TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 05

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 05

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
2
TWO PERSPECTIVES TO THE POST-WAR ATLANTICISM
LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM
POWER POLITICAL VIEW

• HEGEMONIC
• STABILITY
• HEGEMONIC
• LEADERSHIP
• BANDWAGONING
• PROVOKES
• CHALLENGERS

INSTITUTIONS COLLABORATION CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT COMMON AIMS

• COMMON
• VALUES
• DEMOCRACY
• PEACE
• FREE MARKET

BALANCE OF POWER COMMON ENEMY LEADS TO COMMON
DEFENCE
SOURCE DUFFIELD, 2001
JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

3
LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

• LEADERSHIP BY MANDATE
• THE LEADING POWER MANAGES THE INTERNATIONAL
  SOCIETY BY PROMOTING COMMON AIMS AND COMMON
  INTERESTS
• LESSER POWERS ACCEPT LEADERSHIP AND MANDATE THE
  LEADER
• PRODUCES A HEGEMONIC POWER
• LEADERSHIP RESTS ON HEGEMONIC PRESTIGE WHICH IS
  COSTLY TO PRESERVE
• LEADERSHIP BY DOMINANCE
• THE LEADING POWER MANAGES THE INTERNATIONAL
  SOCIETY ACCORDING TO ITS OWN AIMS
• NATIONAL INTERESTS SEEN AS COLLECTIVE INTERESTS
  OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
• PRODUCES A UNILATERL POWER
• LEADERSHIP RESTS ON THE ABILITY TO ACT ALONE
  UNDER A PRESSURE TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF
  LESSER POWERS

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
4
NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

• INSTITUTIONS AS MEDIATORS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR
  COOPERATION
• INSTITUTIONS GOVERN COMPETITIVE AND ANARCHIC
  INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
• MULTILATERALISM HELPS TO DEFEND ESSENTIAL
  NATIONAL INTERESTS
• THREE PRINCIPLES
• IDIVISIBILITY
• COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK
  ON ALL
• NON-DISCRIMINATION
• ALL PARTIES TREATED SIMILARLY
• DIFFUSE RECIPROCITY

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
5
POST-WAR CYCLE OF ATLANTIC HEGEMONY
JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
BRETTON WOODS -COLLAPSED 72 VIETNAM, NIXON
DOCTRINE
x
THE HAGUE 69
NATO MODERNISATION 79
EEC 57
CONSTITUTION
x
1955
NICE 2000
X 1985
ECSC 51
INSTITUTIONALISED HEGEMONY
MAASTRICHT 93
NATO, GATT, 0EEC BRETTON WOODS
1945
NEW ATLANTISM? EQUAL PARTNERS?
ESKO ANTOLA, 2005
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CYCLES OF US LEADERSHIP

• HEGEMONIC LEADERSHIP (1950S)
• EISENHOWER
• SOCIAL PURPOSE LEADERSHIP (IKENBERRY) 1960S-
  70S
• AMERICAS ABILITY TO REORIENT THE SOCIAL PURPOSE
  OF OTHER NATIONS (KENNEDY)
• AIMS RATHER THAN ARMS
• UNILATERAL LEADERSHIP 1980 - 1992
• UNITED STATES ENJOYS UNRIVALLED POWER WITHOUT
  CHALLENGER (REAGAN)
• ISOLATIONISTIC TENDECIES
• CO-OPTIVE LEADERSHIP 1995-2000?
• WILLIGNESS TO LEAD THROUGH COOPERATION (CLINTON)
• UNILATERAL LEADERSHIP 2000-?
• (BUSH)

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

7
UNILATERALISM DEFINITION

• THE DOCTRINE THAT NATIONS SHOULD CONDUCT THEIR
• FOREIGN AFFAIRS INDIVIDUALISTICALLY WITHOUT THE
• ADVICE OR INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER NATIONS
• STATE POLICIES ARE UNILATERAL IF THEY
• ARE UNDERTAKEN BY A SINGLE STATE
• HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS ON PEOPLE IN OTHER
  STATES
• ARE NOT GOVERNED BY BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL
  TREATIES
• ETHICAL DILEMMA EXTERNAL CONSEQUENSES,
  INTENTIONAL OR UNINTENTIONAL, MAY HARM OTHERS IN
  THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENTS
• JUSTIFIABLE WHEN ACTIONS BENEFIT LARGE POPULATION
  BUT ARE RESISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT (IRAQ?)

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2004

8
MULTILATERALISM DEFINITIONS

• THE PRACTISE OF COORDINATING NATIONAL POLICIES
  IN GROUPS OF THREE OR MORE STATES Keohane,
  Multilateralism An Agenda for Research.
  International Journal, 45 (Autumn, 1990), 731.
• MULTILATERALISM REFERS TO COORDINATING RELATIONS
  AMONG THREE OF MORE STATES ACCORDING WITH CERTAIN
  PRINCIPLES Ruggie, Multilateralism The
  Anatomy of an Institution. International
  Organization, 46, 3, (Summer 1992), 566-68.
• As an organizing principle, the institution of
  mulitlateralism is distinguished from other forms
  by three properties indivisibility, generalized
  principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.
  Indivisibility can be thought of as the scope
  (both geographic and functional) over which costs
  and benefits are preadGeneralized principles of
  conduct usually come in the form of norms
  exhorting general if not universal modes of
  relating to other states, rather than
  differentiating relations case-by-case on the
  basis of individual preferences, situational
  exigencies, or a prior particularistic grounds.
  Diffuse reciprocity adjusts the utilitarian
  lenses for the long view, emphasizing that actors
  expect to benefit in the long run and over many
  issues, rather than every time on every issue.
  Caporaso, International Relations Theory and
  Multilateralism The Search for Foundations.
  International Organization, 46, 3 (Summer, 1992),
  600-601.

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AMERICAN MENTAL MAP OF EUROPE

• SECURITY MAP (NATO)
• ECONOMIC MAP (EU)
• CULTURAL MAP (COUNCIL OF EUROPE, LIBERAL VALUES)
• RELIGIOUS MAP (ROMAN VS ORTHODOX)
• GEOGRAPHICAL MAP (WHERE EUROPE ENDS)
• POLITICAL MAP (CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
  WILLIGNESS TO TRANSFORM)
• Martin Walker, 2000

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

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ATLANTIC CRISES
RECONSTRUCTION GENERATION
WAR GENERATION
PEACE GENERATION
55
63-65
72
79-83
91-92
01
87
NEW ATOMIC VIETNAM MODERNI-
REAGAN- POST- TERRORISM LOOK
SECRECY SATION
GORBATSOV COLD-WAR
N N L
N L L
L
NNUCLEAR CRISIS, LLEADERSHIP CRISIS

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2004

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SECURITY NARRATIVES OF POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN
SECURITY

• BOHEMIAN RHAPSODY - GENSCHERISMUS
• PAN-EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY THROUGH OSCE
• GALLIAN VERSION
• MERGING WEU-EU, EUROCORPS, EUROPEANISATION OF
  ATLANTISISM
• EUROPEAN CONCERT
• SOVIET-RUSSIAN PROPOSAL, NATO AND CIS UNDER OCSE,
  DIRECTOIRE OF GREAT POWERS
• ATLANTIST VISION
• BASED ON NATO, ENLARGEMENT, COMBINATION OF
  INTERESTS EUROPE WANTS US TO STAY BUT
  EUROPEANISE NATO - US WANTS TO MAINTAIN
  LEADERSHIP
• ESKO ANTOLA 2003

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NEW ATLANTICISM

• ADAPTATION TO POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
  1989-1994
• THE GULF WAR
• TREATY OF MAASTRICHT 1992
• COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 1991
• PROLONGED U.S. LEADERSHIP 1995-200?
• DECISION ON NATO ENLARGEMENT (BRYSSEL
  1994)
• NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA NTA
  (MADRID 1995)
• TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS DIALOGUE TABD
  (ROME 1997)
• NEW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE NTM
  (COMISSION 1998)
• TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP TEP
  (LONDON 1998)
• THE POSITIVE ECONOMIC AGENDA 2002
• FROM THE U.S. HEGEMONY TO EQUAL PARTNERSHIP ?
• TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TAEC
  (200?)
• FLEXIBLE DEFENCE COOPERATION
  (200?)
• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
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TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION1990

• support democracy, the rule of law and respect
  for human rights and individual liberty, and
  promote prosperity and social progress world-
  wide
• safeguard peace and promote international
  security, by cooperating with other nations
  against aggression and coercion, by contributing
  to the settlement of conflicts in the world and
  by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and
  other international organisations
• pursue policies aimed at achieving a sound world
  economy marked by sustained economic growth with
  low inflation, a high level of employment,
  equitable social conditions, in a framework of
  international stability
• promote market principles, reject protectionism
  and expand, strengthen and further open the
  multilateral trading system
• Carry out their resolve to help developing
  countries by all appropriate means in their
  efforts towards political and economic reforms
• provide adequate support, in cooperation with
  other states and organisations, to the nations of
  Eastern and Central Europe undertaking economic
  and political reforms and encourage their
  participation in the multilateral institutions of
  international trade and finance.

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NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA (1995)

• Promoting peace and stability, democracy and
  development around the world
• Responding to global challenges
• Contributing to the expansion of world trade and
  closer economic relations
• Building bridges across the Atlantic.

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TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUES

• Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 1995
• Transatlantic Small Business Initiative
  (TASBI) 1996
• Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD) 1996 -
• Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD) 1998
• Transatlantic Development Dialogue (TA 1998 -
• Transatlantic Donors Dialogue (TADD) 1998 -
• Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue
  (TLD) 1999 ()
• Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue
  (TAED) 1999 -
• active
• - inactive

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC
AGENDA

• SUMMIT MEETINGS
• Presidents of the US and the EU
• (Bi)annually
• GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS
• Secretary of State Presidency Foreign Minister
  and Commission
• Biannually
• SUB-CABINET CONSULTATIONS
• US Government authorities and the European
  Commission
• Biannually
• SENIOR LEVEL GROUP (SLG)
• Preparation of Summits
• 4-6 times a year
• NTA TASK FORCE MEETINGS
• Co-ordination of actions

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
17
AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THE CREATION OF THE EEC

• GENERAL SUPPORT TO INTEGRATION
• GATT XXIV PROCEDURE SEEN AS A VETO
• CUSTOMS UNIONS MUST BE EXAMINED BY WORKING PARTY
• CUSTOMS UNIONS MUST ENTER INTO BILATERAL
  NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUTSIDERS
• AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
• DID NOT FUNCTION BECAUSE
• PROCEDURE WAS LIMITED TO TRADE IN GOODS
• DEEPENING OF INTEGRATION NOT COVERED
• REVIEW ONLY AFTER EU HAS FINISHED ITS INTERNAL
  PROCEDURES - CHANGES DIFFICULT
• DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE BASED ON CONSENSUS
• LEADS TO BLOCKING SITUATIONS

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2002

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AMERICAN UNILATERALISM IN TRADE POLICY

• BASED ON TRADE ACT OF 1974, SECTION 301
• GIVES INITIATIVE TO US GOVERNMENT TO SET
  SANCTIONS IF
• ACT, POLICY OR PRACTISE OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
  IS UNJUSTIFIABLE AND BURDENS OR RESTRICTS US
  COMMERCE
• IF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OBEY US CLAIMS US
  MAY RETALIATE (QUOTAS, DUTIES)

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2002

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COMPARATIVE DATA

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
20
EURO AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

• US REACTIONS
• INATTENTION
• OBSCURE FINANCIAL UNDERTAKING OF NO RELEVANCE TO
  U.S.
• CANNOT WORK - NOT AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA
• DANGER TO US INTERESTS ?THREAT TO THE DOLLAR
• ELEMENTS OF NEW TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK
• FROM US HEGEMONY TO EQUAL PARTNERSHIP
• REFORMS IN ATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS
• ELEMENT IN EUS INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY
• THE NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
• G7
• IMF
• WTO
• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

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DIPLOMACY OF EURO

• TARGETS
• EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM WITH NON-COMMUNITY
  CURRENCIES (ART 11)
• MANAGEMENT OF CURRENCY CRISES
• GLOBAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
• WHO SPEAKS FOR EURO?
• CURRENT PROCEDURE PRESIDENCY
• LACK OF CONTINUITY
• LACK OF CONFIDENCE - SMALL STATE PRESIDENCY
• ECB PRESIDENT?
• LEGITIMACY PROBLEM
• ADDS WEIGHT OF THE ECB
• COMMISSION?
• LEGITIMACY PROBLEM
• MR/MRS EURO TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONSTITUTION
• LINKS TO CFSP
• PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IF NEEDED
• COMMON POSITION ON MONETARY POLICY?
• JOINT ACTION?

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

22
AMERICAN NATO STRATEGY BEFORE 911

• NATO ENLARGEMENT
• ENHANCING PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
• COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE
• BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO MEMBERS
• SECURITY BEYOND NATO BOARDERS (BALKANS)
• NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2002

23
STEPS TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY

• TREATY OF MAASTRICHT 1991
• EVENTUAL FRAMING OF A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY,
  WHICH MIGHT IN TIME LEAD TO A COMMON DEFENCE
• TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 1997
• PROGRESSIVE FRAMING OF A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY,
  WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A COMMON DEFENCE SHOULD THE
  EUROPEAN COUNCIL SO DEFINE
• ST. MALO DECLARATION 1998
• FULL ROLE FOR EU ON INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND
  CAPACITY FOR AUTONOMOUS ACTION IN MILITARY CRISES
  MANAGEMENT
• HELSINKI HEADLINE GOALS 1999
• EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD HAVE THE AUTONOMOUS
  CAPACITY TO TAKE DECISIONS AND, WHERE NATO AS A
  WHOLE IS NOT ENGAGED, TO LAUNCH AND THEN TO
  CONDUCT EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO
  INTERNATIONAL CRISES IN SUPPORT OF THE CFSP
• TREATY OF NICE 2000
• ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SECURITY OF THE
  UNION, PROGRESSIVE FRAMING OF A COMMO DEFENCE
  POLICY, MIGHT LEAD TO COMMON DEFENCE

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
ESKO ANTOLA, 2005
24
MAIN ELEMENTS OF ESDI

• POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF
  EUROPE TO ALLIANCE
• DEVELOPED WITHIN NATO
• AVAILABILITY OF NATO ASSETS TO SUPPORT WEU/EU
  OPERATIONS
• NATO/WEU CONSULTATION ON PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF
  WEU OPERATIONS
• WEU OPERATIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN NATO
  PLANNING
• NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AVAILABLE IN WEU
  OPERATIONS
• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
25
BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENT 1999

• NATO - EU Security Agreementb. Assured Access to
  NATO planning capabilities for
• EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)c.
  Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for
• EU-led CMOd. Procedures for Release,
  Monitoring, Return and
• Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilitiese. Terms
  Of Reference for DSACEUR and European
• Command Options for NATOf. EU - NATO
  consultation arrangements in the
• context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO
  assets
• and capabilitiesg. Arrangements for coherent
  and mutually reinforcing
• Capability Requirements

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EU NATO PRINCIPLES

• PARTNERSHIP
• MUTUALLY REINFORCING ACTIVITIES RECOGNISING
  DIFFERENT NATURE OF ORGANISATIONS
• EFFECTIVE MUTUAL CONSULTATION, DIALOGUE,
  CO-OPERATION, TRANSPARENCY
• EQUALITY AND DUE REGARD FOR AUTONOMY OF PARTNERS
• RESPECT FOR INTERESTS OF MSs OF EU AND NATO
• RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE
  UN
• COHERENT, TRANSPARENT AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING
  DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES COMMON TO
  BOTH ORGANISATIONS
• EU-NATO DECLARATION, DECEMBER 2002

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
27
TRANSATLANTIC PILLAR STRUCTURE
JOINT MEMBERS 19
EU
NATO
SECURITY ISSUES
EU NON -NATO MEMBERS -FINLAND -SWEDEN -IRELAND
-AUSTRIA -MALTA -CYPRUS

• NATO NON-EU
• MEMBERS
• -NORWAY
• -ICELAND
• -TURKEY
• -USA
• -CANADA
• BULGARIA
• ROMANIA

CAPABILITY GOALS
EU ACCESS TO NATO CAPABILITIES
PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS
JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

28
INCLUSION - EXCLUSION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SYSTEM

• NATO MEMEBERS THAT DO NOT SEEK MEMBERSHIP IN EU
• NORWAY, ICELAND
• EU MEMBERS THAT DO NOT SEEK MEMBERSHIP IN NATO
• AUSTRIA, FINLAND, IRELAND, SWEDEN, MALTA, CYPRUS
• EU MEMBERS THAT ARE NATO MEMBERS
• 19 EU MEMBERS
• EU CANDIDATES AND NATO MEMBERS
• TURKEY, BULGARIA, ROMANIA
• NORTH AMERICAN NATO MEMBERS

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

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BENEFITS OF EUROPEAN CAPACITY TO THE ALLIANCE

• ADDS POLITICAL AND MILITARY FLEXIBILITY OF NATO
  BY INCREASING CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
• INCREASES CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE
• MAKES MORE FORCES AVAILABLE TO CONFRONT DIFFERENT
  CRISES
• BALANCES BURDEN-SHARING

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

30
ESDP AUTONOMY VS.NATO INVOLMENT IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
NATO INVOLMENT
CIVILIAN OPERATIONS PEACE
KEEPING PEACE ENFORCEMENT
PETERSBERG TASKS
ESDP AUTONOMY
HOW TO IMPROVE ESDP AUTONOMY - IMPROVE MILITARY
COMPETENCE (INCREASE DEFENCE SPENDING,
CONVERGENCE, COLLABORATION) - INSTITUTIONALISATION
EU-NATO RELATIONS - IMPROVE ESDP DECISION-MAKING
AND OPERATIONALCAPABILITIES (ALLOW COALITION OF
THE WILLING,COMMUNITARISATION)
JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2002

31
US REACTIONS TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE DIMENSION

• THREE Ds (ALBRIGTH 1998)
• DUBLICATION
• DISCRIMINATION
• EUROPEAN OPERATIONS WITHOUT USA
• EXCLUSION OF USA OR OTHER NON-EU NATO MEMBERS
  FROM PLANNING
• DECOUPLING
• FEAR OF POLITICAL DECOUPLING
• EUROPE GOING TOO FAR
• FEAR OF STRATEGIC DECOUPLING
• EUROPE NOT DOING ENOUGH

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

32
WHAT IS DUBLICATION?

• AVOID INVESTING WHERE OVERCAPACITY EXISTS
• DO NOT INVEST IN CAPACITIES WHICH DO NOT INCREASE
  CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY
• DO NOT ESTABLISH NEW COMPETING PROGRAMMES OR
  SYSTEMS WHERE THEY ALREADY EXIST
• WHERE EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS NEEDED?
• INCREASE INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO
• FILL OPRATIONAL NEEDS INSUFFICIENTLY COVERED BY
  THE ALLIANCE
• TO MEET HELSINKI HEADLINE GOALS
• INCREASE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPEAN
  CAPABILITIES
• COMPLETE OPERATIONAL NEEDS OF EUROPEAN FORCES

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

33
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER 911

• DEFENCE THE GOLIATH SYNDROME
• SOCIAL MODEL ASSYMETRY
• COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT NEEDED
• GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
• IDENTITY

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

34
NEW NATO AFTER 911

• FUZZYNESS THE DEATH OF NATO?
• THE ROLE OF ART V
• IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT
• NEW EUROPE VS OLD EUROPE
• FUTURE COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA
• NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
• BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO MEMBERS
• COALITION OF THE WILLING
• NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP
• CONSTITUTIONALISATION
• DECISION DECEMBER 2002
• US HOMELAND SECURITY AS A PRIORITY
• UNILATERALISM

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2003

35
"NEW NATO AFTER 911

• FUZZYNESS THE DEATH OF NATO?
• THE ROLE OF ART V
• IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT
• NEW EUROPE VS OLD EUROPE
• FUTURE COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA
• NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
• BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO MEMBERS
• COALITION OF THE WILLING
• NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP
• CONSTITUTIONALISATION
• DECISION DECEMBER 2002
• US HOMELAND SECURITY AS A PRIORITY
• UNILATERALISM

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

36
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES

• Scientists or individuals from any discipline or
  profession who have a strong claim to a body of
  knowledge valued by society
• Distinguished from interest groups or other
  agencies by the combination of a shared set of
  causal and principled beliefs, consensual
  knowledge and common interests 

37
PHILOSPHICAL CONFRONTATION

• EUROPE KANTIAN VIEW
• WORLD OF LAWS, RULES AND TRANSITIONAL NEGOTIATION
  AND COOPERATION
• PARADOX OF CIVILIAN POWER TRADITION
• EUROPEAN REJECTION OF POWER POLITICS UNDER THE
  AMERICAN PROTECTION IN THE COLD WAR
• MULTILATERALISM
• UNITED STATES POWER POLITICAL VIEW
• RULES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE UNRELIABLE
• GULLIVERS SYNDROME
• UNILATERALISM AS MUCH UNILATRALISM AS POSSIBLE
  - AS MUCH UNILATERALISM AS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL
  TO PROTECT AMERICAN INTERESTS

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
38
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER 911

• DEFENCE THE GOLIATH SYNDROME
• SOCIAL MODEL ASSYMETRY
• COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT NEEDED
• GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
• IDENTITY

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

39
REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY

• RESPECT OF POWER
• BUILDING AND SUSTAINING COALITIONS
• MULTILATERALISM A LA CARTE
• PROMOTING PRIVATE INTERESTS
• FACING ENEMIES
• Robert Zoellick, 2000

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

40
TRANSATLANTIC MISPERCEPTIONS

• Policy-makers will cling to perceptions of
  constant conditions, making it harder to
  recognize change
• Decision-makers often see others behavior as
  more purposeful, planned, and coordinated than it
  is
• Actors tend to exaggerate the role they play in
  others policies, and thus overestimate their
  importance as an influence on others policies
• Cognitive dissonance leads to anti-learning
  failure leads an actor to hold more strongly to
  his policy rather than learn

41
SOCIAL AGENDA

• THE END OF US SOCIAL PURPOSE LEADERSHIP
• DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHY
• US SEEKS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EU SEEKS EQUAL
  OUTCOME
• ECONOMIC POLICY
• US EMPLOYMENT CREATION
• FLEXIBILITY, CHEAP LABOUR ENTERTING MARKET, LACK
  OF SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION
• PIONEER MODEL VOLUNTARY SOCIAL NETWORK
• EU SOCIAL EUROPE IN OLD EUROPE
• CRADLE-TO-GRAVE MODEL
• POSITIVE REGULATION, PARTNERSHIP, SOCIAL
  SOLIDARITY, TAXATION
• HEAVY TAX BURDEN WEIGHTS DOWN ECONOMIC GROWTH?
• BASED ON A STRONG NATION-STATE HOW ABOUT EU?

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

42
TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AREA?

• WHY?
• NO TRANSATLANTIC MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK EXISTS
• MUST GO THROUGH GATT/WTO
• THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 90S NOT ENOUGH
• INSTITUTIONALISED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM NEEDED
• FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION AND REGULATORY POLICY
• PROBLEMS
• NEEDS WTO ENFORCEMENT
• DIFFERENT ECONOMIC POLICY PHILOSOPHIES
• COMPETITION POLICY
• EU PREVENT MARKET DOMINANCE
• US DESTROY COMPETITION
• TRADE PART OF MACRO-ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY
• SEAT AT THE TABLE -PROBLEM

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

43
CHALLENGES TO THE US DOMINANCE

• OTHER STATES ADVANCE THEIR INTEREST BY
  VOLUNTARILY SUPPORTING THE INTERESTS OF THE US
• COALITIONS
• CHALLENGE OF ISOLATIONISM
• WOULD LEAVE US ALONE
• REDUCING INFUENCE TO MILITARY POWER ALONE
• MULTILATERALISM
• IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH
• ENGAGEMENT TO TOO MANY OBLIGATIONS

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
44
IRAQ AS A CASE

• ESSENTIALLY A NATO ISSUE
• DIVISION OF LABOUR
• US HOBBESIAN SHORT TERM PERSPECTIVE
  (PRE-EMPTIVE)
• EU KANTIAN LONGER PERSPECTIVE (POST CONFLICT)
• PROBLEM
• RELIES ON US TIMING (KOSOVO - IRAQ) AND THE
  COMPOSITION OF THE COALlTION
• WHY US NEEDS EUROPE?
• ONLY MODEST MILITARY CONTRIBUTION BUT
• POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND FRONT (NORTH KOREA,
  PAKISTAN-AFGANISTAN)
• ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN US
  ECONOMY WIDENING OF THE DEFICIT
• DOMESTIC OPINION - MOGADISHU EFFECT

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU
45
(No Transcript)
46
TRANSATLANTIC CAPABILITY GAPS

• SOVEREIGNTY GAPS
• GOVERNMENTS WANT TO MAINATIN SOVEREIGNTY
• LEADERSHIP GAP
• US NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE EU NO ABLE TO TAKE
• INVESTMENT GAP
• GAPS IN DEFENCE INVESTMENTS
• PROCUREMENT GAP
• TECHNOLOGY GAP
• SPECTURM GAP
• DIFFERENCE IN WHAT KIND OF MILITARY POWER IS
  OFFERED
• MODIFIED FROM SPERLING 2004

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

47
TWO VISIONS

• USA UNIPOLAR HEGEMONIC-UNILATERAL
• CLINTON MAKE US THE LEADING ECONOMIC POWER
• BUSH PROJECT MILITARY POWER "WARTIME PRESIDENT"
• ALLIES MORA A HINDRANCE THAN CONTRIBUTOR TO US
  HARD POWER
• EU MULTIPOLAR-BALANCE-MULTILATERAL
• UNILATERAL US MORE AS A PROBLEM TO TRANSATLANTIC
  RELATIONS THAN AS A CONTRIBUTOR
• FOCUS TO SOFT POWER (CULTURE, VALUES)
• MODIFIED FROM CALLEO, 2004

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

48
AMERICAN NEO-CONSERVATIVE DOCTRINE

• INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SEEN IN MORALLY ABSOLUTIST
  CATEGORIES US HAS THE MORAL POWER
• EMPHASIS ON THE UNIPOLAR NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER
  USE MILITARY POWER IN PRE-EMPTIVE WAYS
• SIDELINE CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMATIC AGENCIES SINCE
  THEY DILUTE THE IDEOLOGICAL CLARITY
• SIDELINE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS BECAUSE THEY
  DILLUTE AMERICAN VALUES
• MODIFIED FROM HALPER AND CLARKE, 2004.

JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

49
JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005

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JEAN MONNET CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE UNIVERSITY OF
TURKU

• ESKO ANTOLA, 2005