Title: Group 1 Malefactors
1Group 1Malefactors
2Tasks for Group 1
- Describe the best candidate agents (chemical and
biological) that could be used to attack this
system. - Why are these preferable?
- What sorts of physical attacks could be used?
- What are the best alternatives for
- hurting people?
- spreading fear?
- hurting the economy?
- Which approach most cost-effective?
- Which approach is most difficult to detect?
- What are the types of personnel needed to have an
effective system to address these issues?
3Tools for Group 1
- Maps of the city and water system
- Description of the water system
- Lists of
- Potential organisms
- Potential toxins
- Information on organisms/toxins
- NOEL
- Infective dose
- Chlorine resistance
4Weapons, organisms, toxins
5 Weapons of Mass
Destruction
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- Nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear device
- Radiological material dispersal device
- Chemical weapons
- Biological agents
- Bombs
6Biological Agent Characteristics
- Produce delayed effects
- Do not penetrate unbroken skin
- Do not evaporate
- More toxic than chemicals by weight
- Undetectable by senses
- Difficult to detect in the field
7Biological Agent Characteristics (continued)
- Most effectively disseminated as aerosols
- Range of effects
- Obtained from nature
- Multiple routes of entry
- Destroyed by environment (UV light)
- Some are contagious
8Enhanced Potential of Agents to Contaminate
Drinking Water
- Resistance to disinfectants at normal
concentrations - Resistance to boiling for 1 to 3 minutes
- A low oral infectious dose
- Easy availability
- Easy to culture without sophisticated equipment
- Survival in water for long periods of time
- Difficult to remove by common water treatment
practices
9Treatment Biological Agents
10Treatment Biologic Agents
11Treatment Biological Toxins
12Treatment Biological Toxins
13Weaponization and Infective Dose of Biological
Agents
14Weaponization and Infective Dose of Biological
Agents
15Weaponization and Infective Dose of Biological
Agents
16Weaponization and No Observed Adverse Effect
Level (NOAEL) for Biotoxins
17Weaponization and No Observed Adverse Effect
Level (NOAEL) for Biotoxins
18Relative Toxicity of Some Poisons in Water
19Group 2Public Utility Workers
20Tasks for Group 2
- Describe the vulnerability assessment process.
- What are the vulnerable components of the Redmond
system? - What types of protections could be put into place
to fortify the system? - What are the potential costs of these
fortifications? - What are the types of personnel needed to have an
effective system to address these issues?
21Tools for Group 2
- Maps of the city and water system
- Description of the water system
- Outline of the vulnerability assessment process
- Potential vulnerabilities
- Security products
22Vulnerability Assessments
23Public Law 107-188
- Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002. - Requires all cities with a population of over
3300 to conduct a vulnerability assessment (VA)
of their water systems (by end of 2004). - Incorporate results of VA into Emergency Response
Plan (ERP). - Obtain EPA certification of ERP.
246 Elements of Vulnerability Assessments
- 1. Characterization of the water system,
including its mission and objectives - 2. Identification and prioritization of adverse
consequences to avoid - 3. Determination of critical assets that might be
subject to malevolent acts that could result in
undesired consequences
256 Elements of Vulnerability Assessments
- 4. Assessment of the likelihood (qualitative
probability) of such malevolent acts from
adversaries - 5. Evaluation of existing countermeasures
- 6. Analysis of current risk and development of a
prioritized plan for risk reduction
261. Characterization of the System
- What are the important missions (customers) of
the system? - General public - Industrial
- Government - Critical Care
- Military - Retail Operations
- Firefighting
27Characterization of the System
- What are the most important facilities,
processes, and assets of the system? - Utility facilities
- Operating procedures
- Water sources (ground water/surface water)
- Management practices
- Treatment processes
- Storage methods/capacity
- Chemical use/storage
- Distribution system
282. Identification and Characterization of Adverse
Consequences to Avoid
- Impacts that could disrupt supply of safe and
reliable water or cause public health concerns - Ranges of consequences for impacts
- Magnitude of service disruption
- Economic impact
- Number of illnesses/deaths
- Impact on public confidence
- Chronic problems
- Other indicators of the impact of each event
293. Determination of Critical Assets that Might be
Subject to Malevolent Acts
- Could include
- Physical damage or destruction of critical assets
- Contamination of water
- Intentional release of stored chemicals
- Interruption of electricity or other
infrastructure interdependencies
304. Assessment of the Likelihood of Malevolent Acts
- Moving from what is possible to what is likely
- Very difficult task
- Baseline Threat Information for Vulnerability
Assessments of Community Water Systems - Sensitive document prepared by EPA and supplied
to community water systems serving more than
3,300 people.
315. Evaluation of Existing Countermeasures
- What capabilities does the current system employ
for detection, delay, and response? - Detection
- Intrusion detection systems
- Water quality monitoring
- Operational alarms
- Guard post orders
- Employee security awareness
32Evaluation of Existing Countermeasures
- Delay
- Locks and key control
- Fencing
- Structure integrity for critical assets
- Vehicle access checkpoints
- Response
- Policies and procedures for evaluation and
response to - Physical intrusion
- System malfunction alarms
- Adverse water quality indicators
- Cyber system intrusions
336. Analysis of Current Risk and Development of a
Prioritized Plan for Risk Reduction
- Analyze information from steps 1-5 to determine
current level of risk - Are current risks acceptable or should risk
reduction measures be pursued? - Recommended actions should measurably reduce
risks by reducing vulnerabilities and/or
consequences through improved deterrence, delay,
detection, and/or response
34Top 10 Cyber Vulnerabilities
- Operator station logged on all the time (with or
without operator present) - Physical access to the SCADA equipment relatively
easy - Unprotected SCADA network access from DSL or
dial-up modems - Insecure wireless access points on the network
- Most of the SCADA networks directly or indirectly
connected to the Internet
35Top 10 Cyber Vulnerabilities
- No firewall installed or the firewall
configuration is weak or unverified - System event logs not monitored
- Intrusion detection systems not used
- Operating and SCADA system software patches not
routinely applied - Network and/or router configuration insecure
passwords not changed from default
36Security Products(epa.gov/safewater/security/guid
e)
- Cyber Protection Products
- Firewalls
- Anti-virus and pest eradication software
- Network intrusion hardware/software
37Physical Asset Monitoring and Control Products
- Backflow prevention devices
- Exterior intrusion buried sensors
- Fences
- Films for glass-shatter protection
- Fire hydrant locks
- Ladder access control
- Locks
- Manhole locks
- Security for doorways
- Valve lockout devices
- Visual surveillance monitoring
38Group 3Health System Workers
39Tasks for Group 3
- Describe the system that should be in place to
detect an attack (through the health care system)
involving chemical, radiological, or biological
agents. - Who would need to be communicating with whom?
- Who should report a potential problem?
- To whom?
- What do you think the pre-defined thresholds
(excess cases) of symptoms should be? - Should we be testing patients for exposure to
potential agents? - What are the infra-structure needs/costs to put
such a system in place? - Describe the potential indicators of an attack
(syndromes, epi clues) - What are the types of personnel needed to have an
effective system to address these issues?
40Tools for Group 3
- Lists of (in Group 1 section)
- Potential organisms (in Group 1 section)
- Potential toxins
- Information on organisms/toxins (in Group 1
section) - NOEL
- Infective dose
- Epidemiological indicators/sentinel clues
- Syndromic surveys
41Identifying an Event
- Illness may be the first indication that an event
has occurred. - Epidemiological clues (sentinel clues) can be
used to identify and confirm a CBR exposure event.
42Epidemiological Indicators and Sentinel Clues
- Record number of severely ill or dying patients
over short period - Very high attack rates (gt60)
- Severe and frequent disease in previously health
patients - Increased and early presentation of disease in
vulnerable populations (elderly,
immunocompromised)
43Epidemiological Indicators and Sentinel Clues
- Impossible epidemiology
- Naturally occurring diseases diagnosed in regions
where the disease has not previously occurred. - gtnormal number of patients with gastrointestinal,
respiratory, neurologic, or fever diagnoses - Record number of fatal cases with few
recognizable signs and symptoms - Localized areas of disease in specific areas
(neighborhoods) - Multiple infections at single locations (school,
hospital, nursing home) with unusual or rare
pathogen
44Epidemiological Indicators and Sentinel Clues
- Lack of response or clinical improvement of
patients to traditional treatment - Near simultaneous outbreaks of similar or
different epidemics at the same or different
locations indicating a pattern of agent release - Endemic disease presenting during an unusual time
of the year - Endemic disease presenting in a community where
the normal vector is absent
45Epidemiological Indicators and Sentinel Clues
- Unusual temporal or geographic clustering of
cases attending a common public event - Increased patient presentation with acute
neurologic illness or cranial nerve impairment
with progressing generalized weakness - Unusual or uncommon route of exposure of a
disease - Illness resulting from a waterborne agent not
normally found in the water environment
46Syndromic Surveys
- Monitoring of disease through grouping of cases
into syndromes rather than specific diagnoses - Certain syndromes may be characteristic of
terrorist activity
47Types of Syndromic Disease Clustering Potentially
Indicating CBR Exposure
- Gastrointeritis of an apparent infectious
etiology, acute toxic chemical exposure, or
possible acute radiation exposure - Upper and lower respiratory disease with fever
and sudden death of previously healthy patients - Rash of synchronous skin lesions and fever,
reddened skin, radiation burns - Suspected meningitis, encephalitis, encephalopathy
48Types of Syndromic Disease Clustering Potentially
Indicating CBR Exposure
- Sepsis or non-traumatic shock
- Unexplained death with a history of fever
- Advancing cranial nerve impairment with
progressive generalized weakness
49Hospitals in the Redmond Area
50Group 4Environmental Health Group
51Tasks for Group 4
- What actions should be taken in the event that a
threat is made? - Describe the monitoring systems that are
available to detect contaminants. - Where should these be placed in the Redmond
system? - What do anticipate the costs that it would take
to implement such a system? - Personnel and capital
- Describe potential alternative water supplies for
the citizens of Redmond. - What are the types of personnel needed to have an
effective system to address these issues?
52Tools for Group 4
- Maps of the city and water system
- Description of the water system
- Lists of (in Group 1 section)
- Potential organisms
- Potential toxins
- Information on organisms/toxins (in Group 1
section) - NOEL
- Infective dose
- Chlorine resistance
- How to respond to a threat
- Characteristics of early warning systems
- Early warning methods
- Early warning systems currently in-place
- How to identify alternative water supplies
53Responding to Threats
54Types of Terrorism Attacks
- No Notice Incident
- Calls to 9-1-1 EMS responses
- Medical community response
- Epidemiology
- Warning Provided
- Detection and Sampling
55Responding to a Threat
- Identify the threat
- Immediately notify officials
- Assess and respond to the threat
- Communicate with others
- Consider additional water testing
561. Identify the Threat
- Take any suspicious activity or evidence of
vandalism or sabotage seriously - Notify your chain of command immediately
- Designate a response coordinator
- Document what you see and keep notes
57Primary Indicators of Threat
- Verbal or written threats
- Should threats be taken seriously?
- Who should you notify?
- What actions to take?
- Classification of Threats
- Possible
- Credible
- Confirmed
- Locks found off or broken
- Suspect devices found
58Secondary Indicators of Threat
- Unusual Items
- Containers (boxes, drums, bottles,
- bags, )
- Ropes, pulleys, ladders
- Additional pumps
- Foreign objects in water
- boats, rocks, material
- Strange odors or colors of water
592. Immediately Notify Officials
- Contact local law enforcement
- Contact appropriate state/federal authorities
- Alert other officials (local public health)
603. Assess and Respond to Threat
- Inspect facilities but do no disturb evidence
- This may be a crime scene
- If threat is credible, call the FBI
- Pull together a response team
- Determine if there is a biological, chemical, or
physical disruption of supply - Determine need for immediate actions
- Do not drink advisory
- Boil water advisory
61Assess and Respond to Threat
- If contamination is suspected, sample for
indicators - Collect samples for future analysis and preserve
accordingly - Conduct full assessment of facility
- Develop a communication strategy and communicate
with affected people - Determine alternative water sources
- If appropriate, drain, clean, repair, and
disinfect system
624. Communicate with Others
- Designate one public spokesperson
- Control of emotions, calm, in control, firm,
polite - Identify key messages
- Anticipate possible questions
- Prepare answers
- Never assume that what you say will be off the
record - Avoid conjecture and blame
- Keep communication succinct and to the point
635. Consider Additional Water Testing
- Coliform bacteria
- Heterotrophic Plate Count
- gt1000 suggests a problem
- Chlorine Residual
- Chlorine Demand
- Total Organic Carbon
- Total Halogenated Organic Carbon
- Cyanide
64Consider Additional Water Testing
- pH
- Conductivity
- Turbidity
- Fecal Coliform
- Biomonitoring (Fish ventilatory response)
- Rapid Microbiological toxicity
- Consumer complaints
65Water Security Resources
66Security Products(epa.gov/safewater/security/guid
e)
- Cyber Protection Products
- Firewalls
- Anti-virus and pest eradication software
- Network intrusion hardware/software
67Characteristics of an Early Warning System
- Rapid response time
- Time from the point of sensor detection to
reporting and response hours to minutes - Fully automated
- No operator present, 24 hour operation
- Screens for a wide range of contaminants
- Expensive and technically challenging
- Difficult to distinguish between harmful and
benign substances
68Characteristics of an Early Warning System
- Specific for the contaminant of concern
- Able to distinguish between harmful and benign
- Sufficient sensitivity
- Need to be sufficiently sensitive to provide
quantification of agents at the lowest level that
poses a threat - Low occurrence of false positives and false
negatives - Not possible to eliminate but must be known
69Characteristics of an Early Warning System
Characteristics of an Early Warning System
- High rate of sampling
- As frequently as is possible
- Reliable and rugged
- Be able to withstand field conditions
- Requires minimal skill and training
- Should not require excessive skill/training to
operate or maintain or to interpret results - Affordable
- The cheaper they are, the more that they will be
used
70Early Warning Monitoring Methods
- Physical analyses
- Turbidity
- Conductivity
- Temperature
- Odor
- Chemical analyses
- On-line probes
- pH, ions, ammonium, nitrate, cyanide, metals
71Early Warning Monitoring Methods
Early Warning Monitoring Methods
- Chemical analyses (cont.)
- Dissolved oxygen
- Detects presence of oxygen demanding substances
(sewage) - Nitrate and ammonia
- Metals
- Anionic stripping voltametry/polarography
- Used in Europe, restricted to certain metals
- Colorometric methods
- Atomic absorption spectrometry
- Inductively coupled plasma spectroscopy
72Early Warning Monitoring Methods
- Chemical analyses (cont.)
- General organic chemicals
- Total organic carbon
- UV absorption
- Oxygen demand
- Oil and petroleum
- Fluorescence oil detectors
- Organic chemicals
- 30 100K
73Early Warning Monitoring Methods
- Chemical analyses (cont.)
- Pesticides
- GC/MS
- 100K
- ELISA
- Available for some
- Radiation detection equipment
- Radiation detection equipment for monitoring
personnel and packages - Radiation detection equipment for monitoring
water assets
74Early Warning Monitoring Methods
Early Warning Monitoring Methods
- Microbiological analyses
- Conventional methods are slow (days)
- DNA probes, DNA microchip arrays (hours)
- Bioalarms
- Monitor behavior of fish or Daphnia
75Biological Detection Process
- Collect samples
- Generic detection
- Particle sizer
- Biological agent characteristics
- Identification kits
- Clinical laboratory
76Early Warning Systems Currently In-place
- Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission
- Organics Detection System
- 15 gas chromatographs
- Rhine River used by millions as water supply
- 30 monitoring stations
- Biomonitors using fish, Daphnia, mussels, algae,
bacteria
77Early Warning Systems Currently In-place
- River Dee - Wales and England
- On-line monitors for formaldehyde, ammonia,
phenol, VOCs, herbicides, and other parameters - Yodo River Japan
- Biomonitoring stations, TOC and UV monitors, Gas
chromatography - River Trent UK
- On-line monitoring of VOCs, nitrogen species,
TOC, Ion chromatography, oils
78Early Warning Systems Currently In-place
- St. Clair River Canada
- Hourly on-line monitoring for 20 VOCs.
79Identifying Alternative Water Supplies
80Need for Alternative Supply
- Water is a critical resource for health,
healthcare, business, and public health - Lack of water could cause panic
81Alternate Supply for Consumer Use
- Identify agencies, companies, contractors,
surrounding communities, and related utilities,
as appropriate - Establish mutual aid agreements with companies,
contractors, surrounding communities, and related
utilities, as appropriate - Maintain phone numbers for entities that could
assist in providing alternate water supplies
82Alternate Supply for Consumer Use
- Advise consumers to maintain emergency supply of
water (bottled water) - Identify optimal locations for parking water
tankers and distributing bottled water. - Identify ways to use only uncontaminated water
sources if multiple contributing water sources
are available.
83Options for Alternate Supplies of Drinking Water
84Possible Contacts for Alternate Water Supply
- Local businesses (dairies, well drillers,
distributors with tank trucks that can carry
water) - Companies that might have chlorinators or
generators for disinfection - Irrigation supply companies with pipe that can
extend water supply lines - Bottle manufacturers that could provide milk
jugs, other containers to transport water to the
affected community
85Possible Contacts for Alternate Water Supply
- Hospitals and universities may maintain backup
water supplies for industrial processes - Local industries may also have backup water
supplies for industrial purposes - Some local citizens may have well water sources
that can be utilized. - Local authorities may permit the utility to pump
and treat an available water source
86Public Guide to Water Purification
- Straining- Water containing sediment or floating
material can be strained through a cloth or paper
filter as the first step in the purification
process. - Boiling
- Chemical Sterilization (chlorine bleach)-
- Chemical Sterilization (iodine)-
- Filtration Devices- Such as those used for
camping and backpacking may also be used to
purify water from natural sources. - Water that officials report has been
contaminated with toxic chemicals or radioactive
materials should not be purified using home
decontamination methods
87Alternate Water Sources in the Home
- Ice Cubes
- Chilled Water stored in the refrigerator
- Hot water tank
- Toilet tank (Not toilet bowl. If cleaners have
been added to tank, do not use.) - Water pipes
- Rainwater, spring water, ponds, rivers, lakes
(Purify these sources before use.) -
- (Note Any of these listed sources may contain
contaminated water if filled in the timeframe of
the contamination incident.)
88Group 5Public Health ResponseRisk Communication
89Tasks for Group 5
- Develop risk communication strategies for the
following scenarios - Physical disruption of service
- Fake attack
- Idle (passive) threat to the media
- Toxin added to service lines
- Biological agent added to service lines
90Tasks for Group 5
- Who would you notify first?
- How would you notify the public?
- What is the content of your message?
- What actions would you tell the public to take?
- Who should be delivering the message?
- Mayor
- Commissioner of Health
- What are the types of personnel needed to have an
effective system to address these issues?
91Tools for Group 5
- Maps of the city and water system
- Description of the water system
- Lists of (in Group 1 section)
- Potential organisms
- Potential toxins
- Information on organisms/toxins (in Group 1
section) - NOEL
- Infective dose
- How to respond to a threat (in Group 4 section)
- How to decide appropriate notification technique
- Potential target audience
- Content/format of notification
92How to Decide What Type of Public Notification
Technique is Appropriate
- Evaluate the credibility of the threat and
potential consequences. Is notification
appropriate? - Are operational response actions adequate to
protect public health? - Consult with appropriate officials regarding
public notification options. - Is the contaminant known?-Yes If advisable,
issue a boil water notice.-Yes If risk of
dermal exposure or inhalation, issue a do not
drink notice.-No Issue a do not use notice.
93Target Audience
- People served by the water system include renters
and transients, not only billed customers. - Give sensitive subpopulations priority (daycares,
nursing homes, etc.) - Critical Care Facilities
- Hospitals, Clinics, Dialysis Centers,etc.
- Schools
- Businesses
- Food/drink makers, commercial ice makers,
restaurants, agricultural operations, power
generation facilities
94Content of Notification
- Content should be part of planning, not developed
during crisis. - Copy of should be sent to primacy agency.
- Description of incident, contaminant(s), and
information on how contaminant(s) entered water
supply. - Potential health effects, population at risk
- Whether alternative water supplies should be
used, possibly listing locations of alternative
water supplies. - Actions consumers should take (boiling, do not
use, do not drink, conserve water)
95Content of Notification
- When consumers should seek health care (e.g. what
symptoms to watch for) - Actions being taken to correct the situation
- Expected duration of emergency
- Name, business address, and phone number for
additional information
96Format of Notification
- Displayed in a conspicuous way when printed or
posted - Should not contain overly technical language or
small print - Assume consumers only read top half of notice (or
what can be read in 10 seconds) - Try to limit wordiness in notice. QA and
bullet/number formats are particularly effective. - Highlight the name of the water utility,
especially if more than one water service is in
use.
97Notification of Special Populations
- Identify ways to notify visually and
hearing-impaired populations and meet their
needs. - In the case of multilingual communities, issue
non-English warnings. - 10 of the population being non-English speaking
usually warrants multilingual warnings. - Make notices easy to read in all languages. Some
consumers may not have strong reading skills.
98Methods of Delivery
- Government access channels
- Web sites (local government and others)
- Listserve e-mail
- Newspaper
- Phone banks
- Broadcast phone messages (reverse 911
messages) - Broadcast faxes
- Mass distribution through community centers
- Door-to-door canvassing
- Town hall meetings
- Regular/special partner conference calls