New Politics Parties and Agendas

1
New Politics Parties and Agendas
Lecture 7
2
Objectives

• Objectives
• (i) to identify new parties and new social
  movements
• (ii) to present an overview of explanations for
  their emergence
• (iii) to introduce post-materialist theory

3
Introduction

• 1945-1965 decades of political quietude
  (Lipset/Rokkan, Rose Urwin)
• Generally the same parties in place since 1920
  (except catholic Parties to CDs)
• Major political or economic disruptions/changes
  did not change the system
• Slight swing to the left after 1945
• In 1950s, most party systems stabilized and
  maintained until beginning 1970s

4
Party strengths

• Communists Fears about influence of communist
  parties not justified (France 26 Italy 20
  others 5-15)
• Christian democrats become major political force
  (notably catholic countries)
• Conservatives
• Liberals
• Socialists/soc-dems/labour main opposition
  parties

Relatively weak
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1945-1965

• A remarkable phase in WE stability, welfare,
  privacy
• Socially
• Expansion of education
• Women entering labour force
• Decline in church attendance
• Expansion of the middle class
• Politically
• Major parties unchallenged
• Elections produced few surprises
• Electoral cleavages and party systems appeared
  frozen
• Elite-dominated politics

Economically - Period of long boom - National
GDP growth - Growth in GDP/head
6
Changes in the 1960s and 70s

• Student revolts
• Vietnam war
• Post-Stalinism
• Gay / women movements
• Pacifism/anarchism
• Left extremism

7
Changes in WE party systems

• Patterns of electoral support (from cleavage
  orientation to individualism)
• Cognitive mobilisation (better education, media
  access)
• Types of governments formed (increase of
  multi-party coalitions)
• Shape of party systems (increasing fragmentation)
• Nature of political action (social movements etc.)

8
Irruptions

• Electoral shocks
• Belgium (linguistic divide)
• Netherlands (secularization)
• Denmark, Norway, Sweden (fragmentation)
• - not Germany, Austria, Ireland, France
  (de-fragmentation)
• Government formation
• Belgium, Netherlands (coalition building much
  more difficult)
• Denmark, Norway (from coalition to SD dominated
  minority governments)
• Sweden (SD dominance replaced by bourgeois
  coalitions)
• Austria (grand coalitions replaced by single
  party governments)
• Germany (loss of CD/lib dominance)

9
Electoral Breaks
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New parties and 'unconventional' politics

• There have always been marginal parties in WE
  party systems
• Changes since the 1960s
• New parties
• New political agendas
• Seem to deliberately challenge establishment
• Not a national phenomenon therefore wave of
  new politics
• Linguistic based on local language (B, I, CH, E)
• Far right racist/xenophobic/anti-EU (DK, S, F,N
  )
• Left splinter/left socialist radical left agenda
  (DK, NL, Fin, Lux)
• Greens, ecology most successful of new parties
  (CH 1979, B 1981, until 1989 in additional 8
  WE countries G, S, I, A, Ice, Fin, Lux, P)
• NOT in NL (strong Green movement) and N, DK
  (issue occupied by centre parties)

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New Parties - Linguistic

• Belguim Volksunie, now Nieuw-VA (VB?)
• Rassemblement Wallon
• Italy South Tyrol Peoples Party
• Val dAosta Union
• Switzerland Jura Entente
• Spain Catalan Convergence and Union
• Other Catalan Parties
• Basque Nationalist Party
• Galician Nationalist Bloc
• Finland (Swedish Peoples Party)

12
New Parties - Regional

• Italy Lega Nord
• Spain Canarian Coalition
• Andalusian Party
• Aragonese Junta

13
New social movements

• Feminism
• Environmentalism
• Anti-nuclear
• Peace
• Third world
• Gay

To be found in almost every country but in
different strength and shape

• essentially large-scale mobilizations around
  single issues
• reflect a generally greater readiness to engage
  in direct or unconventional action marches
  demonstrations donations
• sit-ins protest-actions media events
• Unorganized
• Issues normally ignored by conventional
  institutions
• Focus on change in public awareness
• Explanations structural shift, value shift (see
  Inglehart)

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New left/left-libertarian parties

• Belguim ID21, now Spirit
• Denmark Radical left
• Red-Greens
• Finland Left Alliance
• France Left Radical Party
• Greece Sinaspismos (Left Progress Party)
• DIKKI (Democratic Social)
• Luxemburg The Left
• Green and Liberal Alliance
• Netherlands Democrats 66
• Norway Socialist Left
• Portugal Block of the Left

15
Green/ecology parties

• Austria Greens
• Belguim Ecolo (French speaking)
• Agalev (Flemish speaking)
• Finland Green League
• Ecological Party
• France Greens
• Other ecologists
• Germany Greens (plus Bündnis 90)
• Ireland Greens
• Italy Federation of Greens
• Luxemburg Green
• Netherlands Green Left
• Portugal Greens
• Spain Greens
• Sweden Greens
• Switzerland Greens

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extreme-right populist
Not really a new phenomenon F, I, G, A New
is their appearance in almost every WE country

• Austria Freedom Party (since Haider)
• Belgium Vlaams Blok (Flemish)
• National Front
• Denmark Danish Peoples Party
• France National Front
• Germany Die Republikaner/DVU/NPD
• Italy Alleanza Nationale
• Lega Nord Splinters
• Netherlands Centre Parties, Lijst Pim Fortuyn,
  Freedom Party
• Norway Progress Party
• Portugal (Popular Party)
• Sweden Sweden Democrats
• Switzerland Swiss Democrats, SVP

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Explanation for irruptions

• The decline of traditional cleavages
• 1. changes in the social structure
• 2. changes in collective identities
  (identification)
• 3. changes in the ideological and organizational
  behaviour of parties
• Reasons for decline in cleavage voting
• Parties aim to resolve political divisions in
  society (common agreement on policy issues,
  welfare state, solidarity)
• Parties broadened electoral appeals
• Equalization of Living conditions
• Less people organized (Putnam)

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1. Changes in the social structure

• Class cleavage undermined by growing affluence,
  welfare state, decline of manual working class,
  growth of high tech industries

1997
1960
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1. Changes in the social structure

• Growing individualism
• Religious cleavage undermined by secularization,
  rationality, education
• WE church attendance halved since 1950s
• World Values Survey (1981) Are you a religious
  person?
• 65 year olds 83
• 15-24 56
• Life cycle or generational effect?

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2. Changes in collective identities

• Rise of single-issue arguments (education,
  economic security)
• Vote less ideologically determined
• Growing aggregate electoral volatility

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3. Changes in the ideological and organizational
behaviour of parties

• Party realignment
• voters adapt themselves in the party system
  mainly within party family
• New voters, new cleavage (young, middle class,
  better educated, non-religious, not represented
  in traditional cleavages)
• Party dealignment
• social and economic change undermining parties
• Waning of party identification (stable 1920s
  60s)

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materialism-postmaterialism

• Ronald Inglehart
• Maintain order in the nation
• Give people more say in government decisions
• Fight rising prices
• Protect freedom of speech
• AC Materialist
• BD Postmaterialist
• Else mixed

Dalton 2002 Political Cleavages, Issues and
electoral Change Citizens in these societies
have expanded their interests to include
non-economic, quality of life issues that
represent a new post-material agenda. The growth
of environmentalism, the emergence of womens
movement, and demands for increased involvement
in the decisions affecting ones life have
broadened the boundaries of contemporary politics
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postmaterialism
Ronald Inglehart Theory of value change
Russel Dalton Theory of cognitive mobilization
Citizens are less likely today to rely on social
group cues even when they perceive these cues.
Rising levels of education and political
information have generally led to a process of
cognitive mobilization, whereby citizens feel
better able to make the decisions affecting their
lives without habitual reliance on external cues
Greater access to information through expanding
electronic media also increases the number and
diversity of political cues to which individuals
are exposed
A process of inter-generational change is
gradually transforming the politics and cultural
norms of advanced industrial societies- from
giving top priority to physical sustenance and
safety towards higher emphasis on belonging,
self-expression and the quality of life
(Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society
1991, p. 66)
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Summary

• Change
• New politics cross-cut old politics
• New politics extended political agenda
• greater fluidity of vote
• greater volatility of electoral outcomes
• Politics less predictable
• stability
• Major parties still in place
• Political agenda not radically different
• Left-right divide constant