Econ 522 Economics of Law

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Econ 522Economics of Law
Dan Quint Spring 2012 Lecture 18
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Incentives

• I hear in some places, you need one form of ID
  to buy a gun, but two to pay for it by check.
  Its interesting who has what incentives to care
  about what mistakes.
• - XKCD

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Jumping back into tort law

• Coase Theorem relied on voluntary negotiations to
  allocate goods, and rights, efficiently
• Certain interactions, ex-ante negotiations not
  feasible
• I cant negotiate with everyone in Madison over
  how carefully I should drive
• Best we can do design rules that make good
  behavior in my own private interest
• Several ways we could discourage adverse behavior
• Punish the behavior criminal law, speed
  limits, safety regulation
• Punish the outcome strict liability rule
• Punish the combination of behavior and outcome
  negligence rule

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Jumping back into tort law

• Weve focused on a few particular incentives
• Injurer precaution
• Victim precaution
• Injurer activity level
• Victim activity level
• and considered the effect on each of these of
• No liability
• Strict liability
• Various versions of a negligence rule
• Both in interactions between private individuals
• and between businesses and individuals

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Jumping back into tort law

• Also examined how legal standard for negligence
  is set
• Hand Rule efficient precautions are required
• Other ways safety standards, industry norms
• and the effect of errors in implementing each
  rule
• Strict liability rule random errors in
  calculating damages have no effect, systematic
  errors do
• Negligence rule small errors in damages have no
  effect errors in standard for negligence have
  strong effect uncertainty in legal standard
  leads to overprecaution

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Does it allmatter?
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Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law Does Tort Law Really Deter?

• Reviews a wide range of empirical studies
• Finds tort law does affect peoples behavior, in
  the direction the theory predicts
• but not as strongly as the model suggests

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Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law Does Tort Law Really Deter?

• Reviews a wide range of empirical studies
• Finds tort law does affect peoples behavior, in
  the direction the theory predicts
• but not as strongly as the model suggests
• Most academic work either
• took the model literally, or
• pointed out reasons why model was wrong and
  liability rules might not affect behavior at all
• Schwartz the truth is somewhere in between

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Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law Does Tort Law Really Deter?
Yet between the economists strong claim that
tort law systematically deters and the critics
response that tort law rarely if ever deters lies
an intermediate position tort law, while not
as effective as economic models suggest, may
still be somewhat successful in achieving its
stated deterrence goals. The information in
various studies suggests that the strong form of
the deterrence argument is in error. Yet it
provides support for that argument in its
moderate form sector-by-sector, tort law
provides something significant by way of
deterrence.
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Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law Does Tort Law Really Deter?
Much of the modern economic analysis, then, is
a worthwhile endeavor because it provides a
stimulating intellectual exercise rather than
because it reveals the impact of liability rules
on the conduct of real-world actors. Consider,
then, those public-policy analysts who, for
whatever reason, do not secure enjoyment from a
sophisticated economic proof who care about the
economic analysis only because it might show how
tort liability rules can actually improve levels
of safety in society. These analysts would be
largely warranted in ignoring those portions of
the law-and-economics literature that aim at
fine-tuning.
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Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law Does Tort Law Really Deter?

• Workers compensation rules in the U.S.
• Employer is liable whether or not he was
  negligent for economic costs of on-the-job
  accidents
• Victim still bears non-economic costs (pain and
  suffering, etc.)
• Workers compensation disavows its ability to
  manipulate liability rules so as to achieve in
  each case the precisely efficient result in terms
  of primary behavior
• It accepts as adequate the notion that if the
  law imposes a significant portion of the accident
  loss on each set of parties,
• these parties will have reasonably strong
  incentives to take many of the steps that might
  be successful in reducing accident risks.

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Up next

• What factors/complications has our simple model
  been leaving out?
• How much money is your life worth?
• But first

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Experiment
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Relaxing theassumptionsof our model
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Our model thus far has assumed

• So far, our model has assumed
• People are rational
• Injurers pay damages in full
• They dont run out of money and go bankrupt
• There are no regulations in place other than the
  liability rule
• There is no insurance
• Litigation is costless
• We can think about what would happen when each of
  these assumptions is violated

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Assumption 1 Rationality

• Behavioral economics people systematically
  misjudge value of probabilistic events
• Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect
  Theory An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• 45 chance of 6,000 versus 90 chance of 3,000
• Most people (86) chose the second
• 0.1 chance of 6,000 versus 0.2 chance of
  3,000
• Most people (73) chose the first
• But under expected utility, either u(6000) gt 2
  u(3000), or its not
• So people dont actually seem to be maximizing
  expected utility
• And the errors have to do with how people
  evaluate probabilities

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Assumption 1 Rationality

• People seem to overestimate chance of unlikely
  events with well-publicized, catastrophic events
• Freakonomics people fixate on exotic, unlikely
  risks, rather than more commonplace ones that are
  more dangerous

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Assumption 1 Rationality

• People seem to overestimate chance of unlikely
  events with well-publicized, catastrophic events
• Freakonomics people fixate on exotic, unlikely
  risks, rather than more commonplace ones that are
  more dangerous
• How to apply this accidents with power tools
• Could be designed safer, could be used more
  cautiously
• Suppose consumers underestimate risk of an
  accident
• Negligence with defense of contributory
  negligence would lead to tools which are very
  safe when used correctly
• But would lead to too many accidents when
  consumers are irrational
• Strict liability would lead to products which
  were less likely to cause accidents even when
  used recklessly

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Assumption 1 Rationality

• Another type of irrationality unintended lapses
• Many accidents result from tangled feet,
  quavering hands, distracted eyes, slips of the
  tongue, wandering minds, weak wills, emotional
  outbursts, misjudged distances, or miscalculated
  consequences

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Assumption 2 Injurers pay damages in full

• Strict liability injurer internalizes expected
  harm done, leading to efficient precaution
• But what if
• Harm done is 1,000,000
• Injurer only has 100,000
• So injurer can only pay 100,000
• But if he anticipates this, he knows D ltlt A
• so he doesnt internalize full cost of harm
• so he takes inefficiently little precaution
• Injurer whose liability is limited by bankruptcy
  is called judgment-proof

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Example of judgment-proofness(from old final
exam)

• Owner of an oil tanker
• Any accident would be an environmental
  catastrophe, doing 50,000,000 of harm
• Upgraded navigation system would cost 225,000,
  and reduce likelihood of an accident from 1/100
  to 1/500
• Precaution reduces expected harm from 500,000 to
  100,000, costs 225,000, so efficient to take
  precaution
• If company would be forced to pay 50,000,000
  after an accident, then under strict liability,
  would choose to buy new nav system
• Suppose the business is only worth 5,000,000
• If theres an accident, pay the 5,000,000 and go
  out of business
• Now nav system reduces expected damages from
  50,000 to 10,000 not worth the cost
• So judgment-proof business would take too little
  precaution

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Assumption 3 No regulation

• What stops me from speeding?
• If I cause an accident, Ill have to pay for it
• Even if I dont cause an accident, I might get a
  speeding ticket
• Similarly, fire regulations might require a store
  to have a working fire extinguisher
• Regulations supply additional incentive to take
  precaution

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Continuing the example of judgment-proofness from
before

• We saw, if business is only worth 5,000,000,
  liability does not create enough incentive to
  upgrade nav system
• Now suppose government passes regulation
  requiring modern navigation systems on all oil
  tankers
• If business doesnt upgrade, 1 in 5 chance of
  being caught by safety inspector and having to
  pay a 1,000,000 fine
• Now, combining liability with regulation
• Upgrade cost of new nav system is 225,000,
  expected damages are 10,000 ? private cost is
  235,000
• Dont upgrade expected damages are 50,000,
  expected government fine is 200,000 ? private
  cost is 250,000
• Liability regulation gives enough incentive to
  take precaution, even though either one alone
  would not be enough

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Assumption 3 No regulation

• When liability gt injurers wealth, liability does
  not create enough incentive for efficient
  precaution
• Regulations which require efficient precaution
  solve the problem
• Regulations also work better than liability when
  accidents impose small harm on large group of
  people

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Assumption 4 No insurance

• We assumed injurer or victim actually bears cost
  of accident
• When injurer or victim has insurance, they no
  longer have incentive to take precaution
• But, insurance tends not to be complete

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Assumption 4 No insurance

• Insurance reduces incentive to take precaution
• Moral hazard
• Insurance companies have ways to reduce moral
  hazard
• Deductibles, copayments
• Increasing premiums after accidents
• Insurers may impose safety standards that
  policyholders must meet

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Assumption 5 Litigation costs nothing

• If litigation is costly, this affects incentives
  in both directions
• If lawsuits are costly for victims, they may
  bring fewer suits
• Some accidents unpunished ? less incentive for
  precaution
• But if being sued is costly for injurers, they
  internalize more than the cost of the accident
• So more incentive for precaution
• A clever (unrealistic) way to reduce litigation
  costs
• At the start of every lawsuit, flip a coin
• Heads lawsuit proceeds, damages are doubled
• Tails lawsuit immediately dismissed
• Expected damages are the same ? same incentives
  for precaution
• But half as many lawsuits to deal with!

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More twistson liability
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Vicarious Liability

• Vicarious liability is when one person is held
  liablefor harm caused by another
• Parents may be liable for harm caused by their
  child
• Employer may be liable for harm caused by
  employee
• Respondeat superior let the master answer
• Employer is liable for unintentional torts of
  employeeif employee was acting within the scope
  of his employment

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Vicarious Liability

• Gives employers incentive to...
• be more careful who they hire
• be more careful what they assign employees to do
• supervise employees more carefully
• Employers may be better able to make these
  decisions than employees
• and employees may be judgment-proof

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Vicarious Liability

• Vicarious liability can be implemented through
• Strict liability rule employer liable for any
  harm caused by employee (as long as employee was
  acting within scope of employment)
• Negligence rule employer is only liable if he
  was negligent in supervising employee
• Which is better? It depends.
• If proving negligent supervision is too hard,
  strict vicarious liability might work better
• But an example favoring negligent vicarious
  liability

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Joint and Several Liability

• Suppose you were harmed by accident caused by two
  injurers
• Joint liability you can sue them both together
• Several liability you can sue each one
  separately
• Several liability with contribution each is only
  liable for his share of damage
• Joint and several liability you can sue either
  one for the full amount of the harm
• Joint and several liability with contribution
  the one you sued could then sue his friend to get
  back half his money

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Joint and Several Liability

• Joint and several liability holds under common
  law when
• Defendants acted together to cause the harm, or
• Harm was indivisible (impossible to tell who was
  at fault)
• Good for the victim, because
• No need to prove exactly who caused harm
• Greater chance of collecting full level of
  damages
• Instead of suing person most responsible, could
  sue person most likely to be able to pay

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Back to Comparative Negligence

• Negligence with a defense of contributory
  negligence was dominant liability rule in common
  law countries
• Negligent injurer is liable, unless victim was
  also negligent
• Example a car going 60 mph hits a car going 35
  in a 30-mph zone
• Since victim was also negligent, injurer is not
  liable
• Last 40 years, most U.S. states have adopted a
  comparative negligence rule
• Usually through legislation, sometimes through
  judicial decision
• Appealing from fairness point of view
• But any negligence rule leads to efficient
  precaution
• So how do we explain the move?

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Comparative Negligence and Evidentiary Uncertainty

• Evidentiary uncertainty
• Given a legal standard for negligence, xn
• and an actual level of precaution taken, x
• still uncertainty in whether the court will find
  negligence
• Evidentiary uncertainty, like random errors in
  setting xn, leads to over-precaution
• but comparative negligence partly mitigates this

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Comparative negligence and evidentiary uncertainty

Simple negligence, evidentiary uncertainty
Comparative negligence, evidentiary uncertainty
Any negligence rule
wx p(x) A
wx
p(x) A
x
x

• Comparative negligence mitigates effect of
  evidentiary uncertainty

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PerfectCompensation
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Perfect compensation

• Perfect compensatory damages (D A)
• Returns victim to original level of well-being
• (Works like insurance)
• And sets correct incentive for injurers
• But in some cases, hard to determine level
• Might be no price at which youd be willing to
  give up a leg
• Certainly no price at which a parent would be
  indifferent toward losing a child

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Perfect compensation

• Recommended jury instructions, Massachusetts
• Recovery for wrongful death represents damages
  to the survivors for the loss of value of
  decedents life. There is no special formula
  under the law to assess the plaintiffs damages
• It is your obligation to assess what is fair,
  adequate, and just.
• You must use your wisdom and judgment and your
  sense of basic justice to translate into dollars
  and cents the amount which will fully, fairly,
  and reasonably compensate the next of kin for the
  death of the decedent.
• You must be guided by your common sense and your
  conscience on the evidence of the case
• And from California
• You should award reasonable compensation for
  the loss of love, companionship, comfort,
  affection, society, solace or moral support.

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One other odd feature of compensatory damages

• Most people would rather be horribly injured than
  killed
• Which means killing someone does more damage than
  injuring someone
• But compensatory damages tend to be lower for a
  fatal accident than an accident which crippled
  someone
• When someone is badly injured, may require huge
  amount of money to compensate them
• In wrongful-death case, damages compensate
  victims loved ones, but no attempt to compensate
  victim
• So these damages tend to be smaller

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Whats a lifeworth?
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Whats a life worth?

• Assessing damages in a wrongful death lawsuit
  requires some notion of what a life is worth
• Safety regulators also need some notion of what a
  life is worth
• Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and
  Health
• Regulators need to decide where to draw the line

Estimated cost per life saved
Regulation
200,000
Airplane cabin fire protection
1,300,000
Car side door protection standards
89,300,000
OSHA asbestos regulations
104,200,000
EPA asbestos regulations
72,000,000,000
Proposed OSHA formaldehyde standard
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Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health

• Let w be starting wealth, D death, p probability
• There might be some amount of money M such that
• p u(D) (1 p) u(w M) u(w)
• When p 1, this breaks down not because you
  cant equate death with compensation, but because
  the second term vanishes
• So how do we find M?
• Ask a bunch of people how much money they would
  need to take a 1/1000 chance of death?
• Cant do a lab experiment where you actually
  expose people to a risk of death!
• Clever trick impute how much compensation people
  require from the real-life choices they make

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Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health

• Lots of day-to-day choices increase or decrease
  our risk of death
• Choose between Volvo and sports car with
  fiberglass body
• Take a job washing skyscraper windows, or office
  job that pays less
• Buy smoke detectors and fire extinguishers, or
  dont
• Hand Rule Damages
• Hand Rule precaution is cost-justified if
• cost of precaution lt reduction in accidents X
  cost of accident
• Suppose side-curtain airbags reduce risk of fatal
  accident by 1/1000
• If someone pays 1,000 extra for a car with
  side-curtain airbags, it must mean that
• 1,000 lt 1/1000 value of their life
• or, they value their life more than 1,000,000

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Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health

• Viscusi surveys lots of existing studies which
  impute value of life from peoples decisions
• Many use wage differentials
• How much higher are wages for risky jobs compared
  to safe jobs?
• Others look at
• Decisions to speed, wear seatbelts, buy smoke
  detectors, smoke cigarettes
• Decision to live in very polluted areas
  (comparing property values)
• Prices of newer, safer cars versus older, more
  dangerous ones
• Some used surveys to ask how people would make
  tradeoffs between money and safety
• Each paper reaches some estimate for implicit
  value people attach to their lives

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What does Viscusi find?
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24 studies based on wage differentials
Implicitvalueof life
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7 studies using other risk-money tradeoffs
Implicit Value of life( millions)
Component of theMonetary Tradeoff
Nature of Risk,Year
0.07
Value of driver time based on wage rates
Highway speed-related accident risk, 1973
1.2
Estimated disutility of seat belts
Automobile death risks, 1972
0.6
Purchase price of smoke detectors
Fire fatality risks without smoke detectors,
1974-1979
0.8
Property values in Allegheny Co., PA
Mortality effects of air pollution, 1978
0.7
Estimated monetary equivalent of effect of risk
info
Cigarette smoking risks, 1980
2.0
Purchase price of smoke detector
Fire fatality risks without smoke detectors,
1968-1985
4.0
Prices of new automobiles
Automobile accident risks, 1986
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6 studies based on surveys
Implicit Value of Life ( millions)
SurveyMethodology
Nature ofRisk
0.1
Willingness to pay question, door-to-door small
(36) Boston sample
Improved ambulance service, post-heart attack
lives
15.6
Mail survey willingness to accept increased risk,
small (30) U.K. sample, 1975
Airline safety and locational life expectancy
risks
3.4 (pay),8.8 (accept)
Willingness to pay, willingness to accept change
in job risk in mail survey, 1984
Job fatality risk
3.8
Willingness to pay for risk reduction, U.K.
survey, 1982
Motor vehicle accidents
2.7 (median)9.7 (mean)
Interactive computer program with pairwise auto
risk-living cost tradeoffs until indifference
achieved, 1987
Automobile accident risks
1.2
Series of contingent valuation questions, New
Zealand survey, 1989-1990
Traffic safety
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Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health

• Wide range of results
• Most suggest value of life between 1,000,000 and
  10,000,000
• Many clustered between 3,000,000 and 7,000,000
• Even with wide range, he argues this is very
  useful
• In practice, value-of-life debates seldom focus
  on whether the appropriate value of life should
  be 3 or 4 million
• However, the estimates do provide guidance as to
  whether risk reduction efforts that cost 50,000
  per life saved or 50 million per life saved are
  warranted.
• The threshold for the Office of Management and
  Budget to be successful in rejecting proposed
  risk regulations has been in excess of 100
  million.
• CU NHTSA uses 2.5 million for value of traffic
  fatality
• Current EPA 9.1 MM, FDA 7.9 MM, Transpo Dept
  6 MM

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Punitive damages(probably wont get to)
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Inconsistency of damages

• Damage awards vary greatly across countries, even
  across individual cases
• We saw last week
• As long as damages are correct on average, random
  inconsistency doesnt affect incentives (under
  either strict liability or negligence)
• But, if appropriate level of damages isnt
  well-established, more incentive to spend more
  fighting

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Punitive damages

• What weve discussed so far compensatory damages
• Meant to make victim whole/compensate for
  actual damage done
• In addition, courts sometimes award punitive
  damages
• Additional damages meant to punish injurer
• Create stronger incentive to avoid initial harm
• Punitive damages generally not awarded for
  innocent mistakes, but may be used when injurers
  behavior was
• malicious, oppressive, gross, willful and
  wanton, or fraudulent

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Punitive damages

• Calculation of punitive damages even less
  well-defined than compensatory damages
• Level of punitive damages supposed to bear
  reasonable relationship to level of
  compensatory damages
• Not clear exactly what this means
• U.S. Supreme Court punitive damages more than
  ten times compensatory damages will attract
  close scrutiny, but not explicitly ruled out

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Example of punitive damages Liebeck v McDonalds
(1994) (the coffee cup case)

• Stella Liebeck was badly burned when she spilled
  a cup of McDonalds coffee in her lap
• Awarded 160,000 in compensatory damages, plus
  2.9 million in punitive damages
• Case became poster child for excessive damages,
  but

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Liebeck v McDonalds (1994)

• Stella Liebeck dumped coffee in her lap while
  adding cream/sugar
• Third degree burns, 8 days in hospital, skin
  grafts, 2 years treatment
• Initially sued for 20,000, mostly for medical
  costs
• McDonalds offered to settle for 800
• McDonalds serves coffee at 180-190 degrees
• At 180 degrees, coffee can cause a third-degree
  burn requiring skin grafts in 12-15 seconds
• Lower temperature would increase length of
  exposure necessary
• McDonalds had received 700 prior complaints of
  burns, and had settled with some of the victims
• Quality control manager testified that 700
  complaints, given how many cups of coffee
  McDonalds serves, was not sufficient for
  McDonalds to reexamine practices

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Liebeck v McDonalds (1994)

• Rule in place was comparative negligence
• Jury found both parties negligent, McDonalds 80
  responsible
• Calculated compensatory damages of 200,000
• times 80 gives 160,000
• Added 2.9 million in punitive damages
• Judge reduced punitive damages to 3X
  compensatory, making total damages 640,000
• During appeal, parties settled out of court for
  some smaller amount
• Jury seemed to be using punitive damages to
  punish McDonalds for being arrogant and uncaring

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What is the economic purpose of punitive damages?

• Weve said all along with perfect compensation,
  incentives for injurer are set correctly. So why
  punitive damages?
• Example
• Suppose manufacturer can eliminate 10 accidents a
  year, each causing 1,000 in damages, for 9,000
• Clearly efficient
• If every accident victim would sue and win,
  company has incentive to take this precaution
• But if some wont, then not enough incentive
• Suppose only half the victims will bring
  successful lawsuits
• Compensatory damages would be 5,000 company is
  better off paying that then taking efficient
  precaution
• One way to fix this award higher damages in the
  cases that are brought

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This suggests

• Punitive damages should be related to
  compensatory damages, but higher the more likely
  injurer is to get away with it
• If 50 of accidents will lead to successful
  lawsuits, total damages should be 2 X harm
• Which requires punitive damages compensatory
  damages
• If 10 of accidents lead to awards, damages
  should be 10 X harm
• So punitive damages should be 9 X compensatory
  damages
• Seems most appropriate when injurers actions
  were deliberately fraudulent, since may have been
  based on cost-benefit analysis of chance of being
  caught

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Some empirical observations about tort system in
the U.S.(wont get to this)
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U.S. tort system

• In 1990s, tort cases passed contract cases as
  most common form of lawsuit
• Most handled at state level in 1994, 41,000 tort
  cases resolved in federal courts, 378,000 in
  state courts in largest 75 counties
• Most involve a single plaintiff (many contract
  cases involve multiple plaintiffs)
• Among tort cases in 75 largest U.S. counties
• 60 were auto accidents
• 17 were premises liability (slip-and-fall in
  restaurants, businesses, government offices,
  etc.)
• 5 were medical malpractice
• 3 were product liability

62
U.S. tort system

• Punitive damages historically very rare
• 1965-1990, punitive damages in product liability
  cases were awarded 353 times
• Average damage award was 625,000, reduced to
  135,000 on appeal
• Average punitive damages only slightly higher
  than compensatory
• In many states, punitive damages limited, or
  require higher standard of evidence
• Civil suits generally require preponderance of
  evidence
• In many states, punitive damages require clear
  and convincing evidence

63
U.S. tort system

• Medical malpractice
• New York study in 1980s 1 of hospital
  admissions involved serious injury due to
  negligent care
• Some estimates 5 of total health care costs are
  defensive medicine procedures undertaken
  purely to prevent lawsuits
• Some states have considered caps on damages for
  medical malpractice

64
U.S. tort system

• Product liability
• Recent survey of CEOs liability concerns caused
  47 of those surveyed to drop one or more product
  lines, 25 to stop some research and development,
  and 39 to cancel plans for a new product.
• Liability standard for product-related accidents
  is strict products liability
• Manufacturer is liable if product determined to
  be defective
• Defect in design
• Defect in manufacture
• Defect in warning

65
Vaccines

• Most vaccines are weakened version of disease
  itself
• Make you much less likely to acquire the disease
• But often come with very small chance of
  contracting disease directly from vaccine
• Salk polio vaccine wiped out polio, but caused 1
  in 4,000,000 people vaccinated to contract polio
• 1974 case established maker had to warn about
  risk
• Since then, some people were awarded damages
  after their children developed polio from vaccine
• If liability cant be avoided, built into cost of
  the drug
• And discourages companies from developing vaccines

66
Mass torts

• Since health risks of asbestos understood, over
  600,000 people have brought lawsuits against
  6,000 defendants
• DES (drug administered to pregnant women in
  1950s)
• Impossible to establish which firm produced dose
  given to a particular woman
• California Supreme Court introduced market share
  liability
• Class action lawsuit
• Small, dispersed harms no plaintiff might find
  it worthwhile to sue
• Class action suits allow large lawsuits with lots
  of plaintiffs
• Give more incentive for precaution against
  diffuse harms
• But

67
Cooter and Ulens overall assessment of U.S. tort
system

• Critics claim juries routinely hand out excessive
  awards and tort system is out of control
• but actually it functions reasonably well
• Outside of occasional, well-publicized outliers,
  damage awards are generally reasonable
• and liability has led to decreases in accidents
  in many industries

68
To wrap up tort law, a funny story from Friedman
A tort plaintiff succeeded in collecting a
large damage judgment. The defendants
attorney, confident that the claimed injury was
bogus, went over to the plaintiff after the
trial and warned him that if he was ever seen
out of his wheelchair he would be back in court
on a charge of fraud. The plaintiff replied
that to save the lawyer the cost of having him
followed, he would be happy to describe his
travel plans. He reached into his pocket and
drew out an airline ticket to Lourdes, the
site of a Catholic shrine famous for miracles.