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Signaling

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... it is just the difference between consuming quiche and consuming beer ... Then the settlement offer of the plaintiff can 'signal' the strength of the case ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Signaling


1
Signaling
Tough players

2
The beer quiche model I
  • An incumbent monopolist can be either tough or a
    wimp (not tough).
  • An incumbent monopolist receives 4 if the entrant
    stays out and 2 if the entrant enters.
  • An entrant earns 2 if it enters against a wimp
    incumbent, loses 1 if it enters against a tough
    incumbent, gets 0 if it stays out.

Entrant
Dont Enter
Enter
( 2, -1)
( 4, 0)
Tough
Incumbent
Wimp
( 2, 2)
( 4, 0)
3
Beer Quiche II
  • If the entrant sees who is the incumbent
    (complete information)
  • Enters if wimp
  • Stays out if tough
  • The problem is that the entrant can not see
    whether the incumbent is tough or wimp
    (incomplete information).
  • In order for this to be a signaling game we are
    going to add a stage where the incumbent can send
    a signal.
  • Then we are going to try to understand if this
    strategy of changing the game can actually help
    the incumbent.

4
Beer Quiche III
  • Before the entrant enters the incumbent can have
    breakfast in public so the entrant sees his
    behavior.
  • He can either order BEER or QUICHE.
  • Having beer for breakfast is awful so there is a
    cost for having beer for breakfast
  • Having Quiche for breakfast is nice so it
    actually gives a payoff if you have it. Lets
    assume that this payoff is U where U is non
    negative.
  • The trick is that tough incumbent do not suffer
    much for having beer they suffer a loss of 1
    while the wimp suffers a loss of 2.

5
The beer quiche model IV
Wimp Incumbent
Tough Incumbent
Entrant
Entrant
Dont Enter
Dont Enter
Enter
Enter
( 2-3, 2)
( 4-3, 0)
( 2-1, -1)
( 4-1, 0)
Beer
Beer
Quiche
Quiche
( 2U, 2)
( 4U, 0)
( 2U, -1)
( 4U, 0)
6
Beer Quiche V
  • In this representation we can not incoporate that
    the incumbent moves first
  • We need to draw a game tree that incorporates
    this
  • To complete the incomplete information set up
    we need to add beliefs
  • We are going to assume that the incumbent can be
    tough or wimp with equal probability.

7
Beer Quiche Game Tree I
quiche
beer
½
tough
Incumbent
wimp
½
quiche
beer
8
Beer Quiche Game Tree II
quiche
beer
½
tough
Entrant
Entrant
Incumbent
wimp
½
quiche
beer
9
Beer Quiche Game Tree III
enter
enter
quiche
beer
out
out
½
tough
Entrant
Entrant
Incumbent
enter
wimp
enter
½
quiche
beer
out
out
10
Beer Quiche Game Tree IV
2U,-1
enter
1,-1
enter
quiche
beer
4U,0
3,0
out
out
½
tough
Entrant
Entrant
Incumbent
enter
wimp
enter
½
2U,2
-1,2
quiche
beer
4U,0
1,0
out
out
11
Beer Quiche solution
  • Equilibrium Tough incumbent drinks beer wimp
    incumbent eats quiche entrant stays out against
    beer drinkers and entrant enters against quiche
    eaters.

12
Beer Quiche Game Tree IV
2U,-1
enter
1,-1
enter
quiche
beer
4U,0
3,0
out
out
½
tough
Entrant
Entrant
Incumbent
wimp
enter
½
enter
2U,2
-1,2
quiche
beer
4U,0
1,0
out
out
13
Beer Quiche conditions
  • For the tough incumbent to play beer we require 3
    to be bigger or equal than 2U.
  • If 2Ugt3 then the tough incumbent would try to
    get the quiche instead of signaling his type.
  • This equilibrium is not possible for Ugt1.
  • What happens when Ugt1
  • Tough incumbent will change his behavior
  • This will induce the entrant to modify his
    behavior

14
Beer Quiche Tough change
2U,-1
enter
1,-1
enter
quiche
beer
4U,0
3,0
out
out
½
tough
Entrant
Entrant
Incumbent
wimp
enter
½
enter
2U,2
-1,2
quiche
beer
4U,0
1,0
out
out
15
Beer Quiche interpretation
16
Beer Quiche the role of U
  • U reflects the utility derived form consuming
    quiche.
  • In fact it is just the difference between
    consuming quiche and consuming beer (when we
    incorporate that beer is costly).
  • When U increases taking beer is more costly than
    before
  • Tough incumbents do not have incentives to
    actually leave quiche in the table and take beer
  • It is more difficult to incur a cost in order to
    signal yourself

17
Other Applications
  • Settlements in court cases
  • Suppose the plaintiff knows the expected damages
    of the case with greater precision than the
    defendant
  • Then the settlement offer of the plaintiff can
    signal the strength of the case
  • Effective signaling can avoid costly court battles
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