst.
37

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

A resurgent India can take calculated risks and
afford to be magnanimous.
38

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

• Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
  AGPL justified?
• Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
  alternatives?
• Can Pakistan be trusted?
• What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
  occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date?
• Can a national consensus be built on
  demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
  sell out a political albatross?

Demilitarisation of Siachen is an idea whose time
has come.
39
(No Transcript)
40
Satellite Mosaic of the Siachen Area
Defence L ine