NAGRA

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NAGRA A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT BENKEN ?
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1,000 Sv/hour
First, lets get a perspective on radiation For
example, take spent fuel rod that has been out of
a nuclear reactor for a few months
1,000 x 1,000 1,000,000 mSv/hr
ANNUAL RADIATION DOSE LIMIT 0.004 seconds
1,000,000 / (60 x 60) 277 mSv/second
1 / 277 0.004 seconds for annual radiation
dose limit of 1mSv
50 CHANCE FATAL DOSE 14.5 seconds
OR 4000 / 277 14.5 seconds to the LD fatal dose
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And the fuel remains radioactive for a long time
look here, its still deadly after 100,000 and
1 million years.
Time - YEARS
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Oh, I almost forgot, THROW it down a HOLE in YOUR
BACKYARD !
According to NAGRA, best thing to do with this is
THROW IT DOWN A HOLE in the ground !
Thanks NAGRA !
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So, now we know its going to be thrown down a
hole, all we have to do is
Decide what TYPE of HOLE, WHERE it is, and
WHEN to FILL IT IN
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Its good enough for me !
Hmmmmm - If it is good enough for him, will it be
good enough for me when Im in charge?
NAGRA A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT BENKEN ?
SUSTAINABILITY
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Where are you now ?
Lets go for a walk into the future
But weve a bit further to go yet !
And now ?
1,000,000 years
Were now 1 million years after you
Were about 10 thousand years AFTER you
10,000 years
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1,000,000 years
TO PASS THE SUSTAINABILITY TEST
10,000 years
OUR SOLUTION TODAY MUST BE ACCEPTABLE 10,000 TO
1 MILLION YEARS IN THE FUTURE
TODAY
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Ive got it a sustainable development mustnt
have any adverse affect on any future generation.
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This is the type of nuclear spent fuel that NAGRA
will be dealing with.
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WHAT IS IT
HOW MUCH IS THERE
HOW IS IT CONTAINED
WHAT HAPPENS IF IT GETS OUT
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Uranium Fuel
Leibstadt NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
MOX Fuel
Spent Fuel Store
Export to Britain/France
Fuel Fabrication
Plutonium
Uranium Enrichment
RadWaste
Returned Waste
Fuel Reprocessing Plant
Depleted Uranium
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(No Transcript)
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Okay, now that weve thrown it down a hole, who
is going to look after it ?
deep disposal
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150 years
Institutional Management
Post-Institutional Management
Repository Recovery Not Practicable
gt 1 million years
150 years
logarithmic scale
TIME - years
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Now we know that after about 150 years we cant
get at the fuel, we had better shield and package
so nothing goes wrong
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Fuel Pellets
Fuel Pin
Fuel Cladding
Spent Fuel
Assembly
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FUEL ASSEMBLIES
CAST STEEL CANISTER
FUEL ASSEMBLY
VITRIFIED HLW
SPENT FUEL
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So, just make the canisters durable enough so
that they dont leak until the radiation has died
away - EASY
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Some last long time others fizzle away quickly
lots of Yummy different tastes
WHAT IS SPENT FUEL HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Just like a bag of sweets
dissolves in the mouth
Uranium-233
Neptunium-237
Caesium-137
Iodine-129
Radium-226
Cerium-144
Plutonium-239
Plutonium-240
Lead-210
Plutonium-238
Strontium-90
Polonium-210
Americium-241
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radioactive decay - RTI
X radiotoxicity
- Toxicity
Radioactivity
E09 1,000,000,000 1 billion
TIME - years
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Caesium 137 - half-life 34 years
Pu-239
Plutonium 239 - half-life 24,400 years
Radioactivity - Toxicity
Polonium 210 - daughter product of Lead
radioactive decay
10,000
10
1000
100,000
100 M
100
1 M
10 M
TIME - years
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Radioactivity - Toxicity
Pb-210
10,000
10
1000
100,000
100 M
100
1 M
10 M
TIME - years
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HLW - VITRIFIED WASTE
EQUIVALENT URANIUM ORE IN REPOSITORY
Radioactivity - Toxicity
IVE GOT IT NOW THIS IS WHERE THE 10,000 YEARS
COMES FROM
TIME - years
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HLW - VITRIFIED WASTE
NOT REALLY THE 10,000 YEARS DERIVES FROM AN OLD
SALES PITCH OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
EQUIVALENT URANIUM ORE IN REPOSITORY
Radioactivity - Toxicity
IVE GOT IT NOW THIS IS WHERE THE 10,000 YEARS
COMES FROM
TIME - years
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But this is meaningless first, people just dont
live in uranium ore surroundings
host geology
bentonite clay
uranium ore
second, its the radioactivity on the surface
thats important.
years
10000
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Thats right the radiation dose from a leaking
repository will be received either by inhalation
or ingestion, particularly via drinking water
now drink up Son !
Are you sure this is going to be good for me, Dad
?
Now we are introducing a new measure - DOSE
EXPOSURE this is measured in milliSieverts
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TOTAL - SPENT FUEL
HLW - VITRIFIED WASTE
Annual Dose - mSv
EQUIVALENT URANIUM ORE IN REPOSITORY
Radioactivity - Toxicity
First, lets scrub this uranium nonsense
Finally we drag this line to todays annual dose
limit
So we need to modify the cut off point
Change this scale to DOSE EXPOSURE in
milliSieverts
Vitrified HLW gt110,000 years
Spent Fuel gt2,000,000 years
TIME - years
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Is that SUSTAINABLE ?
The HLW is now much further away! At 110,000
years
2,000,000 years
110,000 years
And were now 2 million years after you
10,000 years
So we have to keep radwaste safely away for
between 110,000 and 2 million years
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These are still 3 orders of magnitude 1/1000
below the Guidance Limit
This is NAGRAs prediction most of nuclides are
held back by the geology
Those radionuclides that get through the
geological barriers are below the limit
This is the present public dose limit at
1mSv/annum
Its not what gets through but what NAGRA claim
to stop thats of interest to us.
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If I lay this over the NAGRA graph, that tells me
what NAGRAs stops
Remember this slide its the total
radioactivity of spent fuel that is going to be
thrown down the hole.
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Public Dose Limit
Regulatory Guideline Limit
IAEA Insignificant Dose
TOTAL SPENT FUEL INVENTORY
I-129
Cl-36
Se-79
C-14
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• Two Problems so far
• NAGRA really doesnt consider whether its
  proposal is SUSTAINABLE
• No account of Collective Dose, risk almost
  totally versed in Individual Dose

Sustainable Development
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Lets move on and make a quick comparison between
the Swedish and Swiss Schemes
Multiple Barriers
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Swedish Model
Host Geology
Gallery Backfilled Bentonite/Sand
MULTIPLE BARRIERS
1) Fuel Cladding
2) Steel Liner
Disturbed Geology
3) Copper Canister
4) Bentonite Clay Plug
5) Host Geology
Bentonite Clay Jacket
Bentonite Clay Plug
Access Gallery
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Swiss Model
Host Geology
MULTIPLE BARRIERS
Gallery Backfilled Bentonite/Sand
1) Fuel Cladding
2) Steel Canister
3) Bentonite Backfill
4) Host Geology
Disturbed Geology
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Access until final closure
Monitoring until final closure
Post-Closure Access Practicable
Larger Tunnel
Swedish Vertical Borehole
Immediate Closure
No Post-Closure Access
Smaller Tunnel
Swiss Place Backfill
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CONTAINMENT
Can the Canister be Totally Failsafe for 10,000
years ?
What are the Consequences if Canister Fails
Earlier ?
FUEL DISSOLUTION
How Soluble is the Fuel ?
Is the Fuel Damaged ?
GEOLOGY DISPERSION
Is the Seeping Teabag Model Appropriate ?
What Happens if it all goes Wrong ?
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CANISTER CORROSION - COPPER -v- STEEL CANISTER
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TOTAL - SPENT FUEL
Radioactivity - Toxicity
Swedish Model late canister failure REDUCES RTI
by x15
Swiss Model early canister failure INCREASES RTI
by x5
mixing fuel solubility processes
dispersion through host geology
total containment
within canister
TIME - years
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CANISTER CORROSION - COPPER -v- STEEL CANISTER
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2mm ELECTRON WELD BEAM DIAMETER
2mm
DEFECTIVE AT MANUFACTURE
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DEFECTIVE AT DELIVERY
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Gas Vapour Accumulates in
Disturbed Geology Zone
of Gallery Roof
Two-Phase Flow at 1,000 years
NAGRA CLAIM BENTONITE OPANILUS CLAY WILL
RESEAL SO NO CONTINUOUS PATHWAYS FORMED
Crevices Provide 'QUICK'
Escape Path from
Venting Canister
Gas Bubble Pressure Exceeds
Bentonite Clay Cohesive Swell Pressure
Permanent Crevices Form
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MIGRATION CONTAINED
MIGRATION COMMENCES
Hydraulic Gradient Lowers rom E-13 to E-11 m/s
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FUEL DISSOLUTION
How Soluble is the Fuel ?
Is the Fuel Damaged ?
GEOLOGY DISPERSION
Is the Seeping Teabag Model Appropriate ?
What Happens if it all goes Wrong ?
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FUEL CORROSION DISSOLUTION
Fuel Pellets
ACTUAL 33 MWday/t PWR Fuel
Fuel Pin
Fuel Cladding
IDEALISED
No Reliable Dissolution Model of Fuel in this
State
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Benken
Benken Borehole
Repository Site
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Opalinus Clay strata
geological faults
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1,000 X faster
Opalinus Clay
Conductivity
flow rate
Hydraulic Head
X
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25 km
40 m
River Gravel Basin
40 m
60 m
15 km
2) moves along water strata (Benken Borehole)
1) migrates through clay
3) enters river basins
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2 km
Malm Aquifer
Existing Geologial Fault
30 km
Muschelkalk Aquifer
2) moves along strata into fault and joins
aquifer
1) involves existing geological fault line
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FUEL HEAT
1) Bentonite Buffer Temperature Rises
Opalinus Clay Ambient Temperature
2) Heating Drives Moisture Out - outer layers of
Bentonite Buffer Swell
3) Several Hundreds of years later, water
migrates back into buffer, possibly generating
cracks and fissures
4) Resaturation of Bentonite increases Swelling
Pressure, Compresses Canister
5) By Now Corroded Canister Collapses - 27/40MPa
- Release Commences
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GEOLOGICAL DISPERSION
MULTIPLE GEOLOGICAL BARRIERS
INEFFECTIVE - LEACHATE DIVERTED TO RUNNING
AQUIFER
PROGRESS OF LEAK CONTROLLED BY
100m OPINALUS BUFFER STRATA REDUCED TO 40m BY
WORKINGS
LEACHATE DIVERTED TO AQUIFER
PLANNED TO LEAK FOR OVER 1 TO 10 MILLION YEARS
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SECURITY TERRORIST THREAT
Just one passing mention
NAGRA SAFETY REPORT NTB 02-05 - 9 VOLUMES
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NAGRA UNCERTAINTIES
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OMISSIONS
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
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(No Transcript)
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NAGRA claim that whatever can go wrong has been
taken into account even in the worse
conceivable event everything will be okay, even
over 1 to 2 million years in the future Lets
test this with a few examples
Just this and one more slide
TITANIC
WINDSCALE
THREE MILE ISLAND
COLUMBUS SHUTTLE
CHERNOBYL
9-11 2001
LUCENS
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www.largeassociates.com
NORTH ATLANTIC RADIOACTIVE WASTE SEA DUMPING
1946 - 1982
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Low-Level 100,000m3
Intermediate-Level 30,000m3
High-Level 3,030m3
ILW (long lived) 10,000m3
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING SECTOR - 40 YEAR CRADLE
TO GRAVE CYCLE
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Research, Industrial and Medical Wastes

Nuclear Operational Decommissioning Wastes
RD Medical Wastes (LLW ILW)
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136,000 m3 shallow repository
SPENT FUEL VITRIFIED FISSION PRODUCT
15,000 m3 deep repository
SHALLOW DISPOSAL
TOTAL RADWASTE 2050 - NO NEW NUCLEAR POWER
DEEP REPOSITORY