Semantics and Cognition

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Semantics and Cognition
Lecture 6
2 Nov.,
2005

• Helena Gao

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• Required readings
• Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language
  Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford
  University Press.Chapter 10 Reference and Truth.
  pp. 53-67 Chapter 11 Lexical Semantics. pp.
  333-377
• Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a kind of
  fruit the semantics of human categorization.
  American Ethnologist , Vol. 11, No. 2, 313-328.
• Recommended readings
• Talmy, L. (2000). Toward a Cognitive Semantics.
  Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. Vol. 1. Chapter 7
  Force dynamics in language and cognition. pp.
  409-47

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The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics

• Semantic structure is conceptual structure
• Semantic structure (the meanings conventionally
  associated with words and other linguistic units)
  is equated with concepts.
• Conceptual structure is embodied
• The nature of conceptual organization arises from
  bodily experience

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The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics

Contd

• Meaning-representation is encyclopedic
• Words (and other linguistic units) are treated as
  points of access to vast repositories of
  knowledge concerning a particular concept.
• Meaning-construction is conceptualization
• Meaning construction is equated with
  conceptualization, a dynamic process whereby
  linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of
  conceptual operations and the recruitment of
  background knowledge.

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Issues in Cognitive Semantics

• Conceptual structure
• a) Conceptual structure vs. conceptual content
• b) profile/base organization
• c) mappings projection, pragmatic-function,
  schema
• Word-meaning
• Categorization
• Bodily basis of meaning
• a. John got the highest score on the test.
• b. Oil prices have fallen lately.
• c. Be nice to people on your way up because you
  meet them on your way down.

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• According to Jackendoff (1992),
• Within a cognitive theory

Conceptual Well-Formedness Rules
linguistic structures
conceptual structures
perceptual and action
Inference rules
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the resources available in the brain for
forming concepts

Conceptual Well-Formedness Rules
the brains combinatorial organization
linguistic structures
conceptual structures
perceptual and action
Inference rules
Similar to logical inference
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Contributions from perceptual modalities for the
structure of meaning (Jackendoff, 2002)

• How perceptual structures are stored?
• According to Jackendoff, a major division in the
  structure of meaning appears to lie between
  conceptual structure (CS) and spatial structure
  (SpS)
• (see Jackedoff, 1978, 1996b Landau and
  Jackendoff, 1993)

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Conceptual Structure (CS)

• CS is a hierarchical arrangement built out of
  discrete features and functions.
• It enables such aspects of understanding as
  category membership (taxonomy) and
  predicate-argument structure.

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Spatial Structure (SpS)

• SpS is concerned with encoding the spatial
  understanding of the physical world not just
  moment by moment appearance, but the integration
  over time of the space, motion, and layout of
  objects in space (and possibly the forces among
  them).
• The upper end of the visual system
• Also receives and integrates inputs about shape
  and spatial somatosensory system (felt position
  of ones own body)
• This integration is what enables you to know by
  looking at an object where to reach for it, and
  what it should feel like when you handle it.
• Thus SpS should be thought of as a system of
  central cognition, to some degree
  modality-independent.

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SpS

• SpS must encode the shape of objects in a form
  that is suitable for recognizing an object at
  different distances and from different
  perspectives.
• E.g., it must solve the classic problem of object
  consistency
• It must be able to encode spatial knowledge of
  parts of object that cannot be seen (e.g., the
  hollowness of a balloon).
• It must support visual object categorization as
  well as visual object (identification)
• e.g., making explicit the range of shape
  variations possible among different cups
• It must be able to encode the degrees of freedom
  in objects that can change their shape
• e.g., human and animal bodies.
• It must be suitable for encoding the full
  spatial layout of a scene , and for mediating
  among alternative perspectives.

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The Difference between Image and SpS

• An image is restricted to a particular point of
  view, whereas SpS is not.
• An image is restricted to a particular instance
  of a category, whereas SpS is not.
• An image cant include the unseen parts of an
  object its back and inside whereas SpS does.
• An image is restricted to the visual modality,
  whereas SpS can equally well encode information
  received haptically or through proprioception.

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Functions of CS and SpS

• Judgments and inferences having to do with
  predicate-argument relations, category
  membership, the type-token distinction,
  quantification, and so forth can be formulated
  only in terms of CS.
• Judgments and inferences having to do with exact
  shapes, locations, and forces can be formulated
  only in terms of SpS.

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Overlap between CS and SpS

• The notions of physical object, part-whole
  relationships, locations, force, and causation
  have reflexes in both systems.
• It is these shared components that enable the two
  systems to communicate with each other through an
  interface of the usual sort.

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Jackendoffs (1996) Hypothesis

• The grammatical aspects of language make
  reference only to CS, not to SpS.
• Nothing in grammar depends on detailed shapes of
  objects.
• SpS is languages indirect connection to visual,
  haptic, and proprioceptive perception, and to the
  control of action.
• It is through the SpS connection that we can talk
  about what we see.

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Incorporating the CS-SpS split in meaning
(Jackendoff, 2002, 348)
Visual system
Object
SpS
Noises
Language
CS
Haptic system
F- MIND
Action system
WORLD
However, not all lexical terms have a SpS
component. e.g., abstract concepts such as
fairness and values and logical concepts such as
and, if, not
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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection
(Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

• a. Lexical items supplemented by SpS

SpS
Phonology Syntax CS
???
LANGUAGE
SpS falls outside the standard tripartite
organization of language
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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection
(Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

• b. Non-linguistic concept attached to words
• An evolutionary perspective Suppose one deletes
  the phonological and syntactic structures
• What is left is a non-linguistic association of
  cognitive structures in memory, much of which
  could be shared by a non-linguistic organism.
• Phonological and syntactic structures can then be
  viewed as further structures tacked onto this
  concept to make it linguistically expressible.

Phonology Syntax
CS SpS
LANGUAGE
CONCEPT
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Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a kind of
fruit the semantics of human categorization

• Our principle categorization of the world does
  seem to be taxonomic, both in the areas of
  biological kinds and of manufactured
  environment.
• But, above this basic level of categorization, it
  is only with respect to the biological
  environment that we group kinds of things into
  superkinds
• With respect to the manufactured environment, we
  proceed differently
• we group kinds of things into supercategories on
  a different basis.
• We no longer ask, what kind of thing is it?
  rather we ask, what is it for? How can one use
  it? Where does it come from? Why is it there?
  (Wierzbicka, 1984 325).

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Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984 314)

• Taxonomic categorization does play a role in
  human thinking as reflected in natural language,
  but it does not dominate that thinking as has
  been assumed.
• Other classification principles also play an
  important role and in some areas of the lexicon,
  a more important role at that.

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Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984 315)

• Scientific classification, according to which a
  bird, a fish, or a spider is a kind of animal, is
  not at issue.
• In ordinary language they are not so classified.
• One would say of a parrot, a fish, or a spider
  A beautiful creature! or A repulsive
  creature! but not A beautiful animal! or A
  repulsive animal!
• In nonscientific English the word animal does not
  apply to everything that zoologists call animal,
  and the word plant does not apply to everything
  that botanists call plant.

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Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984 316)

• When we define a cat as a kind of animal, a
  parrot as kind of bird, a rose as a kind of
  flower, or an oak as a kind of tree, we are
  implying that conceptually a cat is above all a
  kind of animal, a parrot is a kind of bird, and
  so on, and that all the other defining features
  are subordinate to this one.
• A concept that identifies a kind of thing stands
  for something that has certain perceptual
  characteristics and can therefore be imagined or
  drawn.
• Thus, one can draw not only a parrot but also an
  unspecified bird, not only a rose but also a
  flower, not only an oaktree but also a tree in
  general.

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Functional concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984 316)

• Functional concepts stand for artifacts if any
  kind made with a particular function in mind
• The crucial differences between taxonomic
  supercategories such as birds or flowers or trees
  and nontaxonomic ones such as toys or weapons or
  ornaments can be seen immediately when one tries
  to represent them pictorially.
• One cannot draw a toy, a weapon, a container, or
  a utensil in general.
• purely functional and thus imply no visual or
  more generally perceptual properties.

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Functional concepts vs. taxonomic concepts
(Wierzbicka, 1984 318)

• For taxonomic concepts (concepts that stand for a
  kind of thing), such as tricycles or balls,
  visible characteristics are crucial.
• But a concept such as toy or weapon stands
  neither for a kind of thing nor strictly
  speaking, for a kind of function. It stands for
  anything that has a particular function.
• Imaginability is a useful criterion to
  distinguish concrete concepts that stand for a
  kind of thing from other concrete concepts.

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Semantic fuzziness (Wierzbicka, 1984 318)

• The difference between taxonomic and functional
  concepts is reflected in the greater semantic
  fuzziness of the latter.
• This fuzziness has been presented as a
  fundamental feature of human categorization
  reflected in natural language (e.g., cup, knife,
  etc.)

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The concept of contiguity (Wierzbicka, 1984 319)

• The concept of contiguity plays crucial role in
  natural language in the area of concrete lexicon.
• A concept based on anthropologists distinction
  between taxonomies (systems of kinds) and
  partonomies (systems of parts).
• Thus a nose is not a kind of thing (that sticks
  out in the middle of the face, etc.) but a part
  of the face (that sticks out in the middle of the
  face, etc.).

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singularia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984 320-321)

• Collective concepts based on contiguity and
  function, such as furniture, are singularia
  tantum.
• A misconception to assume that tables are
  semantically a kind of furniture shirts, a kind
  of clothing or apples, a kind of fruit.
• There is nothing wrong to say so but semantically
  they are not.
• E.g., cockroaches can be described as vermin, but
  semantically they are not a kind of vermin they
  are a kind of bug.
• Vermin is a collective concept and cockroach is
  an individual one.
• The grammatical difference between vermin (a mass
  noun) and a cockroach (a countable) reflects a
  difference in the conception.

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pluralia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984 321)

• Collective concepts based on contiguity without a
  reference to function, such as leftovers and
  contents, are pluralia tantum.
• E.g., goods, , clothes, goodies groceries,
  refreshments, odds-and-ends, bits-and-pieces,
  remains, belongings, supplies, trappings,
  trimmings, spoils, valuables, nuts-and-bolts,
  covers, dishes.
• All these words are designate heterogeneous
  collections of things things that at some
  particular time are, or are expected to be, in
  the same place.
• In some instances the lack of a common function
  is transparent.
• In other instances a common function does seem to
  be implied.

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singularia tantum vs. pluralia tantum
(Wierzbicka, 1984 321)

• The two types of supercategories are both based
  on contiguity.
• Singularia tantum such as furniture stand for
  categories the members of which are physically
  separate from one another and therefore could be
  counted together.
• Memebers of categories designated by pluralia
  tantum such as groceries are not only
  heterogeneous but also not fully discrete.
• The pluralia tantum class has a nontaxonomic
  character while the singularia tantum one does
  not.