Title: Military History Chapter 21 Vietnam War
1Military HistoryChapter 21Vietnam War
2Vietnam War- Strategic Overview
- Vietnam was longest US combat deployment (so
far) - US combat units fought hostile actions (1965-72)
- SOF also involved before after that (1961-73)
- Military advisor role started in 1959
- But no fixed date of start of US involvement
- No Lexington Concord or Pearl Harbor
- or New York Trade Center Towers
- US entered left incrementally
- In series of incremental steps gt 1950s-1970s
- Successive US Administrations actively
participated in the War - From Truman to Nixon
- All tried to save Vietnam from Communist
take-over (as part of Containment Policy) - All would ultimately fail
3Lay of the Land
4Brief Historical Outline
- Truman (May 1950)gt authorized Mil to aid
Frenchgt - preserve post-WW2 French Indochina colonies
(image) - Ike continued US support, even following Dien
Bien Phu - Aim build Vn Nation out of diverse political
factions - After French defeat, US took control of bad
situation - Deployed military advisors to build SVNs
military - Tasked CIA to conduct psychological war against
NVN - JFK tripled aid to SVN increased military
advisors - Early 61 secretly deployed 400 SF 30 Navy
SEALs - Tasked to advise ARVN SVN Navy CI tactics
techniques - Covert direct action against North Vietnam (Oplan
34A) VC in South - By Nov 63 16,300 advisors operate thru-out N/S
Vietnam
5Johnsons War
- After JFKs assassination, LBJ took over war
- Determined not to lose Vietnam like Truman
lost China - Embarked on a limited war strategy to convince
NVN to cease infiltration of South Vietnam - After Tonkin Gulf incident its resolution in
Aug 1964 - LBJ secured Congress support (as equivalent of
war) - Authorized by resolution to take all necessary
actions - Following his 1964 re-election, LBJ did just that
- Result US military commitment intensified
incrementally - LBJ personally directed sustained bombing of
targets in NVN - Mar 65gt Rolling Thunder begangt would last
until 31Oct68 - US also deployed first combat units (USMC) in
March 1965 - US took over war from 65-69 when force levels
peak _at_ 543K
6Statistics Vietnam Syndrome
- Statistic totals 2.7M served in Vietnam gt 1.6
in combat - 58K KIA 300,000 WIA, approx 2500 remain MIA
- US spent between 140B to 175B on the war
- American outlook deeply influenced by Vietnam
War - Future Presidential Foreign Policy decisions
affected as result - Vietnam syndrome hovered always in background
to present - Not since Civil War has a conflict divided US
society so - Americas first war ever lost
- Humiliating political defeat for USG institutions
- Especially for the US military- long time to
recover - VN vets came home as Nation tried to forget
move on - VN Vets were ignored at best blamed for war at
worst
7Vietnams History of Peoples War
- Vietnam has had a long tradition of war
against outsiders - rebellion against China the Trung sisters
- Later Trieu Au would lead another revolt in 248
AD - 10th century defeated Chinas Fleet won
independence - 13th century Vietnam repulsed Kublai Khan 3
times - In process became experts in employing GW gt
- Stressed protracted war to wear a superior
military power down - Raid ambush tactics on the enemys
over-extended LOCs - Outlined in Daos Essential Summary of Military
Arts - Strategy drew enemy into protracted campaign to
wear him down - (Also applied these techniques to 1st 2nd
Indo-China wars)
8Historical Experience with Outside Threats
- Vietnams defeat of Mongols Chinesegt
- Now key part of Vietnams martial tradition
history - i.e. struggle resistance against superior
outside forces - All became part of Vietnams military heritage
- (In addition to Vietnams civil war that soon
followed) - French involvement came in late 1850s
- Vn persecuted Fr Euro missionaries their
converts - Gradually (late 1800s) gt Fr establish expand
their colonies - French then expanded throughout all of Indo-China
gt - Also suppressed Vietnams civil war in process
9 On Protracted War An Overview
- Maos Guerilla War model
- On Protracted War
- Vietnam drew heavily on Maos model for war
- Model instructed followers to proceed by 3
stages - 1st - defensive stage
- survive, establish base gain peoples support
- conduct hit run raids ambush of soft targets
- 2nd - equilibrium
- gradually expand offensive campaigns gt
- stage larger battles of a more conventional
nature - 3rd - Counter-Offensive
- Incorporate conventional military ops with
guerilla warfare - Then ramp up to full scale conventional war
(when ready)
10First Indo-China War
- WW2 Japan occupied controlled
Vietnam since 1940 - Vietnamese allied with China to fight Japanese
(GW) - Following Japans defeat, Ho Chi Minh
asserted his leadership - Led coalition of Communists Nationalists
- Declared Vietnam independence on 2Sept45
- Began talks with French
- But both sides failed to agree on basic strategic
aims - Nov46gt Viet Minh attacked French garrisons gt
- 1st Indochina war began gt would last 8 yrs
(1946-54)
11Escalation to Major Battle
- Jan48 Viet Minh begin 2nd stage
- Expand military operations
- Conduct bigger battles against French
- Meanwhile (late 49)gt China became Communist
state under Mao - Resultgt China provides Vietnam with economic
political support - Also sanctuaries within Chinas sovereign
territory - 1951 Vietnam launched stage 3 prematurely
- Result suffers major conventional defeat
- Temporary set back for Viet Minh
- 1953 at Chinas insistence Vn lures French
Commander (Navarre) into - Plain of Reeds gt near a place called (?)
- ?_______ __________ ____________
12Dien Bien Phu (Nov53-May54)
- Gen Navarre established several strong French
Firebases on surrounding hills near main base - All manned by paratroops Fr Foreign Legion
- supplied thru airstrip by airlift
- 1954 Chinese press Vietnamese to act decisively
- Giap orders arty/ammo towed into surrounding mtns
- Complete surprise (operational and tactical
surprise) - Viet Minh bombard French outposts from mountain
sites - Paratroops forced to abandon outposts 1 by 1 gt
- 13Mar54 Beatrice falls within hours of attack
- Gabrielle Anne Marie overrun during next 2 days
- Impact denied French airfield- key to French
defense - Reinforcement re-supply (also Fr arty
suppressed)
13Dien Bien Phu (final assault)
- Remaining outposts must be re-supplied by airdrop
(men/supplies) - Drops inaccurate (high altitude drops due to Vn
AAA) - French situation now desperate
- French government requests US help
- Ike refuses to send US troops or tactical Nukes
- Many French Foreign Legion troops desert
- Hide in caves along Nam Yum scavenge for food
- Paratroopers left to fight alone until the end
- 7 May54 Last French position overrun
- Fr survivors marched into captivity humiliation
- At on going Peace talks in Geneva
- French must now accept distasteful political
terms - Unfavorable terms a direct result of French
tactical defeat - US must now take up containment directly
14Expanded US involvement
- By 54 US paying close to 80 of Wars cost
- French viewed as containing communism in Asia
- Ike refused to sign Geneva Accords
- Rejects VNs temporary 2 year partition at 17th
parallel - Wary of nation wide elections to determine fate
in 1956 - Well aware of who is most likely to win (who?)
- Instead US used 2 yr time to back separate
non-communist Government below 17th parallel - Government in South to be led by who?
- ?________ ______ ________- a Catholic
- What is the faith of Vietnam majority?
- ?_________________
- 1956 elections overwhelmingly
favor Ho Chi Minh - Vote results ignored by US new RVN Gov
15Second Indochina War
- Following South Vietnam refusal to allow free
electiongt - Ho Chi Minh began modernization of his forces
- Prepares to deploy NVN advisors south
- Begins armed struggle in South Vietnam (SVN)
- Diem starts search to rout out Viet Minh south in
1956 - Included all viewed as opposed to his rule
- i.e. All non-Catholics minorities alike
- By 57 Viet Minh in South close
to all but eliminated - Result Viet Minh launched major rebellion
against Diems Government - Initiate guerilla warfare, intelligence ops,
propaganda - Focus develop support base in rural villages
- Diems harsh policies facilitate Viet Minh efforts
16Violence Escalates
- Raids assassinations escalate between 1958 gt
1960 - 1958 700 gov. officials killed
- 1960 2500 killed
- By 1960 National
Liberation Front (NLF) established - (Political arm of Viet Minh rebellion)
- By Dec63 PAVN (NVA) escalated
infiltration/support to Viet Minh - Ho Chi Minh Trail established
- NVN sends men supplies south
- By 1965 full blown insurgency was established in
SVN - US concludes Diems regime will fall without
direct military support
17NLFs War Aims Strategy
- Political Aim
- Unite South under NVN government of Ho Chi Minh
- NLF Grand Strategy
- Combine political military aspects of struggle
- Undermine SVN political military positions
- Rally people popular support for NLF cause
- Political Tactics
- Conduct Agitprop
- Tactical focus village level
- Establish a tight political military structure
- By63 NLF was successful gt
- Signed up 300K supporters in countryside
18NLF Military Strategy Tactics
- Tactics formulated to serve strategic political
ends - 1st stage hit run raids just survive
- Targets selected for maximum psychological impact
- Assassination target most effective most
despised - Mayors, village chiefs, teachers
- Ambush ARVN troops government strategic Hamlets
- Sabotage commercial transport infrastructure
- Strategic Objective
- Provoke government to react w/repressive actions
- Aim alienate the very people government is
suppose to protect - Demonstrate to people ineffectiveness of Gov
efforts
19Chinese Tactical Model
- By65 PAVN provided direct support to SVN
insurgents - Employed Chinese model, tactics, techniques
- Totaled 500K troops with 500K in reserve
- Divisions comprised 10K Troops
- Used 7.62 AK-47s w/3-5 grenades each member
- 3 infantry regiments in South
- Weapons company attached 60/82 mm mortars
- 57/75mm recoilless rifles, RPGs Machine Guns
- Train extensively in night ops effective
concealment - Small unit tactics employing stealth
- Meticulous planning full scale rehearsals
- Detailed withdrawal plans back-up contingencies
- Preposition supplies ammo escape routes
20Tactical Focus
- Bottom line
- a well respected opponent
- NVA soldier was good, dedicated,
- Well trained highly motivated troop
- Extensive training battlefield prep
- NVA tactics doctrines focus
- Raid ambushgt (became experts at)
- Small unit mobility to minimize US technology
- Extreme close contact
- (often at Danger Close ranges)
- Concentrate on weak point, overwhelm encircle
- Then quickly withdraw gt rarely held territory
- Key Lesson Learned
- Never follow a blood trail why?
?_________________
21US Counter Insurgency (CI) Limited War
- US foreign policy (FP) focused on Containment
- Halt communist expansion directed from Moscow
- Main focus of US FP throughout Cold War (CW)
- Vietnam War viewed as just another communist
threat of attempted expansion - Specific attempt at communist expansion in SE
Asia - Ho Chi Minh NVN inspired by Moscow Beijing
- During60sgt Vietnam became test
case for JFKs CI doctrine - JFK campaigned to replace
Ikes massive retaliationgt - Replacement National Security Strategy?
22Result Flexible Response
- JFK placed major emphasis on CI
- To counter Maos guerilla warfare in SE Asia
- Carried out by SOF advisors
- 400 SF 30 SEALs May 1961
- 16,300 military advisors by Nov 1963
- Also JFK ordered covert actions against NVN
- (OPLAN 34A) by SOG Teams
- CI Strategy against NLF
- Build-up of military support to ARVN
- APCs, CV air support, Helos, TACAIR
- SF advisors conducted training civic action
- US Helo support to ARVN
- Infiltration/extraction Medivac
- Direct support, to include advising SVN SOF
teams into enemy held areas
23 Strategic Hamlet Program
- Another attempt to protect people from insurgents
by isolating them - Theory serve as instrument of social reform
security - Attract the people to SVN gov programs
- Convince peasant SVN gov better than NLF
- Objective relegate insurgents to outlaw status
- Lose support of masses gt force revised NLF aims
- Return insurgent to Survival mode (stage 1)
- Reality program failed in both concept
execution - Dislocated peasants from village bred resentment
- SVN Government (not NLF) viewed as bad guy
- Poor security gt vulnerable villages easy to
overrun
24Factors in Failure
- Result opposite of desired government objective
- Peoples discontent rose while security safety
fell - Atrocious execution by Nhu alienated peasants
- Another factor conventional military mindset
- Conventional US Army leaders resisted CI
- Did not support CI concept
- Conflict in philosophies of war Clausewitz vs.
Sun Tzu - Conventional military preferred conventional
methods - Bigger better mindset employing modern weapons
- Even though jungle warfare very tough environment
- Conventional infantry armor profile ineffective
- Tactical surprise unlikely operational surprise
hard
25Battle of Ap Bac (2 Jan 1963)
- LTC John Paul Vann
- Pressed IV Corps tactical zone Cmdr MG Cao, Col
Dam, Cmdr of 7th ARVN, to attack 3
VC radio companies (350 men)
near hamlet of Ap Bac - Located 65 KM southwest of Saigon in the Mekong
Delta - Plan 3 pronged pincer attack from different
directions by 3 Battalions of 7th Infantry, - Supported by regional units, 13 APCs
(3500 men), ABN US Helos (CH-21s UH-1s) - Objective Surprise overwhelm enemy with numbers
26Execution
- Execution badly flawed
- ARVN commander delayed attack too long
- Allowed enemy to discover Cmdrs intent
- Time to prepare defense to receive attack
- No tactical surprise gt
- First sign of resistance ARVN froze
- 1 prong of offense refused to even attack
- Remaining units purposely failed to block enemys
escape - Result numerous ARVN casualties (friendly fire)
- 61 KIA 100 WIA
- Viet Cong slip away undetected (3 KIA)
- Victory claimed anyway (why?)
- Rationale conventionally- held ground
- ARVN performance does not bold well for future
27Tonkin Gulf Incident
- SVN maritime sea commandos advisors
- Conduct sea-borne raids on NVN radar
- Raids conducted in/around Tonkin gulf op area
- Objective
- Force NVN to light off radars ELINT
- Permit US DDs w/special ELINT collection
- NVN Response
- Torpedo boats attack SVN commandos
- SOF insertion craft (NASTIES) in vicinity
- NVN craft see US DD Maddox
engage - Result 3 enemy PT sunk or damaged
- 2 days later- NVN PT appear to fire on US DDs
- USS Maddox Turner Joy call for CV air CAS
- Who find nothing
28Tonkin Gulf Resolution
- Capt of USS Maddox not sure second
NVN attack actually occurred, but... - Files report to CINCPAC via chain of command
- LBJ sees opportunity to exploit NVN attack
- Applies much political pressure to confirm attack
- Meanwhilegt Admin prepared draft resolution for
Congress - Resolved for President to take all action
necessary - Protect US forces its allies
- While Navy still try to figure out what really
occurred - LBJ exploits incident Tonkin Gulf Resolution
- Passed unanimously by House all but 2 in Senate
- (Just as administration drafted it) gt
significance? - Future impact on US involvement?
29 NLF Threat Grows
- By 1965 gt NLF secured Mekong Delta (Map) gt
- Appeared to have gained both
momentum initiative, especially in the Delta - Appeared to US that SVN Gov
about to fail - US concluded it must send massive assistance to
prevent its collapse - Specially configured armored
landing craft were deployed
30Operation Rolling Thunder (Mar65- Nov68)
- Mar 65 (after LBJ safely re-elected)gt US
strikes - Launched massive strategic bombing of North
- Longest sustained air bombing campaign in US
history - Targets primarily along northern areas of DMZ
- Included bridges, railheads, logistic supply
dumps - Also re-supply routes along Ho Chi Minh Trail
31Major US Ground Combat Introduced
- LBJ also deployed USMC to DaNang in late July65
- Two Battalion Landing Teams waded
ashore - Prepare to conduct active forward defense
search destroy ops - From then on, US begins to take direct control
of war gt - Major ground combat key battles conducted by US
- More US combat units deploy
- ARVN relegated primarily to garrison defense
duties as the US directly takes over the War
32Theory Practice of Limited War
- Flexible Response (review)
- Tailored action required only to meet political
aim - Avoids dilemma of massive retaliation as only
option - Result military instruments limited to minimum
needed to send the enemy a message - Target hit to modify enemys behavior (political
end) - Limited War theories civilian theorists
- Flexible Response provided basis of limited war
theories - Ltd War Theories provide set of broad guidelines
- Focused on attaining US political objectives
- Military considerations not taken into account
- Craft military response to send clear signal to
enemy - Convey political intent to attain desired enemy
response
33Theory vs. Reality
- Result in practice
- Political considerations dominated military
actions - Military responses limited to minimum required
- Civilian leadership prevalent thru-out all
operations - LBJ selected many of the bomb targets personally
- Limited geographic battle areas of operations
- BDA unimportant gtonly political message sent is
central - Theorys Flaw?
- Reality of war - military factors do count
- Assumption regarding enemys response
frictions role? - Precision of message sent how it is received
interpreted - How the enemy will respond remains uncertain
- Gradual escalation in attempt to get desired
response flawed
34Modern Hi-tech Military Advances
- Flexible Response strategy gt conventional forces
- SECDEF McNamara modernized US forces
- Established Brush War capability (for Vietnam)
- USAF USN build-up
- WWII BBs refitted updated
- CV/CVN on Yankee Station in Tokin Gulf launch
F-4/A-4 strikes - B-52 (Guam) F105/F-4 (Thailand) Rolling Thunder
35Weapons Technology Advances
- High Tech Equipment
- Radar units small portable developed
- Sniffers attached to skids of UH-1s to detect
infiltrators odors - Sensors passive transmitters alert SF teams
- IBM computers predict enemy movements
- Puff (AC-47 gunships)
- AFSOC AC-130 Specter Gunships
- provide devastating fire support
36Troops, Weapons, Equipment
- Troops best ever trained equipped to date
- 1 Million men combat ready divisions expand11
to 16 - Airlift equipment stockpiles expanded
- Army reorganization
- Task oriented for specific jobs
- Direct ground support weapons equipment
- Armor Personnel Carriers
- Weapon advances (M-60, M-16, Stoner LMG, M-79)
- Helo its role UH-1, Cobra, CH-47, 1st Air
Cavalry
37Next Military History Chapter 21b
Vietnam War (to be continued)
38Back-up Slides
39US Combat Units Direct Ground Operations
- US also deployed first full combat units in March
1965 - 3500 USMCs land on DaNang beaches for combat ops
- Key US threshold passed
- (Many to follow incrementally)
- From then until April 1969, US commitment
gradually increased - US ground troop levels combat units grew
steadily - US combat actions rose incrementally for next 4
yrs - Operation Starlite was typical
- From 65-69 US took over most fighting from ARVN
- US troop levels peaked at 543,400 troops by early
1969
40Conflicting post-War Analysis
- Several hard lessons were learned as a result of
Vietnam - For somegt we simply backed the wrong horse
- US Military power support never be enough
regardlessgt - Military pwr couldnt prop up RVNs corrupt
failed regime - Local revolutionary war fought for nationalistic
political aims - Therefore US caught in middle of bitter civil war
- For others war too hard to win under political
constraints - War considered integral part of global Cold War
threat - Key political concern for LBJ administration
avoid escalation - Both in intensity of fighting geographic region
- Result US attempted to fight limited
conventional war - Without a coherent realistic operational
strategy - While applying separate poorly chosen tactics to
support it
41Serious Strategic Disconnect
- US approach to war appeared to have serious
disconnects - Political Aims were unrealistic given military
constraints - Operational Strategy poorly matched to those
strategic aims - Tactics employed served a failing strategy
- Result Tactical success served poor operational
strategy - Which in turn attempted to achieve Unrealistic
strategic aims gt - Which ultimately resulted in political failure at
the end of the day - Political decisions makers failed to realize
until too late - That superior American military power cant make
up for what? - American peoples lack of political will to
continue war indefinitely! - These failures would affect many in different
ways - Including foreign policy decisions taken
following the Cold War