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The Politics of North Korea in Japan

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Title: The Politics of North Korea in Japan


1
The Politics of North Korea in Japan
  • Rust M. Deming

2
Introduction
  • The normalization of relations with North Korea
    represents one of the two major Japanese foreign
    policy issues remaining from WWII. (The other is
    a peace treaty with Russia.)
  • Today I will examine the background of this
    issue, the efforts made by Japan to normalize
    relations with the North, and current impasse
    over the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues.
  • I will also discuss the current strains between
    Washington and Tokyo over approaches to North
    Korea.
  • I will conclude with some thoughts about the
    future evolution of Japan-North Korean
    relations.

3
The Political Setting In Japan
  • Since 1945, the Korean issue has created a deep
    divide in Japanese politics
  • Cold War polarization
  • The Japanese Left attracted to Kim Il Sungs
    Socialist Paradise
  • ROK US puppet
  • Conservative establishment supported ROK
  • Korean War deepened divide
  • Left
  • ROK started war
  • GOJ
  • Still under Occupation so neutrality not an
    option
  • Sent Japanese minesweepers
  • Japanese firms provided logistical support
  • Korean War contributed to major economic boom

4
Divided Interpretations in Japanese Politics of
Japans Korean Legacy
  • Japanese Left regarded Japans 40 - year
    occupation of Korea as an example of Japanese
    imperialism and exploitation
  • Japanese Right defended colonial period as
    leaving a largely positive legacy of economic
    development and education
  • Left/Right divide on treatment of Korean
    residents of Japan
  • Left supported greater rights for resident Koreans

5
Japans Korean Community
  • Korean community in Japan divided on North/South
    lines
  • Chosen Soren
  • Supported North
  • Originally about 2/3s of 700,000 Korean
    community
  • Schools, well developed social networks
  • Channeled remittances to Pyongyang
  • Supported 1959-1984 repatriation to DPRK of
    87,000 Koreans
  • 6000 Japanese spouses also went to North Korea
  • Mindan
  • Supported ROK
  • Originally About 1/3 of Korean Community
  • Less structured than Chosen Soren
  • Membership less political, more integrated
  • GOJ allowed Korean residents to register only as
    ROK citizens

6
Japans Normalization with the ROK
  • ROK-Japan relations not normalized until 1965,
    reflecting the complex history between Japan and
    Korea
  • First ROK President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) not
    interested in normalizing
  • Left in Japan opposed to normalization with ROK,
    pushed for normalization with DPRK
  • US pushed GOJ to establish diplomatic ties with
    ROK

7
Elements of Japan-ROK Normalization
  • Treaty with apology deep remorse
  • ROK government only lawful government, from UN
    resolution language
  • Reflected ROK desire to block Japan-DPRK
    relations
  • Claims/reparations
  • GOJ position Japan-Korea not at war
  • But renounced all claims to property
  • 1.5 billion aid package
  • Fisheries agreement
  • Status of 700,000 Koreans in Japan
  • Legal residency for those in Japan in 1945 and
    their children

8
GOJ-ROK Relations Developed Rapidly
  • Trade expanded rapidly
  • Sato agreement to Korea clause at Nixon Sato
    summit - 1969
  • Connected to US agreement to return Okinawa to
    Japan
  • Seen by US as GOJ intent to allow US use of bases
    to defend ROK
  • Kim Dae Jung kidnapping by KCIA (1973) set back
    ties
  • Nakasone breakthrough - 1982
  • Visited ROK right after his assumption of office
  • Took with him 4 billion aid package
  • But still rocky periods
  • History
  • Fujio statement
  • Textbooks

9
Japan-North Korea
  • Normalization with North on Japans diplomatic
    agenda after 1965
  • Balance ties with ROK
  • Remove source of domestic political tension
  • Trade incentives (DPRK and ROK economies
    essentially equivalent in 1965)
  • But steady erosion of interest in Japan
  • ROK economy took off
  • US, ROK discouraged GOJ overtures to DPRK
  • Japan had other priorities
  • Okinawa return 1972
  • China normalization

10
Japan-North Korea (2)
  • Norths increasingly aberrant behavior added to
    problem
  • North gave sanctuary to Japan Red Army hijackers
    of Yodo airliner - 1970
  • Suspected abduction of Japanese citizens -
    1979-83
  • Rangoon bombing
  • KAL bombing 1987
  • GOJ essentially left relations with DPRK to JSP
  • Part of quiet division of labor under the 1955
    system
  • Private trade and fisheries agreements but no
    formal ties

11
Japan -North Korea (3)
  • Post Cold War revival of interest
  • Roh Tae Woo initiatives toward North (1988)
    opened door for GOJ
  • Led to NK-ROK agreements on reconciliation/denucl
    earization 1991
  • ROK normalization with Moscow (1990) and PRC
    (1992)
  • Opened door for ROK/DPRK UN membership (1991)
  • Kanemaru-JSP mission (1990)
  • Designed to set terms for negotiations on
    normalization
  • Kanemaru (Mr. Abouto) poor negotiator
  • Japanese delegation agreed to compensate DPRK not
    only for colonial period but for post war
    division - repudiated by GOJ
  • But did agree on basic issues to be negotiated
  • 1) Settlement of basic issues of past with
    treaty
  • 2) Economics, including reparations
  • 3) International issues, N-S, nukes
  • 4) Humanitarian (abductions) - Megumi Yokota
  • Eight rounds of negotiations with little
    results
  • Disagreement over amount/terms of compensation

12
Japan-North Korea (4)
  • 1990s fluctuations
  • 1992-94 cool nuclear issue erupts
  • 1995-97 - Revitalized
  • Jimmy Carter visit - GOJ joins KEDO, contributes
    1billion for LWR
  • GOJ provides food, humanitarian aid to North
  • Resumption of normalization negotiations, return
    of Japanese spouses
  • 1997-99 downturn
  • Abduction issue families organized
  • Taepodong missile launch over Japan - key event
  • Japan developed laws to control funds to DPRK
  • GOJ unhappy with muted US response led to
    satellite program
  • Spy boat intrusion
  • Fundamentally hardened Japanese attitudes toward
    North Korea
  • Even long-time supporters on Left backed away
    from DPRK
  • Support in Korean community greatly weakened
  • New generation less political
  • Increased integration of Korean community into
    Japanese society

13
The Koizumi Era
  • Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in Sept. 2002
  • Wanted to make historic breakthrough
  • Settle one of last pending WW II issues
  • Give Japan greater diplomatic leverage,
    flexibility
  • Speculation that Bushs tough approach to NK may
    have led Pyongyang to soften toward Japan
  • Secret negotiations kept from US
  • Visit produced mixed results
  • NK revealed 13 abductions, eight dead
  • Included one person GOJ was unaware of
  • North apologized
  • Allowed five survivors to visit Japan
  • Koizumi demanded full explanation
  • But revelations produced backlash in Japan
  • Suspicions became confirmed reality
  • Almost complete erosion of public support in
    Japan for North Korea

14
The Koizumi Era (2)
  • Visit did produce some positive results
  • North agreed to
  • Nuclear would stand by agreements
  • Long-range missiles continue moratorium on
    tests
  • Normalization
  • Accepted Murayama statement as basis for apology
  • Accepted ROK formula for reparations
  • Breakdown of negotiations
  • Oct. 2002
  • GOJ did not return five survivors visiting Japan
  • North accused Japan of breaking agreement

15
Koizumi Era (3)
  • Second summit May 2004
  • North allowed family members to leave
  • Promised further investigations of abductions
  • But remains of Megumi Yokota did not match DNA
  • Comprehensive talks 2006
  • DPRK stiffed Japan on further investigations

16
Japans Response to Nuclear North Korea - Oct.
2006
  • July 4-5 2006 missile tests by DPRK led to
    sanctions
  • Ban on port calls by weekly ferry linking
    Niigata-Wonson, charter flights, remittances for
    groups linked to WMD
  • Oct. nuclear test -Japans reaction strong but
    measured
  • GOJ played lead role at UNSC on resolution
    condemning DPRK
  • Japan banned all North Korean ships from
    Japanese ports -impact on fund transfers - and
    all DPRK imports
  • Reinforced public support for missile defense
  • Net result
  • Further hardening of Japanese public attitudes
    toward the North
  • Reinforced when Abe became PM in late Sept. 2006
  • Abes popularity largely a result of hard stance
    on DPRK

17
The Gap Between the US and Japan on North Korea
after Norths tests
  • Tokyo and Washington had been the hardliners
    among the Six Parties
  • Some ambivalence in Tokyo about refusal of Bush
    administration to engage directly with North
  • But happy with Washingtons strong support on
    abduction issue
  • Bush meeting with families

18
US-Japan Gap (2)
  • US shift on North Korea not clearly signaled to
    Tokyo
  • Complex policy and bureaucratic background
  • Nuclear test changed stakes for US
  • Rumsfeld, Bolton departures
  • Hardliners weakened
  • Sec. Rice, Chris Hill got Presidents support for
    engagement
  • Hills Berlin meeting alarmed GOJ
  • Agreement on terms of Banco Delta Asia settlement
    cleared way for resumption of Six Party talks

19
Feb. 13, 2007 Beijing Six Party Denuclearization
Action Plan
  • Implementation of Sept. 2005 Six Party Agreement
  • Five parallel actions agreed on
  • DPRK shuts down Yongbyon, invites IAEA back
  • DPRK to list all its nuclear programs, including
    separated Pu
  • US-DPRK normalization talks - removal of DPRK
    from terrorism list, etc.
  • Japan-DPRK normalization talks
  • Resolve unfortunate past and outstanding
    issues of concern
  • Economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance for
    DPRK
  • 50,000 tons of fuel oil in 60 days
  • GOJ reluctantly went along but did not join
    supply of oil

20
Oct. 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions to Implement
Joint Statement
  • Spelled out details and timetable for
    declaration, disablement by end of 2007
  • DPRK commitment not to transfer nuclear material
    and technology
  • US reaffirmed its intent to remove DPRK from
    terrorism list, tied to declaration, disabling of
    reactor, reprocessing, fabrication facilities
  • Japan, DPRK to make sincere effortsto
    normalize
  • Reaffirmed aid, oil, to DPRK

21
GOJ - US Tensions
  • GOJ unhappy with USG de-linkage of abduction
    issue from the removal of DPRK from US list of
    state sponsors of terrorism
  • Seen as a betrayal and undercutting GOJ
    leverage with North
  • US unhappy with GOJs parochial perspective
  • De-nuclear DPRK highest priority for US, Japan,
    region, world
  • Delisting one of few carrots US has to offer
  • US terrorism list relates only to recent actions
  • PM Fukuda appears to be looking for greater
    flexibility but has little room to maneuver
  • Separate abductions from nuclear issue
  • Tie abduction resolution to final normalization

22
Recent Developments
  • US-DPRK Singapore meeting - March 2008
  • US seeking promised full declaration of all DPRK
    nuclear programs, including clarification of the
    uranium enrichment issue, that was due at end of
    2007
  • Indication that earlier DPRK declaration
    inadequate
  • US also seeking clarification of Syrian
    connection
  • US also made clear that it will remove NK from US
    terrorism list if it produces declaration/clarific
    ations
  • Form of clarifications unclear - Shanghai
    formula?
  • On-going discussions within USG and with DPRK to
    flesh out the deal
  • On-going USG-GOJ discussions on coordination
  • Deputy Secretary Negropontes May 9 visit to
    Tokyo
  • Continuing major source of tension in relations

23
Other Lurking US-Japan Differences on the DPRK
  • Differing end-game priorities
  • For US
  • Non-proliferation is real red line
  • Syrian connection very troubling
  • Accounting and removal of plutonium essential
  • Explanation of uranium enrichment program
  • For GOJ
  • Abductions - resolution is highest political
    priority
  • Plutonium - insists on accounting/removal of all
    material
  • Missiles - continued moratorium
  • HEU - important but less central to GOJ concerns
  • Non-proliferation - important but Syrian
    connection less central
  • Potential for differing US and GOJ bottom lines

24
Conclusion - Whither Japan and North Korea?
  • Japan-North Korean normalization essential
    element of long-term solution of the Korean
    Issue
  • Strategic
  • Remove a lingering source of tension in East
    Asia
  • Resolve one of last WW II issues
  • Economic
  • Japanese aid, investment one of the keys to NK
    development
  • Humanitarian
  • Family reunifications

25
Barriers to Normalization
  • Abduction Issue
  • Extremely difficult to resolve
  • GOJ demand
  • Return all living victims to Japan
  • Provide a full accounting of all victims
  • Hand over those responsible for the abductions
  • DPRK may be unable or unwilling to comply
  • Most sensitive, and embarrassing, aspects of
    North Korean behavior are involved
  • Tied to both Kims
  • How do you prove a negative?

26
Barriers to Normalization (2)
  • Nuclear Issue
  • Represents direct threat to Japan
  • Normalization conditioned on resolution of
    nuclear issue
  • Freeze, disablement, dismantlement of Yongbyon
  • Accounting for and export of all separated
    plutonium
  • Missile Issue
  • Taepodong poses unique threat to Japan
  • Not a threat to ROK
  • Not a credible threat to US given US nukes
  • Tied to credibility of US nuclear umbrella
  • Continued moratorium on tests essential condition
    of normalization

27
Barriers to Normalization (3)
  • Dynamics of Japanese politics and public opinion
  • Hardened attitudes toward DPRK in LDP
  • Abe, Aso representative of uncompromising
    attitude
  • Appeal to right wing in LDP
  • Disinclined to follow Koizumis example
  • Pro-DPRK lobby has essentially dried up
  • Japan becoming more nationalist, less apologetic
    about the past
  • Reduced tolerance of North Korean polemics
  • Politics of guilt no longer works in Japan
  • Lack of informal pipes between Japan and North
    Korea
  • Economic disincentives
  • GOJ budget deficits, reduced support for ODA
  • Little interest in Japanese business community
  • DPRK represents unattractive trade and investment
    target

28
Barriers to Normalization (4)
  • North Korean attitudes toward Japan
  • Pyongyang giving little apparent priority to ties
    with Tokyo after Koizumi visits
  • Some Japanese believe that Pyongyang is convinced
    that isolating Tokyo is the best strategy
  • Belief that if US moves toward DPRK, Japan will
    inevitably follow

29
Requirements for a Breakthrough
  • A nuclear deal of some kind
  • Continued missile test moratorium
  • Some DPRK give on info about abductees
  • Political will on both sides to make it happen
  • Now apparently lacking in both Tokyo and
    Pyongyang
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