Emerging Disease

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Conference on Preparing the U.S. Air Force
for Countering Chemical and Biological Weapons -
- Observations -- David R. Franz, DVM, PhD
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B.W. Agents Differ from C.W. Agents
Biological Agents Natural Production
difficult None volatile Many toxins more
toxic Infectious agents replicate Not dermally
active Legitimate medical use Odorless and
tasteless Diverse pathogenic effects Many are
effective immunogens Aerosol delivery Delayed
Onset (Days to Weeks)
Chemical Agents Man-made Production difficult
(industrial) Many volatile Less toxic than many
toxins Do not replicate Many are dermally
active No use other than as weapons Odor or taste
when contaminated Fewer types of effects Poor
immunogens Mist / droplet / aerosol
delivery Rapid Onset (Minutes)
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Biological Defense
We have more time with biological agents
but
Getting good answers is much more difficult
There are no technical solutions - Lederberg
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The BW Development Cycle (Classical Threats)
Intent (difficult to measure)
The Soviet Union of the 80s
RD (dual-use)
Scale-up
(dual-use)
Production (dual-use)
Weaponization
Testing
Use
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The BW Development Cycle (Classical Threats)
The 90s
Intent (difficult to measure)
RD (dual-use)
Scale-up
(dual-use)
Would-be
Proliforators
Brain Drain
Production (dual-use)
Weaponization
Testing
Use
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An Integrated BW Defense
The BW Development Cycle (Classical Agents)
Available Approaches
t resort option, poor long-term approach)
Medical Countermeasures (Vaccine, Drug, Diagnost.)
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Force Protection
The BW Development Cycle (Classical Agents)
Available Approaches
Terrorist with State Support
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The last 5 years Rapid Change

• Focus Cold-War defense.Force Protection/Domestic
  Preparedness
• Nonprolif. Treaties..Nunn-Lugar-Type
  Programs
• PCMs MOP/M17...Perm Sel Memb/Int. Helmet-Mask
• MCMs Specific Vaccines..Diagnostics, Drugs,
  Generic CMs
• Intel Humint.Masint and Threat Analysis
• Surveillance Nuclear.Bio and Chem
• Analysis DoD..DoD/CDC/DoJ/DoEState and
  Local
• Complexity Low...High
• Management DoD..HHS, DoJ, DoD
• Interest Low......High
• Research \ DoD..../ HHS, DoJ, DoD,
  DoE, IC
• Experts Few..(Many)
• Education DoD..DoD, DoJ, HHS, Academia,
  Industry
• The Enemy Soviet Union (80s)..State and
  Non-state actors
• Collaborators Allies..Russian Colleagues
• Hoaxes Almost none.Routine
• Attacks Almost none.....None

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Points to Underscore

• The Force Protection Agent Spectrum
• The Role of Leadership and Culture
• The Preparedness Cup is Half-full
• Early Detection is Critical
• Reference Laboratories are Critical
• No Easy Medical Fixes Tomorrow
• Education vs. Rubber Suits for the Masses
• Epidemiology is Dual-use
• Preplanning is Critical
• Details (and priorities) Matter

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On-Scene Questions

• Is there an agent or munition?
• Is it capable of producing a respirable aerosol?
• Is the agent liquid or dry?
• Has it detonated?
• Inside a building or outside?
• What are the meteorological conditions?
• Are there people in the area or downwind?
• Can it be contained?
• Can the agent be decontaminated in place?
• What about forensics?

Hoax Device not Found Device Found -Hoax
-Did not function -Functioned
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Threat Evaluation Team

• Law enforcement
• Microbiologist
• Chemist
• Psychologist
• Forensic expert
• Public health Officer

Experienced People - 30-minute Telephone Conferenc
e
FBI Model
On Pagers
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The Dual-use Nature of Force Protection
Threat Awareness
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Protecting The ForceA Case for Education
Teamwork
Medical Countermeasures -Vaccines
-Diagnostics -Therapeutics
Intelligence -Agent -Delivery system
-Organization -Time
Education
Public Health Infrastructure
Interservice Collaboration
Planning
Physical Countermeasures -Detection
-Physical Protection -Decontamination
Counter-proliferation Active Defense CTR
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Knowledge of the threat reduces the
threat.If we work together, force
protectionis not too hard to do.
Bottom lines...
Bang for the Buck