DAVID HUME 17111776

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DAVID HUME (1711-1776)
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HUME ON TASTE

• Taste is a human faculty analogous to the senses
  of hearing and sight.
• Judgements of taste have a foundation in things
  which we experience, and they can be confirmed or
  refuted by experience.
• People with the proper organs of perception who
  are mentally sound ought to be able to agree when
  something is beautiful or aesthetic and when it
  is not.

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JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE

• For Hume, aesthetic properties depend on
  judgements of taste, but the judgements about
  aesthetic properties are objective.
• Just as vision can see that an object is red, so
  the faculty of taste can judge that an object is
  aesthetic. Accordingly, the faculty of taste is
  likened by Hume to a faculty of perception.
• Agreement among people with taste - experts,
  aesthetes - forms the foundation of the objective
  standards of taste.

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HUME ON JUDGEMENTS AND SENTIMENT I

• Sentiment df. 1. a feeling 2. emotional
  attitude 3. thought and judgement influenced by
  feeling
• Hume It is commonly thought that there is a
  difference between judgement and sentiment.
• Feelings are thought to be always right or not
  disputable, because sentiment feeling has no
  reference to anything beyond itself.
• But judgements do refer to things beyond
  themselves, and so can be true or false.

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HUME ON JUDGEMENTS AND SENTIMENT II

• According to the common opinion which Hume
  opposes, that there is no disputing taste, the
  contrast between judgement and feeling can be put
  like this there is but one correct judgement
  about the chemical composition of water, but of
  any number of different sentiments or feelings
  about something, or of ten different opinions
  about the aesthetic merit of a work of art, no
  one is right or any better than any other.

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FEELINGS AND JUDGEMENTS ACCORDING TO THE COMMON
SUBJECTIVE VIEW

• People can disagree about the quality of an
  artwork because the same artwork can produce
  different, conflicting feelings.
• Where the same object produces different
  feelings, how do we say one is right and one is
  wrong?
• Hume The common subjective opinion is that
  different sentiments produced by the same object
  are all equally correct. This is what I am
  calling the common subjective view. It is
  common because many people and thinkers hold it
  to be true, and it is subjective because the idea
  is that the perception of beauty is not only
  dependent on the subject, but does not extend
  beyond the subject.
• And this is because no sentiment represents what
  is really in the object. And something not in
  the object leads to the possibility of
  disagreement.

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FEELINGS AND OBJECTS ACCORDING TO THE COMMON
SUBJECTIVE VIEW

• According to the common subjective view which
  Hume rejects, a feeling only marks a certain
  conformity or relation between the object and the
  organs or faculties of the mind.
• Because of this relation of a feeling to the
  mind, beauty for the common view which Hume
  rejects is no quality in things themselves it
  exists merely in the mind which contemplates
  them and each mind perceives a different
  beauty.
• This results in the conclusion that all aesthetic
  opinions are equally good.

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VARIABILITY OF TASTE ACCORDING TO THE COMMON
SUBJECTIVE VIEW

• That feeling depends on a relation between
  properties of the object and properties of the
  subject leads to the view that beauty is not a
  quality of an object like its shape.
• Rather, as was seen, beauty is thought to be a
  property of the mind which contemplates an
  object.
• To talk about the real or objective beauty of an
  object is then not thought to be possible.

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CAN TASTES BE DISPUTED?

• Although it is common to say that tastes cant be
  disputed, another position, defended by Hume, is
  that tastes can be disputed.
• Hume Anyone who maintained the aesthetic
  equality of disproportionate cases, such as
  asserting that Stephen King is the equal of
  Shakespeare and or that the Rolling Stones are as
  musically sophisticated and expressive as Mozart,
  would be as wrong as maintaining that a pond and
  the ocean are equal in size.
• There may still have a problem in disputing cases
  of near equality - e.g. Mozart and Beethoven -
  but not in the case of things where to maintain
  there equality would be absurd and ridiculous.

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ART, RULES, AND EXPERIENCE

• Hume There are no a priori rules of composing
  art. Rather, the foundation of artistic
  composition is experience. That is, we cannot
  use reason to deduce principles of artistic
  composition, but must learn what works and what
  doesnt through experiment and artistic insight.
• Rules of composition are just general
  observations about what has been found to please
  in all countries and in all ages.
• However, rules are not binding but can be broken.
  And perhaps an artwork can be made better by
  breaking the rules.

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ARTS AND SCIENCES

• Hume notes that the arts are different from
  philosophy and the sciences.
• And he says that, to attempt to reduce art to
  geometrical truth and exactness, would just
  produce bad art.
• However, he observes that, although art has no
  rules which conform to exact truth, there are
  certain rules of art discovered by genius or
  observation.

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THE VALUE OF AN ARTWORK

• For Hume, the test of an artworks worth is
  whether or not it pleases those with educated
  tastes in all countries and in all ages. The
  same Homer who pleased at Athens and Rome two
  thousand years ago, is still admired at Paris and
  at London. All the changes of climate,
  government, religion, and language, have not be
  able to obscure his glory.
• Bad art may have a temporary audience but it will
  not endure. Only great art lasts, and has a wider
  audience.
• The longer an artwork lasts, and the more widely
  it is admired, the more its creator is rightly
  held in esteem.

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ART CRITICISM AND ITS GROUNDS

• Hume Amidst all the variety and caprice of
  taste, there are certain general principles of
  approbation or blame, whose influence a careful
  eye may trace in all operations of the mind.
• For Hume, the perception of beauty depends on
  good organs eyes for seeing painting, and ears
  for hearing music.
• That a number of people with sound organs agree
  about the worth of artworks gives a basis for
  deriving the idea of perfect beauty. If, in the
  sound state of an organ, there be an entire or
  considerable uniformity of sentiment among men,
  we may thence derive an idea of perfect beauty.

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MINDS AND DEVELOPED TASTES

• Hume says that some objects are likely to be
  pleasing to all because of the common structure
  of the human mind.
• However, certain incidents and situations may
  interfere with proper perception of objects, and
  minds can differ by delicacy of imagination.
• Delicacy of imagination is required for the
  discriminating tastes of aesthetes or experts in
  art. (See Don Quixote passage on p. 486.)

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BEAUTY AND SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS I

• Hume says that there is a great resemblance
  between mental and bodily taste. And even more
  than sweet and bitter, Hume says that beauty and
  ugliness are not properties of objects.
• Rather, beauty and ugliness are like secondary
  properties of objects they are observer
  dependent or have an essential relation to
  percipients.
• No minds no beauty, no minds no ugliness.

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BEAUTY AND SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS II

• However, although beauty depends on subjects,
  there are certain qualities in objects which are
  fitted by nature to produce these particular
  feelings.
• Therefore, beauty and ugliness depend on
  properties of the object in addition to
  properties of the subject.

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DELICACY OF TASTE

• The properties of objects which make them
  beautiful are not always found by ordinary taste,
  but may require a delicacy of taste to discern
  them.
• Delicacy of taste df. The organs are so fine as
  to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same
  time are so exact as to perceive every ingredient
  in a composition.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD TASTE

• Hume Acute perception of beauty and deformity
  must be the perfection of our mental taste.
• Hume The best way to develop taste, or perfect
  our mental taste, is to appeal to those models
  and principles which have been established by the
  uniform consent and experience of nations and
  ages.
• To acquire good taste in art a person should
  study great art and contemplate different kinds
  of beauty.
• Experience breeds expertise, and so taste can be
  educated.

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TASTE, PREJUDICE, AND INTELLECT

• Hume notes that, just as prejudice destroys good
  judgement in intellectual matters, so prejudice
  affects good taste and the judgement of beauty.
• One should use reason to eliminate prejudice in
  matters of taste and in judgements of beauty.
• It takes thought to comprehend all parts of
  artworks in harmonious relation.
• And it takes thought to recognize the end or
  purpose of an artwork.
• And it takes work to establish good taste through
  the study of the arts and their histories.

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WHY ONE PERSONS TASTE CANT ESTABLISH A STANDARD
FOR ALL

• A. The faculty of taste, or the organ of internal
  sensation is seldom perfect, but usually has some
  defect.
• B. A person may lack delicacy of taste. If so,
  then his judgement has no merit.
• C. A person judging a work may lack expertise
  which must be developed by practice.
• D. Prejudice may be involved.
• E. The person may be lacking in good sense.

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QUALITIES OF A GOOD CRITIC

• According to Hume, a good critic has a strong
  sense coupled with delicate sentiment. The
  critics skills are improved by practice and
  perfected by comparison.
• In addition, a good critic has a mind which is
  cleared of all prejudice.
• Hume acknowledges that we may rightly ask where
  good critics are to be found, and how we are to
  know which critics are good and which are not,
  but he maintains that whether or not a critic is
  good is a question of fact, not of sentiment.
  However, Hume says that all will acknowledge that
  the qualities which make a critic good are good
  qualities to have.

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TRUE STANDARDS OF TASTE

• For Hume not all tastes are equal.
• General standards of taste come from the
  agreement of good critics.
• Where questions of taste are a matter of dispute,
  Hume says people must use reason and argument to
  attempt to settle the dispute, and must
  acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist
  somewhere, to wit, real existence and matter of
  fact, and we must further recognize that the
  taste of all individuals is not upon an equal
  footing.
• Thus, for Hume, questions of taste are questions
  of aesthetic fact, not merely of individual
  taste, and some tastes, namely of the educated
  experts, are better than others.

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TWO SOURCES OF DIFFERENCE OF TASTE

• 1. Different temperaments humors of different
  individuals. Hume calls this a difference of
  internal frame.
• 2. Cultural differences of time and place age
  and country. Hume calls this a difference of
  external situation.
• However, in spite of these two sources of
  variation, Hume still thinks that the general
  principles of taste are uniform in human nature.
  And where men vary in their judgements there
  is some defect or perversion in the faculties,
  or prejudice, lack of practice, or lack of
  delicacy, and so there is just reason for
  approving one taste and condemning another.

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CONCLUSION ABOUT SOURCES OF DIFFERENCE OF TASTE

• However, where disagreements about tastes cannot
  be reconciled because of individual temperaments,
  or because of influences of time and place, then
  in that case a certain degree of diversity in
  judgement is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for
  a standard, by which we can reconcile the
  contrary sentiments.
• This seems especially applicable to disagreements
  among experts about the superiority of one great
  artist to another, Leonardo to Rembrandt, for
  instance.

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CURT DUCASSES (1881-1969) DEFINITION OF BEAUTY

• Beauty is defined as the capacity of an object
  aesthetically contemplated to yield feelings that
  are pleasant.
• 1. What does Ducasse mean by object?
• A. Physical?
• B. Perceptual?
• C. Mental or intellectual?

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OBJECTS AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

• All aesthetic feelings presuppose objects which
  can elicit aesthetic experience. All aesthetic
  experience is reactive, a person cannot will
  herself to have an aesthetic experience, but, as
  reactive, it is dependent on an object to which
  it responds.
• The objects which aesthetic experience
  presupposes must be perceptual. This is because
  they must be external to the observer or to the
  person whose experience it is, and knowledge of
  external objects is based on sense perception.
• However, must aesthetic experience be limited to
  perceptual objects? Cannot intellectual objects
  be beautiful or elicit aesthetic experience?

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ARTWORKS AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS

• An artwork is not a mind-independent physical
  object, although it always depends on one.
• One cannot deduce from a physical description of
  an object that it is a work of art.
• Artworks are necessarily dependent on objects
  which can be experienced, and so are dependent on
  minds, since there is no experience apart from
  mind.

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ARTWORKS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS

• All artworks depend on public perceptual objects,
  although they need not themselves be perceptual.
  An example is Robert Barrys
• ALL THE THINGS I KNOW
• BUT OF WHICH I AM NOT
• AT THE MOMENT THINKING - 136PM JUNE 15, 1969.
• Notice that on Ducasses definition of beauty, an
  object need not be an artwork to be beautiful,
  but could be a natural object.

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DUCASSE AND AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION

• Beauty is defined as the capacity of an object
  aesthetically contemplated to yield feelings that
  are pleasant.
• What does aesthetically contemplated mean? To
  take an aesthetic attitude towards an object?
• George Dickie objects that there is no such thing
  as taking an aesthetic attitude towards an
  object. Rather, we are just attending to the
  object - just contemplating it - and doing so may
  produce aesthetic experience.

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DUCASSE AND FEELING

• Beauty is defined as the capacity of an object
  aesthetically contemplated to yield feelings that
  are pleasant.
• Must aesthetic experience be a feeling? Are
  feelings always emotional, or can aesthetic
  experience be intellectual or at least elicited
  by the minds experience of an intellectual
  object? If elicited by such an object, is the
  feeling different or the same as a feeling due to
  a perceptual object?
• Can a reaction to an object be called aesthetic
  if it is not a feeling?

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THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

• Is aesthetic experience homogeneous or
  heterogeneous?
• Do all aesthetic experiences have something in
  common in virtue of which they are aesthetic, or
  are they similar in some ways and different in
  others?

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THE PLEASANTNESS OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

• Beauty is defined as the capacity of an object
  aesthetically contemplated to yield feelings that
  are pleasant.
• Can any feeling or reaction which is not pleasant
  be termed aesthetic?
• Does every part of an artwork have to be pleasant
  for the work to be aesthetic?
• Could aesthetic experience be neutral rather than
  pleasant, just not bad?
• Could an unethical action be termed aesthetic?

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BEAUTY AND SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS

• According to Ducasse, his definition of beauty is
  not simply objective or subjective.
• Beauty is objective in the sense that the term
  beautiful is applied only to objects.
• However, saying that an object is beautiful means
  that it produces pleasant feelings in a subject.
  Thus beauty is subjective in being dependent on a
  subject that can experience beauty.

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THE RELATIVITY OF BEAUTY

• Ducasse says that, because seeing an object as
  beautiful depends in part on the constitution of
  a subject, whether or not an object is seen to be
  beautiful will vary with the constitutions of
  subjects.
• For Ducasse, beauty cannot be objective or
  universal because a) it depends on the
  constitutions of subjects, and b) the
  constitutions of different subjects differ.
• Different subjects can disagree about an objects
  beauty, and the same subject can find an object
  beautiful at one time and not at another. And
  where disagreement exists about beauty there is
  no means by which the disagreement can be
  resolved, and each judgement is equally valid.

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WHAT DOES CONSTITUTION INCLUDE?

• 1. The physical, genetic or developed make-up of
  the brain?
• 2. The innate structure or developed make-up of
  the mind?
• 3. The experiential/historical make-up of mind
  and/or brain as developed through experience and
  aesthetic education?
• 4. The make-up of a person as a combination of
  1, 2, and 3?

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BEAUTY AND AUTHORITY

• According to Ducasse, because aesthetic
  experience depends on different constitutions,
  there is no such thing as authoritative opinion
  concerning the beauty of a given object.
• There are only opinions, not objective or
  authoritative judgements. One need not accept the
  judgement of a so-called connoisseur or
  expert. For Ducasse, for you to accept the
  judgement of an expert with whom you disagree
  means that you are not being true to your own
  feelings.
• Because there is no absolute standard to which
  one can appeal in order to resolve aesthetic
  disagreement, one opinion is as good as another,
  and beauty is not absolute but relative.

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WHAT IS GOOD TASTE?

• For Ducasse, good taste is either my taste, or
  the taste of people who are to my taste, or the
  taste of those people whose taste I want to
  have.
• There is no objective test of the goodness or
  badness of taste you either find beauty in an
  object or you do not.
• The taste of experts does not have to be
  accepted.
• Contra Hume, for Ducasse, taste cannot be proved
  by consensus of the experts.
• And contra Hume, for Ducasse, the test of time is
  no guarantee that one taste is better than
  another.

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PRINCIPLES AND PROOF OF BEAUTY

• Ducasse says that beauty cant be proved by
  appeal to accepted principles or authoritative
  lists of beautiful objects.
• The principles of beauty to which a person
  subscribes can change, both my principles and
  that of others.
• One persons taste can only be praised or
  condemned by another, and there is no proving
  that one is right and another wrong.

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STANDARDS OF EVALUATION I

• Ducasse says that standards by which artworks are
  evaluated cannot themselves be evaluated, but can
  only be accepted as correct or rejected as wrong.
  Or if the standards accepted are themselves
  evaluated by a different standard, then that
  standard cannot be independently confirmed, but
  can only be assumed to be correct.
• The idea is that all arguments for the worth of
  an artwork must rest on value principles which
  must be assumed to be correct and cannot be
  argued for, or we must eventually reach a point
  at which all argument ceases, and rests on points
  which are assumed. This is because, without such
  an assumed starting point, we would be left with
  an infinite regress of arguments.

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STANDARDS OF EVALUATION II

• As just seen, one cannot argue for a standard of
  evaluation which one accepts, since any argument
  for the standard will simply assume the
  correctness of the standard accepted for which
  one attempts to argue, or will require an
  additional argument which one accepts without
  argument.
• For instance, to evaluate art by a standard of
  representation will assume that that standard of
  evaluation is correct, and any attempted argument
  in favor of such a standard will simply assume
  the correctness of the position that no art can
  be valuable which is not representational. Or, if
  we want to argue for the standard of
  representation by saying that art should copy
  reality, then that copy standard must simply be
  assumed or dogmatically laid down to be
  correct.
• But Ducasse says that different standards of
  evaluation are equally legitimate.

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ART, RULES, AND BEAUTY

• Ducasse maintains that there are no rules which
  will guarantee an artworks aesthetic worth.
• Aesthetic feeling is the final court of appeal,
  and where one person has it another may not, and
  where I did not have it at one time at another
  time I might, or vice versa.
• Works of art are only to be judged by the
  aesthetic experiences which they actually produce
  or fail to produce, and not by any rules or other
  standards.

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CAN TASTES BE DEVELOPED?

• Ducasse says, yes, they can, but that does not
  affect his theory that tastes are subjective.
• Tastes can be refined and educated, but they can
  also be perverted and deprived.
• How can we know which is which? Or how can we
  prove philosophically that we are going in one
  direction rather than another?

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THE PROOF OF TASTE

• Recall that, for Ducasse, you cant prove that
  one persons taste is better than another.
• This means the taste of experts or aesthetes
  reflects only one possible position, but it cant
  be said to be the one true or correct taste.
• Also, the taste of the majority of opinion is not
  proof that it is the correct taste. This is
  because the majority might have either good taste
  or bad taste.

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MONROE BEARDSLEY (1915-1981) ON DISPUTING TASTES

• For Beardsley, the chief use of the view that
  tastes cant be disputed is to put an end to
  argument about the aesthetic worth of something
  which is making no progress.
• To say that there is no disputing tastes is meant
  to sound both profound and democratic profound
  in stating a truth about man in relation to
  certain objects, and democratic in recognizing
  the equality of all tastes none is better than
  or superior to another.
• If the principle is true, then there would seem
  to be no point to criticizing and discussing art
  but if it is false then criticism and education
  in the arts does have a point.

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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT TASTES ARE OR ARE
NOT DISPUTABLE? I

• For Beardsley, saying that tastes cannot be
  disputed has two key terms taste and disputed.
• Taste has both a broad and a narrow meaning.
  Taste in the narrow sense concerns its primary
  sensory meaning, and so concerns preferences for
  and aversions to certain foods and drinks.
  Taste in the broad sense refers to the arts,
  and is not simply sensory, but involves the mind
  of the percipient.
• A main difference between taste in either sense
  is that not much can be said or argued about
  regarding taste in the narrow sense, but a great
  deal can be said and argued about regarding taste
  in the broad sense.

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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT TASTES ARE OR ARE
NOT DISPUTABLE? II

• What does it mean to dispute about tastes?
  Beardsley says that it doesnt mean that we
  cannot disagree, or differ in taste because both
  ordinary people and experts have different tastes
  and disagree with one another about the aesthetic
  merit of objects.
• A disagreement is a dispute when reasons are
  given for the disagreement. Without reasons a
  disagreement is simply an opposition of opinion.
• Beardsley wants to know why, if we can dispute
  about politics and other things, why not art?

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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT TASTES ARE OR ARE
NOT DISPUTABLE? III

• For Beardsley, a disagreement is a disagreement
  about taste in the broad rather than the narrow
  sense when reasons can be given why one taste is
  preferable to another.
• It may be hard to argue why a person ought to
  prefer squid to bologna, but not why someone
  should like Matisse better than Leroy Nieman, or
  Beethoven better than Madonna.
• The question, then is whether a preference for
  Picasso or Monteverdi is more like a preference
  for green olives or like a preference for a
  Senatorial candidate is it arguable? can it be
  reasoned?

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BEARDSLEY ON TASTE AND REASONS

• Beardsley says then that disputing tastes depends
  on giving reasons why one artwork, style, or
  movement is better than another.
• If tastes can be disputed, it is because
  aesthetic positions can be argued for.
• Critics argue for their positions, they give
  reasons why a work, style, or movement is good or
  bad. Such arguments are not simple preference
  statements, as might be given regarding taste in
  the narrow sense. (See Beethoven-Mozart example.)

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AESTHETIC SKEPTICISM I

• Beardsleys Aesthetic Skeptic doubts that
  reasons can be given for tastes, or doubts that
  the reasons given are genuine.
• They are not genuine because, in the end, they
  simply rest on individual preferences sheer
  liking or disliking.
• Because tastes rest on individual preferences,
  rational arguments cant be given for against
  them. (See the Aesthetic Skeptics response to
  the Beethoven-Mozart example.)

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AESTHETIC SKEPTICISM II

• The Aesthetic Skeptic will acknowledge that
  critics can point out features of artworks which
  he thinks makes them good works, but will
  maintain that the critic is simply assuming
  rather than proving that these features are good.
  Instead, the critic is taking for granted, what
  may not be true, that you happen to like those
  features.
• You cant, says the Skeptic, argue anybody into
  liking something he doesnt like, and thats why
  there is no disputing about tastes all disputes
  are in the end useless.
• Notice then that the Skeptic assumes all tastes
  are tastes in the narrow rather than the broad
  sense. Beardsley disagrees. However, although he
  thinks that Aesthetic Skepticism is wrong, he
  does not think that it is childish or
  simple-minded.

51
AESTHETIC SKEPTICISM III

• The Skeptical theory takes peoples likes and
  dislikes as ultimate and unappealable facts about
  them that a personal taste is based on such
  things as genetic constitution, culture, and
  particular history of experience.
• All argument for Skepticism ends, not in
  conclusions of aesthetic arguments, but in basic
  likes or dislikes. And for Skepticism these are
  ultimate and unappealable.

52
BEARDSLEYS RESPONSE TO AESTHETIC SKEPTICISM

• Beardsley acknowledges that you cant change a
  disliking into a liking simply by arguments,
  however that doesnt imply that you cant
  change it at all, or that we cannot argue whether
  or not it ought to be changed.
• Rather, one can give reasons why a person would
  be better off if he could enjoy music or painting
  that he now abhors, and tastes can be changed
  and improved by study and enlarged experience.

53
BEARDSLEY ON TASTE I

• For Beardsley, there are not just individual
  tastes, but better and worse tastes.
• Tastes can be developed into higher forms through
  education and experience of great works of art.
• Also, I can say that some artworks are better or
  worse than others without claiming that I know
  for certain which are which.

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BEARDSLEY ON TASTE II

• For Beardsley, taste matters, whereas taste does
  not seem to matter to the Aesthetic Skeptic.
• It matters because good taste will determine
  which artworks get shown, which works of music
  are played, which books get published, and so
  forth. Good taste will also determine what good
  artists will produce, or if they produce at all.
• Further, the kind of experiences that can only
  be obtained by access to the greatest works is an
  important ingredient of the richest and most
  fully developed human life.
• Because this is the case, giving reasons why some
  works are better than others is of the greatest
  importance to culture.

55
DONT I HAVE A RIGHT TO MY TASTE?

• Beardsley says that the Aesthetic Skeptic may
  think it unfair or undemocratic to try to educate
  tastes, since this may be taken to interfere with
  each persons right to his or her own taste.
  However, Beardsley says that it is no invasion
  of a persons right, if he is willing to
  consider the problem, to try to convince him that
  he should try to like other things that appear to
  deserve it.
• Would you want to attend a university which had
  you study inferior works of art because they are
  easy or popular, or should you rather assume that
  professors of art, music, and literature are
  experts in a manner analogous to that of
  professors of physics and mathematics?

56
EDUCATION AND THE ARTS

• Beardsley Works of art are complicated.
• Ergo, you may have to study and think about them
  in order to appreciate and understand them.
• Why should our assessment of the value of an
  artwork have to be immediate? Cant tastes can be
  educated as much as our minds? Cant we be
  educated in the arts as much as in any other
  subject? Does Aesthetic Skepticism invite a
  certain laziness in art education?
• Strayer There is an inverse relation between
  knowledge of art and opinion about art the
  weaker the knowledge the stronger the opinion.

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ART CRITICISM

• Critics give reasons in favor of their opinions
  about artworks, but are not being dogmatic when
  they deny that its all a matter of taste.
• Instead, They believe that some true and
  reasonable judgement of an artwork is in
  principle possible, and that objective critics,
  given time and discussion, could in principle
  agree, or come close to agreeing on it.
• But they do not need to claim infallibility
  people can be mistaken about art as they can
  about anything else.

58
JUDGING WORKS OF ART

• Beardsley says that an artwork must be judged on
  its own terms We must keep our eye on the
  object the painting, the novel, the quintet.
• An artists personal life is irrelevant to
  judging the merit of an artwork by her.
• A work of art, whatever its species, is an
  object if some kind something somebody made.
• The preceding remark recognizes implicitly that
  we cannot produce aesthetic experiences
  internally, or at will. Aesthetic experience can
  only be reactive - it presupposes an object which
  elicits it. It also recognizes that artworks are
  objects produced by intentional actions.

59
ART AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE I

• And the question is whether it the artwork was
  worth making, what it is good for, what can be
  done with it.
• For Beardsley, an artwork is a means of
  producing aesthetic experience. He calls artworks
  consumption goods things which we consume
  perceptually and intellectually in order to
  afford certain valuable kinds and degrees of
  aesthetic experience.
• And it must be recognized that artworks do not
  yield aesthetic experience to those who cannot
  understand them . . .

60
WHEN ARE ARTWORKS GOOD?

• According to Beardsley, works of art are good
  when they elicit aesthetic experience.
• However, one may have to learn how to approach a
  work to get the experience it is capable of
  providing.
• Tastes can be developed through aesthetic
  education.
• Developed tastes are superior to undeveloped
  tastes.