WASTE NOT - WANT NOT

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WASTE NOT - WANT NOT
Critical Review of Radioactive Waste Management
in Short, Interim and Longer Terms Planned at
Benken, Switzerland
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WHAT IS IT
HOW MUCH IS THERE
HOW IS IT CONTAINED
WHAT HAPPENS IF IT GETS OUT
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Uranium Fuel
Leibstadt NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
MOX Fuel
Spent Fuel Store
Export to Britain/France
Fuel Fabrication
Plutonium
Uranium Enrichment
RadWaste
Returned Waste
Fuel Reprocessing Plant
Depleted Uranium
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DecommissioningWastes
Spent Fuel
Operational Wastes
Nuclear Power Plant
4,400 tonnes unreprocessed
Intermediate Level Waste
Low-Level Waste
High-Level Waste
Intermediate Level Waste
Low-Level Waste
Returned Waste from 1,200 tonnes reprocessed
spent fuel
RadWaste
vitrified HLW
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LIQUIDS SOLIDS
Cubic Meters
INTERMEDIATE
LOW
HIGH
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Low-Level 100,000m3
Intermediate-Level 30,000m3
High-Level 3,030m3
ILW (long lived) 10,000m3
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING SECTOR - 40 YEAR CRADLE
TO GRAVE CYCLE
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Research, Industrial and Medical Wastes

Nuclear Operational Decommissioning Wastes
RD Medical Wastes (LLW ILW)
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136,000 m3 shallow repository
SPENT FUEL VITRIFIED FISSION PRODUCT
15,000 m3 deep repository
SHALLOW DISPOSAL
TOTAL RADWASTE 2050 - NO NEW NUCLEAR POWER
DEEP REPOSITORY
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LONG-LIVED INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL WASTE - 1,400m3
SPENT FUEL VITRIFIED FISSION PRODUCT
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Fuel Pellets
Fuel Pin
Fuel Cladding
Spent Fuel
Assembly
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(No Transcript)
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(No Transcript)
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WHAT IS SPENT FUEL HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Uranium-233
Neptunium-237
Caesium-137
Iodine-129
Radium-226
Cerium-144
Plutonium-239
Plutonium-240
Lead-210
Plutonium-238
Strontium-90
Polonium-210
Americium-241
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Ouch !
biological
radioactive
radionuclide
emitter
organ
Half-Life
Half-Life
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X radiotoxicity
radioactive decay - RTI
- Toxicity
Radioactivity
logarithmic
E09 1,000,000,000 1 billion
TIME - years
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Caesium 137 - half-life 34 years
Plutonium 239 - half-life 24,400 years
Radioactivity - Toxicity
Polonium 210 - daughter product of Lead
radioactive decay
100 M
10 M
TIME - years
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Radioactivity - Toxicity
Pb-210
10,000
10
1000
100,000
100 M
100
1 M
10 M
TIME - years
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Repository hypothetically filled with natural
uranium ore
Radioactivity - Toxicity
Canister to last 10,000 years
10,000
10
1000
100,000
100 M
100
1 M
10 M
TIME - years
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FUEL ASSEMBLIES or VITRIFIED HLW
CAST IRON SLEEVE
Swedish Model
acts as reducing agent
Optional Swiss Choice
on radionuclide solubility
?
COPPER CANISTER
Swedish Model
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Swiss Model
FUEL ASSEMBLIES
preferred
VITRIFIED HLW
CAST STEEL CANISTER
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Swedish Model
Host Geology
Gallery Backfilled Bentonite/Sand
MULTIPLE BARRIERS
1) Fuel Cladding
2) Steel Liner
Disturbed Geology
3) Copper Canister
4) Bentonite Clay Plug
5) Host Geology
Bentonite Clay Jacket
Bentonite Clay Plug
Access Gallery
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Swiss Model
Host Geology
MULTIPLE BARRIERS
Gallery Backfilled Bentonite/Sand
1) Fuel Cladding
2) Steel Canister
3) Bentonite Backfill
4) Host Geology
Disturbed Geology
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Access until final closure
Monitoring until final closure
Post-Closure Access Practicable
Larger Tunnel
Swedish Vertical Borehole
Immediate Closure
No Post-Closure Access
Smaller Tunnel
Swiss Place Backfill
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CONTAINMENT
Can the Canister be Totally Failsafe for 10,000
years ?
What are the Consequences if Canister Fails
Earlier ?
FUEL DISSOLUTION
How Soluble is the Fuel ?
Is the Fuel Damaged ?
GEOLOGY DISPERSION
Is the Seeping Teabag Model Appropriate ?
What Happens if it all goes Wrong ?
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solutes gases out
water in
TUNNEL BACKFILL
MANKINDS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT
FUEL CORRODES DISSOLVES
DISTURBED ZONE
BENTONITE PLUG
CANISTER FAILS
HOST GEOLOGY
dispersion through host geology
10,000
1M to 10M
10,400
11,500
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CANISTER CORROSION - COPPER -v- STEEL CANISTER
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TOTAL - SPENT FUEL
Radioactivity - Toxicity
Swedish Model late canister failure REDUCES RTI
by x15
Swiss Model early canister failure INCREASES RTI
by x5
mixing fuel solubility processes
dispersion through host geology
total containment
within canister
TIME - years
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CANISTER CORROSION - COPPER -v- STEEL CANISTER
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CANISTER PARTIALLY FAILS IMMEDIATELY
CANISTER EMPLACED
CANISTER FILLS WITH WATER
FUEL CORROSION AND DISSOLUTION
SKB 93-31
IN CORE
RIM EFFECTS
STEADY STATE
EARLY GAS VENTING DAMAGES BENTONITE
FUEL DISSOLVES
CANISTER EJECTS WATER
FUEL SOLUTES MIGRATE
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2mm ELECTRON WELD BEAM DIAMETER
2mm
DEFECTIVE AT MANUFACTURE
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DEFECTIVE AT DELIVERY
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Gas Vapour Accumulates in
Disturbed Geology Zone
of Gallery Roof
Two-Phase Flow at 1,000 years
NAGRA CLAIM BENTONITE OPANILUS CLAY WILL
RESEAL SO NO CONTINUOUS PATHWAYS FORMED
Crevices Provide 'QUICK'
Escape Path from
Venting Canister
Gas Bubble Pressure Exceeds
Bentonite Clay Cohesive Swell Pressure
Permanent Crevices Form
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MIGRATION CONTAINED
MIGRATION COMMENCES
Hydraulic Gradient Lowers rom E-13 to E-11 m/s
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FUEL DISSOLUTION
How Soluble is the Fuel ?
Is the Fuel Damaged ?
GEOLOGY DISPERSION
Is the Seeping Teabag Model Appropriate ?
What Happens if it all goes Wrong ?
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Benken
Benken Borehole
Repository Site
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Opalinus Clay strata
geological faults
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1,000 X faster
Opalinus Clay
Conductivity
flow rate
Hydraulic Head
X
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25 km
40 m
River Gravel Basin
40 m
60 m
15 km
2) moves along water strata (Benken Borehole)
1) migrates through clay
3) enters river basins
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2 km
Malm Aquifer
Existing Geologial Fault
30 km
Muschelkalk Aquifer
2) moves along strata into fault and joins
aquifer
1) involves existing geological fault line
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FUEL HEAT
1) Bentonite Buffer Temperature Rises
Opalinus Clay Ambient Temperature
2) Heating Drives Moisture Out - outer layers of
Bentonite Buffer Swell
3) Several Hundreds of years later, water
migrates back into buffer, possibly generating
cracks and fissures
4) Resaturation of Bentonite increases Swelling
Pressure, Compresses Canister
5) By Now Corroded Canister Collapses - 27/40MPa
- Release Commences
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FUEL CORROSION DISSOLUTION
FUEL CORROSION AND DISSOLUTION
Fuel Pellets
Fuel Pin
Fuel Cladding
IN CORE
STEADY STATE
RIM EFFECTS
FUEL DISSOLVES
FUEL SOLUTES GASES MIGRATE
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IDEALISED
No Reliable Dissolution Model of Fuel in this
State
ACTUAL 33 MWday/t PWR Fuel
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GEOLOGICAL DISPERSION
MULTIPLE GEOLOGICAL BARRIERS
INEFFECTIVE - LEACHATE DIVERTED TO RUNNING
AQUIFER
PROGRESS OF LEAK CONTROLLED BY
100m OPINALUS BUFFER STRATA REDUCED TO 40m BY
WORKINGS
LEACHATE DIVERTED TO AQUIFER
PLANNED TO LEAK FOR OVER 1 TO 10 MILLION YEARS
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SECURITY TERRORIST THREAT
Just one passing mention
NAGRA SAFETY REPORT NTB 02-05 - 9 VOLUMES
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NAGRA UNCERTAINTIES
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OMISSIONS
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
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TRUST
DO YOU TRUST THOSE WHO ORGANISED THIS
NORTH ATLANTIC RADIOACTIVE WASTE SEA DUMPING
1946 - 1982
WITH THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF SWISS RADIOACTIVE
WASTE ?
(under your feet!)