NRIC Council Meeting

1
NRIC Council Meeting

• Focus Group 1C
• Analysis of Effectiveness of Best Practices Aimed
  at E911 and Public Safety
• September 23, 2004

2
Focus Group 1C Charter

• The Council shall present a report containing
  its analysis of 63.100 outages related to
  911/E911 and the Best Practices that are most
  applicable to E911 outages. The report shall
  also identify E911 architecture vulnerabilities.

3
Process
A
B
C
4
Outages Reviewed Qualified

• C.F.R. 63.100 Reported Outages affecting 911
  between January 2002 and March 2004
• FCC data 84 outages
• NRSC summary 80 outages
• Focus Group 1C review 76 outages
• Eliminated reported outages that
• Did not affect 911
• Were finally determined to not meet 63.100
  reporting criteria

5
Definitions Root Cause and Direct Cause

• The Direct Cause is defined as the event, action,
  or procedure that triggered the incident
• e.g., Cable damaged by falling tree
• Direct Cause Cable Damage
• The Root Cause is defined as the key problem,
  which once identified and corrected prevents the
  same or a similar problem from recurring
• e.g., switch was improperly configured to allow
  auto reroute of calls
• Root Cause Service Provider Procedural Error
• - from Outage 02-016

6
Results in Brief Outages by Direct Cause
7
Results in Brief Outages by Root Cause
8
Results in Brief Outage Categories
9
Results in Brief Facility Failure
10
Results in Brief 911/E911 Best Practices

• 97 out of the 776 existing NRIC Best Practices
  from NRIC I-VI were identified as being
  applicable specifically to 911/E911 outages and
  Public Safety
• The Best Practices identified fell into the
  following categories
• Diversity/Redundancy
• Contingency/Emergency Planning
• Data Assurance/Traffic Management
• Media/Public Awareness
• Emergency Management
• Prevention
• Cooperation/Communications with Emergency Service
  Entities
• Future 1C efforts will evaluate the effectiveness
  of 911/E911 and Public Safety Best Practices

11
Results in Brief 911/E911 Architecture
Vulnerabilities

• Five areas of the 911/E911 architecture were
  identified as key vulnerabilities when analyzed
  against the outage data
• Facility
• Affected by 47 of the 911 outages
• Power Elements
• Affected by 16 of the 911 outages
• CCS (Common Channel Signaling)
• Affected by 15 of the 911 outages
• Local Switch Tandem Switch
• Affected by 9 and 4, respectively for a total
  13 of the 911 outages
• DCS (Digital Cross-Connect System)
• Affected by 7 of the 911 outages

12
Network Diagram
13
Focus Group 1C Next Steps

• Group outages by network components
• By outage, determine most relevant best practices
• Link relevant best practices to network component
• Develop recommendations on which best practices
  to emphasize