The ontogeny and phylogeny of cultural cognition

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The ontogeny and phylogeny of cultural cognition
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Some uniquely human abilities

• language
• artifacts and technology
• social practices and institutions

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Some uniquely human abilities
playing hide-and-seek
showing your vacation photos
attending a summer school

• language
• artifacts and technology
• social practices and institutions

holding open a door for someone
playing a duet
helping your kid with homework
driving in traffic
taking a walk together
pointing out interesting sights for others
co-authoring a paper
playing house with your kid
cooking dinner together
planning a party
playing cards
holding a ladder steady for someone
going on a date
meeting for lunch
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• All involve sharing and collaboration.

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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• All involve sharing and collaboration.
• We propose that the crucial difference between
  human cognition and that of other species is the
  ability to participate with others in
  collaborative activities with shared goals and
  intentions shared intentionality.

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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• All involve sharing and collaboration.
• We propose that the crucial difference between
  human cognition and that of other species is the
  ability to participate with others in
  collaborative activities with shared goals and
  intentions shared intentionality.
• Two components
• understanding of others goals and intentions

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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• All involve sharing and collaboration.
• We propose that the crucial difference between
  human cognition and that of other species is the
  ability to participate with others in
  collaborative activities with shared goals and
  intentions shared intentionality.
• Two components
• understanding of others goals and intentions
• motivation to share psychological states with
  others

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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• By 9-12 months, infants understand something
  about others goals and intentions.
• Young children with autism and chimpanzees may
  have (at least) some understanding of others
  goals.
• An understanding of others goals and intentions
  gives individuals a tremendous social advantage
  in terms of being able to explain and predict
  others behavior.
• But neither is enough to explain some interesting
  aspects of human cognition.
• In addition

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Sharing intentions
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Understanding of others goals and intentions
Attention
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Sharing intentions
SHARED GOAL
SHARED GOAL
Joint Attention
Decision-Making
Decision-Making
relevant reality
relevant skills, knowledge
relevant reality
relevant skills, knowledge
JOINT INTENTION
JOINT INTENTION
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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• Sharing and coordinating psychological states
• Motivation to share (joint emotions, attention,
  interest)
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration (joint goals, intentions)
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities

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• Sharing and coordinating psychological states
• Motivation to share (joint emotions, attention,
  interest)
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration (joint goals, intentions)
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities

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Motivation to share in infants

• Early proto-conversations (early infancy sharing
  emotions) (e.g., work by Rochat Striano,
  Stern, Trevarthen)

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Motivation to share in infants

• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)
• (e.g., work by Rochat Striano, Stern,
  Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months sharing attention
  interest triadic) (e.g., work by Bakeman
  Adamson, Tomasello, Trevarthen)

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13-month-old infant in joint attentional
engagement
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Motivation to share in infants

• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)
• (e.g., work by Rochat Striano, Stern,
  Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months)
• (e.g., work by Bakeman Adamson, Tomasello,
  Trevarthen)
• Declarative gestures
• (e.g., work by Bates, Bruner, Camaioni,
  Lempers, Tomasello)
• shows (around 10 months)
• points (around 12 months)

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3-year-old child pointing declaratively
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Motivation to share in infants

• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)
• (e.g., work by Rochat Striano, Stern,
  Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months)
• (e.g., work by Bakeman Adamson, Tomasello,
  Trevarthen)
• Declarative gestures
• (e.g., work by Bates, Bruner, Camaioni,
  Lempers, Tomasello)
• shows (around 10 months)
• points (around 12 months)
• Moore not sharing, just attention to self

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Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano,
Tomasello (2004)

• 12-month-olds
• Toys were activated to elicit pointing. E
  reacted to infants points in one of four
  different ways
• Ignore
• Look only to Event
• Look only to Face
• Joint Attention

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• Infants were most satisfied in the Joint
  Attention condition
• in Joint Attention, they pointed more across
  trials
• in the other conditions, within trials, they
  repeated points more often.
• 12-month-olds point to share attention and
  interest.

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Liszkowski, Carpenter, Tomasello (in press)

• When E misunderstands the infants referent, even
  if E reacts with excitement, 12-month-old infants
  repeat their pointing. Infants pointing is thus
  about specific objects or events, not just to
  obtain an adult reaction. (also evidence of
  collaborative communication message repair)

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Motivation to share in chimpanzees and children
with autism

• Early proto-conversations no (?)
• (autism e.g., work by Hobson)
• (chimpanzees Tomonaga et al.)
• Joint attention no
• (autism e.g., work by Carpenter, Charman,
  Dawson, Mundy, Wetherby)
• (chimpanzees e.g., Bard Vauclair,
  Tomasello Carpenter)
• Declarative gestures no
• (autism e.g., work by Baron-Cohen,
  Carpenter, Loveland, Mundy, Sigman)
• (chimpanzees e.g., Gomez, Tomasello
  Carpenter)

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration

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• Collaboration
• Bratman (1992)
• shared goal each participant has the goal that
  we (in mutual knowledge) do X together
• coordination of plans/intentions. This requires
  that
• each participant understands both roles of the
  interaction (so can reverse roles if needed) and
• each can help the other with his role if needed.

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities

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Carpenter, Tomasello, Striano (2005)
Tomasello Carpenter (2005)

• 12- and 18-month-olds, children with autism,
  chimpanzees
• E performed one role of an action and had S
  perform the other, e.g.,
• E hid a toy for S to find, or
• E held out a plate for S to place a toy on it.

• Test E gave the object(s) for the other role
  to S and waited.
• Does S perform Es previous role (hiding or
  offering) toward E (while looking at her)?

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Hiding Task

p.053

• Infants sometimes reversed roles (hid the toy
  for E or held out the plate for her) and looked
  to E.
• Children with autism and chimpanzees sometimes
  performed these actions but did so without looks
  to E.
• They may have been reversing at an action,
  rather than a psychological level. (see also
  work by Hobson)

Offering Task
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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping (see also Kuhlmeier, Wynn, Bloom,
  2003)
• cooperation and collaborative activities

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Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, Tomasello (2006)

• 12- and 18-month-olds
• Infants watched E repeat an action (e.g.,
  punching holes) with a target object.
• The target and a distractor object were
  displaced.
• E began looking around.

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• Infants pointed to help the adult by informing
  her about the location of the object she was
  looking for.

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Warneken Tomasello (2006) 18-month-old
infant
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Warneken Tomasello (2006) nursery-reared
chimpanzee
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Warneken Tomasello (2006)

• 18-month-olds help instrumentally, in many
  different situations
• chimpanzees only when E reached
• but other positive results for chimpanzees too
• helping doesnt necessarily involve a shared
  goal understanding others individual goal is
  sufficient

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
• communication (Clark, 1997 Golinkoff, 1993
  Sperber Wilson, 1986 Tomasello et al., 2005,
  submitted)

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Behne, Carpenter, Tomasello (2005) Hare
Tomasello (2004)

• 14- to 24-month-olds,
• chimpanzees
• E hid a toy/food in one of
• two opaque containers.
• E indicated the toys
• location by pointing or gazing
• ostensively at the correct
• container.

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Infants
Chimpanzees

• Infants pass this test.
• Chimpanzees do not use cooperative/communicative
  (pointing) cues but do use competitive (reaching)
  ones.

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
• communication
• instrumental

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Warneken, Chen, Tomasello (2006) Liebal et al.
(in prep.)

• 18- and 24-month-olds, chimpanzees (and children
  with autism)
• Social and instrumental games
• E1 E2 demonstrate how to operate the apparatus.
• E1 cooperates with the child to perform the joint
  activity.
• E1 refrains from the activity for 15 seconds.

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Warneken, Chen, Tomasello (2006)
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Warneken, Chen, Tomasello (2006)
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• By 18 months, infants are able to cooperate with
  an adult to achieve a joint goal.
• When the adult stopped playing his role, children
  communicatively requested his continued
  participation.
• New results at least by 2 years, children do
  this even in tasks in which they could achieve
  the goal individually (Gräfenhein, Behne,
  Carpenter, Tomasello, in prep.)
• Chimpanzees (and children with autism) showed far
  less coordination of roles and no communicative
  requests for their partners continued
  participation.
• Chimpanzees showed no interest in the social
  games.

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• Sharing and coordinating intentions
• Motivation to share
• primary intersubjectivity
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
• Collaboration
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
• communication
• instrumental
• pretense

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Pretense

• Pretend play is (probably) uniquely human.
• It is often collaborative (shared goal, roles,
  etc.).
• Some consider it to be the earliest form of true
  collective intentionality in infancy (Rakoczy,
  2006).
• It sets the stage for later collective beliefs
  (money, marriage, government).

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Summary

• In addition to their understanding of others
  goals and intentions, infants demonstrate
• the motivation to share psychological states with
  others
• and
• ability to cooperate and coordinate intentions
  with others.
• Chimpanzees and children with autism do not show
  evidence of either of these additional
  motivations or abilities.

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Where does it come from?
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(a sketchy)Phylogenetic hypothesis

• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition
  are cooperative they evolved skills and
  motivations for collaborating.

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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(a sketchy)Phylogenetic hypothesis

• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition
  are cooperative they evolved skills and
  motivations for collaborating.
• How?
• Individuals or groups who could collaborate more
  effectively had a selective advantage (more food,
  better shelter protection, etc.).

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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(a sketchy)Phylogenetic hypothesis

• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition
  are cooperative they evolved skills and
  motivations for collaborating.
• How?
• Individuals or groups who could collaborate more
  effectively had a selective advantage (more food,
  better shelter protection, etc.).
• The abilities to share and collaborate made
  language and other cultural learning and creation
  possible.

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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(a sketchy)Phylogenetic hypothesis

• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition
  are cooperative they evolved skills and
  motivations for collaborating.
• How?
• Individuals or groups who could collaborate more
  effectively had a selective advantage (more food,
  better shelter protection, etc.).
• The abilities to share and collaborate made
  language and other cultural learning and creation
  possible.
• Over cultural-historical time, repeated,
  habitual instances of sharing intentions resulted
  in social practices and institutions (e.g.,
  marriage, money, government).

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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(a sketchy)Ontogenetic hypothesis

• Two interweaving lines of development
• understanding of goals and intentions
• motivation to share psychological states and
  activities

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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(a sketchy)Ontogenetic hypothesis

• Two interweaving lines of development
• understanding of goals and intentions
• motivation to share psychological states and
  activities
• The motivation to share transforms the
  understanding intentions line, resulting in
  shared collaborative activities.

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Motivation to share
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Motivation to share

Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Motivation to share
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Motivation to share
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, Moll (2005)
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Tomasello Carpenter (in press)
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Take-home message

• What is unique about human cultural cognition is
  the motivation to share and the ability to
  collaborate.
• The interaction of
• a biological adaptation
• cultural-historical processes, and
• individual development
• results in uniquely human abilities
  ranging from language to taking a walk together,
  all of which involve shared intentionality.