The Battle of Naseby

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The Battle of Naseby

• June 14th, 1645
• "The Description of the Armies of Horse and Foot
  of His Majesties, and Sir Thomas Fairfax his
  Excellency . . . at the Battayle of Nasebye,
• Joshua Sprigg, Anglia rediviva, London R. W. for
  John Partridge, 1647

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Background

• Improvements in organisation
• Changes in the Parliamentarian army
• Self Denying Ordinance
• Creation of the NMA
• (12 regiments of infantry 11 regiments of
  cavalry 1 regiment of dragoons)
• Commander in Chief
• Major General of Foot
• Lieutenant General of Horse
• Changes in the kings army
• Lord General Prince Rupert replaced the Earl of
  Forth
• Lieutenant General in Wales and the Marches
  Prince Maurice replaced Prince Rupert
• Lieutenant General in the West Country Goring
  took over from Prince Maurice

Sir Thomas Fairfax
Philip Skippon
Oliver Cromwell
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• The decision to fight
• NMA mocked as the New Noddle
• Charles was convinced by some of his generals
  that the NMA was divided and that it would be no
  match for his troops
• Disastrous decision as Royalists were outnumbered
  
• King 5000 horse just under 5000 foot
• Fairfax 6500 horse and dragoons 7000-8000 foot
• Royalists continuing problem of division
• Ongoing conflict in kings Council of War between
  Prince Rupert and Lord Digby

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Royalist infantry

• Royalists defensive formation
• Two lines and a strong reserve line (Reserve
  about 700-800 men)
• Cavalry incorporated into the main body of their
  army

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Parliamentarian infantry

• Rupert had chosen a field that suited an army
  that was outnumbered
• Field was 1 mile wide and with enclosures to the
  west and gorse bushes to the east ? remove the
  opporturtunity for rebel flanking attacks
• Parliamentarian army was cramped
• Two lines (2nd line on reverse slope of Cluster
  Hill out of sight of the royalists!)
• Unable to take up customary chequerboard
  formation it was drawn up in two parallel lines
  with very small gaps between regiments
• (may have deceived the royalists into thinking
  that it was the two lines had already closed up
  together)
• Small part of Colonel Harleys regiment held
  back to defend the artillery

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Royalist cavalry Right wing

• Criticism of Rupert
• Rupert accompanied the right-wing led by Prince
  Maurice rather than placing himself at the rear
  of his army. This meant that during the battle
  he was not in a position to direct the reserves
  where they were needed

Rupert Here I am!
Rupert Damn! Being here might have been better!
Think in what circumstances may a reserve force
be vital?
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• The Royalist right wing was led by Prince Maurice
• 1500-1700 horse
• Drawn up in 2 lines
• Supported by 200 musketeers
• In reserve Kings and the Queens Lifeguards

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Parliamentarian cavalry Left wing

• The Parliamentarian left wing was led by Henry
  Ireton he was inexperienced in this role (had
  only ever commanded a single regiment)
• 2500 horse
• Drawn up in 2 lines
• Supported by dragoon regiment

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Royalist cavalry Left wing

• The Royalist left wing was led by Langdale
• About 2000 horse
• Drawn up in 2 lines
• Supported by 200 muskets

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Parliamentarian cavalry Right wing

• The Parliamentarian right wing was led by Oliver
  Cromwell
• He had well over 3000 horse
• Drawn up in 2½ lines
• Cromwell initially stayed at the rear of his
  cavalry. From he was able to manage it more
  effectively
• No parliamentary cavalry reserves behind the
  main infantry offensive intent!

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So what happened?
The events of the battle!
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• The battle began at 10 am (a result would
  happen!) with an all-out royalist attack
• Unusually the fighting was not preceded by much
  of an artillery bombardment the royalist
  artillery was probably not ready because of the
  speedy advance
• (Rupert has been criticised for this but
  artillery bombardments had made little impact in
  previous battles)
• Despite the uphill slog the Royalist infantry
  caused considerable disorder in the enemy first
  line However, probably much to their surprise,
  they faced a 2nd line almost as strong as the
  1st.
• However, the Royalist commanders failed to
  commit their infantry reserves when the enemy 2nd
  line came into view!

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• What was happening with the cavalry?
• On Rupert and Maurices wing the Royalists
  routed their enemy
• Some of the Cavaliers chased the enemy horse
  from the battlefield in the direction of
  Northampton
• The rest of the Royalist cavalry attacked the
  artillery train (whilst the chances of victory
  were ebbing away elsewhere on the battlefield!)
• What might the Royalist cavalry have done instead?

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• These events are often seen as evidence of
  Ruperts inability to train and discipline his
  horse (unlike Cromwell!)
• However, Wanklyn defends Rupert suggesting that
  re-grouping is only usually possible in
  fortuitous circumstances.
• What do you think he means by fortuitous
  circumstances?
• Wanklyn also suggests that Rupert may not have
  lost control of his men and may have been trying
  to loop around to the infantry but found the
  artillery train blocked his way.

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• On the eastern side of the battlefield Sir
  Marmaduke Langdales Royalists charged first and
  Cromwells frontline moved forward to meet them.
• The Royalists were routed Royalist and fled back
  to Dust Hill
• The Royalists were not pursued but Cromwell
  did order some of his squadrons to keep a watch
  on them and prevent them re-entering the fray.

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• Ruperts options when he returned to Dust Hill
• The reserve cavalry had ignored Ruperts plans
  during his absence and had already been committed
  to supporting the Royalist left wing when it had
  got into difficulties. They were swept away in
  their defeat.
• Rupert was furious The king had sent away by
  somebodys persuasion about him all his horse to
  charge the wing of the horse of the enemy,
  whereas if they had stayed till Rupert came back
  and marched horse and foot together they had
  probably beaten him (Ruperts diary)

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• Charles had even personally tried to lead the
  Royal Lifeguards in a charge against the flank of
  Cromwells cavalry regiments.
• But this was aborted after the Earl of Carnwath
  seized his reigns and bellowed in his ears that
  it would mean certain death.
• Rupert was incensed but because of his own poor
  positioning he was not in a position to oversee
  the use of the reserves

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• In routing the Royalist right wing Cromwell had
  not even had to use part of the 2nd line and the
  whole of the 3rd line of his horse. Nor had
  Fairfaxs own regiment of foot been used.
• When this was sent into the battle it broke the
  back of the Royalist infantry
• The main body of the kings infantry were forced
  to surrender and the NMA horse then pursued the
  remaining royalist cavalry off the battlefield

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Aftermath of the battle

• At the end of the battle the Parliamentarians
  plundered the Royalist baggage train. This
  included a typical but inexcusable murder and
  deliberate disfigurement of many of the women.
• Bigoted Puritans saw these women as Irish Papists
• No shame an early Parliamentarian battlefield
  report mentioned in passing The Irish women
  Prince Rupert brought on the field (wives of the
  bloody Rebels in Ireland his Majestys dearly
  beloved subjects) our soldiers would grant no
  quarter to, about 100 slain of them, and most of
  the rest of the whores that attended that wicked
  Army are marked in the face or nose, with a slash
  or cut. (number may have been 3-400)

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• 800 Royalists lost their lives (500 on the
  battlefield and 300 more cut down by Cromwells
  pursuing cavalry)
• 5000 Royalists were captured (included 500
  officers who were sent to London to be paraded
  through the streets).
• Discovery of Charles private papers (personal
  correspondence with Henrietta Maria revealed him
  to be negotiating with foreign, Catholic powers).

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Overview the key reasons for royalist defeat

• Charless decision to fight when outnumbered he
  should have waited for Gorings cavalry and
  Gerards foot
• The low morale of the Northern horse their
  retreat was disastrous
• The decision to fight an offensive battle
• The want of discipline from Maurices horse
• Ruperts decision not to leave the right cavalry
  wing to Maurice and keep a controlling view of
  the battle.

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The end!

• Design Mr Acourt
• Research Mr Acourt
• Visual Effects Mr Acourt
• Editor Mr Acourt
• Audience You
• Now get an A Grade!

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Guarding the baggage train, parliamentary army
1645
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Looking north, from the right flank of the
parliamentarian deployment, across Broadmoor to
the royalist deployment on Dust Hill.
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Naseby battlefield monument in 2002, looking
north east from the parliament lines to the
position of Langdale's royalist cavalry on the
opposite side of Broadmoor.
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Lead bullets of varying calibre, some still with
sprews attached, together with powder box caps
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Looking north east from the Sibbertoft to
Clipston road towards Moot Hill. On the left the
ground falls increasingly steeply down into the
Welland valley. In places the scarps are
precipitous, as at Hellcoombe, forcing the
retreating royalist army back across Moot Hill on
the route the infatry had taken to reach the
battlefield. By the afternoon of the 14th June
1645 this hilltop ridge must have been a sad
sight, scattered with dead and dying royalist
soldiers.
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Looking south from near Lowe Farm, on the
Sibbertoft/Clipston road across the area where it
is believed that the royalist baggage train had
been sites during the battle. It as also across
this plateau that the royalist infantry retreated
towards Moot Hill.
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Looking north west across Broadmoor to Broadmoor
Farm in the valley bottom and Prince Rupert Farm
on Dust Hill, where the royalist army deployed.
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Looking north across Broadmoor towards the centre
of the parliamentarian infantry deployment along
the edge of the plateau. Low angle sunlight
emphasises the relatively gentle nature of the
slope rising up from Broadmoor which the
attacking royalist forces had to ascend.
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Looking across Broadmoor to the eastern end of
Dust Hill, where Langdale's royalist left wing of
cavalry deployed.
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An imaginative Victorian impression, by
Cattermole, of a key stage in the Naseby
battle.Late 19th century engraving by
Cattermole.
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Barrett, 1896