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downstream knowledge upstream re-feedback

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goal: fix Internet's resource allocation and accountability architecture ... long: e.g. policing zombie hosts, p2p file-sharing (selfish not malicious) ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: downstream knowledge upstream re-feedback


1
downstream knowledge upstream re-feedback
  • Bob Briscoe
  • Arnaud Jacquet, Carla Di Cairano-Gilfedder,
    Andrea Soppera Martin Koyabe
  • BT Research

2
goals non-goals, approach
intro
  • goals non-goals
  • goal fix Internets resource allocation and
    accountability architecture
  • non-goal solve the whole DoS problem
  • non-goal solve app-layer/user-space flooding
  • goal foundation for wider DoS solution(s)
  • approach
  • part of effort to determine new Internet
    architecture
  • mechanism for non-co-operative end-game in case
    things get nasty
  • network economics incentives, but no fiddling
    with retail pricing
  • network operators (not users) assumed to be
    rational
  • work in progress
  • simulations in progress
  • not even submitted yet

3
the problem rate policing
intro
  • short long term congestion
  • short e.g. policing TCP-friendliness (or any
    agreed response)
  • long e.g. policing zombie hosts, p2p
    file-sharing (selfish not malicious)
  • user congestion response voluntary
  • why is TCP compliance stable? what shouldnt we
    do to keep it?
  • TCP-friendly malware?? imagine a TCP virus
  • network congestion response voluntary
  • why care if my users cause congestion in
    downstream networks?

access capacity
rate
TCP-friendly
pathcongestion,?
4
pre-requisite knowledge explicit congestion
notification (ECN)
IETF proposed std RFC3168 Sep 2001 most recent
change to IPv46
packet headers
marked ACK
network transport data
ACKnowledgement packets
data
probability
1
probabilisticpacket marking algorithm on all
egress interfaces
drop
mark
marked packet
ave queue length
0 5 6 7
00 Not ECN Capable Transport (ECT) 01 or 10 ECN
Capable Transport - no Congestion Experienced
(sender initialises) 11 ECN Capable Transport -
and Congestion Experienced (CE)
ECN
DSCP
bits 6 7 of IP DS byte
5
path characterisationvia data headers
loss rate or explicit congestion notification
(ECN)
0
time to live (TTL)
255
6
downstream knowledge upstream the idea
10
16
propgn timecongestionhop countetc
7
11
3
16
16
16
11
11
11
14
R1
10
10
16
8
S1
R2
S2
7
downstream knowledge upstream re-feedback
intro
metric,h
h0(tT)
3
nodesequenceindex,i
h0(t)
m1
1
hz
0
1
2
i
n
...
...
he(t)
hn
2
sequence of relays on a network path
sender
receiver
8
congestion protocol terms
intro
  • ECN Explicit Congestion Notification
  • ECL Explicit Congestion Level (my term)
  • re- receiver aligned (or re-inserted)

aligned at binary multi-bit
sender ECN ECL
receiver re-ECN re-ECL
9
incentive framework
incentives
downstreampath metric,?i
congestionpricing
i
routing
policer/scheduler
dropper
Snd
Rcv
10
downstream path metric at receiver
downstreampath metricat rcvr, ?n
naïvedropper
incentiveframework
0
downstreamcongestionprobability distribution
i
dropper
Rcv
11
penalising uncertain misbehaviour
downstreampath metricat rcvr, ?n
stateless dropper
incentiveframework
systematiccheating, ??c
0
1
i
??c
dropper
dropper
adaptivedropprobability
downstreamcongestionprobability distribution
Rcv
12
downstream path metric at receiver
downstreampath metricat rcvr, ?n
statelessdropper
incentiveframework
no systematiccheating, ??c 0
0
downstreamcongestionprobability distribution
i
dropper
Rcv
13
spawning focused droppers
incentives
  • use penalty box technique Floyd99
  • examine (candidate) discards for any signature
  • spawn child dropper to focus on subset that
    matches signature
  • kill child dropper if no longer dropping (after
    random wait)
  • push back
  • send hint upstream defining signature(s)
  • if (any) upstream node has idle processing
    resource
  • test hint by spawning dropper focused on
    signature as above
  • cannot DoS with hints, as optional testable
  • no need for crypto authentication no additional
    DoS vulnerability

14
TCP policer no state for well-behaved flows
congestion,delay,
flowpolicer
each packet header carriesview of its own
downstream path
TCP-friendly
downstreamcongestion,?i
incentive framework
downstreamcongestion,?i
rate
policer/scheduler
policer/scheduler
sample packetsto check/enforce the
agreedcongestion response no per flow state for
honest flows
Snd
15
incentive compatibility hosts
??c
incentives
net value to end-points,?U
0
dominant strategy
scheduler/policer
dropper push-back
dropper
ideal
overstatement of downstream path metric at
source ??c
  • incentivise
  • responsible actions
  • honest words

practical
0
16
inter-domain policing
  • bulk congestion charging emulates policing
    passive simple
  • capacity charge modulated by congestion charge
  • sending domain pays C ?X ?Q to receiving
    domain (e.g. monthly)
  • ?, ? are (relatively) fixed prices of capacity, X
    and congestion, Q resp.
  • usage related price ? 0 (safe against denial
    of funds)
  • any receiver contribution to usage settled
    through end to end clearinghouse
  • congestion charge, Q over accounting period, Ta
    is Q STa ?i
  • ?i metered by single bulk counter on each
    interface
  • note negative ?i worthless creates incentive
    to deploy droppers

incentives
downstreampath metric, ?i
?AB
?BD
i
N2
congestion profit, ? ?1 (? ?)12 ?2
(? ?)12 (? ?)24 ?4 (? ?)24per packet
N1
R1
N4
S1
Capacity price, ? sign depends on relative
connectivity
17
incentive compatibility inter-domain routing
incentives
  • why doesnt a network overstate congestion?
  • msecs congestion response gives diminishing
    returns (for TCP ?? ? v??)
  • minutes upstream networks will route round more
    highly congested paths
  • by sampling data N1 can see relative costs of
    paths to R1 thru N2 N3
  • months persistent overstatement of congestion
  • artificially reduces traffic demand (thru
    congestion response)
  • ultimately reduces capacity element of revenue
  • also incentivises provision, to compete with
    monopoly paths

18
long term congestion incentives
per-user policer
incentives
  • effectively shuts out zombie hosts
  • incentivises owners to fix them
  • (also incentivises off-peak file-sharing)

cumulative multiple flows
incentive framework
downstreamcongestion,?i
downstreamcongestion,?i
congestionpricing
rate
policer/scheduler
policer/scheduler
Snd
19
incentives for other metrics
incentives
  • downstream unloaded delay (emulated by TTL)
  • approximates to ½ feedback response time (near
    source) ? RTT
  • each node can easily establish its local
    contribution
  • identical incentive properties to congestion
  • increasing response time increases social cost
  • physically impossible to be truthfully negative
  • incentive mechanism identical to that of
    congestion
  • assess other metrics case-by-case

20
slow-enough-start
  • initial value of metric(s)for new flows?
  • undefined deliberately creates dilemma
  • if too low, may be dropped at egress
  • if too high, may be deprioritised at ingress
  • without re-feedback (today)
  • if congested all other flows share cost equally
    with new flow
  • if not congested new flow rewarded with full
    rate
  • with re-feedback
  • risk from lack of path knowledge carried solely
    by new flow
  • creates slow-start incentive
  • once path characterised, can rise directly to
    appropriate rate
  • also creates incentive to share path knowledge
  • can insure against the risk (see differentiated
    service)

apps
21
single datagram-dominated traffic mix
  • current Internet would collapse
  • not designed for all eventualities
  • 1012 devices, 109 users, RPCs, sensor nets, event
    avalanches
  • with re-feedback
  • service protected against completely uncorrelated
    traffic mix
  • demanding users can still insure against risk
  • for brief flows, TCP slow start sets rate limit
  • not technology performance advances
  • with re-feedback, once characterised path, can
    hit full rate

apps
22
distributed denial of service
  • merely enforcing congestion response
  • honest sources
  • increase initial metric reduce rate
  • malicious sources
  • if do increase initial metric
  • policer at attackers ingress forces rate
    response
  • have to space out packets even at flow start
  • if dont increase initial metric
  • negative either at the point of attack or before
  • distinguished from honest traffic and discarded
  • push back kicks in if persistent

apps
downstreamcongestion,?i
i
23
migration
classic origin
unchanged
unchanged
re-f/b origin
  • approach
  • realign metrics by modifying sender and/or
    receiver stack only
  • unchanged router path characterisation (protocol
    routers)
  • re-ECN possible without contravening existing ECN
    code-points
  • reason changing hosts incremental changing
    routers flag day
  • deployment path
  • network operators add incentive mechanisms to
    edge routers
  • add policers droppers, but permissively
    configured
  • increasing strictness incentivises incremental
    host upgrades

deployment
24
summaryre-feedback incentive framework
policer
congestion,delay,
each packet header carriesview of its own
downstream path
premium
TCP-friendly
incentive framework
downstreamcongestion,?i
downstreamcongestion,?i
stateless dropper
downstreampath metricat rcvr, ?n
systematiccheating, ??c
congestionpricing
i
rate
0
routing
policer/scheduler
policer/scheduler
1
??c
dropper
dropper
so just sample packetsto check/enforce the
agreedcongestion response
adaptivedropprobability
Snd
downstreamcongestionprobability distribution
Rcv
discussion
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