Near Optimal Network Design With Selfish Agents. Eliot Anshelevich Anirban ... to c. Neither player can contribute to b, since d is a tempting deviation. ...
Motion planning is a classical problem. Mostly for rigid or ... GPU-based culling and set partitioning. Summary. Advantages. Scales better to complex scenes ...
Object of the game is to make a continuous chain of your ... A subgame in which if we get one free move, we play one piece to create a new full connection. ...
Price of Stability = cost(best NE) cost(OPT) (Min cost Steiner forest) ... Such games have pure NE: just do Best Response! The Fair Connection Game is a ...
On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with ... Price of stability: C(best NE) C(OPT) (Min cost Steiner forest) Summary. Known Results ...
These two white pieces are 'virtually connected' because even if it is ... Virtual Connections are treated as having resistance 0 if they are yours, and ...
On a Network Creation Game. Joint work with Ankur Luthra, Elitza Maneva, Christos ... Introduce a simple model of network creation by self-interested agents ...
the worst price of anarchy is always on two edge network. s. t. x. 1. s. t. x. 1. 1. 0. 1- Corollary: price of anarchy for degree d polynomials is O(d/log d) ...
Algorithmique et informatique: utiliser les donn es pour construire une solution ... Economie et th orie des jeux: les donn es et ressources sont partag es ou ...
Price of stability ratio between the cost of best Nash solution to the cost of ... Each player, in its turn, selects a path minimizing its cost (best response) ...
Users with a multitude of diverse economic interests sharing a Network (Internet) ... true for cars, packets?: users do not choose paths on the Internet: routers do! ...
Auction design: players have private 'valuations' for goods ... Moulin mechanism: simulate ascending auction using ? to compute prices at each iteration. ...
Bad news: inefficiency of selfish routing grows as cost functions ... Good news: inefficiency does not grow with network size or # of source-destination pairs. ...
Potential Functions and the Inefficiency of Equilibria. Tim Roughgarden. Stanford University ... example: POA 4/3 if G has affine cost fns. 36. Proof of General Thm ...