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Title: Heiner Meulemann Forschungsinstitut f


1
Heiner MeulemannForschungsinstitut für
Soziologie, Universität zu Köln
  • Greinstraße 2, D50939 KölnTel. 0221 - 470 5658,
    Fax 0221 - 470 5169e-mail meulemann_at_wiso.uni-koe
    ln.de
  • Perspectives on Social Capital
  • Definition, questions and some results from the
    European Social Survey
  • Lecture at the X. Conference of the SU-Higher
    School of Economics,
  • Moscow, April 6-10, 2009
  • I like to express my gratitude to the Verein
    der Freunde und Förderer der Universität zu Köln
    (Association of friends and sponsors of the
    University of Cologne)for the generous support
    of this research visit.

gt traditional-corporatist regime
2
Three topics
  • 1 How is social capital (SC) best defined?
  • According to this definition
  • 2 Which questions on SC should be reserarched
    first? And which have? First priority Transfer
    hypothesis
  • 3 Example of transfer hypothesis
  • - European social survey
  • - Economic sphere of labour relations

3
1 Defining social capital Social relations as
resources of actors in contexts
4
1.1 Criteria
  • Putnam refers to features of social
    organization, such as trust, norms and networks
  • Combines reference to social process
    organization with enumeration such as.
  • I will analyze what is social of features of
    organization in order to understand the
    enumeration

5
Features of social organization
  • collective good of organizations. Organizations
    can be distinguished by their SC just as by
    constitution, function, size. Grammatical
    singular organization accidental.
  • Yet singular meaningful organization
    process sustained by persons. Members of a group
    interact, organize themselves, so that
    collective products result
  • Question what collective goods or products?

6
Three collective goods, resulting from
interaction of persons
  • (1) productivity of a network from flow of
    exchanges between persons with positions and
    intentions
  • (2) climate of trust sufficient number of people
    reciprocate benevolent actions if number goes
    down, trust risky, vicious circle climate of
    distrust
  • (3) validity of norm sufficient number follow
    norm and sanction violations if number goes
    down, vicious circle of deviance and tolerance,
    norm breaks down
  • In each case collective good from interaction
    of members. Features of organization
    established bottom up
  • Therefore, genus proximum of definition not
    organizations, but persons.
  • New definition 1 SC any property of a group
    member, which contributes to group outputs.

7
Problem of new definition 1 too broad, social
lost
  • Contribution of persons also from human or
    cultural capital
  • Therefore restricton only outputs from
    membership in group.
  • In pursuing common interest, members form social
    relations, interactions more densely knit amongst
    members than with non-members.
  • Somewhat narrower definition 2 SC sum of
    social relations a person holds in groups

8
Problem of new definition 2 still too broad,
includes intimate relationships
  • Intimate sexual and generational relations,
    rest on biology everybody can, and most will,
    enter into them. Practiced in private living
    arrangements.
  • Private particularistic (Parsons) person
    essential for the relation
  • many mothers, but only my mother is my
    mother
  • SC consists of universalistic relations in
    public realms, persists with interchangeable
    persons
  • New and final definition 3 SC sum of social
    relations a person holds in groups beyond
    intimate living arrangements

9
Uses of SC in social contexts
  • SC does not capitalize by itself. In order to
    not decay, it must be utilized. What can actors
    gain from SC?
  • Due to its relational nature, SC more useful when
    more relations in group.
  • Therefore, distinction of contexts of use

10
1.2 Relational capital and system capital
Concept and measurement
  • Relational SC of persons - system SC of group
  • System SC conceived of independently of persons
    as sum of relations.
  • Person may aim to manipulate and to
    improve relational SC
  • System SC of group exists independently
    of members
  • Emerging quality in two ways
  • network of relations knitted between members in
    pursuance of group goal social structure of the
    group.
  • Some relations bundled in civic associations.
    System SC sum of civic associations acting
    within group
  • Measured in surveys by aggregation
  • Two problems

11
Measurement problem 1 interdependency, solitary
decisions
  • In social reality interdependency some are eager
    to and some detest emulating other people.
  • Measurement should follow up interdependency
    until SC is established
  • Yet surveys
  • neglect interdependency and time
  • Instead means within groups at single time point
  • Justification Practical short-cut?
  • Yes, but also substantive reasons some decisions
    made without looking at others (join a tennis
    club).
  • If this holds measure of system SC as group mean
    of relational SC also theoretically justified

12
Measurement problem 2 circularity, random
sampling
  • Danger of circularity system SC relational SC.
    Yet
  • Sum of relations of all persons does not
    necessarily amount to system SC of group.
  • Example 1 Two persons related only one
    relation, counting two relations not correct.
    However, random samplings improbable that two
    persons with relation are drawn. Total as system
    SC feasible
  • Example 2 Two persons join same association
    one, not two association. Again, random sampling.
    Furthermore multiple memberships reflect size of
    association. Again, total as system SC feasible

13
Summary so far
  • SC consists of relations of persons, basically
    relational
  • Relations add up within a group to system SC
  • (a) network, social structure
  • (b) civic associations
  • Although system SC conceived of as independent of
    relational SC, measurement of system SC through
    mean of relational SC can be justified. Mean of
    relational SC indicator of system SC.
  • Question Which properties of system SC fruitful
    for group member in pursuance of goals?

14
1.3. Three Properties of System SC
  • From (1) density of social relations
  • to (2) social trust and
  • (3) validity of norms
  • fundamental, (2) and (3) derived
  • This to be shown in following

15
(1) Density of social relations
  • Network of high mean personal relationships eases
    moves, each partner has more relations. That is
    value of relational SC increases with system SC
  • Quantity of relations increases the number of
    ways to attain goals
  • Quality of relations affects probability of
    attainment on these ways. In particular
  • Niceness eases goal attainment. Starts
    interactions with a cooperative move, and end up
    better than people starting with a
    non-cooperative move (Axelrod)
  • Nice relations result from two nice
    tendencies of partners
  • to trust each other, gt 2nd property
  • to endorse norms of cooperation, gt 3rd property

16
(2) Climate of trust
  • Trust overrides suspicion that partner will not
    give back. More trusting, longer chain of
    reciprocation, stronger climate of trust
  • Trust learned in particularistic relations,
    reinforced reciprocally in universalistic
    interactions
  • I trust in others who have repeatedly not
    disappointed me, and others trust in me if I have
    repeatedly not disappointed them.
  • My trust in others indicates the trust others
    have in me. Trust not personal attitude alone,
    but indicator of trustful relations in group.
  • If trust indicator of niceness of relations,
  • climate of trust system SC useful for persons

17
(3) Validity of norms of cooperation
  • Norms of cooperation (proscription not to),
    justified by the norm of reciprocity alone.
  • Norms of institutions (e.g. marital fidelity),
    additionally justified by values the person
    beliefs in (family or life)
  • Endorsement of norms of cooperation, more or less
    strongly reciprocated
  • Behavior If enough follow norms of cooperation
    and enough sanction violations, norm becomes
    valid.
  • Attitude If enough endorse norm, it becomes
    valid
  • Consequently, the more norm held among
    interaction partners, the more one can uphold
    norm oneself.
  • Endorsement of norms indicator of nice
    relations
  • Validity of norms of cooperation system SC

18
In sum Triad of system SC, but only relations
relational SC
  • Distinction between density and niceness of
    social relations justifies to classify system SC
    into Putnams triad networks, trust, and norms
    (order changed!).
  • Yet
  • - density of relations only justified directly as
    a system SC
  • - further arguments required to classify climate
    of trust and validity of norms of cooperation as
    system SC indicators for niceness of social
    relations, not measured directly with reference
    to relations, but indirectly as means of
    attitudes.
  • Test switch back from system SC to relational
    SC
  • - Just as density of relations system SC, so
    relations of person relational capital.
  • - However, while climate of trust and validity of
    norms system SC, trust or norm endorsement not
    SC of person.

19
1.4 System SC as context Social order and
opportunity structure
  • Which kinds of groups bearer of system SC? Any
    aggregation level or context.
  • Trivial question? No. To explain system SC,
    reference to analytical properties of groups.
    Question changes
  • Which kinds of analytical properties define their
    system SC? Two
  • (1) Name and a border, constitution and laws,
    folklore and customs. Become social facts
    social order.
  • (2) Resources of action money, educational
    degrees, power. Circulate among citizens and make
    up different life chances opportunity
    structure.

20
Context 1 Social Order
  • Consists of norms directly guiding actions. Valid
    because
  • most people endorse them
  • in large parts, written down in legal form
    constitution.
  • Example equality defined in constitutions,
    achievement (equalitys twin value) only in
    peoples minds
  • Typical variables federal or unitary
    constitution, Protestants (tradition of
    self-determination)
  • Guides actions in same way as personal
    endorsement of norm only difference binds
    every citizen
  • Must be symbolically identified kings or
    presidents, laws and customs, flags and hymns,
    border stones and national football teams.
  • Higher aggregation level more important. Nation
    state has a social order, city precinct not

21
Context 2 Opportunity Strucuture
  • Sets de facto range of options for every citizen,
    beyond personal resources, indirectly affects
    actions.
  • Results from actions of all citizens and all
    organizations of country.
  • Examples Social inequality, reduces trust.
    Democracy since long, facilitates associations.
  • Options and restrictions in same way as
    opportunity profile of person (combination of
    resources) - only difference for every citizen
    alike
  • Need not be symbolically identified
  • Lower aggregation level more important level.
    Public swimming pool in neighborhood, not in city.

22
Cross-Classification with societal domains
Social order Opportunity Structure
Economy Economic Freedom (EFR) GDPpc
Polity Good Governance Years of democracy
23
2 2 Classifying and evaluating research
questions on SC
24
Capital two qualities
  • every capital means for ends to be attained in
    purposive action
  • every capital capitalizes pays off in same
    kind
  • These two qualities dimensions to classify
    research questions

25
Quality 1 means to ends in purposive action
  • Money exchange against goods and services.
  • Prestige used to attain goods and services from
    others.
  • SC channels to goods and services.
  • Each means to success. Yet difference
  • Money buys everything of its worth. Success no
    problem.
  • Prestige, SC be worked upon to become a means.
    Success problem.
  • Thus If SC contributes to success, consequences
    should before causes. If not, reduced importance
    of causes.
  • SC research agenda 1 consequences - 2 causes
  • Money success for everyone who holds it, first
    how got it second what done with it.
  • Money research agenda 1 causes - 2 consequences

26
Quality 2 capitalization
  • Money interest.
  • Prestige of educational degrees prestige of
    occupations attained
  • SC social relations, pay off in social
    relations. That is
  • - Relational SC the more useful, the more
    embedded in network of relations, the more system
    SC.
  • As relation to B
  • limited value if B knows nobody,
  • highly valuable if B at core of
    network.
  • - Due to relational nature of SC, capitalization
    depends on context
  • Research agenda priority of effects of system
    SC
  • 1 on a means end chain of some action (slopes)
  • 2 on ends themselves (intercepts)

27
Figure 1 Causes versus consequences, processes
versus outputs in social capital research
28
Agenda followed by research up to now? Yes, but
only implicitly
  • Research not in SC per se or causes, but in
    consequences for social integration, democratic
    stability of nation state.
  • At heart of SC research transfer hypothesis.
    Good government is a by-product of singing
    groups and soccer clubs (Putnam). Abstractly
    citizens involvement grants social integration.
  • Transfer hypothesis on consequences, implicitly
    priority of consequences over causes. But apart
    from that, not clear. .
  • Meaning specified using right half of figure 1.

29
Transfer hypothesis, specified
  • Country level correlation
  • Corresponding person level effect
  • more citizens in associations, more
    articulation of interests in democratic decision
    making
  • Transfer from civic life to organized social
    life.
  • Figure 1 SC as a means gt action success
  • Two Problems
  • (1) Articulation of interests not yet social
    integration. Further causal link from successes
    of persons to integration of groups, ultimate
    impact of social capital research. Beyond figure
    1 to the right. Mostly, taken for granted on
    theoretical grounds and not researched
    empirically.
  • (2) Reference also to embeddedness in macro
    conditions. Thus, the singing groups and soccer
    clubs cipher for system SC. But its effects
    on micro relation not specified. Therefore both
    effects of figure 1

30
Transfer hypothesis, summarized
  • Comprises right half of figure 1 as a whole and
    expands it to the right. To be tested, its four
    elements must be specified
  • (1) Macro relation. To which added
  • Two top down elements
  • (2) Effect hypothesis, capitalization of
    system SC
  • (3) Mean hypothesis, output of system SC.
  • A new bottom up element
  • (4) From action success to social integration

31
3 Example Empowerment at the work place
32
3.1 Question and research design
  • Transfer of transfer hypothesis
  • From politics
  • The more someone is involved in private
    associations, the more..
  • - able to assert political interests
  • To labor relations system
  • - attain empowerment at the workplace
  • range of discretion in order to make decisions
    about work

33
Controls to examine transfer hypothesis of labor
relations
  • On the level of persons
  • Human capital, union membership, workplace
  • On the level of countries
  • - Institutions and opportunity structures of
    labour relations system

34
Research Design Influences on empowerment
5 Collective work placesector, size of firm
?
4 Collective strategyunion membership,


?

Empowermentdiscretion at work
1 Civic Involvementsocial capital
()
2 Human Capital in FirmPeople supervised,
Prestige of occupation


()
-

()
3 Human Capital, person political efficacy,
education, Exit options
Labour relations system Favourable to unions
35
Dependent Variable Index of Inventory and a
Question
  • Inventory Please say how much the management at
    your work allows you
  • - to be FLEXIBLE in your working hours,
  • - to DECIDE how your own daily work is
    organised,
  • - to influence your work ENVIRONMENT,
  • - to influence decisions about the general
    DIRECTION of your work,
  • - to CHANGE your work tasks if you wish to?
  • 0 I have no influence - 10 I have complete
    control
  • Single question To what extent can you ORGANIZE
    your own work, to a large extent (4), to some
    extent (3), very little (2) or not at all (1)?
    reversed for analysis
  • Sample ESS 2002, employed population

36
Figure 1. Mean empowerment, one standard
deviation above and below means
Highest N 6.69
Lowest PL 2.49
37
Empowerment at the Work Place
  • High Scandinavian countries, NL
  • gt social democratic regime
  • Medium AU, B, EI, I, LUX
  • gt traditional-corporatist regime
  • Low E, GR, PT, D-E, D-W
  • gt traditional-corporatist regime

38
3.2 Hypotheses and measurements Level of persons
  • (1) Civic Involvement
  • (2) Human capital Person
  • Political efficacy, education, exit
    options
  • (3) Human capital Firm specific
  • People supervised, prestige of
    occupation
  • (4) Union membership
  • (5) Work Place
  • Size, sector of firm
  • (6) Control variables Age and Gender

39
(1) Civic Involvementin private organizations
  • For each of these voluntary associations, tell
    me whether any of these things apply to you now
    or in the last 12 months
  • - A member of such an organization
  • - Participated in an activity arranged by such
    an organization
  • - Donated money to such an organization
  • - Done voluntary (unpaid) work for such an
    organization.
  • Membership participation belonging
  • Donation of money voluntary engagement
  • In 5 private associations
  • sports clubs
  • consumer associations
  • scientific/educational/teachers associations
  • social clubs
  • cultural associations

40
(3) Exit options
  • - Index of (1) How difficult or easy would it be
    for you to get a similar or better job with
    another employer? and (2) ... and to start your
    own business?, scale 0 to 10
  • - partner employed

41
3.3 Hypotheses and measurements Level of
countries
  • Countries characterized by labor rule system LRS,
    more or less favorable to workers
  • rule set and power structure, which exonerate
    workers from personal endeavor to attain
    empowerment if unions successful Workers less
    dependent on their own initiative

42
Two Dimensions of LRS
  • Dimensions
  • - Relations between collectivities or
    individuals
  • Regulation through normative social order or
    factual opportunity structure
  • Four-Fold Table
  • Collective relations
  • Normatively range covered by bargaining process
  • Factually a high degree of organization and
    public support
  • Individual relations
  • normatively favor employment and restrict
    dismissal
  • Factually a labor market situation with high
    employment and many secure work contracts
  • Indicators in following table

43
Table 1 Variables of the labor relation system
44
Mean hypothesis
  • Union efficiency hypothesis
  • The more collective or individual labor relations
    of a country favor normatively, or strengthen
    factually, the unions,
  • the higher mean empowerment of employees

45
Effect hypothesis
  • Substitution hypothesis
  • The more the labor relation system of a country
    favors unions, the less important individual
    strategies become for the worker in order to
    attain empowerment.
  • Negative cross-level interaction effect between
    LRS favorable to unions and individual endeavor
    to attain empowerment, in particular human
    capital

46
3.4 Results
  • Mean Union membership
  • .359 mean of 19 countries
  • Range from .146 Portugal
  • to .844 Denmark

47
Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on
Person and Country Variables Raw Coefficients
Variables (Categories) Empty Random Intercept Intercept Outcome Intercept 2 Slopes Intercept 1 Slope
Intercept
Mean Intercept 5.233 5.406 5.472 5.509 5.512
Union Membership mean .019 .019 .019
Civic Involvement
Private-Belonging .242 .240 .227 .233
Private-Engagement .207 .205 .203 .203
Firm-Specific Human Capital Firm-Specific Human Capital Firm-Specific Human Capital Firm-Specific Human Capital Firm-Specific Human Capital Firm-Specific Human Capital
People Supervised (5) .445 .445 .456 .445
P Superv UM mean (100) -.298
Prestige (10) .282 .284 .283 .283
Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital Individual Strategy Personal Human Capital
Political Efficacy (5) .143 .143 .144 .143
Education (7) .139 .137 .132 .134
Exit Option (11) .213 .213 .216 .217
Exit O. UM mean (100) -.174 -.198
Partner Employed .124 .123 .126 .124
Collective Strategy
Professional-Belonging -.203 -.210 -.207 -.205
Workplace
Firm size (5) -.191 -.191 -.192 -.189
Sector Service (.064) (.065) (.063) (.063)
Control Variables
Male (-.125) (-.125) (-.128) (-.128)
Age (b for 10 years) .160 .160 .160 .160
48
Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on
Person and Country Variables Variance Components
Variables (Categories) Empty Random Intercept Intercept Outcome Intercept 2 Slopes Intercept 1 Slope
Intercept
Variance Components
Person-Level 5.047 3.809 3.810 3.774 3.784
Country-Level Intercepts .616 .285 .129 .111 .114
Slope1 P Supervised (100) .689
Slope2 Exit Option (100) .331 .332
InterceptSlope1-Correlation -.760
InterceptSlope2-Correlation -.383 -.416
Slope1Slope2-Correlation -.187
Intra-Class-Correlation .1094 .0696 0.033
R2 Persons .245 .245 .252 .250
R2 Countries .538 .791 .819 .815
Deviance 69411 60383 60380 60295 60315
Df (Deviance) 2 2 2 7 4
N of persons 15333 14429 14429 14429 14429
49
Quantity of intercept and slope effects
  • Meancountry 25 percentage points above grand
    mean gt predicted intercept of 5.472
    0.019255.947, half a point on 11 point scale of
    empowerment.
  • Slope country 25 percentage points above mean gt
    predicted slope for
  • people sv. .456 (-.0029825) .382
  • exit option .216 (-.0017425) .172.

50
3.5 ConclusionHypotheses confirmed?
  • Transfer hypothesis confirmed. Effects stronger
    than many effects of the more immediate personal
    factors
  • - Belonging to and engagement in private
    associations stronger than belonging to trade
    unions. Articulation of ones interest in private
    realm more easily transformed into empowerment at
    the workplace than in public realm.
  • - More distant more effective route. Longer
    distances needed to acquire general capacities of
    self-assertion, while focusing on the very arena
    of interest narrows down opportunities to learn
    general capacities. Longer distances more
    challenges to generalize.

51
I like to express my gratitude to the Verein
der Freunde und Förderer der Universität zu Köln
(Association of the friends and sponsors of the
University of Cologne)for the generous support
of this research visit.
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