The Western Union 1948

1
The Western Union (1948)?

• Other intergovernmental, Franco-British
  cooperation schemes in 1947-1949
• Treaty of Brussels, March 17th 1948, creates the
  Western Union (becomes the Western European Union
  in 1955)
• Incentive from London and Paris, that approach
  Washington for the creation of a European
  organization on security and defense issues
• The tone of the Franco-British proposal is very
  anti-German, and the Benelux and Washington are
  cautious
• During the debate on the institutions, Britain
  gains one more time loose, weak institutions, and
  the guarantee against Germany is watered down
• The Benelux and France wanted a more developed,
  robust organization
• This is a classical alliance, largely deprived of
  its meaning by NATO in 1949

2
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,
1949)?

• Á military alliance, established by the signing
  of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4th, 1949.
  The organization established a system of
  collective defense whereby its member states
  agree to mutual defense in response to an attack
  by any external party
• Important part of European politics for the
  Atlantist countries the Benelux, but also
  Norway, Portugal, Greece
• Necessity in the future to balance between a
  European and an Atlantic system
• French divided
• Atlantists alliance with Britain, western
  solidarity, etc
• Realists France needs the help
• The military
• The Gaullists

3
The Franco-British axis

• France and Britain as the favoured partners of
  the US in European reconstruction
• They emphasize intergovernmental, weak
  associations, or even classical alliances
• In 1949, Few could doubt the money had been well
  spent
• the system has ensured Western European economic
  recovery, which starts to be felt in 1949
• For Britain, the system of intergovernmental
  organizations is satisfying
• OEEC, Council of Europe, NATO, European Payments
  Union Loose, intergovernmental organizations. A
  mix of Atlantic and European organizations allows
  Britain to juggle between the US and Europe, and
  protects itself from too much commitment on the
  continent
• Projects mostly forcefully accepted by France in
  the hope to get economic help and strategic help
  against Germany

4
France divided

• A satisfying state of affairs?
• Most of these projects have been forcefully
  accepted by the French
• The OEEC seems good for high ranking civil
  servants in the Ministry of Finances especially
  small commitment, big help to Frances recovery,
  control of trade liberalization in Europe
• Diplomats (the influential René Massigli),
  support intergovernmental cooperation with
  Great-Britain, seen as a continuation of the
  pre-war cooperation against Germany
• In the military, support for NATO
• A debate in 1950-1951
• The field confederalists, traditionalists
  (souverainistes), and federalists
• Much in the middle, much undecided A minor
  partnership with Britain or a senior partnership
  with Germany?
• The communists
• Find new solutions to accommodate a new Germany,
  and find a new role for France in Europe
• West Germany would not be able to remain cut
  off, since East Germany is becoming increasingly
  attached to the Soviet bloc. But just how far
  does one have to go if one does not wish to
  overstep the bounds of caution? (Le Monde, 28th
  March 1950)
• Some in France for a change of paradigm, amongst
  political parties and leaders the
  Christian-democrats, the socialists, etc

5
Divisions in France

• Is this satisfying for France?
• Most of these projects had been forcefully
  accepted by a French leadership worried about the
  resurgence of Germany and the economic sacrifices
  linked to liberalization
• 1948-1949 battle lines emerge
• The advocates of the OEEC/NATO/Britain policy
• High-ranking civil servants, members of the
  military, the press
• France has to lean on the United States and
  Britain to develop its economy, its military
  force and its position in the world
• The coalition of democracies
• Arguments against that start to rise
• France is systematically dominated by Britain in
  weak, intergovernmental organizations
• An old streak of French foreign policy culture
  the fickle Brits
• France does not get the political, European,
  strong backup it needs to control a resurgence of
  Germany
• Economically, the liberalization driven by the
  OEEC will be very hard to swallow for France
• Strategically, the French lose inside NATO
• A moderate version the negotiations for
  membership have brought in the Scandinavian
  countries, making of NATO less a protection
  against Germany and more a tool in an
  American-led Cold War
• An extreme version France has lost its
  independence and needs to reclaim it
• In 1949-1950, the debate is on

6
May 9th 1950, The Schuman declaration

• French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman gives a
  speech to the press
• The pooling of European coal and steel under a
  supranational agency that would manage these
  resources.
• Europe will not be made all at once, or
  according to a single plan. It will be built
  through concrete achievements, which first create
  a de facto solidarity The pooling of coal and
  steel production should immediately provide for
  the setting up of common foundations for economic
  development as a first step in the federation of
  Europe.
• Very different from the projects advocated until
  then. A political federation! Strong,
  supranational institutions! A Franco-German axis!
  
• A French foreign policy decision, born in the
  circles of French politics. Why?

7
France, Western Germany, the US

• At the heart of these debates, the German
  question for France
• France mid-sized country after 1945
• 1945-1949 the basis of French policy has been
  avoiding the reconstruction of an economic and
  political Western Germany
• To achieve that, governments have leaned on
  Great-Britain and the United States, hoping to
  control a resurgence of Germany

• But the US want the Europeans to include Western
  Germany
• From the Morgenthau plan (1945, dismantling
  German industry) to creating a Western Germany in
  a European context
• Reservations in Washington about creating
  economic and political competition in Europe, but
  Dean Achesons policy is to propose the French a
  measure of control on Germany, if they organize,
  and if they accept German resurgence
• Political and economic aspects

8
Franco-British discrepancies the negotiations
of London

• From a French point of view, the shortcomings of
  cooperation with London
• February to March 1948, negotiations in London
• Bidault tries to defend a hard line on Germany,
  but it is a rearguard action against
  Great-Britain and the US
• France has to accept the economic fusion of its
  zone with the Anglo-American bizone, and the
  elaboration of a plan for a political unity of
  Western Germany
• May 1948 the Western German fundamental law is
  adopted
• The Soviet Union reacts by the blockade of
  Berlin, May-June 1948
• Fear of the USSR strengthens even more the US
  intention to build a Western Germany

9
The Council of Europe

• One of the only successes of the European
  Movement
• A europeist lobby group, emanation of the
  European ideal of the Resistance, created in
  October 1948
• The federal congresses (The Hague, May 1948)?
• Associations European Union of Federalists
  (Paris, 1946 June 1947, Christian-democrat
  Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, etc)?
• Winston Churchill lobbies in the Movement
• The Zurich Speech in September 1946
• After the Hague, lobbying for a Council of
  Europe

10

• Bidault takes the idea with the hope to build a
  strong political organization with Britain to
  keep Germany under friendly control
• Bidaults Foreign minister, Robert Schuman,
  proposes on July 20th 1948 a customs union, a
  European assembly, a strong cooperation around a
  prestigious, supranational assembly
• A British rebuttal
• Negotiations during the winter of 1948-1949
  debates extremely frustrating for the French,
  misunderstanding at its worst
• Treaty of London (May 5th 1949)
• The Council of Europe an intergovernmental body,
  symbolic powers, an agenda fixed by the states, a
  limited margin of manoeuvre

11
1949-1950

• In the summer of 1949, it is clear for most
  French leaders that neither the USSR, nor the US,
  nor Great-Britain will support Frances options
  in Germany a divided Germany, the border with
  France internationalized, etc
• Searching for new forms of cooperation with the
  Germans
• The Franco-German axis of post-1951 comes from
  the failure of the Franco-British axis
• The Cold War context
• Fear of Soviet power against fear of resurgent
  Germany?
• US pressure for a rebuilt Western Germany
• Dean Acheson and European leaders
  cross-fertilization

12
Economic, technical pressures

• Keeping US support means
• accepting the United States German policy
• September 1949, Dean Acheson says in an
  interview that he would like Germans in
  uniforms by the autumn of 1951
• The French also look for economic openness
  without the risks of an uncontrolled market an
  upgraded customs union, with a regulatory body
  able to reproduce state regulation on the zone (a
  cocoon where the states would quietly adapt)
• More specific
• Why Coal and Steel?
• Essential industrial products, the tools of war
• Fear in 1949-1950 of an overproduction crisis in
  Western Germany, that would drop the prices only
  a European-wide solution would correct that
• A naturally international problem scattered
  mines, 6 European countries use coal in 1950 for
  70 of their energy consumption
• Find a possibility to solve the problem of
  resources without letting it entirely in the
  hands of a Western German state

13
The Saarland

• The Saar as a problem in Franco-German relations
• Old story the 1920s and the autonomy of the Saar
• A part of the French occupation zone, in a
  customs union with France separating it from
  Germany?
• In March 1950, the French sign a series of
  treaties with the Saarland autonomous
  authorities, the Western Germans are extremely
  dissatisfied at what they see as a French
  protectorate on the region
• German protestations and activity in the Council
  of Europe
• Negotiations are ongoing in parallel to the
  ECSCs negotiations
• The Council of Europe treats the matter in
  1953-1955
• Referendum of October, 23rd, 1955, 67.7  of the
  electorate in the Saar rejected a European
  territory status. France was obliged to come to
  terms with the return of the Saar to Germany.
•  October 27th, 1956, the Luxembourg Agreements,
  signed by France and the Federal Republic,
  provided for the political reintegration of the
  Saar into Germany on 1 January 1957

14
The Ruhr and the IAR

• The Ruhr, coal, steel and heavy industry
• The creation of the International Authority for
  the Ruhr in 1948
• French concerns and American will to recreate
  Germany
• August 1947 Bidault strikes a deal with William
  Clayton France would stop demanding complete
  control of the Ruhr, if guaranteed the German
  industrial recovery would not outspace the
  French, and that an international managment would
  be created for the Ruhrs resources A board to
  allocate the Ruhr production of coal, iron, and
  steel and possibly chemicals between Germany and
  other countries
• February 1948, the French propose the creation of
  an IAR
• Control production, the prices, and help tariff
  reduction and German democratization
• April 28th, 1949 creation of the IAR in London
• But there are pressures for a dismantlement of
  the IAR from Germany and the US
• The perspective of a dismantlement of the IAR in
  December 1951 can only frighten the French how
  to keep a control on the German coal? How to
  guarantee access to French companies?

15
Konrad Adenauers proposals

• In this context, the French have also to react to
  the policy of the Western German chancellor
• Long-term politician, Christian-democrat,
  opponent to Hitler
• A Western Germany turned to the West,
  collaboration with France, resistance to Eastern
  Germany
• September 1949, first speech as chancellor
  Franco-German cooperation
• Die Zeit, November 1950 The notion of
  hereditary enemy is anachronistic
• March 1950 a Franco-German union, first
  economic then political
• No idealism in Adenauers policy
• Complete territorial sovereignty through Western
  European integration (Westintegration)
• Germany a respectable partner again
• Solving the Saar problem through negotiations
• On Frances side, how to react to that?
• The same article in Le Monde urges French
  politicians to do something the country that
  can and must steer Germanys European policy
  ought not be behind all the others France as
  the senior partner to Germany

16
Solving the Ruhr problem?

• 1946 map by the French government to England
• Detaching the Ruhr, dividing Germany?
• Who would support such a plan?
• The difficulty to move on from that, even for
  socialist or Christian-Democrat governments

17
Jean Monnet

• Monnet
• Cosmopolite character, with an international view
• Businessman
• French civil servant
• A lobbyist networks in the US, Great-Britain,
  Germany
• The indispensable intermediary between the US and
  Europe
• At the end of 1949, Commissioner general of the
  French national planning board
• Planification, modernization and European
  cooperation hand in hand
• Free trade and cooperation to avoid the spilling
  of economic tensions into politics
• Integrating Germany
• France would not survive another assault born of
  inflamed economic and political tensions with
  Germany
• There was a need to integrate the productive
  forces of Germany into a new international order
• Sectorial integration, functionalist thinking an
  elite-led project, the provision of welfare
• French interests wrapped into European projects
• Answer to Adenauer frustration after the
  negotiations of the Council of Europe
• He draws a project for the French leadership
• A supranational organization pooling French and
  German coal and steel resources, with independent
  institutions managing it, and able to act as a
  step on the way to creating a European federation
  able to guarantee Frances interests, peace and
  prosperity
• A European solution to the German problem?

18
Coal, steel, and war

• The symbolic and economic value of coal and steel
• The tools of war
• The 6 putative members (Italy, Benelux, Germany,
  France) use coal for 70 of their energy
  consumption in 1950, with the Ruhr the main
  producer
• A pool would make it impossible for Germany to
  act on the prices while ensuring that everybody
  would get its share of coal and that the
  disbandment of the IAR would go without problems.
  
• Same for steel

19
Robert Schuman

• Schuman Christian-democrat, born in a border
  region
• Foreign minister, lobbied by Monnet
• The soviet danger
• The possibility to start better relations with
  Germany from the hard-line to collaboration
• The possibility to control German resurgence
• A chance to modernize French economy
• A chance to create a European pole outside of the
  bipolar divide
• November 1948-January 1949
• negotiations for the Council of Europe see
  Schuman defend more cooperation, unsuccessfully
• Acknowledges the need for a change of paradigm
• Prevent war by economic and political cooperation
• Schuman is in a position to choose between
  solutions he chooses to advocate the Monnet
  project

20
Elaborating the declaration

• Monnets lobbying bears fruits at the beginning
  of 1950
• Nine drafts of the memorandum between Monnet,
  Schuman, and Bidault
• French cabinet meeting around Monnets
  memorandum, May 3rd 1950 (records burnt)
• Lobbying outside the public eye Secrecy was the
  order of the day
• The decision of a few men
• Monnet, who presents and defends the idea
• Tactics taking everybody by surprise
• Schuman, who politically endorses the project
• To Schuman, the projects main dimension is
  political, symbolic
• The text of the declaration Peace,
  reconciliation
• Bidault, who lets Schuman present the project to
  the government and Frances partners
• Bidault has other plans. He emphasizes more the
  control of Germany and Atlantist projects, but
  will let Schuman and Monnet work
• He sees, however, already in 1948, that contacts
  have to be recreated with Germany, and that the
  recovery of Germany will happen. There is a need
  to prepare for the future

21
The last moves

• Critics inside France, mostly political
• souverainistes the integrity of Frances
  sovereignty (Gaullists)
• confederalists and Anglophiles not with
  Germany, not through supranational integration
  (Quai dOrsay)
• Communists are still outside the game
• Still very far from the peoples preoccupations
• However, the thing is kept secret to the end
• Frances partners are informed
• Dean Acheson, May 8th
• Knee-jerk reaction isn't it to revive a
  cartel, thus going against the process of
  liberalization?
• Reaction is reserved, but Monnet acts as an
  intermediary and Acheson supports the project
• Konrad Adenauer approves the plan May 8th, again
  in the morning of May 9th
• May 8th plan presented to the Ministers of
  Economy and Finances of Benelux, Great-Britain,
  Italy, during a secret meeting
• 9th May, the French government accepts the final
  draft
• 6 pm, a press conference is convened in the Quai
  dOrsay, 200 journalists to listen to the Schuman
  declaration

22
May 9th 1950

• World peace cannot be safeguarded without the
  making of creative efforts proportionate to the
  dangers which threaten it. The contribution which
  an organized and living Europe can bring to
  civilization is indispensable to the maintenance
  of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for
  more than 20 years the role of champion of a
  united Europe, France has always had as her
  essential aim the service of peace. A united
  Europe was not achieved and we had war.
• Europe will not be made all at once, or according
  to a single plan. It will be built through
  concrete achievements which first create a
  de facto solidarity. The rassemblement of the
  nations of Europe requires the elimination of the
  age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any
  action taken must in the first place concern
  these two countries.
• With this aim in view, the French Government
  proposes to take action immediately on one
  limited but decisive point. It proposes to place
  Franco-German production of coal and steel as a
  whole under a common higher authority, within the
  framework of an organization open to the
  participation of the other countries of Europe.
  The pooling of coal and steel production should
  immediately provide for the setting up of common
  foundations for economic development as a first
  step in the federation of Europe, and will change
  the destinies of those regions which have long
  been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of
  war, of which they have been the most constant
  victims.
• Different visions on the Schuman declaration
• Certainly the beginning of a new orientation, for
  France, for Europe