CHINESE ARMED FORCES

1
CHINESE ARMED FORCES
2
CURRENT MILITARY AIMS AND STRATEGIES

• LONG RANGE BALANCE OF POWER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
  ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
• TO GUARANTEE SEA BORNE ACCESS TO SUPPLY AND
  ROUTES OF TRADE

3
PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY
4
PLA ORGANISATION

• CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION
• PLA-ARMY
• PLA- NAVY
• PLA-AIRFORCE
• SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE
• MILITARY REGION
• GP ARMIES (CORPS EQUIVALENT)

5
PLA DOCTRINE

• LIMITED WAR UNDER HIGH TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONS.

• ACTIVE DEFENCE.
• RAPID REACTION FORCES.

6
PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY-NAVY
7
PLA-N ORGANISATION

• THREE FLEETS
• NORTH SEA
• EAST SEA
• SOUTH SEA
• 700 SHIPS, 75 SUBMARINES AND 500 COMBAT AIRCRAFTS

8
PLA-N MODERNISATION

• PURCHASED RUSSIAN KILO CLASS SUBMARINES.
• ADDITION OF NEW INDIGENOUSLY BUILT DESTROYERS,
  FRIGATES, SUPPLY SHIPS LANDING CRAFTS.
• MODERN ANTI SUBMARINE AND ANTI AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

9
NAVAL FORCE PROJECTION STRATEGY

• IMMEDIATE
• TO DOMINATE SEAS ON HER BORDERS.
• TO WREST CONTROL OVER ENTIRE SOUTH CHINA SEA,
  TAIWAN EAST CHINA SEA.
• SUBSEQUENT
• TO DOMINATE SLOC IN EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN WEST
  PACIFIC.
• POWER PROJECTION IN INDIAN OCEAN WEST PACIFIC.

10
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE
11
CMC
PLAAF HQ
5000 COMBAT AIRCRAFTS 1000 SAM SYSTEMS THREE
AIRBORNE DIVS 24 ANTI AIRCRAFT DIVS
12
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AIR
FORCEMODERNISATION PLAN
13
NEW ACQUISITIONS
14

J-8
UPGRADATIONS
J-7
15
NUCLEAR STATUS

16
(No Transcript)
17
CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

• DOCTRINE
• NO FIRST USE
• NON-USE AGAINST NON NUCLEAR NATIONS
• DETER OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS BY
  MAINTAINING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
• CAPABILITY
• DELIVERY TRIAD OF ICBM,
• SLBM AND AIR LAUNCHED
• TYPES SHORT, MEDIUM,
• LONG RANGE AND
• INTERCONTINENTAL

18
COMPARISON FORCES CHINA VIS-À-VIS INDIA AND USA
19
COMPARISON MAJOR EQUIPMENT ARMY
20
COMPARISON OF NAVIES PRINCIPAL SURFACE
COMBATANTS AND SUBMARINES
21
COMPARISON OF AIR FORCES
22
THREAT LAND

• PLAS FORMIDABILITY INCREASING AT A RAPID PACE
• EMPHASIS ON INTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR,
• HELICOPTER AND AIRBORNE / SPECIAL FORCES
• TRAINED IN NBC IN SIMULTANEOUS DEEP BATTLE
• MASSIVE IMPROVEMENT IN LOGISTICS
• INFRASTRUCTURE
• RADICAL UPGRADATION OF OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY
• DUE IMPROVEMENT IN COMD AND CONT,
• SURVEILLANCE AND OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT
• CAPABILITY

MAJOR AND FORMIDABLE THREAT BY 2015 / 2020
23
THREAT MARITIME

• RAPID UPGRADATION OF CAPABILITY INCLUDING A
• CARRIER TASKFORCE WITHIN A DECADE
• CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERS INDIA AS
• PRINCIPLE ADVERSARY WHEN CHINA PROJECTS NAVAL
• FORCE ACROSS MALACCA STRAITS

24
THREAT AIR

• ACQUISITION OF MODERN AIRCRAFTS, MID AIR
• REFUELLING CAPABILITY AND EXTENSION OF
• RUNWAYS IN TIBET
• CAPABILITY TO THREATEN EASTERN PART OF
• INDIAN HINTERLAND INCLUDING MOST OF
• EASTERN SEA COAST

25
NUCLEAR THREAT

• NUC MSLS LOC IN TIBET

ABILITY TO HITALL PARTS OF THE GLOBE
26
WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN TO INDIA

• NO IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT
• BY 2015 / 2020 A MODERNISED AND
  ECONOMICALLY STRONGER CHINA LIKELY TO
• FLEX THEIR MUSCLES

INDIAN FORCE DEVELOPMENT MUST CATER FOR A
CREDIBLE DETERRENCE CAPABILITY VIS-À-VIS A
STRONGER CHINA