Title: Philosophy 100
1Philosophy 100
2 3The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
- (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) We have eggs.
- (3) ? Jim went to the store.
4The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
- (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) We have eggs.
- (3) ? Jim went to the store.
-
- - Logic deals with the form, not the content of
arguments. So, to consider only the form of this
argument, we will cut the content out.
5The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
- (A)
- (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) We have eggs. (A)
- (3) ? Jim went to the store.
6The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
-
- (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) (A)
- (3) ? Jim went to the store.
7The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
- (B)
- (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) (A)
- (3) ? Jim went to the store. (B)
8The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
-
- (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim (B)t to the store
- (2) (A)
- (3) ? (B)
9The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Ponens
- (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) We have eggs.
- (3) ? Jim went to the store.
10The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Tollens
- (1) If we have eggs, then Jim went to the store.
- (2) Jim didnt go to the store.
- (3) ? We dont have eggs.
11The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Tollens
-
- (1) If we (A)veeggs, then Jim (B)t to the store
- (2) (B)
- (3) ? (A)
12The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Tollens
-
- (1) If A, then Bt to the store
- (2) B
- (3) ? A
13The Logic of Skepticism
- Some basic logic Modus Tollens
-
- (1) If A, then Bt to the store
- (2) B
- (3) ? A
- Skepticism in contemporary philosophy is usually
put forth as a Modus Tollens argument.
14- Descartes Argument for Skepticism
15Skepticism
- In contemporary terminology, the ground for
doubt proposed by Descartes can be put like this
-
- U My epistemic equipment is untrustworthy.
-
- The Cartesian-style argument for Academic
Skepticism can now be put like this - (1) If I know that p, then there are no genuine
grounds for doubting that p. - (2) U is a genuine ground for doubting that p.
- (3) Therefore, I do not know that p.
-
- (SEP Skepticism)
16Skepticism
- In contemporary terminology, the ground for
doubt proposed by Descartes can be put like this
-
- U My epistemic equipment is untrustworthy.
-
- The Cartesian-style argument for Academic
Skepticism can now be put like this - (1) If I know that p, then there are no genuine
grounds for doubting that p. - (2) U is a genuine ground for doubting that p.
- (3) Therefore, I do not know that p.
-
- (SEP Skepticism)
17- The Contemporary Argument for Skepticism
18Skepticism
- O Ordinary Beliefs
- (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
1030, Blackholes exist) - S Skeptical Hypotheses
19Skepticism
- O Ordinary Beliefs
- (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
1030, Blackholes exist) - S Skeptical Hypotheses
- (e.g. Dreams, Brain-in-a-vat, Subjective
Contributions)
20Skepticism
- O Ordinary Beliefs
- (e.g. I have two hands, Class begins at
1030, Blackholes exist) - S Skeptical Hypotheses
21Skepticism
- O Ordinary Beliefs
- S Skeptical Hypotheses
22Skepticism
- O Ordinary Beliefs
- S Skeptical Hypotheses
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
23- The Arguments Against Skepticism
24The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
25The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
26Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
27Skepticism
- Closure If person P knows p and p entails
- q, then P knows q.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
28Skepticism
- Closure If person P knows p and p entails
- q, then P knows q.
- Reject Closure?
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
29Skepticism
- Closure If person P knows p and p entails
- q, then P knows q.
- Reject Closure?
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
30The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
31Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
32Skepticism
- Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
-
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
33Skepticism
- Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
- Indexical (e.g. I or small)
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
34Skepticism
- Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
- Know-1 Ordinary Contexts
- Know-2 Philosophy Class
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
35Skepticism
- Contextualism Knows is an indexical term.
- Know-1 Ordinary Contexts
- Know-2 Philosophy Class
- (1) If person P knows-2 O, then person P knows-2
S. - (2) Person P does not know-2 S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know-1 O.
36Skepticism
- something's being a zebra implies that it
is not a mule cleverly disguised by the zoo
authorities to look like a zebra. Do you know
that these animals are not mules cleverly
disguised? If you are tempted to say "Yes" to
this question, think a moment about what reasons
you have, what evidence you can produce in favor
of this claim. The evidence you had for thinking
them zebras has been effectively neutralized,
since it does not count toward their not being
mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras.
(Dretske 1970, 1015-1016)
37The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
38Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
39Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
40Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
41Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
42Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
- Bank cases (1) High-risk bank case,
- (2) Low-risk bank case.
43Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
44Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
45Skepticism
- Invariantism Knows is interest relative.
- Know-1 Low-risk contexts
- Know-2 High-risk contexts
- (1) If person P knows-2 O, then person P knows-2
S. - (2) Person P does not know-2 S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know-1 O.
46The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
47(No Transcript)
48Where?
49I dont see it.
50Well then Ill just walk over there and feel it.
51Then lets group up and corner him.
52And so on
53Philosophy of Science
- When someone puts forth a theory that can
never in-principle be falsified, the theory is on
that grounds defective.
54Philosophy of Science
- When someone puts forth a theory that can
never in-principle be falsified, the theory is on
that grounds defective. - - E.g. Freudian Psychology
55Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
56Skepticism
- Verificationism
- Untestable positions are linguistically
- meaningless.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
57Skepticism
- Verificationism
- Untestable positions are linguistically
- meaningless.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
58Skepticism
- Verificationism
- Untestable positions are linguistically
- meaningless.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P cannot know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
59Skepticism
- Verificationism
- Untestable positions are linguistically
- meaningless.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P cannot know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
60Skepticism
- Verificationism
- Untestable positions are...
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P cannot know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
61The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
62Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
63Skepticism
- H. Putnam
- Words can only refer to what they are
- casually connected to.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
64The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
65Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
66Skepticism
- Commonsense philosophy
- Arguments work when we are more certain
- of the premises than the conclusion.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
67Skepticism
- Commonsense philosophy
- Arguments work when we are more certain
- of the premises than the conclusion.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
68The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
69Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
70Skepticism
- Wittgensteins On Certainty
- O cannot be rejected without undermining
- all beliefs.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
71The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
72Skepticism
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
73Skepticism
- Paper-Doubts
- Doubts need real reasons just like beliefs.
- (1) If person P knows O, then person P knows S.
- (2) Person P does not know S.
- (3) ? Person P does not know O.
74The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure
- Contextualism
- Invariantism
- Verificationism
- Hilary Putnam
- G.E. Moore
- Wittgenstein
- Paper Doubt
75The Arguments Against Skepticism
- Reject The Principle of Closure (Epistemology)
- Contextualism (Philosophy of Language)
- Invariantism (Epistemology)
- Verificationism (Philosophy of Language)
- (5) Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Language)
- (6) G.E. Moore (Epistemology)
- (7) Wittgenstein (Epistemology)
- (8) Paper Doubt (Epistemology)