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Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team

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Title: Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team


1
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Appendix B Best Practices
  • Satellite Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) Team
    Product
  • GSFC On-orbit Study Team Product

2
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices
  • Key elements to reduce the risk and insure
    mission safety for operating missions
  • Test the spacecraft and instruments as they will
    be operated and operate the spacecraft and
    instruments as they were tested
  • Utilize state-of-the-art processors and system
    architectures to design robust safe holds
    initiated on-board the spacecraft to reduce the
    time criticality of ground intervention
  • Test and verify all safe modes on the ground
    before launch
  • Identify, define, and document those remaining
    spacecraft and / or instrument failures requiring
    time critical ground intervention and document
    clear and concise recovery procedures for each
  • Utilize the Flight Operations Team to operate the
    spacecraft and instruments during IT prior to
    launch
  • Operate the mission as it was designed
  • Ensure the flight and ground software is frozen,
    under configuration control, well documented,
    stable, and thoroughly tested well before launch
  • Develop and maintain an Engineering Support
    Contact Plan and contact list to aid in rapid
    anomaly resolution

Appendix B
3
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • When an anomaly occurs, stop, get the facts, and
    think. Assess the Spacecraft health safety and
    the time available to resolve the anomaly. Do
    not react quicker than needed. Consult the
    sustaining engineering experts with the time that
    is available. Mission health and safety must
    take priority over temporary loss-of-data. It is
    better to lose a few hours of science data than
    the mission.
  • Anomaly Handling Process
  • Assure spacecraft / instrument / component in
    safe operating mode
  • Determine anomaly severity
  • Determine whether anomaly is spacecraft or ground
    system based
  • Initiate anomaly notification process
  • Evaluate near term impact on operations to
    determine need for immediate action
  • Gather plots / telemetry / event reports
  • Engineers assess situation and take appropriate
    follow-up action
  • Convene anomaly meeting including all appropriate
    players and identify lead individual and
    responsibilities of rest of team
  • Reach consensus on action (always including
    latest available information and incorporating
    most current analysis)

Appendix B
4
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Anomaly Handling Process (continued)
  • Initiate recovery script development and
    coordination across all elements
  • Script review and revision as necessary
  • Simulation and revision as necessary
  • Recovery and analysis / verification
  • Execute corrective actions ensuring necessary ops
    revisions (e.g., procedures, data bases, etc.)
    are incorporated verify expected results are
    attained communicate results and future plans
  • Transition back to normal operations ensuring
    that resulting system configuration, limitations,
    constraints, etc. are documented and communicated
    adequately
  • Wrap up ancillary paper work (e.g, provide full
    anomaly resolution, lessons learned, etc, into
    center-wide processes)

Appendix B
5
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Utilize an integrated team approach to mission
    design and operations
  • A review and reverification of the Operations
    Concept should be included as an integral part of
    all formal mission reviews beginning with the
    Systems Requirements Review, both at the system
    as well as the element level (e.g., spacecraft,
    instrument, ground)
  • Evolve the spacecraft / instrument design and the
    operations concept in parallel during the
    development phase
  • Include the FOT and science team members early in
    the instrument design
  • Utilize the FOT to operate the spacecraft and
    instruments during the IT process
  • Include the FOT in the science team discussions
    of mission changes and development of new
    procedures after launch
  • Mission development team in cooperation with the
    operations team should prepare training materials
    for the operations phase which describe
    spacecraft and instrument systems, define the
    procedures for normal operation, identify
    processes for recognizing mission threatening
    conditions, and highlight the contingency
    responses to spacecraft and instrument anomalies.
    These materials should be maintained and updated
    as the spacecraft ages and procedures change.

Appendix B
6
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • The metrics for tracing the operations contractor
    performance should emphasize mission health and
    safety. The current principal metric (percentage
    of science data captured) is, by itself,
    producing the opposite effect. Long-term mission
    success is driven by other factors such as
  • On-board and ground system anomalies
  • Overtime worked
  • Response time (e.g., special operations requests,
    discrepancy close out, etc.)
  • Number of work arounds in place, average time
    work arounds remain in the system, etc.
  • Quality and timeliness of internal deliveries
  • Percentage of FOT certified to operate spacecraft
  • Reduced staffing, automated paging, etc. assume
    that safeholds are safe and that spacecraft can
    be safely left in safeholds for extended periods
    and then recovered. If the safeholds are not
    inherently safe or will not remain safe during
    the time required for the FOT to return to the
    control center, there is no basis for reducing
    the FOT staffing and shift coverage. Safeholds
    should be tested and verified prior to staff and
    shift reductions.

Appendix B
7
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • The key to controlling the operations cost is in
    the spacecraft and instrument design with ground
    system automation also important
  • The contingency preparedness process starts with
    the documentation of failure modes for each
    subsystem, event tables, Standard Operating
    Procedures (SOP), contingency procedures, and
    command scripts. This is followed by an
    authorization process with formal go / no go
    decisions from all cognizant personnel. After
    launch, established Anomaly Resolution Teams are
    used to respond to any subsystem anomaly.
  • Automated Monitoring / Paging system
    characteristics
  • Provide remote access to operations network to
    assess the problems and the need for an immediate
    response
  • Minimize the user interfaces and complexity of
    the paging system
  • Rotate the on call individual to relieve the
    burden on any one person
  • Ground system anomalies as well as flight system
    anomalies should trigger a page
  • Persistent paging, repeat until answered, should
    be used

Appendix B
8
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Perform routine flight dynamics functions within
    the FOT, especially those remotely located
    relative to GSFC, and focus the FDF team on
    capability development, anomaly response, special
    cases, etc.
  • Sponsor regular Mission functions (business
    and/or social) to maintain the ties among the
    FOT, Science Team, Sustaining Engineering Team,
    etc.
  • Realtime Health and Safety Monitoring Process
  • Planning / Preparation Process
  • Conduct pre-mission and follow-on meetings with
    spacecraft developer, subsystem discipline
    engineers, instrumenters, IT, etc. to
    specifically define on a mission, instrument, and
    special event basis what parameters are the most
    important to be monitored in realtime (on a
    spacecraft and instrument configuration / state
    basis) and what one should be looking for in
    those parameters.
  • Conduct periodic re-education sessions with the
    realtime support personnel to review spacecraft,
    instrument, and ground system elements to
    identify impact of changes that affect realtime
    monitoring and decision making.
  • Pre-Pass Process
  • Generate pass manning schedule, prioritize
    acquisitions, resolve conflicts
  • Review spacecraft configuration, playback times,
    devise command plan
  • Brief remote tracking site, perform set-up

Appendix B
9
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Realtime Health and Safety Monitoring Process
    (continued)
  • Pass Execution Process
  • Acquire telemetry and verify status of downlinks,
    recorders, transmitters
  • Verify spacecraft state take corrective action
    as required
  • Verify command levels take corrective action as
    required
  • Execute and verify realtime commands take
    corrective action as required
  • Execute and verify stored command sequences
    activate as required take corrective action as
    required
  • Monitor and record data quality take corrective
    action as required
  • Verify spacecraft health and safety using
    specified engineering pages and limits compare
    spacecraft telemetry with state table for current
    configuration annotate new limit violations
    confirm old violations against engineering notes
    take immediate and follow-up corrective action as
    required
  • Annotate realtime execution on procedures and
    logs as required
  • Post-Pass Process
  • Perform pass debrief
  • Follow-up on required paperwork including
    documentation of pass anomalies
  • Playback Analysis and Trending Process
  • Ensure that key parameters for trending each
    subsystem / instrument have been selected and
    provided to the FOT by cognizant engineers.

Appendix B
10
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Playback Analysis and Trending Process
    (continued)
  • There should be a clear description of each key
    parameter and the significance of its data
    readings and trends. Limits should be assigned
    to each key parameter with specific instructions
    provided for FOT handling of out of limit
    occurrences.
  • Data sets and products should be defined for
    short and long term trending. The capability
    should exist to provide data in ASCII format for
    use in off-line engineering analysis. The data
    sets and products should be updated, as
    necessary, as the spacecraft configuration
    changes due to failures, etc.
  • Trending data products should be produced in a
    consistent format on a regular basis.
  • Ensure that trending data are reviewed, analyzed,
    and found acceptable by knowledgeable individuals
    (preferably subsystem / instrument engineers).
  • Unexpected trending results should be further
    analyzed, with potential impact evaluated across
    the full operations team, and procedures updated
    to reflect required operations changes to track
    future conditions relating to the unexpected
    results.
  • Periodic reports should be generated that discuss
    the trending analysis and highlight any areas of
    potential concern. These should be reviewed by a
    senior member of the technical or system
    engineering staff, with appropriate feedback
    provided to the FOT.
  • Ensure that results are analyzed for potential
    incorporation into other operational missions and
    / or development missions to lower risk and aid
    in reliability engineering.

Appendix B
11
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Special Events Handling Process
  • Establish special event objectives, success
    criteria, and decision making processes
  • Develop plan to go from initial state to target
    state, including generation of a timeline which
    coordinates all support elements and identifies
    procedures to be executed by the FOT
  • Develop contingency plans
  • Identify external support required
  • Ensure continuous knowledge of spacecraft state
    avoid conducting special events in the blind
  • Develop and test any new or special procedures
    required for the event
  • Hold an event readiness review with all
    participants, management and peers
  • Perform and verify successful execution of
    special event refer to Anomaly Handling Process
    if unexpected results are encountered
  • Return spacecraft to normal operations and
    document results
  • Configuration Management Process
  • Document change proposal on change request form
  • Provide systems engineering review by all
    elements (operations, ground software, database,
    hardware developers) to ensure impacts to total
    system are incorporated.
  • Prioritize change against other open change
    requests, maintenance, and enhancements.
  • Conduct peer review of proposed design of change

Appendix B
12
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Configuration Management Process (continued)
  • Ensure change is implemented and tested by the
    developers in test environment prior to
    transitioning to operations environment.
  • Ensure that changes are prioritized and scheduled
    based on need and future operations planned
    activities as well as available resources. Often
    a need exists to coordinate a change with a data
    base update and / or ground software release in
    support of flight software. Releases may be
    periodic or sometimes emergency.
  • Ensure that operations plan is developed to
    release change into operations. Include back-out
    plan, request for engineering time on the
    observatory, operations procedures updates (e.g.,
    potential modifications to realtime monitoring
    and control procedures, etc.)
  • Conduct operational testing on off-line /
    parallel system with simulator if available.
  • Hold engineering operations readiness reviews
    managers, engineers, developers, users, and
    customers participate as appropriate.
  • Install change in approved time slot and closely
    monitor initial operations under modification to
    ensure successful operations are maintained
    back-out plan allows for easy return to prior
    state if problem.

Appendix B
13
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Access to Engineering Expertise Process
  • Develop and maintain Contact Plan to access
    in-house and / or external engineering support to
    aid in sustaining engineering and anomaly
    resolution tasks.
  • Develop / maintain process for identifying
    situations when experts need to be contacted and
    how to determine which experts to notify. (This
    can be part of other operations or contingency
    plans.)
  • Maintain matrix of required areas of engineering
    expertise, names, and contact numbers. Include
    alternate names in vital areas.
  • Maintain contact with engineering experts (e.g.,
    keep them in the loop on a routine basis through
    e-mail, provide trending reports, etc.) so they
    know the current status of their responsible
    subsystems.
  • Maintain list of engineering organization
    managers to access additional engineering
    resources as required (e.g., personnel, tools,
    models, etc.) beyond known mission specific
    expertise maintained in first sub-bullet above.
  • Identify and maintain information / processes on
    how to reimburse experts companies as they
    change positions / organizations.

Appendix B
14
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Operations Management Transition Process
  • Agreement developed during development phase to
    identify agreed-to roles and responsibilities of
    all operational support elements for all
    life-cycle phases (e.g., pre-launch, initial
    operational phases, during and following possible
    mission operations transition / hand-over, etc.)
    and preliminary transition plan / approach, if
    transition required. Agreement to be updated /
    refined during development phase.
  • Transition occurs after activation, testing, and
    check-out are complete including such tasks as
    deployments, payload activation and outgassing,
    and demonstration of special operations (e.g.,
    orbit maneuvers, attitude maneuvers, safe modes,
    etc.) to extent agreed to by all parties.
  • Performance testing completed. Performance
    specification for system (spacecraft, instruments
    and ground) established pre-launch and verified
    for agreed-to period of time during actual
    operations.
  • Documentation (e.g., operations handbook,
    simulator, spacecraft handbook from vendor, etc.)
    completed and updated, reflecting check-out and
    on-orbit experiences.
  • System demonstrated to be stable and ready for
    on-going operations. Operations environment
    (command / telemetry database, trending plans,
    contingency operations procedures, command
    procedures) are updated to reflect on-orbit
    experiences, configured, and in place.
  • Training and certification of operations and
    sustaining engineering staff completed.
    Continuing training and processes developed and
    in-place.

Appendix B
15
Satellite Operations Risk Assessment Team
  • Best Practices (continued)
  • Operations Management Transition Process
    (continued)
  • Configuration management requirements identified
    and implementation plan is clearly established.
  • Ground system and flight software completed,
    delivered, and tested including essential
    corrections and enhancements. Known problems
    documented and prioritized with required
    work-arounds defined and in-place. Sustaining
    engineering plans in-place with agreed to process
    for scheduling future deliveries.
  • Mechanisms / processes in place to access
    appropriate engineering expertise (e.g.,
    in-house, development contractor, analysis
    support, etc.) to support routine operations and
    potential anomalous conditions. Summary list of
    known points of contact should be included.
  • Handover review held documenting status /
    configuration of system at handover, known risks,
    including remaining open incident reports, and
    status and plans to address known issues and / or
    open discrepancies. Summary report, including
    actions and agreements reached at handover
    review, is documented, distributed, and actions
    are tracked.

Appendix B
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