Title: STATE OF THE PRACTICE OF INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
1STATE OF THE PRACTICE OF INTRUSION DETECTION
TECHNOLOGIES
- Presented by Hap Huynh
- Based on content by SEI
2SEI Report
- Technical REPORT CMU/SEI-99-TR-028
- To provide an unbiased assessment of publicly
available Intrusion Detection (ID) technology
3Roadmap
- An overview of ID from perspective of the CERT
Coordination Center - Examine the current state of ID technology
- Issues surrounding ID technology
- Recommendations for ID sponsor, user, vendor, and
research communities
4Growth in Number of Incidents Handled by the
CERT/CC
5Dimensions of Intrusion Detection
- ID technology is immature and dynamic
- ID system describe a system designed to detect
attacks regardless of their success - Fundamentally, two approaches
- Signature detection identifies patterns
corresponding to know attacks - Anomaly detection identifies any unacceptable
deviation from expected behavior
6State of the ID Market
- What can ID systems do?
- ID Product claims
- Lend a greater degree of integrity to the rest of
your security infrastructure - Make sense of often obtuse system information
sources - Relieve system management staff of the task of
monitoring the Internet searching for latest
hacker attacks - Make the security mgmt of your systems by
non-expert staff possible - Provide guidelines that assist in establishing a
security policy - Trace user activity from the point of entry to
point of exit or impact - Recognize activity patterns reflecting known
attacks and alert proper staff - Statistical analysis for abnormal activity
patterns - Operating-system audit trail mgmt, recognition of
of user activity reflecting policy violations - Based on ICSA paper titled An Introduction to
Intrusion Detection and Assessment
7State of the ID Market
- What can ID systems do?
- ID Experts
- Detect common attacks in a reasonably timely
manner - View network and system activity in real-time,
identify unauthorized activity and provide a
near-real-time automated response - Ability to analyze todays activity in view of
yesterdays activity to identify larger trends
and problems - Designed to be operated at the technician level
but still requires considerable expertise to
understand the data and know what to do in
response - Discovery and detection tools that guide further
investigation - Customers should not expect IDS to offer 100
protection - Gather hard data about whats being directed at
your site from remote locations, and you can use
that knowledge to make informed decisions about
what security controls need to be deployed - Based on 1998 Computer Security Institute round
table discussion
8Current IDS Market Position
- The use of IDS rose from 35 in 1998 to 42 in
1999 (CSI/FBI Computer Crime Survey 1999) - 2,700 executives, security professionals, and
technology managers from 49 countries concluded
that more companies are using IDS (Information
Week Survey 1999)
1998 1999
Alerted by colleague 47 48
Analysis of server, firewall logs 41 45
Intrusion detection systems 29 38
Data or material damage 41 37
Alerted by customer, supplier 14 15
9CERT/CC IDS Team Observations
- CERT examined ISS RealSecure, Cisco
- NetRanger, Network Flight Recorder, and
- Shadow
- IDS products based on current signature-based
analysis approaches do not provide a complete
intrusion detection solution but do produce
useful results in specific situations and
configurations
10Issues Surrounding ID Technology
- Increases in the types of intruder goals,
intruder abilities, tool sophistication, and
diversity as well as the use of more complex,
subtle, and new attack scenarios - The use of encrypted messages to transport
malicious information - The need to interoperate and correlate data
across infrastructure environments with diverse
technologies and policies - Ever increasing network traffic
- The lack of widely accepted ID terminology and
conceptural - Volatility in the ID marketplace which makes the
purchase and maintenance of ID systems difficult
11Issues Surrounding ID Technology
- Risks inherent in taking inappropriate automated
response actions - Attack on the ID systems themselves
- Unacceptably hi-levels of false positives and
false negatives, making it difficult to determine
true positives - The lack of objective ID system evaluation and
test information - The fact that most computing infrastructures are
not designed to operate securely - Limited network traffic visibility resulting from
switched local area networks. Faster networks
preclude effective real-time analysis of all
traffic on large pipes
12ID Technology Recommendations
- For sponsors
- Supporting ongoing, comprehensive testing of
commercial IDS and making test results publicly
available - Emphasizing research funding directed towards
reducing false alarms
13ID Technology Recommendations
- For users
- Implementing a security architecture that
reflects a defense-in-depth or layered approach
in protecting an organizations assets, whether
or not the organization chooses to deploy an IDS - Developing clear, concise IDS requirements based
on security policy and organizational needs - Configuring the IDS to maximize performance.
This includes selective deployment to monitor
critical assets as well as signature tuning to
prevent excessive false alarms
14ID Technology Recommendations
- For vendors
- Support initiatives to create open source
signatures - Move towards the distribution model used by the
anti-virus community - Spend more time and resources testing signatures
and making results public - Provide measures that represent the level of
confidence a user should place in an IDSs
ability to report an intrusion by type of
signature or attack - Integrate human analysis as part of event
diagnosis - Integrate available data sources more effectively
to include information from different sensors and
from different ID systems
15ID Technology Recommendations
- For vendors
- Increase efforts to detect malicious code (email
attachments, Java, ActiveX) - Increase interaction with the research community
16ID Technology Recommendations
- For research community
- Emphasizing the integration of diverse sources of
available date to reduce false alarms - Providing credible, defensible test data to
support test and evaluation of IDS - Providing a taxonomy of vulnerabilities base on
victim perspective rather than intruder
perspective - Developing approaches for defending against
sophisticated attacks such as denial of service,
distributed, coordinated attacks, etc. - Developing approaches that integrate human
analysis as part of even diagnosis - Developing approaches that support better
detection of malicious code - Increase interaction with vendor community
17State of the Practice of Intrusion Detection
Technologies