Abstracting Trusted Flow Architecture

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Abstracting Trusted Flow Architecture

• Davide DAprile Daniele Mazzocchi
• Istituto Superiore Mario Boella
• daprile, mazzocchi_at_ismb.it
• IP-Flow Kickoff Meeting 2004

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Overview

• Abstracting Run-Time Environment
• Trusted Flow Application Developer Kit
• Formalizing Trusted Flow Architecture

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Abstracting Run-Time Environment

• It would be very interesting to free the Trusted
  Flow Architecture (TFA) from any particular
  programming language
• Some Run-Time Environments (RTE) allow to access
  the application (process) codeOther RTEs dont
• Lets build an interface!!!

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Abstracting Run-Time Environment(contd)
RTE
RTE Trusted Flow Enabled (RTE-TFE)
RAM
RAM
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Abstracting Run-Time Environment(contd)

• Which operations should this RTE-TFE give us?
• getValue()
• getCode()
• insertCode()
• deleteCode()
• startProcess()
• stopProcess()
• killProcess()

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Abstracting Run-Time Environment(contd)

• Is any operation redundant?
• Is any operation not necessary?
• Is the set under-specified?
• May beor not
• However, now, it is possible to start design
  activities, abstrating what today RTEs allow us
• What we dont have get today, well get it
  tomorrow!

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Trusted Flow ApplicationDeveloper Kit

• Lets identify architecture main modules
• Provide them with well defined interfaces
• Arrange them in a well-defined protocol stack
• So we are providing a TFADK

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Trusted Flow ApplicationDeveloper Kit (contd)

• Thinking about a Trusted Flow Enabled TCP/IP
  stack

Checked Side Appl.
TFE-RTE
Checker Side Appl.
Checked Side Modules
Checker Side Modules
TCP/IP stack
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FormalizingTrusted Flow Architecture

• Goals I Formal Specification
• Using UML (semi-formal notation) to instantiate a
  TFA (design code phases)
• UML class and object diagram
• for identifying the whole and only entities the
  architecture istance involves
• UML state machines and sequence diagram
• for identifying the whole and only messages,
  and the right sequences, the architecture
  involves
• UMLSec profile
• for performing a security-aware design process

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FormalizingTrusted Flow Architecture (contd)

• Goals II Formal Verification
• Selecting critical diagrams and translating them
  into appropriate formal models, provided by some
  formal notation, such as
• Petri Nets
• Timed Automata

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FormalizingTrusted Flow Architecture (contd)

• Goal II Formal Verification
• Identifying interest properties
• Formalizing them
• Applying formal verification techniques against
  previous cited formal models and such properties

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FormalizingTrusted Flow Architecture (contd)

• End of presentation ?
• Any question?
• Thanks for your attention