A Vote of Confidence in Smartmatic?

1
A Vote of Confidence in Smartmatic?

• Roberto Verzola
• Secretary-General
• Halalang Marangal
• rverzola_at_gn.apc.org

2
March 8 Smartmatic full-page ad

• Last March 8, 2010
• a full-page ad by Smartmatic-TIM
• came out in several national dailies.
• The ad was entitled
• A Vote of Confidence for the 2010 Elections

3
Hardware / supplies / consumables

• 82,200 PCOS manu-factured, delivered
• 1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers and
  printers delivered
• 1,722 power generators delivered

• 180,640 compact flash memory cards purchased
• 82,200 batteries for each PCOS delivered
• 338,750 rolls for printing 30 copies of ER per
  pcnt delivered

4
82,200 PCOS made, delivered

• Note the careful omission manufactured in China,
  delivered in Manila, but no mention of full
  testing and acceptance by the Comelec
• Omission creates false impression of readiness
• In 2004, thorough testing of 1,990 counting
  machines took 3 months (source Comelec Comm.
  Mehol Sadain, a HALAL convenor)?

5
1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers and
printers delivered

• No mention of test results
• or Comelec acceptance

6
1,722 power generators delivered

• No mention of test results
• or Comelec acceptance

7
180,640 compact flash memory cards purchased

• Each machine uses two memory cards
• 82,200 PCOS machines, including backups
• 82,200 x 2 164,400 memory cards needed
• 180,640164,400 16,240 extra memory cards
• There are only 75,471 precinct clusters
• Warning potential capability to substitute
  memory cards in 21.5 of PCOS machines

8
Hardware / supplies / consumables

• Unknown test results
• 82,200 PCOS and batteries
• 1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers,
  printers, generators
• 180,640 compact flash memory cards at least 20
  more than necessary
• PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 80

9
Software / certifications / voter education

• Source code customization finished
• Source code in escrow at BSP
• System audit internationally-recognized
  certification entity finished

• Source code public review process opened
• Successful field tests and mock elections
• Voter education websites launched
• Voter educn TV and radio infomercials

10
Source code customization finished

• Customization included disabling of voter
  verification and confirmation feature which is
  built into the PCOS machine.
• This feature would have displayed the names of
  candidates marked in the ballot. Voters must then
  confirm through a CAST button that their ballot
  was scanned accurately.
• It assures voters that their votes were scanned
  accurately. This feature was disabled.

11
Source code in escrow at BSP

• Source code is Smartmatic's general instructions
  directed to every machine
• No mention of source code certification by
  Systest, for which Comelec paid P72 million
• No mention of any certification document, or of
  the full Systest report, on its source code
  review
• Insiders cite series of written exchanges
  between Systest and Comelec about the review
• Release the full text of the Systest review NOW

12
System audit by internationally-recognized
certification entity

• System audit covers
• not only the source code
• but all the five sub-systems
• essential to AES success
• Smartmatic claims finished. But no
  certification, much less a full report, has been
  released to the public. Full audit report must be
  released.

13
Source code public review process opened

• Process is highly restrictive
• and makes a review extremely difficult
• So far, no group has managed
• to conduct a code review

14
Successful field tests and mock elections

• WHAT A LIE!
• High ballot rejection rates (light shading of
  ovals should not cause ballot rejection)?
• Transmission problems even in Metro Manila
• Blackout on machine accuracy/error rates
• A contractor that will put such a lie in a
  full-page ad can lie about anything

15
Software / certifications / voter education

• System audit and source code review no full text
  report or certification released
• Source code public review no local group has
  done a code review
• Successful field tests and mock elections
• What a lie!
• PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 70

16
Logistics / Support / Preparations

• 28 multinational experts at the PMT
• 327 qualified Filipino organic employees
• Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed for signal,
  power, etc.
• 438 Comelec trainers

• 23,000 sqm central warehouse and config facility
  operational
• Contracts with logistics providers, forwarders
  signed
• Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs
  started

17
Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed for signal,
power, etc.

• Since there are 48,000 voting centers
• only 75 have been covered

18
904 test and config line employees working two
shifts

• Tests needed
• Burn-in of machines, batteries, generators, etc.
• Full testing of batteries will they last at
  least 12 hrs?
• Testing for failures rates and mean time between
  failures (MTBF)?
• Testing for ballot rejection rates
• Testing for scan accuracy/error rates (should be
  less than 5 per 100,000 marks)?
• In 2004, testing 1,990 machines took 3 months

19
Contracts with logistics providers, forwarders
signed

• Relative unknowns. Have you heard of the ff?
  (Malaya, 15 March 2010)?
• Germalin Enterprises (P2.3M 2006 net income)?
• Agro Intl Forwarders (P3.7M 2008 retained
  earnings)?
• ACF Logistics Worldwide (P1.1M 2008 cash
  balance)?
• Assuming a delivery team of 3, at least 200,000
  delivery personnel needed for 75,471 clusters

20
Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs
started

• 48,000 field technicians for 75,471 machines?

21
438 Comelec trainers

• For 226,000 BEI members?

22
Logistics / Support / Preparations

• Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed 75 coverage
• 438 Comelec trainers 260,000 BEIs to train
• Logistics providers, forwarders unknowns
• Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs only
  started
• PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 80

23
Telecommunications and Transmission

• 48,000 modems delivered
• 46,000 SIM cards secured
• 5,500 BGAN mobile sat xmtrs purchased
• 680 VSAT mobile sat xmtrs leased

• 2 data centers for backup of nationwide results
  with redundancy secured
• Contract with major telcos to provide VPN for
  transmitting results secured

24
48,000 modems delivered

• For 75,471 machines?
• (63.6)?
• How many of them can actually get
• a signal in the field?

25
46,000 SIM cards secured

• False security
• Smartmatic generates passwords, issues digital
  certificates, verifies the certificates, and
  operates the machines
• This is like merging in a single person the
  functions of accountant, cashier, auditor,
  operator and vendor!

26
5,500 BGAN mobile sat xmtrs purchased

• 48,000 5,500 53,500

27
680 VSAT mobile sat xmtrs leased

• 53,500 680 54,180
• (for 75,471 machines, or 71.8)?

28
2 data centers for backup of results with
redundancy secured

• Data centers in secret locations which
• the Comelec refuses to reveal to the public
• This is equivalent to conducting a canvass
• in a secret place only the Comelec
• and Smartmatic know

29
Contract with major telcos to provide VPN for
transmitting results secured

• According to Smartmatic's own field surveys,
• only 70 of voting centers have reliable signals

30
Telecommunications and Transmission

• 46,000 SIM cards for 48,000 modems?
• 48,000 modems 5,500 BGAN 680 mobile sat
  transmitters for 75,741 machines? (72)?
• Contract with major telcos 70 coverage
• 2 data centers for backup secret locations
• PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 70

31
Ballot Printing Infrastructure Delivered to
COMELEC and NPO

• 4 high-speed digital printers
• 1,500 metric tons of ballot paper
• 9,380 liters of ink

• Over 10 million ballots with security marks
  (invisible ultraviolet mark and unique barcode)
  printed

32
Over 10 million ballots with security marks
(invisible ultraviolet mark and unique barcode)
printed

• Ballot printing begins after a half-day delay
• C. LAPEÑA, K. J. TAN, GMANews.TV
• 02/08/2010 0211 PM
• The printing of ballots for the May 2010
  elections has finally begun after technical
  considerations" hampered the process, the
  Commission on Elections (Comelec) said Monday.
• This was announced by Commissioner Gregorio
  Larrazabal at 1 p.m. after printing was delayed
  by more than half a day.

33
Confidential March 1 Comelec memo on ballot
printing problem

• ... The Comelec memorandum noted that as of March
  1, some 7.9 million ballots for the electronic
  balloting had been printed. Of the number, 5.3
  million were accepted as good ballots, while
  the rest have yet to be checked.
• Granting that 7,878,480 are all good ballots, we
  still have to print a total of 42,845,254 for a
  period of 54 days. This means, we should be able
  to have a daily production of 793,430,629, more
  or less, per day from four printers, which is
  impossible! the memorandum read.
• Smartmatic-TIM has leased to the commission four
  Kodak VersaMark VL 4000 printers, each capable of
  printing 200,000 ballots.
• Ladra said the printers daily output was only
  650,000 or 162,500 each. At this capacity, she
  said only 34.1 million ballots would be printed
  by April 25, when the Comelec starts to ship out
  the ballots. (PDI report, 10Mar2010)?

34
7.9 million ballots printedfrom Feb. 8 to Mar. 1

• Dates Days Ballots Rate
• 2/8 3/1 20 7.9 million 394,000/day
• assuming the same printing rate...
• 3/2 4/30 60 21.3 million
• 7.9 million 21.3 million 39.2 million
• If the remaining 10.8 million ballots are printed
  at the same rate, they will be finished on May 27

35
1,600 print jobs in 80 days

• Each municipality/city has its own ballot design
• Each ballot design is one print job
• 1,600 print jobs in 80 days
• is 20 print jobs per day
• What if a printing error is made?
• Do candidates verify if their names
• are accurately positioned? (Due diligence!)?

36
4 high-speed digital printers

• According to insiders,
• these special Kodak printers
• are not available off-the-shelf.
• Kodak makes them
• only when orders are received

37
Over 10 million ballots with security marks
(invisible ultraviolet mark and unique barcode)
printed

• Ultraviolet scanning capability
• disabled, according to CJ Panganiban
• (UV mark is a security feature)?
• ARMM ballots minus NPO security mark

38
Over 10 million ballots with security marks
(invisible ultraviolet mark and unique barcode)
printed

• PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 80

39
Expected probabilities of success, as of March 8
Smartmatic ad

• Sub-project PoS
• Hardware and supplies 80
• Software and certifications 70
• Logistics and support 80
• Telecomms and transmission 70
• Ballot printing 80

40
Basic Principle of Project Management (and
Reliability Engineering)?

• To get the overall probability of success
• of a project with a series of sub-projects,
• each one essential to overall project success,
• multiply together
• each sub-project's probability of success
• .8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8 ?

41
If each subproject had 99 chances of success...

• .99 x .99 x .99 x .99 x .99
• .95

42
If each subproject had 95 chances of success...

• .95 x .95 x .95 x .95 x .95
• .77

43
If each subproject had 90 chances of success...

• .9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9
• .59

44
If each subproject had 87 chances of success...

• .87 x .87 x .87 x .87 x .87
• .498

45
If each subproject had 80 chances of success...

• .8 x .8 x .8 x .8 x .8
• .33

46
Estimated AES chances of success, as of March 8
ad by Smartmatic

• .8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8
• .25

47
Will Smartmatic vote on behalf of the Filipino
people?

• The March 8 ad implies that voters have given
  Smartmatic solid votes of confidence
• in each of their five automation sub-projects.
• Smartmatic marked those ovals, not the voters.
• Will Smartmatic, a foreign company,
• also speak for Filipino voters on May 10?

48
I. The COMELEC should ...

• Make public test protocols and test results of
  every machine, particularly the mean time between
  failures, ballot rejection rates, and scan
  accurary rates
• Allow pol parties to test some machines
  themselves
• Not accept, deploy or pay for machines which do
  not meet specifications simple due diligence
• Distribute machines randomly what if bad
  machines are sent to opposition bailiwicks?
• Embargo the 16,240 extra memory cards

49
II. The COMELEC should ...

• Reenable voter verification and confirmation if
  ballot was scanned accurately by the machine
• Make public Systest certification and full
  reports on the system audit and source code
  review
• Provide stakeholder access to the source code on
  the same terms and conditions as Systest
• Make public the series of exchanges between
  Comelec and its Technical Evaluation Committee
  (TEC) and Systest

50
III. The COMELEC should ...

• Make public the transmission and power
  availability survey report of Smartmatic
• Make public the list of field offices of all
  forwarding firms contracted by Smartmatic
• Make public the contracts with forwarding firms
• Make public the latest version of its machine
  testing, ballot printing, delivery and training
  timelines

51
IV. The COMELEC should ...

• Make public detailed continuity plan for areas
  with weak or no signals, or where transmission
  failures occur
• Make public copy of contracts with telcos
• Open to the public Comelec data servers site
• Transfer digital security management from
  Smartmatic to independent third party (DOST?)?

52
V. The COMELEC should ...

• Grant observer status to political parties in the
  ballot printing committee
• Conduct random testing of ballots for quality,
  machine readability and rejection rates
• Allow political parties to inspect and test
  ballot batches themselves

53
To political parties and the public beware of
...

• Location-specific problems, authentic or not
• Regional variations in delivery capabilities,
  quality/reliability of counting machines, modems,
  batteries, servers, electricity, generators,
  telco signals, ballots availability, conduct of
  trainings, etc.
• These variations can bias voter turnout in favor
  of some candidate bailiwicks over others
• Ballot fraud in millions it is easier with
  shading ovals than writing names

54
Reducing the risk of failure

• All proposals for ensuring transparency in the
  AES must be heeded
• Every precinct must be authorized and prepared to
  count votes manually in cases of machine delay or
  failure, valid but rejected ballots and for a
  post-election manual audit
• Full parallel count by a consortium of citizens'
  groups based on one of the 8 official ER copies
  must be authorized and done in public

55
Options in case of failure...

• Orderly constitutional transition must be
  ensured, if no president, vice-president or
  senators are proclaimed
• Clarify the role of such interim post-GMA
  government in settling election disputes or even
  possibly conducting new, credible elections

56
Turbulent times are coming

• Pray for the best
• Prepare for the worst