Institutions

1
Institutions

• Want stable democracy? Get the institutions
  right!
• Institutions humanly devised constraints that
  shape and guide behavior. Who plays the game,
  how they play the game, and consequently, who
  wins and who loses.
• Examples of political institutions term limits,
  the Supreme Court, the House of Representatives,
  campaign finance laws, etc. etc. etc.

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Institutions

• Do institutions matter?
• Traditionally in Comparative Politics NO.
  Institutions are subordinate to social, economic,
  and cultural forces.
• More recently YES. Institutions do not simply
  reflect culture or economics, they actually shape
  outcomes.

3
Presidential Democracy

• Original presidential system ours! But also
  very common in Latin America, Africa, and parts
  of Asia. Not popular in Europe.
• Core element of presidential systems separation
  of power between the executive and legislative
  branches of government. This does not imply that
  the branches are independent. Rather, it refers
  to their separate origin and separate survival.

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Presidential Democracy

• Separate origin Both branches are elected
  separately, in different elections.
• Separate survival Both branches are elected for
  a fixed term, neither can dismiss the other.
• Cabinet answers only to president.
• Personnel of each branch is non-overlapping.

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Presidential Democracy

• Implications
• Divided government is possible.
• Power is fragmented.

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Parliamentary Systems

• Original parliamentary system Great Britain.
  Very common form of government in Western Europe,
  former British colonies.
• Core element the executive and legislature are
  fused. Survival and origin of each branch are
  not separate.

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Parliamentary Systems

• Origin not separate
• One popular election fills parliament, then
  cabinet (the executive) is selected from
  parliament.
• Head of cabinet is the Prime Minister. PM is not
  directly elected.

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Parliamentary Systems

• Survival not separate
• Cabinet must maintain the confidence of
  parliament (sustain the support of a majority of
  MPs) or resign.
• Terms of office are not fixed, so cabinet can
  dissolve parliament and call new elections when
  it sees fit.
• Thus, the executive can dissolve the legislature
  and the legislature can axe the executive!

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Parliamentary Systems

• Implications
• Divided governments are constitutionally
  impossible.
• Power is concentrated cabinets rule with the
  entire weight of parliament behind them.

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Types of Parliamentary Systems

• Majority rule one party has a majority in
  parliament, can form a cabinet and rule on its
  own. Power is highly concentrated. (Most common
  in two party systems).
• If no party has a majority (more common in
  multiparty systems)
• Minority rule a minority party forms a cabinet
  and rules alone but depends on support from other
  parties in parliament to stay in office.
• Coalition government formal agreement between
  multiple parties to form a cabinet and rule
  together.

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The Pres/Parl debate

• Do these differences matter?
• One argument YES. Presidential democracies are
  less stable than parliamentary ones.
• The retort NO. Both systems can be stable or
  unstable, depending on context. Furthermore, we
  cant study them in isolation. They interact
  with the party system to shape outcomes.

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The case against presidentialism

• Divided government gt Deadlock gt War between
  branches of government gt Democratic breakdown.
• In contrast, in parliamentary systems, you cant
  have divided government, so this never happens.

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The case against presidentialism

• Because of the fixed term of office, coups are
  the only way to get rid of a unpopular president.
• In contrast, in parliamentary systems,
  parliaments can remove unpopular cabinets at any
  time. This produces cabinet instability, but not
  democratic instability.

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The case against presidentialism

• Presidentialism is winner takes all. The
  office of the president cant be shared. The
  winner gets all of it. The loser gets nothing.
  Loser gets mad has a coup!

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The case against presidentialism

• And the winner gets to rule however he wants
  even if he won by a small margin, and even if he
  won less than a majority.
• In contrast, coalition governments in
  parliamentary systems are more inclusive and
  force parties to work together. Furthermore,
  losers continue to play an active role in
  politics.

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The counter-argument

• Presidential systems have better
  identifiability, i.e the link between voting
  and government formation is more transparent.
• Presidential systems very transparent. The
  candidate with the most votes wins.
• Parliamentary systems when there is no majority,
  government formation is a result of bargains
  between parties, not just voting. So transparency
  is lower.

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A hypothetical election result . . .

• An election is held and five parties win seats
• The Greens 45 of the seats
• The Reds 30 of the seats
• The Blues 15 of the seats
• The Purples 10 of the seats
• What coalition forms?

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The counter-argument

• Lower identifiability gt Voters peripheral?
• Lower identifiability gt Less accountability
• Accountability degree to which elected leaders
  rule in the interests of the electorate. The
  threat of losing an election is said to promote
  accountability.
• However, if there is a coalition in power
• How do you vote it out if you didnt vote it in
  in the first place?
• If things are going badly, who do you blame?

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The counter-argument

• Presidential systems are not necessarily more
  winner-takes-all.
• Presidential branch might be this way, but the
  system as a whole splits and divides power.
• Furthermore, parliamentary government can be
  extremely winner-takes-all, i.e. under majority
  rule.

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The counter-argument

• Cabinets can be highly unstable in parliamentary
  systems, especially when there is no majority.
  Not the same as democratic instability, but can
  still be problematic!

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The counter-argument

• The performance of each of these systems depends
  the party system.
• Parliamentary systems
• Majority rule stable, high identifiability,
  winner-takes-all. Most likely with 2 parties.
• Coalition government unstable, low
  identifiability, inclusive. Most likely with gt2
  parties.

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The counter-argument

• Presidential systems
• Divided government is most severe when the
  Presidents party is weak in the legislature
• This is most likely when many small parties split
  the vote.
• Thus, we cant consider presidential and
  parliamentary systems in isolation. We also have
  to look at their interaction with the party
  system.

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What about the empirical record?

• Most stable democracies since WWII have been
  parliamentary, not presidential.
• Coups are much more common in presidential
  systems.
• Amongst new democracies, countries with
  parliamentary systems have been more likely to
  stay democratic.

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What about the empirical record?

• BUT, correlation is not the same as causation!
• Most parliamentary systems are located in Western
  Europe. Most presidential systems are located in
  Latin America and Africa.
• Western Europe is rich, LA and Africa are poor.
• Democracy is established in Western Europe, but
  not in LA and Africa.
• Thus, correlation between democratic stability
  and parliamentary government may simply reflect
  the European context of these institutions.

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Conclusions

• First, prior to debating which institution is
  best, we must first deal with the more
  fundamental question when are institutions
  complied with in the first place?
• Second, assuming we can solve this initial
  problem, then the effects of institutions may
  indeed be profound.
• However, the effect of these institutions cannot
  be considered in isolation. We have to look at
  how they interact with other factors, namely,
  other institutions.