Descartes

1
Descartes

• God

2
Ideas
I have noted before, even though the objects of
my sensory experience and imagination may have no
existence outside of me, nonetheless the modes of
thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory
perception and imagination, insofar as they are
simply modes of thinking, do exist within me of
that I am certain AT VII, 35.
3
Different Types of Ideas

1. Innate
2. Adventitious
3. Inventions

Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to
be adventitious, and others to have been invented
by me AT VII, 37-8.
4
External Things
All these considerations are enough to establish
that it is not reliable judgement but merely some
blind impulse that has made me believe up till
now that there exist things distinct from myself
which transmit to me ideas or images of
themselves through the sense organs or in some
other way AT VII, 39.
5
Identity of Ideas
But it now occurs to me that there is another way
of investigating whether some of the things of
which I possess ideas exist outside of me. In so
far as the ideas are simply modes of thought,
there is no recognisable inequality among them
they all appear to come from within me in the
same fashion AT VII, 40.
6
Degrees of Reality

1. Objective Reality
2. Formal Reality
3. Eminent Reality

7
Objective Reality
The objective reality of the idea of the
triangle, for example is the idea of the triangle
insofar as it represents the triangle as a thing.
The objective reality is not the thing
represented, but the representation.
Tree
8
Formal Reality
The formal reality of the idea describes the
status of the idea itself. Whatever idea we speak
of and whatever this idea might represent, the
idea itself exists. Again if we go back to our
picture example, being mindful that ideas are not
pictures for Descartes, so that this is only an
analogy, then we can make a distinction between
the picture, on the one hand, and what the
picture represents on the other. Now the picture,
on this analogy, is the formal idea. That is to
say idea of the tree itself, and not the tree
that is represented in the idea
9
Eminent Reality
For Descartes ideas themselves and not just what
they represent in the idea, have degrees of
reality. Reality meaning perfection. It is
possible to say that some ideas, formally
speaking are more perfect than others. The idea
of frog is less perfect than the idea of God. The
idea of God does not just have more formal
reality than the idea of frog rather it has more
formal reality than other reality. The idea of
God, therefore, for Descartes, has eminent
reality.
10
Formal/Objective Reality
The degree of reality of formal reality
corresponds to the degree of reality of
objective reality
11
Formal/Objective Reality
In order for a given idea to contain such and
such objective reality, it must surely derive it
from some cause which contains at least as much
formal reality as there is objective reality in
the idea AT VII 41.
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Formal/Eminent
If the objective reality of any of my ideas turns
out to be so great that I am sure the same
reality does not reside in me, either formally or
eminently, and hence that I myself cannot be its
cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not
alone in the world, but that some other thing
which is the cause of this idea also exists AT
VII, 42.
13
God
By the word God I understand a substance that
is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent,
supremely intelligent, supremely powerful and
which created both myself and everything
elsethat exists. All these attributes are such
that, the more carefully I concentrate on them,
the less possible it seems that they could have
originated from me alone. So from what has been
said it must be concluded that God necessarily
exists AT VII, 45.
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Existence
From whom, in that case, would I derive my
existence? From myself presumably, or from my
parents, of from some other beings less perfect
than God for nothing more perfect than God, or
even as perfect can be thought of or imagined.
Yet if I derive my existence from myself, then I
should neither doubt nor want, nor lack anything
at all AT VII, 48.
15
Principle of Conservation
For it is quite clear to anyone who attentively
considers the nature of time that the same power
and action are needed to preserve anything at
each individual moment of its duration as would
be required to create that thing anew in it were
not yet in existence. Hence the distinction
between preservation and creation is only a
conceptual one AT VII, 49
16
Conclusion
I recognise that it would be impossible for me to
exist with the kind of nature I have that is,
having within me the idea of God were it not
the case that God really existed AT VII.