LA STRATEGIE DE LISBONNE 20002010

1
LA STRATEGIE DE LISBONNE (2000-2010)

• DES OBJECTIFS multiples (et contradictoires ?)
  marché intérieur, macro- économique, emploi,R
  D,protection sociale, inclusion éducation/
  formation, environnement
• UE face au monde
• nouvel équilibre entre léconomique et le
  social ?
• LES INNOVATIONS INSTITUTIONNELLES DE LA SL ?
  (MOC, rôle du Conseil de printemps, MLG)
• REFORME de 2005 de la stratégie de Lisbonne

2
LA METHODE OUVERTE DE COORDINATION

• domaines dapplication
• raisons de son introduction
• forces (élargit lagenda sur thèmes
  conflictuels  souplesse de révision  engage
  pluralité dacteurs  remet les priorités
  politiques (Conseil européen) au centre 
  envisage la coordination des politiques)
• faiblesses (non obligatoire  pb de légitimité
  (cf. PE)  disqualifie la méthode communautaire
  classique  élitaire  dépendance des équilibres
  politiques nationaux)

3
LA STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE POUR L EMPLOI

• antécédents (Livre blanc de 93  Essen
  processus) 
• Traité dAmsterdam (97)  adoption du titre
  emploi
• procédure
• contenu et paradigmes de la SEE (4 piliers)
• réformes de la SEE (évaluation à 5 ans, rapport
  Kok) 
• 1ère réforme 2003 des 4 piliers (de 20 LD à 10
  LD) 
• 2ème réforme 2005 dans le cadre de la révision
  de la SL réformée (LD intégrées)
• bilan mitigé (numérique  gouvernance  quantité
  versus qualité des emplois  dépendance / Grandes
  orientations de politique économique)

4
LISBON STRATEGY ASSESSMENT IN 2004

• Severe criticism in the assessment of the KOK
  Report
• overloaded program, insufficient coordination,
  diverging
• priorities, lack of Member State political will
  explain bad
• performances (as to growth, employment, RD,
  structural
• reforms)
• EU context different in 2004 from 2000
  11/9/2001, eco
• stagnation (oil crisis), new competitors (China,
  India), GSP crisis,
• effects of EU enlargement, weak Franco-German
  engine,
• EU divide on the war in Irak, the EU budget (and
  more recently on the
• Constitutional Treaty).

5
2005 LISBON STRATEGY REFORM

• Re-appropriation of the LS by Member States
• single National action plan only designate
  a
• Mr(s) Lisbon
• To involve more National Parliaments and Social
  Partners at national level
• - To simplify the number of objectives around
  clear and coherent priorities macro, RD, micro
  and employment
• The streamlining of temporalities (previously
  done) BEPGs and EES of the various social OMCs
  
• - Better policy coordination at EU (with GSP,
  state aids, EU budget, industrial pol) and at
  national level (between Ministries policies)

6
KEY ASSESSMENTS

• Larger MS (France, Germany, Italy) have more
  difficulties with the LS than smaller countries
• Nordic countries (also UK and NL) are meeting
  many of its objectives already
• The New member states make efforts to try comply
  with LISBONNE 2
• Economic assessments more severe than political
  science assessments.

7
The various social OMCs

• - the European employment strategy
• - the OMC on social inclusion
• - the OMC on pension reforms
• - the OMC of health care for the elderly
• - the OMC on education/training policies
• VOIR le texte de J. Goetschy Lapport de la
  méthode ouverte de coordination à lintégration
  européenne, in P. Magnette, La Grande Europe,
  Editions de luniversité de Brxuelles, 2004.

8
STRENTGHS OF THE OMC

• ITERATIVENESS BETWEEN LEVELS (EU, national,
  regional, enterprise)
• - PLURALITY OF ACTORS (State, Parliament, Social
  Partners, Civil Society)
• DURABILITY of POLICY FIELD ON AGENDA
• MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES WITH EVALUATION
  PROCEDURES reflexive approach
• - Enlargement of EU AGENDA on national priorities
  without classical transfer of competence
• ALLOWS to take a BROAD POLICY FIELD on board
• PRE-CONDITION for POLICY COORDINATION
• LEARNING AND SOCIALIZATION between levels,
  between actors, on policy outcomes over time, on
  policy linkages
• Procedural and cognitive developments enabling
  DIFFICULT MEMBER STATE REFORMS
• Allows respecting national sovereignty as well
  as national diversity AND deepening (enlargement)
  of agenda

9
WEAKNESSES OF THE OMC

• LEGITIMACY deficits insufficient role of Social
  Partners, of Parliaments, of Civil Society
• Involvement of EXPERTS rather than POLITICIANS on
  a day-to-day basis
• LACK OF integration and articulation with
  NATIONAL PRIORITIES often a process on its
  own
• - Their NON-COMPULSORY nature (implementation
  deficit at national level lack of traditional EU
  control tools by Commission, ECJ)
• Might enter into COMPETITION with EU measures of
  a COMPULSORY nature, replace and disqualify
  compulsory rules
• Though the national level remains clearly the
  dominant competence level, RISK of the BLURRING
  OF RESPONSABILITIES between levels
• - Some criticism against the fact that it
  tends to encourage putting all items on EU agenda
  (OVERLOAD AND BY-PASSING OF DISTRIBUTION OF
  COMPETENCES).