Title: The Politics of North Korea in Japan
1The Politics of North Korea in Japan
2Introduction
- The normalization of relations with North Korea
represents one of the two major Japanese foreign
policy issues remaining from WWII. (The other is
a peace treaty with Russia.) - Today I will examine the background of this
issue, the efforts made by Japan to normalize
relations with the North, and current impasse
over the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. - I will also discuss the current strains between
Washington and Tokyo over approaches to North
Korea.
- I will conclude with some thoughts about the
future evolution of Japan-North Korean
relations.
3The Political Setting In Japan
- Since 1945, the Korean issue has created a deep
divide in Japanese politics
- Cold War polarization
- The Japanese Left attracted to Kim Il Sungs
Socialist Paradise
- ROK US puppet
- Conservative establishment supported ROK
- Korean War deepened divide
- Left
- ROK started war
- GOJ
- Still under Occupation so neutrality not an
option
- Sent Japanese minesweepers
- Japanese firms provided logistical support
- Korean War contributed to major economic boom
4Divided Interpretations in Japanese Politics of
Japans Korean Legacy
- Japanese Left regarded Japans 40 - year
occupation of Korea as an example of Japanese
imperialism and exploitation
- Japanese Right defended colonial period as
leaving a largely positive legacy of economic
development and education
- Left/Right divide on treatment of Korean
residents of Japan
- Left supported greater rights for resident Koreans
5Japans Korean Community
- Korean community in Japan divided on North/South
lines
- Chosen Soren
- Supported North
- Originally about 2/3s of 700,000 Korean
community
- Schools, well developed social networks
- Channeled remittances to Pyongyang
- Supported 1959-1984 repatriation to DPRK of
87,000 Koreans
- 6000 Japanese spouses also went to North Korea
- Mindan
- Supported ROK
- Originally About 1/3 of Korean Community
- Less structured than Chosen Soren
- Membership less political, more integrated
- GOJ allowed Korean residents to register only as
ROK citizens
6Japans Normalization with the ROK
- ROK-Japan relations not normalized until 1965,
reflecting the complex history between Japan and
Korea
- First ROK President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) not
interested in normalizing
- Left in Japan opposed to normalization with ROK,
pushed for normalization with DPRK
- US pushed GOJ to establish diplomatic ties with
ROK
7Elements of Japan-ROK Normalization
- Treaty with apology deep remorse
- ROK government only lawful government, from UN
resolution language
- Reflected ROK desire to block Japan-DPRK
relations
- Claims/reparations
- GOJ position Japan-Korea not at war
- But renounced all claims to property
- 1.5 billion aid package
- Fisheries agreement
- Status of 700,000 Koreans in Japan
- Legal residency for those in Japan in 1945 and
their children
8GOJ-ROK Relations Developed Rapidly
- Trade expanded rapidly
- Sato agreement to Korea clause at Nixon Sato
summit - 1969
- Connected to US agreement to return Okinawa to
Japan
- Seen by US as GOJ intent to allow US use of bases
to defend ROK
- Kim Dae Jung kidnapping by KCIA (1973) set back
ties
- Nakasone breakthrough - 1982
- Visited ROK right after his assumption of office
- Took with him 4 billion aid package
- But still rocky periods
- History
- Fujio statement
- Textbooks
9Japan-North Korea
- Normalization with North on Japans diplomatic
agenda after 1965
- Balance ties with ROK
- Remove source of domestic political tension
- Trade incentives (DPRK and ROK economies
essentially equivalent in 1965)
- But steady erosion of interest in Japan
- ROK economy took off
- US, ROK discouraged GOJ overtures to DPRK
- Japan had other priorities
- Okinawa return 1972
- China normalization
10Japan-North Korea (2)
- Norths increasingly aberrant behavior added to
problem
- North gave sanctuary to Japan Red Army hijackers
of Yodo airliner - 1970
- Suspected abduction of Japanese citizens -
1979-83
- Rangoon bombing
- KAL bombing 1987
- GOJ essentially left relations with DPRK to JSP
- Part of quiet division of labor under the 1955
system
- Private trade and fisheries agreements but no
formal ties
11Japan -North Korea (3)
- Post Cold War revival of interest
- Roh Tae Woo initiatives toward North (1988)
opened door for GOJ
- Led to NK-ROK agreements on reconciliation/denucl
earization 1991
- ROK normalization with Moscow (1990) and PRC
(1992)
- Opened door for ROK/DPRK UN membership (1991)
- Kanemaru-JSP mission (1990)
- Designed to set terms for negotiations on
normalization
- Kanemaru (Mr. Abouto) poor negotiator
- Japanese delegation agreed to compensate DPRK not
only for colonial period but for post war
division - repudiated by GOJ
- But did agree on basic issues to be negotiated
- 1) Settlement of basic issues of past with
treaty
- 2) Economics, including reparations
- 3) International issues, N-S, nukes
- 4) Humanitarian (abductions) - Megumi Yokota
- Eight rounds of negotiations with little
results
- Disagreement over amount/terms of compensation
12 Japan-North Korea (4)
- 1990s fluctuations
- 1992-94 cool nuclear issue erupts
- 1995-97 - Revitalized
- Jimmy Carter visit - GOJ joins KEDO, contributes
1billion for LWR
- GOJ provides food, humanitarian aid to North
- Resumption of normalization negotiations, return
of Japanese spouses
- 1997-99 downturn
- Abduction issue families organized
- Taepodong missile launch over Japan - key event
- Japan developed laws to control funds to DPRK
- GOJ unhappy with muted US response led to
satellite program
- Spy boat intrusion
- Fundamentally hardened Japanese attitudes toward
North Korea
- Even long-time supporters on Left backed away
from DPRK
- Support in Korean community greatly weakened
- New generation less political
- Increased integration of Korean community into
Japanese society
13The Koizumi Era
- Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in Sept. 2002
- Wanted to make historic breakthrough
- Settle one of last pending WW II issues
- Give Japan greater diplomatic leverage,
flexibility
- Speculation that Bushs tough approach to NK may
have led Pyongyang to soften toward Japan
- Secret negotiations kept from US
- Visit produced mixed results
- NK revealed 13 abductions, eight dead
- Included one person GOJ was unaware of
- North apologized
- Allowed five survivors to visit Japan
- Koizumi demanded full explanation
- But revelations produced backlash in Japan
- Suspicions became confirmed reality
- Almost complete erosion of public support in
Japan for North Korea
14The Koizumi Era (2)
- Visit did produce some positive results
- North agreed to
- Nuclear would stand by agreements
- Long-range missiles continue moratorium on
tests
- Normalization
- Accepted Murayama statement as basis for apology
- Accepted ROK formula for reparations
- Breakdown of negotiations
- Oct. 2002
- GOJ did not return five survivors visiting Japan
- North accused Japan of breaking agreement
15Koizumi Era (3)
- Second summit May 2004
- North allowed family members to leave
- Promised further investigations of abductions
- But remains of Megumi Yokota did not match DNA
- Comprehensive talks 2006
- DPRK stiffed Japan on further investigations
16Japans Response to Nuclear North Korea - Oct.
2006
- July 4-5 2006 missile tests by DPRK led to
sanctions
- Ban on port calls by weekly ferry linking
Niigata-Wonson, charter flights, remittances for
groups linked to WMD
- Oct. nuclear test -Japans reaction strong but
measured
- GOJ played lead role at UNSC on resolution
condemning DPRK
- Japan banned all North Korean ships from
Japanese ports -impact on fund transfers - and
all DPRK imports
- Reinforced public support for missile defense
- Net result
- Further hardening of Japanese public attitudes
toward the North
- Reinforced when Abe became PM in late Sept. 2006
- Abes popularity largely a result of hard stance
on DPRK
17The Gap Between the US and Japan on North Korea
after Norths tests
- Tokyo and Washington had been the hardliners
among the Six Parties
- Some ambivalence in Tokyo about refusal of Bush
administration to engage directly with North
- But happy with Washingtons strong support on
abduction issue
- Bush meeting with families
18US-Japan Gap (2)
- US shift on North Korea not clearly signaled to
Tokyo
- Complex policy and bureaucratic background
- Nuclear test changed stakes for US
- Rumsfeld, Bolton departures
- Hardliners weakened
- Sec. Rice, Chris Hill got Presidents support for
engagement
- Hills Berlin meeting alarmed GOJ
- Agreement on terms of Banco Delta Asia settlement
cleared way for resumption of Six Party talks
19Feb. 13, 2007 Beijing Six Party Denuclearization
Action Plan
- Implementation of Sept. 2005 Six Party Agreement
- Five parallel actions agreed on
- DPRK shuts down Yongbyon, invites IAEA back
- DPRK to list all its nuclear programs, including
separated Pu
- US-DPRK normalization talks - removal of DPRK
from terrorism list, etc.
- Japan-DPRK normalization talks
- Resolve unfortunate past and outstanding
issues of concern
- Economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance for
DPRK
- 50,000 tons of fuel oil in 60 days
- GOJ reluctantly went along but did not join
supply of oil
20Oct. 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions to Implement
Joint Statement
- Spelled out details and timetable for
declaration, disablement by end of 2007
- DPRK commitment not to transfer nuclear material
and technology
- US reaffirmed its intent to remove DPRK from
terrorism list, tied to declaration, disabling of
reactor, reprocessing, fabrication facilities
- Japan, DPRK to make sincere effortsto
normalize
- Reaffirmed aid, oil, to DPRK
21GOJ - US Tensions
- GOJ unhappy with USG de-linkage of abduction
issue from the removal of DPRK from US list of
state sponsors of terrorism
- Seen as a betrayal and undercutting GOJ
leverage with North
- US unhappy with GOJs parochial perspective
- De-nuclear DPRK highest priority for US, Japan,
region, world
- Delisting one of few carrots US has to offer
- US terrorism list relates only to recent actions
- PM Fukuda appears to be looking for greater
flexibility but has little room to maneuver
- Separate abductions from nuclear issue
- Tie abduction resolution to final normalization
22Recent Developments
- US-DPRK Singapore meeting - March 2008
- US seeking promised full declaration of all DPRK
nuclear programs, including clarification of the
uranium enrichment issue, that was due at end of
2007 - Indication that earlier DPRK declaration
inadequate
- US also seeking clarification of Syrian
connection
- US also made clear that it will remove NK from US
terrorism list if it produces declaration/clarific
ations
- Form of clarifications unclear - Shanghai
formula?
- On-going discussions within USG and with DPRK to
flesh out the deal
- On-going USG-GOJ discussions on coordination
- Deputy Secretary Negropontes May 9 visit to
Tokyo
- Continuing major source of tension in relations
23Other Lurking US-Japan Differences on the DPRK
- Differing end-game priorities
- For US
- Non-proliferation is real red line
- Syrian connection very troubling
- Accounting and removal of plutonium essential
- Explanation of uranium enrichment program
- For GOJ
- Abductions - resolution is highest political
priority
- Plutonium - insists on accounting/removal of all
material
- Missiles - continued moratorium
- HEU - important but less central to GOJ concerns
- Non-proliferation - important but Syrian
connection less central
- Potential for differing US and GOJ bottom lines
24Conclusion - Whither Japan and North Korea?
- Japan-North Korean normalization essential
element of long-term solution of the Korean
Issue
- Strategic
- Remove a lingering source of tension in East
Asia
- Resolve one of last WW II issues
- Economic
- Japanese aid, investment one of the keys to NK
development
- Humanitarian
- Family reunifications
25Barriers to Normalization
- Abduction Issue
- Extremely difficult to resolve
- GOJ demand
- Return all living victims to Japan
- Provide a full accounting of all victims
- Hand over those responsible for the abductions
- DPRK may be unable or unwilling to comply
- Most sensitive, and embarrassing, aspects of
North Korean behavior are involved
- Tied to both Kims
- How do you prove a negative?
26Barriers to Normalization (2)
- Nuclear Issue
- Represents direct threat to Japan
- Normalization conditioned on resolution of
nuclear issue
- Freeze, disablement, dismantlement of Yongbyon
- Accounting for and export of all separated
plutonium
- Missile Issue
- Taepodong poses unique threat to Japan
- Not a threat to ROK
- Not a credible threat to US given US nukes
- Tied to credibility of US nuclear umbrella
- Continued moratorium on tests essential condition
of normalization
27Barriers to Normalization (3)
- Dynamics of Japanese politics and public opinion
- Hardened attitudes toward DPRK in LDP
- Abe, Aso representative of uncompromising
attitude
- Appeal to right wing in LDP
- Disinclined to follow Koizumis example
- Pro-DPRK lobby has essentially dried up
- Japan becoming more nationalist, less apologetic
about the past
- Reduced tolerance of North Korean polemics
- Politics of guilt no longer works in Japan
- Lack of informal pipes between Japan and North
Korea
- Economic disincentives
- GOJ budget deficits, reduced support for ODA
- Little interest in Japanese business community
- DPRK represents unattractive trade and investment
target
28Barriers to Normalization (4)
- North Korean attitudes toward Japan
- Pyongyang giving little apparent priority to ties
with Tokyo after Koizumi visits
- Some Japanese believe that Pyongyang is convinced
that isolating Tokyo is the best strategy
- Belief that if US moves toward DPRK, Japan will
inevitably follow
29Requirements for a Breakthrough
- A nuclear deal of some kind
- Continued missile test moratorium
- Some DPRK give on info about abductees
- Political will on both sides to make it happen
- Now apparently lacking in both Tokyo and
Pyongyang
-