The Scottish Philosopher David Hume (1711-1776):

1
The Scottish Philosopher David Hume (1711-1776)

• An Introduction into the ethical theory of David
  Hume.
• If you want truth look to science or mathematics
  ethics is ultimately based on our feelings
  Natural moral sentiments is where moral
  decision-making is grounded.

2
Consider the following quote

• Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
  destruction of the whole world to the scratching
  of my finger.
• A Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A.
  Selby-Rigge (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.

3
Consider the following quote

• Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the
  passions, and can never pretend to any other
  office to serve and obey them.
• A Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A.
  Selby-Rigge (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.

4
Consider the following quote

• Take any action allowed to be vicious willful
  murder, for instance. Examine it in all its
  lights and see if you can find that matter of
  fact, or real existence, which you call vice.
  You never can find it, till you turn your
  affection into your own breast, and find a
  sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you,
  towards this action. Here is a matter of fact
  but it is the object of feeling, not of reason.
  It lies in your self, not in the object. So that
  which you pronounce any action or character to be
  vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the
  constitution of your nature you have a feeling or
  sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
• A Treatise of Human Nature, Everymans
  Library (New York E.P. Dutton, 1956) 2177.

5
Consider the following quote

• When we run over libraries, persuaded of these
  principles what havoc must we make? If we take
  in our hand any volume-of divinity or school
  metaphysics, for instance-let us ask, Does it
  contain any abstract reasoning concerning
  quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
  experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact
  and existence? No. Commit it then to the
  flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry
  literalism and illusion.
• Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
  12.3.173.

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I. Major Tenets

• (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will,
  but rather is the slave of the passions In
  other words, reason alone cannot motivate to
  action the impulse to act itself must come from
  moral sentiments.
• (2) Morals are not derived from reason they are
  derived from the experience of people.
• (3) Morals are generated from moral sentiments
  feelings of approbation (approval, esteem,
  praise) disapprobation (disapproval,, blame)
  felt by spectators who consider a character
  trait or action

7
I. Major Tenets

• (4) While some virtues and vices are natural,
  others, including justice, are artificial.
• (5) The human psychological makeup of man is
  similar. Therefore, moral judgments will tend
  to be similar.
• (6) Since morals will tend to be similar,
  moralities may be conceived in terms of social
  utility

8
I. Major Tenets

• (7) Humes ethics comes out of the worldview of
  empiricism only matters of fact are those
  discernible by the senses.
• (8) Moral facts do not exist rules of morality
  are not derived from reason.
• (9) Vice and virtue are perceptions in the mind
  and that is all that is needed to regulate moral
  behavior.
• (10) Moral distinctions are constituted by their
  pleasantness and usefulness (he did not
  synthesize how the relate to each other).

9
Overview of Enquiry

• An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals
  (1751) is broken down into 9 Units of thought
• 1. Of the Great Principle of Morals
• 2. Of Benevolence
• 3. Of Justice
• 4. Of Political Society
• 5. Why Utility Pleases
• 6. Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves
• 7. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to
  Ourselves
• 8. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others
• 9. Conclusion

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What is the aim of book?

• Thesis Statement Moral sense makes the
  ultimate distinction between vice virtue both
  moral sense and reason play a role in the
  formation of moral judgments. The basis of
  virtue lies in its utility (usefulness),
  fulfilling two requirements for moral sentiments
  (1) It is useful to ourselves (agreeable) or (2)
  to others. Therefore, the purpose of this book
  is the contributions moral sense and reason make
  in our moral judgments.

11
What is the aim of book?

• Complimentary Statement Reason is important
  because we make moral judgments about what is
  useful to us or to others it plays the role of
  an advisor, not decision-maker. In other words,
  reason does not motivate us to action. Rather,
  the capacity of sympathy (moral sentiments),
  which is rooted in our human constitution,
  motivate us to act or ignore those judgments.

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Central Points to Humes Ethics

• Humes list of virtues are
• Qualities useful (pleasurable) to others
  benevolence, justice, fidelity.
• Qualities useful to their possessor discretion,
  industry, frugality, strength of mind, good
  sense.
• Qualities agreeable (immediately pleasurable) to
  their possessor cheerfulness, magnanimity,
  courage, tranquility.
• Qualities agreeable to others politeness,
  modesty, decency.

13
Humes Distinction between artificial natural
virtues

• Artificial virtues depend on social structures
  and include the following
• a. Justice and fidelity to promises
• b. Allegiance
• c. Chastity and modesty
• d. Duties of sovereign states to keep
  treaties, to respect boundaries, to protect
  ambassadors, and to otherwise subject
  themselves to the law of nations.
• Artificial virtues may vary from society to
  society.

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Humes Distinction between artificial natural
virtues

• Natural virtues, originate in human nature, thus
  tend to be more universal
• Compassion Prudence Temperance Generosity
• Gratitude Friendship Fidelity Charity
• Beneficence Clemency Cleanliness Decorum
• Temperance Frugality Pride Modesty
• Good Sense Wit Humor Articulateness
• Perseverance Patience Good nature
• Sensitivity to poetry Self-assertiveness
• Elusive quality that makes a person lovely or
  valuable
• Involuntary virtues (e.g., good sense)
• voluntary virtues (e.g., ambition)

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Related to purpose are three questions (chapter
1)

• (1) Is morality derived from reason or sentiment?
  
• (2) What is the process whereby we obtain
  knowledge of moral judgments chain of arguments
  and induction or by some internal sense?
• (3) Are moral judgments the same for every
  rational intelligent person? In his pursuit for
  the origins of morality he presupposes an
  anti-supernatural claim, thus dismissing any
  theological metaphysical perspectives of this
  matter and advances a utilitarian model.

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Chapters 2-5

• In chapters 2-5 Hume surveys three kinds of
  conduct that are virtuous they are virtuous
  because they are useful
• Benevolence
• Justice
• Political Society.

17
Chapter 2 On Benevolence

• On benevolence, nothing can bestow more merit
  on any human creature than the sentiment of
  benevolence in an eminent degree and that a
  part, at least, of its merit arises from its
  tendency to promote the interests of our species,
  and bestow happiness on human society (2.2.14).

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Chapter 3 On Justice

• On Justice, Hume writes, public utility is
  the sole origin of justice, and that reflections
  on the beneficial consequence of this virtue are
  the sole foundation of its merit (3.1.15). This
  particular virtue is the considerable source of
  merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence,
  friendship, public spirit, and other social
  virtues of that stamp justice (3.2. 38).

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Chapter 4 Of Political Society

• Of Political Society, the fundamental value of
  the duty of allegiance is the advantage, which
  it procures to so society, by preserving peace
  and order among mankind (4. 39). He concludes
  that common interest and utility begets
  infallibly a standard of right and wrong among
  the parties concerned (4. 45).

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Chapters 5-7

• Chapter 5 Why utility pleases is because we are
  social beings.
• Chapter 6 Qualities that are USEFUL to us
  INDIVIDUALLY include happiness, joy, triumph,
  prosperity, honesty, fidelity, truth, temperance,
  patience, perseverance, sobriety, and physical
  fitness.
• In chapter 7 what is immediately AGREEABLE to
  OURSELVES include pleasure accompanied with
  temperance and decency greatness of mind,
  character, philosophical tranquility or
  magnanimous predisposition, benevolence, and
  bravery.

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Chapter 8 Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to
Others

• What is immediately agreeable to others wit,
  politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable
  quality which one possesses which we
  characterizes as good manners and character.
• How one determines those qualities is whether
  they have a beneficial, useful, extensive, and
  positive influence not only will they harmonize
  with the moral sensibilities of others and
  ourselves, but will produce pleasure personally
  and socially.
• To be sure, no quality is absolutely either
  blamable or praiseworthy it is all according to
  its degree and coherence (6.1. 68). But for
  those that produce public affection, they must be
  pursued (e.g., self-love vs. community-centered)
  (5.1. 48-49).

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Chapter 9 Conclusion

• Reason does not cause our actions.
• Our actions are caused by a combination of
  utility and sentiment whereby reason is embedded
  in the passions, desires, habits, and sentiments
  of mind. In other words, morality cannot be
  separated from psychology.
• There is no such thing as good and evil outside
  of human sentiments.
• What promotes happiness among our fellow humans
  is good and what tends to their misery is
  evil we do not need to go any further in our
  reflection or deliberation on these matters.
• What is virtuous is useful.

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Chapter 9 Conclusion

• Hume writes
• What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish
  these sentiments, dependent on humanity, from
  those connected with any other passion , or to
  satisfy us, why the former are the origin of
  morals, not the latter? Whatever conduct gains
  my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures
  also the applause of all mankind, by affecting
  the same principle in them but what serves my
  avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me
  alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition
  of the rest of mankind. There is no circumstance
  of conduct in any man, provided it has a
  beneficial tendency that is not agreeable to my
  humanity (9.1.112-13).

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Central Ideas

• 1. Moral sentiment is where moral decision-making
  is grounded.
• 2. Sympathy is the capacity to be moved or
  affected by the happiness suffering of
  others-to be pleased when others prosper and
  distressed when others suffer.
• 3. The inclination for this capacity is
  experienced to be a principle of human nature
  (V.17).

25
Central Ideas

• 4. Sympathy is not a virtue but the source of
  moral approval.
• 5. When we ascribe moral praise or blame, the
  praise or blame derives from an attitude of
  sympathy.
• 6. Sympathy, if not universal, is a feature for
  any normal human being.
• 7. Hume attempts to describe and explain how we
  do in fact make moral judgments he does not tell
  us how we ought to make them. In other words, he
  is concerned with judgments about personal
  qualities rather than judgments about actions.

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8. Three Stages of Judgments

• First Stage Sympathy induces us to take into
  account the happiness and suffering others and
  ourselves.
• Second Stage General standards correct the
  operation of sympathy so that we attach the same
  moral importance to the happiness or suffering of
  anyone, ourselves, or others, close to us or
  remote to us.
• Third stage In some cases we need to take into
  account not merely the utility or particular
  acts, but the usefulness to society of a whole
  system of general rules and conventions.

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8. Three Stages of Judgments

• Each of these three is a move from a limited to a
  more generalized standpoint.
• Together they challenge the Platonic-Aristotelian
  view that ones moral assessments are necessarily
  made from the standpoint of a concern for ones
  own well-being.

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9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy

• When a man dominates another his enemy, his
  rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is
  understood to speak the language of self-love,
  and to express sentiments peculiar to himself and
  arising form his particular circumstances and
  situation. But when he bestows on any man the
  epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he
  then speaks another language, and expresses
  sentiments in which he expects all his audience
  are to concur with him. He must therefore,
  depart, from his private and particular situation
  and must choose a point of view common to him
  with others he must move some universal
  principle of the human frame (IX.6).

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9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy

• This universal principle is the sentiment of
  humanity or sympathy. And though this affection
  of humanity may not generally be esteemed so
  strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common
  to all men, it can alone be the formulation of
  morals or of any general system of blame or
  praise (Ibid).

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10. A Similarity

• Hume agrees with Plato and Aristotle on the
  following
• A. Moral judgments are primarily about virtues
  and vices. We praise people insofar as they
  exhibit virtues and blame then insofar as they
  exhibit vices. Only secondarily are our moral
  judgments concerned with specific actions. We
  praise or blame others because they reveal
  morally admirable qualities in the agent.
• B. Virtues would not be virtues unless
  possession of them were in some sense an
  advantage. In fact, Hume, an action is only
  virtuous if it proceeds from a virtuous motive.
  So if an action lacks a virtuous motive, that
  action is not virtuous even if it is the same
  type of action as a genuinely virtuous action.

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• An Additional Look at David Hume

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II. Overview of Significant Points

• 1. Primacy of feelings over reason as a guide to
  ethics
• 2. Hume was profoundly influenced by Newtonian
  scientific revolution
• 3. Empirical science nor science can offer us
  ethical truths only genuine knowledge comes from
  pure mathematics or empirical science. It is not
  because reason is flawed, but because basic
  ethical preferences are generated from feelings
  passions
• 4. Factual knowledge arises exclusively from the
  data supplied by the senses and is extended in
  usefulness by means of inferences based on a
  belief in cause-and-effect relations.

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II. Overview

• 5. Feelings cannot provide an objective
  foundation for ethics In fact, feelings are not
  subject to reason.
• 6. Hume attacks the idea of a necessary
  metaphysical connection between cause and
  effect.
• 7. The basis of moral assertion is sourced in
  feelings of approval (pleasure) or disapproval
  (pain or uneasiness).
• 8. Hume is a compatibilist regarding free-will
  and Newtonian determinism (he is a strict
  empiricist).

34
II. Overview

• 9. Hume agrees with the moral sense theorists
  such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (moral sense)
  and Butler (conscience) that all requirements to
  pursue goodness and avoid evil as consequent upon
  human nature, which is so structured that a
  particular feature of our consciousness (whether
  moral sense or conscience) evaluates the rest.
• 10.Because we are the kinds of creatures we are,
  with the dispositions for pain and pleasure, the
  kinds of familial and friendly interdependence
  that make up our life together, and our approvals
  and disapprovals of these, Hume believes we can
  escape radical relativism, generate natural and
  artificial virtues are socially agreeable.

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II. Overview

• Natural and Artificial Virtues
• Artificial virtues are dependent upon social
  structures (justice fidelity to promises,
  chastity, modesty, duties to sovereign states)
• Natural virtues originate in nature and are more
  universal (compassion, generosity, gratitude,
  friendship, fidelity, charity, benevolence,
  clemency, equity, prudence, etc).

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On Justice

• On Justice
• It is natural for justice to arise, but we will
  come together and establish conventions of
  justice.

37
II. Overview

• 11. This view of moral grounding in moral
  sense, emotions, or passional nature is
  contrary to rationalists like Locke, Hobbes, and
  Clarke, who believed that good and evil were
  discovered by reason.
• 12. Locke, Hobbes, and Clarke believed, in some
  moods, that moral standards or requirements are
  requirements of reason.

38
II. Overview

• 13. Hume takes an intermediate view regarding
  whether morality is conventional (Hobbes) or
  natural (Locke). Hume thinks natural impulses
  of humanity and dispositions to approve cannot
  entirely account for our virtue of justice a
  correct analysis of that requires the thesis
  that mankind, an inventive species, has
  cooperatively constructed rules of property and
  promise.

39
II. Overview

• 14. Hume disagrees with Hobbes regarding the
  following
• a. Necessary psychological Egoism
• b. Necessary violent view of a state of nature
  whereby without an organized state all is in a
  war against all

40
II. Overview

• 15. Hume disagrees with Locke (and Rawls) about
  the idea of humanity being involved in a highly
  cooperative domain of law- governing citizens for
  the following reasons
• a It is a hypothetical condition in which we
  would care for our friends and cooperate with
  them
• b. Self-interest and preference for friends
  over strangers would make any wider
  cooperation impossible.
• One of the central themes of Humes political
  philosophy is that we are both fundamentally
  loving and selfish.

41
II. Overview

• 16. Turning from reason to sentiment Hume
  believes that has avoided radical relativism or
  mere subjectivism.
• a. Since people have the same psychological
  makeup, their moral responses will be similar.
• b. If provided the same data, people will tend
  to respond similarly. That does mean that all
  people will agree about the moral worth of an
  action.
• c. Ethical disagreements generally stem not from
  differences in our passional nature or
  feelings but from (a) misunderstandings
  regarding circumstantial evidence or from (b)
  incomplete analyses.

42
II. Overview

• 17. Study of individual assessments reveal that
  socially useful acts are approved while those
  which are socially detrimental are disapproved.
• 18. Since we judge acts generally by their
  conformity to social utility (rather than by
  immediate, personal preferences), impartiality
  will tend to prevail in moral judgments.

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II. Overview

• 18. Conjoined events do not prove they are
  causally connected any more than there is a
  causal connection between the rooster crowing
  and the sun rising. All one can do is
  extrapolate based on oft-repeated occurrences.
  He does not deny the principle of causality he
  denies the basis on which some people try to
  prove causality.
• 19. All objections of human inquiry are relations
  of ideas (mathematics definitions) or matters of
  fact (everything known through one or more of the
  senses).

44
II. Overview

• 20. Laws of nature are habits formed in our minds
  on what has occurred in the past and the
  expectation of similar experiences will occur in
  the future.

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The Nature of Moral Judgment3 Textual
Interpretations

• 1. Non-propositional View a moral evaluation
  does not express any proposition or state any
  fact. Either it gives vent to a feeling, or it is
  itself a feeling. (A more refined form of this
  interpretation allows that moral evaluations have
  some propositional content, but claims that for
  Hume their essential feature, as evaluations, is
  non-propositional).

46
The Nature of Moral Judgment3 Textual
Interpretations

• 2. Description of the Feelings of the Spectator
  Hume is describing the feelings of the
  spectator, or the feelings a spectator would have
  were she to contemplate the trait or action from
  the common point of view.

47
The Nature of Moral Judgment3 Textual
Interpretations

• 3. Dispositional interpretation Evaluated trait
  or action is so constituted as to cause feelings
  of approval or disapproval in a (suitably
  characterized) spectator. On the dispositional
  view, in saying some trait is good we attribute
  to the trait the dispositional property of being
  such as to elicit approval.

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IV. Moral Sentiments

• 1. Moral sentiments are emotions which possess
  unique phenomenological quality, and special set
  of causes.
• 2. Moral Sentiments are caused by contemplating
  the person or action.
• 3. Moral sentiments tend to be clarified or
  brought into focus by social utility which is a
  common moral sentiments or similar responses
  (collectively).

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IV. Moral Sentiments

• Moral sentiments are the sort of pleasure
  uneasiness which are associated with 4 passions
• 1. Pride
• 2. humility
• 3. Love
• 4. Hatred.
• Some argue that pleasure and pain cause these 4
  passions others believe these 4 passions make up
  the pleasure or pain.
• Thus, when we feel moral approval we tend to
  love or esteem, and when we approve a trait of
  our own we are proud of it.

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IV. Moral Sentiments

• Because we share a similar psychological makeup,
  thus share common moral sentiments, we are able
  to generate or invent artificial virtues because
  we find them to be pleasant and not painful
  (e.g.,)
• 1. Justice with respect to property,
• 2. Allegiance to government,
• 3. The laws of nations,
• 4. Modesty, and
• 5. Good manners), which (Hume argues) are
  inventions contrived solely for the interest of
  society.

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IV. Sentiments Sympathy and Benevolence.

• Sympathy is not seen as a mental capacity in the
  Inquiry as it is in the State of Nature (as a
  mirror to yourself).
• Rather he replaces sympathy with a general
  benevolence in Inquiry. We care about our
  species of such but not as a mental capacity.
• Example, in Human Treatise, he states, there is
  no such passion in human minds, as the love of
  mankind, merely as such, independent of personal
  qualities, of service, or of relation to ourseit
  Tis true, there is no human, and indeed no
  sensible, creature, whose happiness or misery
  does not, in some measure, affect us when brought
  near to us and represented in lively colours
  (pg. 13).
• But in Inquiry he doesnt talk about a mental
  capacity as a mirror to yourself but we have a
  benevolence which is part of our species.

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V. Kant vs. Hume

• 1. Similarity Hume and Kant recognized the
  difference between pure reason (understanding)
  from practical reason (work of the will). In
  other words, they both recognized an important
  difference between judgments of facts and
  judgments of value.
• 2. Difference Kant was a rationalist in his
  conception of morals Hume was an empiricist. A
  rationalist derives principles of morality from
  metaphysical assumptions. Stated differently,
  Kant grounds his morality in rationalism and Hume
  on natural moral sentiments.
• 3. Difference According to Kant, no matter how
  unpleasant the command makes you feel, you are
  obligated to fulfill it.

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VI. Kant vs. Bentham and Mill on utility

• Jeremy Bentham argued that the standard of
  goodness in the greatest amount of happiness for
  the greatest number of persons is intrinsically
  valuable.
• 1 While Hume and Bentham agree that happiness is
  good, Hume does not admit that it is the only
  thing that is good. Human beings are complex
  organisms, and their total welfare includes more
  than the satisfaction of the one need for
  happiness.
• 2. Mill recognizes the cultural, intellectual,
  and spiritual pleasures are of greater value
  than mere physical pleasure. While Hume will
  agree that we are complex humans, he would reject
  Mills finite godism and would reject his
  utilitarianism because he grounds morality not
  in utility but in moral sentiments which all
  humans share.

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VII. Hume on Justice

• 1. The purposes of justice can be realized only
  by adapting the methods that are used to the
  particular situation that is involved.
• a. Justice is a relative virtue in contrast to a
  deontological version of justice, one that is
  not influenced by the situational setting.
• b. He believes our human understanding of
  justice does vary from one time to another and
  that the application of the principles of
  justice will vary with the circumstances under
  which they are applied.
• c. Hume implies that there is an unchanging
  element in justice The purpose is always that
  of meeting the needs of society.

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VII. Hume on Justice

• As justice evidently tends to promote public
  utility and to support civil society, the
  sentiment of justice is either derived from our
  reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger,
  thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of
  life, attachment to offspring, and other
  passions, arises from a simple original instinct
  in the human breast, which nature has implanted
  for like salutary purposes.
• An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
  Morals, (Chicago Open Court, 1966), 35.

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VII. Hume on Justice

• 2. Justice is dynamic
• a. Justice is expressed in laws and customs
  which are generated when the need arises for
  them.
• b. The nature of justice varies in view of
  situational setting (illust. Sexual morality may
  vary depending upon setting).

57
VII. Hume on Justice

• 3. In view of his appendix on justice in An
  Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals that
  there are certain principles which may be
  recognized that can advance justice
• A. Avoid giving special privileges to some but
  not others
• B. Take into account the long-range interests of
  others rather than immediate satisfactions
  personal and immediate needs may need to be
  sacrificed in order to achieve the well-being of
  society.
• C. Seek to meet the needs of society as a whole.

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VII. Hume on Justice

• 4. On Distributive Justice
• Justice exists for meeting the needs of society
• Justice will be stated in general rules of
  conduct but particular situations and other
  factors may arise whereby the needs and meeting
  those needs will mean change (e.g., war).
• Distributing justice is quite impossible to meet
  every need.
• Justice is for the purpose of distributing goods
  in an equitable manner there is no exact formula
  for doing this that will meet the needs of every
  situations that comes about.
• Neither extreme wealth or poverty are in the best
  interests of others.
• Believes in a moderate view of property rights.
• Justice is a relative virtue nothing remains
  constant about the nature of justice.
• In dire circumstances, scarce resources, there is
  no justice and no benevolence.
• Because of our human nature we have limited
  benevolent and limited justice.

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VIII. Hume on Altruism and Selfishness

• 1. Altruism and selfishness are not necessarily
  opposed to one another.
• 2. We possess a humanitarian sentiment which
  naturally approves of what is beneficial and
  useful to society.
• 3. Since we share a common morality derived from
  our nature, principles of morality are not
  derived from self-love alone.
• 4. What gains the admiration and respect of
  others is by acting upon the pleasing moral
  sentiments that fellow-humans share this is
  virtuous and meritorious.
• Human nature includes both selfish and unselfish
  sentiments.
• Human nature is selfish to some extent.
• Human nature also has the capacity to act beyond
  ones selfishness.
• We can feel the pain of others and their
  misfortune.
• Selfishness can over shadow good intentions but
  does not necessarily have to.

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IX. In Summary

• About Hume's ethics we have a moral sentiment
  or feeling of approval or disapproval
  (approbation or disapprobation) about actions
  that we find pleasing or agreeable. We find
  actions agreeable (and thus approve of them) not
  because of the utility of such actions but
  because we naturally have an inclination to
  approve of what we are attracted to. In thinking
  about the pleasures or pains of other people, we
  (along with all other normal human beings) are
  attracted to what arouses in us natural
  sentiments of humanity and benevolence. Such
  sentiments are not derived from self-love but
  from a sense of identifying with other human
  beings. That sense of fellow-feeling, not the
  perception of the utility of actions, is the
  basis on which we feel moral obligation. Of
  course, promoting social utility is in our own
  self-interest, but acting for the sake of
  promoting our own self-interest is not a good
  enough reason for acting in a moral way. Dr.
  Steve Daniel

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X. Advantages that have been offered on this view

• 1. Some will appreciate the fact that it removes
  metaphysical mysteries from realm of ethics
  because it grounds morality in moral sentiments
  which all humans share.
• 2. Pleasure and pain are important considerations
  in ethical judgments.
• 3. It attempts to balance both selfishness and
  altruism.
• 4. It seems to avoid pure egoism, utilitarianism,
  and radical relativism.

62
XI Objections Raised against Hume

• 1. Hume reduces ethics to a matter of taste
  (e.g., A.J. Ayer C.L. Stevenson), relativism,
  and subjectivism.
• Hume replies since people have the same
  psychological makeup, moral responses will be
  comparable. To be sure, this doesnt mean
  everyone will agree about but if provided the
  same data, they will generally tend to respond
  similarly
• a. Common Nature
• b. Same Data
• Similar response.
• Ethical differences stem not from differences in
  our feelings or passional nature but from
  misunderstandings about the actual circumstances
  surrounding a given act or from incomplete
  analyses of the consequences accruing from the
  act.

63
XI. Objections

• 2. Those who embrace objectivist feelings will
  reject Humes account of subjectivist feelings.
  Some believe feelings can be a source of
  objective truths of ethics. Consider Blaise
  Pascals famous statement
• The heart has its reasons that the reason know
  not
• For those who embrace objective feelings they
  would argue that while feelings may not be an
  infallible guide to ethics, feelings are not
  distractions on the path to ethical truth.
  Rather, feelings can be a source of ethical
  insight.
• Do you agree? Can ethical feelings be
  objectively true or are they more like tastes?

64
XI. Objections

• 3. Moral sentiments cannot provide an adequate
  basis for moral obligations (e.g., justice).
• Humes response It is obligatory, for example,
  to be justbut the reason we adopt the concept of
  justice and guide our actions in conformity to it
  is because it comes from the moral sentiments we
  all share.
• Hume doesnt deny a specific instance of
  injustice could be more beneficial to society
  than its corresponding instance of justice in
  some odd case, but by conforming ourselves to the
  moral sentiments of justice, humanity can be
  served.
• Response Still justice is not absolute, fixed
  upon absolutes it is sourced in moral sentiments
  that can change (justice becomes somewhat
  relative even if it is not radical relativism).

65
XI. Objections

• 4. Borrowing the notion of social utility to find
  a way to maintain social order is using reason.
  Social utility is powerful enough to incite
  action to actually do the good.
• Hume would respond by saying that the source of
  utility is not reason but moral sentiment that
  we naturally share we identify with other beings
  on that sense of fellow feelings. Thus, it is
  not from social utility but moral sentiments
  that ground our morality. Secondly, reasons of
  social utility is not powerful enough to incite
  action it is the moral sentiments of feelings
  of approval or disapproval that motivates action,
  not the perception of social utility.
• 5. Humes skepticism is self-defeating because he
  did not suspend moral judgments regarding God,
  miracles, and metaphysics.

66
XI. Objections

• 6. Metaphysical problem According to Hume,
  meaningful propositions are empirical. But this
  is self-defeating, for the statement that only
  analytic or empirical propositions are
  meaningful is not itself an analytic statement.
  If one allows that such statements are
  meaningful, then why cannot metaphysical
  statements be meaningful? Stated differently, to
  say there is no metaphysics is itself a
  metaphysical statement, namely that you know that
  metaphysics doesnt exist.
• 7. Causality can be experienced internally. I am
  the cause of this sentence I am typing, and I
  experience that fact. Everyone experiences their
  own thoughts and actions.

67
XI. Objections

• 8. Fundamentally it fails to explain what is
  wrong with a wrong action because it is solely
  based on human experience. Reason only reveals
  matters of fact.
• a. Good in the moral sense of the term is reduced
  to feelings or moral sentiments.
• b. Evil in the moral sense of the term is reduced
  to feelings or moral sentiments.
• 1. Humes response is that there is no other way
  to judge morality. Moreover, we are naturally
  constituted in such a way that there is present
  in us a sense of humanity which always
  approves of that which promotes human welfare and
  is useful in society because we all share it.

68
XI. Objections

• 9. Hume is subject to the postmodern critique
  that are our emotions are not a product of
  moral sentiments. Rather, we are morally
  scripted by our sub-culture. How does Hume know
  that our moral sentiments are natural and not
  socially inscribed values?
• 10. Doesnt the idea that we all share a similar
  constitution of moral sentiments beg the
  question that we are designed by God (e.g.,
  Thomas Reid)?