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Capital Management

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Title: Capital Management


1
Capital Management
  • Outline
  • Definition of bank capital
  • Role of bank capital
  • Capital adequacy
  • Shareholders viewpoint
  • Trends in bank capital

2
Definition of bank capital
  • Equity
  • Common stock, preferred stock, surplus, and
    undivided profits equals the book value of
    equity.
  • Market value of equity
  • Long-term debt
  • Subordinated notes and debentures
  • Interest payments are tax deductible
  • Reserves
  • Provision for loan losses (PLL) is expensed on
    the income statement
  • Reserve for loan losses is a capital account on
    the right-hand-side of the balance sheet

3
Definition of bank capital
4
Role of bank capital
  • Source of funds
  • Start-up costs
  • Growth or expansion (mergers and acquisitions)
  • Modernization costs
  • Cushion to absorb unexpected operating losses
  • Insufficient capital to absorb losses will cause
    insolvency
  • Long-term debt can only absorb losses in the
    event of institution failure
  • Adequate capital
  • Regulatory requirements to promote bank safety
    and soundness
  • Mitigate moral hazard problems of deposit
    insurance by increasing shareholders exposure to
    bank operating losses
  • Market confidence is important to depositors and
    other bank claimants

5
Capital adequacy
  • Bank regulators and bank shareholders have
    different views of capital adequacy
  • Regulators are more concerned with the lower end
    of the distribution of bank earnings.
  • Shareholders focus more on the central part of
    the distribution, or the expected return
    available to them.
  • Regulators perceive that financial risk increases
    the probability of insolvency, as greater
    variability of earnings makes it more likely that
    negative earnings could eliminate bank capital.
  • Regulators must close banks due to capital
    impairment.
  • Excessive capital regulation could inhibit the
    competitiveness and efficiency of the banking
    system.

6
Capital adequacy
  • Capital standards
  • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
    used a capital-deposit rate to measure capital
    adequacy in the early 1900s. This ratio was
    motivated by fears of bank runs.
  • The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) began using the
    Form for Analyzing Bank Capital (FABC) in the
    1950s which classified assets into 6 different
    risk categories. By contrast, the OCC in the
    1960s moved to a subjective system of capital
    evaluation (i.e., management quality, asset
    liquidity, operating expenses, deposit
    composition, etc.).
  • Problems with early standards Different
    standards applied by different regulators (OCC,
    FRB, and FDIC).
  • Not enforceable by law until the International
    Lending Act of 1983.
  • Fairness was questionable with small banks
    required to keep higher capital requirements
    than large banks.

7
Capital adequacy
  • Uniform capital requirements
  • Minimum primary capital-to-assets ratios
    established in 1981 by all three federal bank
    regulators (i.e., equity capital and reserves).
    A ratio of 5 to 6 was required.
  • Some larger institutions increased their risk
    taking in response to this uniform capital
    requirement approach.
  • Risk-based capital requirements were established
    in 1988 under the Basle Agreement among 12
    industrialized nations under auspices of the Bank
    for International Settlements (BIS).
  • Like the FABC approach of the Fed, bank assets
    are classified into 4 categories by risk level.
  • In 1998 an amendment was made to include rules
    for securities trading of banks.
  • Two categories of capital (1) Tier 1 or core
    capital and (2) Tier 2 or supplemental capital.

8
Capital adequacy
9
Capital adequacy
Calculating Risk-Adjusted Assets
10
Capital adequacy
  • Risk-adjusted capital requirements for total
    capital
  • K 80(A1) .20(A2) .50(A3) 1.0(A4)
  • K 0.080(100) .2(2,500) .5(3,000)
    1.0 (5,000)
  • 0.08 7,000 560.00
  • Catagories of assets by credit risk are A1, A2,
    A3, A4
  • A1 -- Cash and U.S. government securities
  • A2 -- Mortgage-backed bonds and government
    obligation (GO) municipal bonds
  • A3 -- Home loans and municipal revenue bonds
  • A4 -- Business, consumer, and other loans,
    other securities, and bank premises
  • Off balance sheet rules these items must
    first be converted to on- balance sheet credit
    equivalent amounts. Then these adjusted
    amounts are assigned to the different asset
    categories above.
  • Example
  • Performance standby Conversion Risk Risk-adjusted
  • letters of credit factor weight assets
  • 1,000 x 0.50 0.20 100

11
Capital adequacy
  • Market risk capital requirements (January 1998)
  • Institutions with more than 10 of total assets
    or 1 billion or more in trading account
    positions.
  • 8 risk-adjusted capital requirement on a daily
    basis based on market-to-market values of trading
    account securities.
  • Add to credit-risk-weighted assets or
    risk-adjusted assets after removing these
    securities from the previous calculation.
  • Example
  • Previous risk-adjusted assets 7,000
  • Remove GO munis trading account securities
    (1,500 x 0.20) (300)
  • Value-at-risk (VAR) over the last 60 business
    days 200
  • Risk-adjusted assets with market risk capital
    requirements 6,900
  • Stress tests need to be regularly performed on
    VAR models by experimenting with assumptions.
    These backtesting results allow VAR models to be
    continuously updated and improved.

12
Capital adequacy
  • General market risk (financial market as a whole)
  • Value-at-risk (VAR) is normally calibrated to the
    10-day 99th percentile standard.
  • Example over the past year records show there
    is a 1 in a 100 chance of losing 66.57 in any
    10-day period.
  • VAR times a scaling factor (3 normally but it can
    be higher).
  • Example 66.57 x 3 200
  • Must use (1) an average VAR over the last 60
    business days times 3, or (2) the previous days
    VAR. Latter condition only relevant to periods
    in which the financial markets are very volatile.
  • Specific risk (other risk factors including
    credit risk of the securities issuer and
    liquidity risk).
  • Scaling factor of 4 normally.
  • Add to risk-adjusted assets.

13
Capital adequacy
  • Potential weakness of current risk-based capital
    requirements
  • Differences in credit risk for most loans are not
    taken into account.
  • Book values are used rather than market values
    for most of the assets in the risk-adjusted
    assets calculations.
  • Regulatory requirements may change banks
    behavior in terms of allocation of loanable funds
    and investment decisions and possibly channel
    savings to less than the best uses.
  • Some kinds of bank risk are excluded, including
    operating risk and legal risk.
  • Portfolio diversification is not taken into
    account.

14
Capital adequacy
  • FDIC has a vested interest in bank capital
    adequacy due to its deposit insurance activities.
  • Handling distressed banks
  • Depositor payoff
  • Purchase and assumption (PA via mergers and
    acquisitions)
  • Provision of financial aid
  • Charter of a Deposit Insurance National Bank
    (DINB or bridge bank)
  • Reorganization
  • Variable-rate deposit insurance (in cents per
    100 domestic deposits) implemented in 1994
  • Risk Group
  • Capital Level A B C
  • Well capitalized 0 3 17
  • Adequately capitalized 3 10 24
  • Undercapitalized 10 24 27

15
Shareholders viewpoint
  • Financial risk and share valuation

16
Shareholders viewpoint
  • Debt and bank valuation

VL
VL VU tD
Max VL
VL VU tD - C
VU
VL Total value with debt VU Total value with
no debt t Tax rate D Debt outstanding
C Regulatory costs
D
Optimal Debt Level
17
Shareholders viewpoint
  • Corporate control
  • Greater debt increases the concentration of
    ownership among shareholders and thereby
    increases corporate control of the bank.
  • In banks that are not closely held there is the
    potential for agency costs related to conflicts
    of interest between owners and managers.
  • Hostile takeovers of banks with undervalued
    shares is a potential threat that tends to reduce
    agency costs.
  • Link management compensation to performance
    (e.g., stock options) to decrease agency costs.
  • Preemptive rights of shareholders reduces
    shareholder dilution and reduces agency costs to
    the extent that owner concentration is increased.

18
Shareholders viewpoint
  • Market timing (debt versus equity usage, interest
    rate levels, and stock market levels)
  • Asset investment considerations (asset risk and
    capital needs to absorb potential losses)
  • Dividend policy (fixed dividend policy versus
    fixed payout dividend payout policy)
  • Debt capacity (financial slack or flexibility)
  • Transactions costs (private and public sales of
    equity)
  • Mergers and acquisitions (Financial Services
    Modernization Act of 1999)
  • Internal expansion (internal capital generation
    rate)
  • ICR (1/capital ratio) x ROA x Earnings
    retention ratio
  • Rate at which a bank can expand its assets and
    still maintain its capital ratio.
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