ESDP

1
ESDP

• Bridging Internal and External Security Lessons
  from the European Security and Defence Policy

2
Introduction

• ESDP ?operational capacity and the political will
  to intervene abroad for humanitarian,
  peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking
  purposes.
• Internal security threats on top of political
  agenda ?terrorist attacks, natural disasters etc.
• New and more complex threats ?difficulties of
  managing crises in a borderless Europe.
• Convergence between EUs external and internal
  crisis ?ESDP as policy relevant only to external
  crises.
• However, bridges between external and internal
  policy might eventually emerge.

3
The Development of the ESDP

• Early development
• External crisis management using military
  capabilities ?changing nature of international
  politics and security in the 1990s
• Growing external expectations ?neighbours looked
  for EU advice and support
• The process of integration also made it difficult
  to leave questions of security and defence out of
  the process.

4
Military Crisis Management

• Initial development of ESDP ?military aspects
  (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo).
• Petersberg tasks in Amsterdam Treaty
  ?humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping
  tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis
  management (also peacemaking) etc.
• Headline Goals ?ability of the EU to respond to
  external crises with military tools.
• Battle Groups concept ?respond rapidly to crises,
  permanent force at very short notice.

5
Civilian Crisis Management

• Major weakness ?the need for civilian tools to
  complement military crisis management.
• Feira European Council (2000) ?four civilian
  intervention areas
• The police
• The rule of law
• Civilian administration
• Civilian protection
• ESDP ?On the second pillar of the EU,
  governments closely overseeing and controlling
  its development.

6
Sources of DivergenceCompeting Competences

• Growing competition between the Community and The
  Common Foreign and Security Policy in crisis
  management ?divide responsabilities within EU so
  the Community would adress internal crises and
  CFSP external crises.
• This would ignore Communitys role in managing
  crises outside EU ?competences in external
  relations,in development and assistance, trade
  and enlargement.
• Numerous gray areas where Community as well as
  CFSP could legitimately claim competence.
• Bureaucratic rivalry between the Commission and
  the Council ensued.

7
Competing Definitions

• The Commissions definition groups together
  peace-building, conflict prevention, conflict
  management and conflict resolution ?distinguish
  between short-, medium- and long-term aspects of
  crisis management.
• Conflict prevention as fixed priority
• No clear distinction between the roles of the
  Community (the Commission) and the member states
  (the Council) in crisis management.
• Absence of visible definitions on the Council
  side (terminology is open to interpretation)
  ?fierce bureaucratic rivalries.

8
The Internal Security Challenge

• EUs reasons for engaging in crisis management
  outside the Unions territory
• EU sees itself abroad as single actor
• EU is expected to act by citizens and outside
  actors
• European Security Strategy A European Union
  which takes greater responsibility and which is
  more active will be one which carries greater
  political weight (Solana 2003).
• EU puts itself as an actor among other actors as
  UN, NATO or the OSCE.
• EU has a choice whether to be involved or not and
  the possibility of defining the operations length
  and goals clearly.

9
Sources of ConvergenceNatural Disasters and
Terrorist Attacks

• A number of barriers between internal and
  external dimensions of crisis management are
  being eroded.
• Co-ordination within the EU and with external
  partners ?disaster scenarios may demand the
  mobilisation and utilization of military and
  civilian resources.
• ESDP military and civilian missions should be
  linked more effectively with humanitarian
  assistance, consular services and financial aid
  aspects on the Community side of external
  equation

10
New Ideas and Doctrines

• The need to develop strategic thinking and
  doctrines about EU security.
• ESDP development initially event-driven ?the next
  stage what Union would be doing with its new
  capacities - European Security Strategy
  (ESS)(Solana 2003).
• ESS ?first attempt by EU to provide a guiding
  framework behind its role on the world stage
  ?outlines threats to EU terrorism, proliferation
  of weapons of mass destruction, regional
  conflicts, state failure and organized crime.
• ESS oriented mainly towards external security
  issues.
• ?

11
New Ideas and Doctrines

• EU Action Plan on Terrorism ?regular
  coordination, the exchange of information and
  personnel between the pillars is essential for
  comprehensive approach to a threat.
• Report by Michel Barnier (2006) ?the lack of
  systematic scenarios or protocols at the European
  level for responding to a number of crisis.
• The need for an Operational Manual on EU
  emergency and crisis coordiantion pointed out by
  Commission.

12
Dual Use and Overlapping Capacities

• Some policies implemented in one pillar are
  clearly applicable in others as well
• Sharing of intelligence and other crisis-relevant
  information
• Related with the ESDP?strategic lift that could
  be provided by EU Military Staff
• The various pillars may lead to consolidation.
• Apparent that many aspects of ESDP have practical
  implications for internal crisis management, most
  notably in air transport.

13
Institutional Venues and Informal Bridging

• The creation of new institutional venues related
  to security and crisis management ?may also
  create more comprehensive crisis management
  approach in the future
• Sit-Cen (Situation Centre) ?to coordinate
  intelligence and to provide effective
  communication in regards to external EU missions.
• Sit-Cen asked by member states to take a new role
  ?to coordinate the procedures for an EU Crisis
  Group(contains important Commission and Council
  leaders who will act in case of internal crisis
  in EU territory.
• ?

14
Institutional Venues and Informal Bridging

• The creation of Civilian-Military Cell (Civ-Mil
  Cell) ?to create greater coherence between the
  military and civilian structures used to plan and
  deploy EU crisis management missions.
• The aim of Civ-Mil Cell ?to reinforce the
  national headquarters of member state that leads
  EU operation and to build general capacity for
  running coordinated crisis management missions
  abroad.

15
Information Networks

• Institutional division and capacity divergence in
  the EU ?solution would be better information
  networks.
• ARGUS ?devloped at the moment and will eventually
  be a central network in the Commission for the
  rapid flow of information between the EU rapid
  alert systems.
• The Central Crisis Centre ?in process of being
  establisehed, aim of coordinating efforts so that
  comprehensive evaluation may be made in order to
  determine options and appropriate responses
• Commissions 129 delegations ?advising on
  potential challenges or threats to regional or
  international stability.

16
The Search for Legitimacy

• Boosting EUs role in either internal or external
  components of security must be legitimate
  ?politically acceotabe, practically necessary and
  publicly supported.
• Greater emphasis on internal-external dimensions
  since European citizens are concerned about the
  threats posed by organized crime, terrorism and
  illegal migration issues.
• Citizens seem to appreciate EUs growing
  international role ?it is rather EUs role in
  internal security that needs sources of
  legitimacy
• Member states more willing to boost capacities
  for internal security if those capacities can
  also be used abroad and vice versa.

17
Conclusions

• New policies frequently cite the need to turn all
  of the EU crisis management resources toward new
  threats.
• Much of the ambiguity and ill-defined goals of
  the ESDP create competition today, but can also
  illuminate the points of convergence and
  cooperation for the future.
• Short-term solutions are too simplistic
• They ignore Community competences in external
  relations
• Ignore also ESDPs potentially important role in
  military and civilian roles in civilian crises
• Different approaches EU governments take to
  cooperation at home versus abroad
• In international context, Eu is not competing
  against its own member states, but posits itself
  as an actor among other actors such as NATO.
  Member states have control over ESDP. ?

18
Conclusions

• Internal crises ?member states must act
  effectively without warning and oportunities to
  prepare properly. Different politics, role of EU
  less clear and political uncertainties undermine
  the legitimacy with which the EU might take part.
• ESDP ?suggesions that it should include other
  areas of CFSP the area of freedom, security and
  justice numerous areas of Community policy the
  Commissions External Service and the member
  states themselves.
• Eventually all comes down to questions of who
  does what (competences) and with what (resources).