Secure Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks

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Secure Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Panagiotis Papadimitratos and Zygmunt J.HaasCNDS
2002

• Present by Jung, jong-kwan

CS710 Special issues in Computer Architecture
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Contents

• Introduction
• Related work
• Proposed Scheme
• Protocol Description
• Protocol Correctness Proof
• Conclusions

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Introduction

• Feature of MANET
• Absence of a fixed infrastructure
• - Impede the practice of establishing a line of
  defense
• Roaming node
• - difficult to have a picture of the ad hoc
  network
• membership
• No guarantee that a path between two nodes would
• be free of malicious nodes
• Technique in the MANET context of route
• discovery based on broadcasting query packets

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Related Work

• Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc
• Provide incentive to nodes
• Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
• An extension of the AODV
• Secure Message Transmission in Mobile Ad Hoc
  Networks
• Determines a set of diverse paths connecting the
  source and the destination nodes

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Proposed Scheme(1/3)

• Basic assumption
• Focus on bi-directional communication between a
  pair of nodes
• Security Association (SA)
• Existence of shared key Ks,t
• An attack mounted by two colluding nodes during a
  single route discovery

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Proposed Scheme(2/3)

• Overview
• Provide approach to the secure route discovery
  operation
• Source node S initiates the route discovery
• Intermediate nodes relay route request
• Destination T constructs the route replies

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Proposed Scheme(3/3)

• Example Topology
• Qs,tn1,n2,,nk SRP Header for a query
  searching for T
• Rs,t n1,n2,,nk

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Proposed Scheme(1/4)

• Scenarios of security attacks by two malicious
  nodes
• Scenario 1
• M1 receives Qs,tS
• M1 generates Rs,t S,M1,T
• T disallows any intermediate node to provide a
  reply
• M1 does not posses Ks,t

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Proposed Scheme(2/4)

• Scenario 2
• M1 discards request packets arriving from its
  neighbors
• Scenario 3
• M1 receives Rs,t S, 1, M1, 5, 4, T and relays
  Rs,t S, 1, M1, Y, T
• Integrity protection provided by the MAC

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Proposed Scheme(3/4)

• Scenario 4
• M2 receives Qs,t S, 2, 3 and relays Qs,t
  S, X, 3,M2
• Scenario 5
• M1 attempts to forward Qs,t S, M IP
  spoofing
• Mask its identity will be temporary

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Proposed Scheme(4/4)

• Scenario 6
• M1 attempts to return a number of replies with a
  different spoofed IP
• Relay more than one route requests, placing a
  different IP address in each of them

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Protocol Description (1/5 )

• SRP can be incorporated in the underlying basic
  protocol

01234567890123456789012345678901
IP Header
Basic Routing Protocol Packet
SRP Header
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Protocol Description (2/5 )

• Route Request
• S maintains a Query Sequence number Qseq
• S generates a 32-bit random Query Identifiers Qid
• Both Qid and Qseq are placed in the SRP header

01234567890123456789012345678901
Reserved
Type
Query Identifier
Query Sequence Number
SRP MAC
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Protocol Description (3/5 )

• Query Handling/ Propagation
• Intermediate nodes parse the received Route
  Request
• If an SRP header is present
• Extract the Qid, the source and destination
  address
• Queries with Qid match one of the Query table
  entries are discarded
• Intermediate nodes measure the frequency of
  queries received from their neighbors
• Benign node maintains a priority of ranking of
  its neighbors
• The highest priority nodes generating request
  with the lowest rate

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Protocol Description (4/5 )

• Route Reply
• T validates the received route request packet
• If Qseq lt Smax, the request is discarded
• Otherwise. T calculates the keyed hash of the
  request field
• T generates a number of replies
• Source-route a reply with an empty payload
• Route Reply Validation
• S check the source and destination address, Qid,
  Qseq
• S calculates the MAC

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Protocol Description (5/5 )

• Intermediate Node Replies
• Intermediate Node Reply Token(INRT)

01234567890123456789012345678901
SRP Header
IN Reply Token
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Protocol Correctness Proof(1/4)

• Idealized SRP
• H Message Authentication Code function
• Rst route reply

(1) Qs,t,H(Qs,t,Ks,t)
S
T
(2) Rs,t,route,H(Rs,t,route,Ks,t)
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Protocol Correctness Proof(2/4)

• Initial assumption
• For message(1), we have

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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Protocol Correctness Proof(3/4)

• From (i), (iii), (iv), (vi), we get

(v)
(vi)
(vii)
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Protocol Correctness Proof(4/4)

• And finally

(viii)
(ix)
(x)
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Conclusions

• Proposed an efficient secure routing protocol
• Guarantees the discovery of correct connectivity
  information over an unknown network
• The resultant protocol is capable of operating
  without the existence of an on-line certification
  authority