An Early Example of EITM

1
An Early Example of EITM

• John Aldrich
• and
• Arthur Lupia

2
Testable Spatial Models

• Davis, Hinich, Ordeshook formalize and extend
  Downs
• McKelvey develops aggregate level conditions that
  are testable
• Aldrich specifies McKelvey conditions, given
  first suitable data.

3
Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook

• M Why formalize?
• NH Same as Duncan Black in Downsian setting?
• P Key decisions in formalization
• Voter Utility and Choice
• Abstention
• Candidate Goals
• Equilibrium Concept
• C Results Convergent equilibrium at
  multivariate median
• Value of the Exercise?

4
McKelveys Generalization

• The What Probabilistic Formulations
• The Why What was Gained Theoretically?
• The Success How General? How Empirically
  Useful?

5
Aldrich Tests

• What are M and NH?
• P Measurement Issues
• Candidate Positions
• Voter Ideal Points and f(x)
• C Results
• f(x) and Symmetry
• Candidate Support Functions
• Better Test?
• Given f(x), why bother?

6
Shesple - Rikerand the New
Institutionalism
7
Rohde-ShepslesFundametal Equation

• They (1978) proposed that
• Political Outcomes f(Goals, Institutions,
  Context)
• Early rational choice examined variation in
  goals, holding institutions and context fixed.
• The new institutionalism examines variation in
  goals and institutions, holding context (mostly)
  fixed.
• This approach assumes that the search is for
  institutional equilibrium, but not equilibrium
  institutions.

8
The Shepsle Model as Iconic

• Did it attract attention because it defined the
  problem better theoretically? How?
• Did it attract attention because it defined the
  formal institution in a way that appeared to be
  like the U.S. House?
• Can it be general? Is it as useful today?
• How does it advance Romer-Rosenthal?

9
Riker and Majority Rule

• What is inheritability?
• Is it a special problem of majority rule?
• Is it a special problem of preferences?
• Is it a special problem of politics?
• How might it be avoided?
• Binders claim about Senate

10
Inter-Branch Politics
11
Moe and the New Economics of Organizations

• Principle-Agency Theory or Metaphor?
• Information
• Adverse Selection
• Moral Hazard
• Multiple Agents
• Multiple Principles

12
Weingast and Moran

• M Congressional Dominance Absence of
  Behavior does not Demonstrate Absence of Effect
• NH Agency Discretion Dominant
• P Congressional Committee Dominance Equates
  with Congressional Dominance Interrupted Time
  Series
• C Change in FTC Behavior due to Change in
  Senate Committee Membership

13
Electoral Institutions and Strategic
Coordination
14
Cox

• M Extend Duvergers Law, in this case to SNTV
  systems, like Japans.
• NH Voters vote sincerely, any number of
  candidates compete.
• P Game theoretic understanding of strategic
  voting by the electorate, with rational
  expectations.
• C In districts electing M candidates, voters
  desert weak candidates, beyond M1, and voters in
  excess of that needed for election desert leading
  candidates. The ratio of votes for the second to
  first candidates (SF ratio) spike at 0
  (Duvergerian equilibrium) or at 1
  (non-Duvergerian equilibrium, with essentially
  tied standings.

15
Reed

• M Empirically infer extension of Duvergers Law
  to the (n 1), case, in which one more candidate
  runs than seats to be one by plurality, due to
  learning and elite coalition formation.
• NH An unpredictable number of candidates run.
• P Process due to learning, rather than
  rationality, and driven by elite coalition
  building rather than by voters.
• C Duvergers Law and extension is driven by the
  mechanical rather than psychological factor
  and therefore there is a very slow convergence to
  (n 1).

16
Bawn

• M Does the fact of endogenous institutions
  yield inheritability? Strategic political choice
  better explains choice of electoral systems in
  post-War Germany.
• NH Participants in choice of institutions do
  not seek alternatives that favor their desired
  policies choice of electoral rules
  non-political.
• P Parties value policies, have full
  information, and reason strategically, knowing
  the consequences of rules to be adopted.
• C In the essentially PR system of 1949, the
  CDU/CSU was hurt and the FDP helped, as predicted
  and as they acted. The 1953 law helped
  incumbents, the governing coalition, and had
  voters avoid wasted vote. All of these as
  predicted.

17
Gerber

• M Direct Democracy Influences Republican
  Institutions
• NH Legislatures do not Respond to the
  Initiative
• P Single Dimension Sequential Moving Three
  Options Status quo, (single) legislative
  proposal, (single) initiative full information
  and strategic choice
• C If legislature deviates, in Romer-Rosenthal
  fashion, from electorate, a second agenda-setter
  reduces that deviation, making outcomes closer to
  the median voter than purely legislative choice.