Prezentace aplikace PowerPoint

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Human factor in the context of fulfiling the
requirements of the Directive Seveso II
reflection by Ing. Martin K r k o
RISK CONSULT Ltd. Racianska 72, 831 02
Bratislava, SLOVAKIA
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Introduction
SK Act n. 261/2002 Z.z. on the prevention of
major major industrial accidents and on changing
and amending other acts 2 dcrees (489/2002 Z.z.
and 490/2002 Z.z. )
EU Directive 96/82/EC Seveso II
One of the reasons for upgrade has been the
changing attitude from considering exclusivetly
technical safety aspects forward to find its real
causes in most cases the HF
HF influence on safety is recognised and covered
by several articles and in the safety
documentation. However, HF analysis is often
neglected.
Sice 1st of january 2004 an amendment of the
Directive 96/82/EC has been in force technical
and organiastional safety easures are far from
being perfect and more improvements are to come.
Focus on the required safety documentation

• - few reasons for getting concerned
• where is HF involved?
• how to approaches and tips.
• - documentation writing.

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Few reasons for getting concerned / experience
from abroad
The Seveso II requirements fulfilment differ in
the different countries. Current practice is that
some requirements are neglected. Most of the
Safety reports worked out by the operators has
been returned for insufficient stress on various
fields. Certain requirements are often
completely ignored / omitted. HF is considered
very superficailly, more qualitatively than
quantitatively, but the most of all cases
ignored / omitted even if the HF is recognised to
be the most contributing factor in the major
industrial accidents which took place. HF
importance is underlined by recnet major
industrial accidents, each had had a considerable
contribution from the human failure point of view.
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Accident causes -general distribution

• Human factors has seemed
• too ambiguous
• too involved
• too comprehensive
• too difficult?

technical failure, vis major
HF

• For the industry to embrace human factors in a
  committed way, we need
• More education
• More practical guidelines
• Additional technical information
• Benchmarking tools
• To do something about it - now!

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Where in the safety documentation is the HF
involved?

• The safety documentation in the field of the
  prevention of major accidents is
• required by the act n. 261/2002 Z.z.
• major accident prevention policy - MAPP
• safety management system - SMS
• risk assessment / analysis
• emergency planning (internal / external)
• safety report

Hidden responsabilities MAPP and SMS MAPP and
SMS are managing documents, which provide the
basis for dealing with the HF in relation to the
potential major accident occurrence. This
documentation is supposed to be the output of the
HF analysis measures resulting from the HF
assessment and analysis.

• Covered fields
• organisational structure
• risk identification and assessment
• operation management
• change management

• emergency planning
• performance monitoring
• audits

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Risk assessment / analysis
Observation the notification and the risk
sources identification does not care about the
influence of the HF on the safety level.
Risk assessment and analysis
Proper quantitative risk assessment is a matter
of evaluating both - technical failures
resulting into an accident - human failure
resulting into some technical failure causing an
accident
In general, technical aspects are easier to cope
with (generic databases, methods for processing
failure data, availabilities, etc.) than human
failure aspects. This fact is caused mainly by
the complex and unpredictable nature of the
human failure parameter.
cause of thechnical failure
cause of human failure

• wrong reflexion
• insufficient training, education
• insufficient instructions
• unsuitable control systems
• etc.

• mismatch of control operations
• disconnection of safety mechanisms
• communication errors
• process control failures
• etc.

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Dilemma

• There are two main streams in integrating the HF
  into the quantitative risk assessment
• an attempt should be made to treat the HF
  explicitely so that the QRA directly reflects
• the influence of the technology operators and
  maintenance on the occurrence of
• accidents.
• the QRA should be hardware-focused and the HF
  should be hidden in the failure
• rate of a certain component in order to reflect
  an average standard of human
• performance

a bit of heuristics

• These two approaches can be combined in order to
  obtain a very representative
• qualitative assessment reflexing the status quo
  of the system.
• This can be achieved by careful choice of the
  basic events
• detailed development of the failure tree where
  appropriate
• integrate the HF into equipment where suitable

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PHA
HEA
Identify activity and tasks
Select Section to Study
Breakdown tasks into necessary steps
Apply Deviation/Guideword
Identify human errors that could occur during
each step
Identify Causes/What Ifs
Evaluate Consequences of Deviation/Cause
Determine the consequences of the error
Determine likelihood of scenario
Determine Likelihood of Scenario
Rank the consequences and likelihood
Perform Risk Ranking
Identify remedial measures for high risk
scenarios
Identify Possible Recommendations
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Some examples
HF
HF
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Some examples
HF
HF
HF
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Some examples
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Some examples
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Error mechanisms
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Performance shaping factors
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Emergency planning
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So, how to write it down?
All this theory has to be found in the safety
documentation of an establishment. An universal
approach may look like
Description of the work position Its potential to
cause an accident
Evaluation of the human-technology relationship
Quantitative evaluation of the human failure
influence
Suggestion of corrective / preventive actions
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Proposal of guidelines
In order to include the HF assessment and
analysis into the safety documentation, one can
follow these steps

• identification of work positions which can be
  directly responsible for the generation of a
• major accident
• identification of common events that may be
  generated by the technical system and by the HF
• assessment and analysis of the HF liability
• critical points in the human-technology system
• possible failures, errors and its causes
• qualitative analyses of the human factor
  reliability (like HRA, THERP, HAZOP, SHERPA
• etc.)

• categorisation of the system demandingness
  (technology complexity, operation management
• complexity, communication, etc.)
• workforce selection based on relevant criteria,
  selected behavior shaping factors, etc.
• regular (time scheduled) evaluation of the
  employee suitability
• regular control of the working environment
  (ergonomy, user friendly software, etc.)
• regular information to the employees,
  work-caused risk awareness, risk perception,
  etc
• regular exercices and formation
• possible back-up of the most sensitive positions
  (personal or technical)

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Final remarks
HF is involved through the entire safety
documentation. HF can be included in the safety
documentation in a variety of ways, no
unified concept is adopted. The Seveso II
requirements concerning the human factor are to
be assessed and considered separately, depending
on the establishment nature, the dangers /
risks emanating from the technology, etc The
output of the HF analysis is to be incorporated
into management documents, so that the
improvements designed are really improved
Thank you for your attention!