Title: Sessions VI and VII Conclusions and summary
1Sessions VI and VII Conclusions and summary
- Francois Besnus Session Chair
- Cape Town July 6, 2007
2Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- The Use of Safety Cases
- Structure of safety case should be maintained
through every stage of the step-by-step process,
with the content of the safety case being
progressively developed as the project proceeds.
For each key step of decision making, a decision
should be taken only if structured information on
all important elements of the disposal system is
available - Whatever the stage is the Safety case must back
up on a Safety assessment that always comprises
three components - The assessment of the engineering, of the impact
- and of the management system
3Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- Vaalputs PCRSA
- The presentation focused on the radiological
impact, gave an overview of the knowledge
necessary to establish a comprehensive set of
scenarios and illustrated that the use of
sensitivity analysis to adjust the safety
strategy. The assessment concluded that the
likelihood is high for post-closure safety at
Vaalputs to be demonstrated successfully for the
disposal of a national inventory of LILW
4Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- Safety Assessment Conclusions
- The safety assessment is a step-by-step process,
required to support the safety arguments in an
integrated manner. It emphasizes the engineering
suitability of a site, gives orders of magnitude
of the possible radiological impacts and
demonstrates that the necessary management
system.
5Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- International harmonization projects
- Presentation gave an overview of the projects
conducted by IAEA that provide an important input
for helping member states to set out efficient
methods in appying safety standards - On of the project,SAFRAN, dedicated to the
development of a software for assessing a safety
case was presented at the end of the session.
6Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- Regulatory Romania
- The regulatory framework as applied in the
country was presented. Authorization follows a
phased approach which includes predisposal,
disposal storage and decommissioning. The
presentation outlined the different existing
facilities in the country and their functions.
Currently a disposal facility is situated at
Baita Bihor, which was designed to handle low and
intermediate waste. A new repository is planned
at Saligny. A spent fuel facility will be
provided at Cernavoda.
7Session VI, Safety Demonstration
- Safe Management of Rad Waste in China
- The Chinese nuclear industry is well established
and has regulatory processes for most activities
regarding waste management in place. However
they are still facing issues such as NORM,
disused sealed sources, lack of understanding by
the public and politicians
8Session VII, Common Framework
9Session VII, Common Framework
- The panel discussion touched on the issues of
Pros and cons of prescriptive vs. a performance
based approach. It was generally agreed that the
performance based approach provides greater
flexibility and a better opportunity to achieve
an optimized solution. However, it was also
pointed out that it requires a mature regulator
and that it may not be suitable for all
licensees. Small licensees would likely not have
the resources for a propose-dispose approach. - It was recognized that setting radiological
criteria for the long term would be difficult.
Various options were discussed and it was pointed
out that the most robust solution may also end up
being the least costly. Also, there may be
safety benefits in carrying out the work right
away. - Since the common framework is also a common
approach to safety, it is expected that its
implementation would lead to better stakeholder
acceptance. Again, countries could integrate the
guidance in their own documents. - While it is hard to quantify an acceptable a
tradeoff between economy and safety, the most
expensive option may turn out to be the cheapest.
10Session VII, Common Framework
- It was felt that the existing proposal would
accommodate mixed waste. - The common framework links management options and
classification. Implementation would require
programmatic and management tools in addition to
regulations. - Equivalencies in the proposal for NORM may
require some revision as they are not truly
equivalent and the two classification schemes
should agree on NORM definitions. - Tailings pose unique problems due to their volume
and long term hazard and other solutions may be
required to deal with local conditions and
effects. - The participant touched on the subject of how
safe is safe - why propose near surface when sooner or later
will need a DGR? (depends on situation) - It was clarified that the proposal is an IAEA
recommendation, which may be published as a
separate document. There is no link to the Joint
Convention.
11Session VII, Common Framework
- Conclusions
- There are common safety, technical, economical
and societal aspects that need to be addressed
and these could be best handled through a common
approach.. - A common framework will help to find a safe and
cost effective disposal solution for the various
wastes and will assist in decision making to link
a waste type with a suitable disposal option. - The IAEA should issue the document on a common
framework. Countries that have developed
policies for the management and disposal of
nuclear waster could use the document to provide
background for their policies, while other
countries could use the document for policy
purposes.