Title: The Ethics of War
1The Ethics of War
2Summary/Walzer on intervention
- Legalist paradigm Political communities (states)
as self-determining gt principle of
non-intervention (prima facie rule) - Exceptions (revisions of legalist paradigm)
- Secession
- Counter-intervention
- Humanitarian intervention
- How should we interpret humanitarian as a just
cause? - Violations of basic human rights (Luban)? Or as
acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind
(Walzer), such as enslavement and massacre?
3Genocide as a case for humanitarian intervention
- Srebrenica 11.7.1995 8000 men and boys massacred
- Rwanda 1994 aprox. one million people massacred
in 100 days
4Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1948)
- Article 1
- The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and to punish.
5Article 2
- In the present Convention, genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such - (a) Killing members of the group
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group - (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part - (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group - (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group
to another group.
6Article 3
- The following acts shall be punishable
- (a) Genocide
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit
genocide - (d ) Attempt to commit genocide
- (e) Complicity in genocide.
7The responsibility of the bystander (AJV)
- Agents, victims and bystanders (actions are
tryadic not dyadic) - Bystanders are persons possessing a potential to
halt the agents ongoing actions - Typology of bystanders
- Passive bystanders
- Bystanders by assignment (e.g. UN observers)
8Acting and not acting
- Not acting is still acting, letting things be
done by someone else, sometimes to the point of
criminality. (P. Ricoeur) - Inaction as action if one decides not to act
(intentional) - Responsibility for omissions the obligation to
help - Complicity
- Signal responsibility sending a message
- How far does bystander responsibility extend?
- Doing and allowing (Arendt to act is to
initiate. But does this not undermine the point
above?)
9Three lessons
- Bystanders legitimize killing and are morally
complicit - Deeds follow words
- Failure to act harms the bystander too shames
humanity
10Iraq A case for humanitarian intervention?
(Mellow)
- Assumptions
- No WMDs in Iraq
- UN inspectors
- Intentional deception by Bush/Blair (Powell
point) - Illegal war of aggression
11Just war framework (again!)
- Just cause
- Legitimate authority
- Right intention
- Last resort
- Proportionality
- Reasonable hope of success
- Open declaration
12Just cause
- Sufficient just cause (suff. to override
presumption against force) - Humanitarian injustice as just cause
- Presumption of self-determination as basic good
(and therefore) (prima facie) collective right - Individual human rights and individual human
suffering
13Some critical points
- The doctrine of self-help and a domestic analogy
- Can forcible democratisation succeed?
- Is forcible democratisation justified without
consent?
14Consider the analogy
- A group of attackers are torturing and killing a
nearby family. You are part of an armed group
(hunting buddies, say), who happen to pass the
scene. You have no way to stop the attacks other
than using your guns, so you prepare to shoot.
The family yells at you to stop, since they are
dedicated pacifists and have chosen to suffer and
die. - Are you wrong to shoot?
- Mellow surely not!
- Do you agree?
15(No Transcript)
16Right intention
- Mixed motives/humanitarian pretext for
- Oil?
- Culpable ignorance about WMDs?
- Establish hegemony in Middle-East?
- Finish daddys business?
17Right intention problems
- Whose intention? The President? The
administration? Legislative bodies? - How do we identify a groups intention?
- Right intention or absence of bad intentions?
- Mere presence of intention or also motivational
force? Threshold? Counterfactual? (Necessary or
sufficient or both?)
18Mellow Exclude right intention!
- The inclusion of right intention in the
JAB-criteria mixes two levels of moral judgement
jugdement of action and judgement of character - Acts are right and wrong independent of the
agents mental states - One can do the right thing for the wrong reasons,
and vice versa.
19True, but
- Can actions be morally right or wrong independent
of the agents mental states? - Yes and no
- Subjective versus objective ought
- But permissibility is not about the objective
ought !!!
20Last resort
- UN inspectors could have continued
- But that is only relevant if WMDs were cause
- For the humanitarian cause, perhaps war was the
only way?
21Legitimate authority
- According to IL, resort to war was illegal (Not
sanctioned by SC) - But immoral?
- Is legitimate authority substantial or merely
formal requirement? - Can just cause and legitimate authority be
separated? (Buchanan)
22Legitimate authority in Iraq?
- Moral case/domestic analogy. Legitimate authority
is substantial, not formal, criterion - Risk of undermining law does not render act
immoral per se - Deception? Only a problem if intention is
important?
23Proportionality
- Relevant good and bad effects
- Good Pertains to the just cause
- Bad Possibility of civil war or destabilisation
of the region - How to weight incomparable effects?
- Thought experiments? (Imagine that..)
- Counterfactual doing nothing (cf. AJV)
24Counterfactual proportionality
- Conflates proportionality with last resort?
- Do nothing is always one of the last resort
alternatives.. (Walzer, p. 81) - Counterfactual proportionality allows us to
dismiss the bad effects as irrelevant! (305) - Demonstrated by allows us to calculate
upfront. Dismisses actual consequences. - But perhaps there is no other way?
25Pre-emptive war
- Defensive war
- Sufficient threat
- Manifest intent to injure
- Active preparation which makes the intent a
positive danger - A general situation in which waiting or choosing
other options gravely magnifies the risk - Always a moral risk! Particular assessment
necessary.
26Preventive war
- Some state of affairs X (US dominance) preserves
some important value V (Freedom and democracy)
and is therefore worth defending at some cost - To fight early, before X begins to unravel,
greatly reduces the cost of the defence of V,
while waiting does not avoid war (unless one
gives up V) but only results in fighting on a
larger scale at worse odds. - (David Luban. Preventive War)
27The Bush Doctrine
- Making the world safe for democracy. Any nation
harboring terrorists is a threat to peace and
liable to attack.
28Too risky?
- Walzer Preventive war may be counter-productive
(destabilising) - Luban Too risky, makes war ordinary
- Also violates the rights of those who have not
yet done anything to forfeit them
29Buchanan
- Alternative reading is possible Preventive war
can be read as preventive self-defence
justification against those wrongfully imposing a
dire risk (cf. The National Security Strategy) - Risk is not fixed, it depends on the
institutional framework - (given (1) Not true that those who pose dire
threat have not done anything (wrong) to forfeit
rights
30The quest for a new institutional framework
(Buchanan)
- Just War Norm (JWN) legalist paradigm
- Preventive war and forcible democratisation
challenges JWN (with regard to just cause) - Buchanan No question of choice between more or
less permissive norms, but a question of
replacing JWN with new institutions. - Legitimate authority (Understood as proper
insitutional framework) is a substantial, not
just formal, criterion. - The validity of a norm can depend on
institutional context. Just cause requires
legitimate authority!
31The limits of just war theory
- The validity of use-of-force norms can depend
upon institutional context - Validity of JWN is contingent upon the absence of
satisfactory institutional framework and on the
costs of risk reduction - We ought to create new institutions which allows
us a more permissive norm depending on whether a
new norm would be - morally better and
- the feasibility and costs of creating new
institutions