Leveraging Social Networks to Defend against Sybil attacks - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation
Title:

Leveraging Social Networks to Defend against Sybil attacks

Description:

Leveraging Social Networks to Defend against Sybil attacks Krishna Gummadi Networked Systems Research Group Max Planck Institute for Software Systems – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:128
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 24
Provided by: Krishna59
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Leveraging Social Networks to Defend against Sybil attacks


1
Leveraging Social Networks to Defend against
Sybil attacks
  • Krishna Gummadi
  • Networked Systems Research Group
  • Max Planck Institute for Software Systems
  • Germany

2
Sybil attack
  • Fundamental problem in distributed systems
  • Attacker creates many fake identities (Sybils)
  • Used to manipulate the system
  • Many online services vulnerable
  • Webmail, social networks, p2p
  • Several observed instances of Sybil attacks
  • Ex. Content voting tampered on YouTube, Digg

3
Sybil defense approaches
  • Tie identities to resources that are hard to
    forge or obtain
  • RESOURCE 1 Certification from trusted
    authorities
  • Ex. Passport, social security numbers
  • Users tend to resist such techniques
  • RESOURCE 2 Resource challenges (e.g.,
    crypto-puzzles)
  • Vulnerable to attackers with significant
    resources
  • Ex. Botnets, renting cloud computing resources
  • RESOURCE 3 Links in a social network?

4
Using social networks to detect Sybils
  • Assumption Links to good users hard to form and
    maintain
  • Users mostly link to others they recognize
  • Attacker can only create limited links to
    non-Sybil users

Leverage the topological feature introduced by
sparse set of links
5
Social network-based Sybil detection
  • Very active area of research
  • Many schemes proposed over past five years
  • Examples
  • SybilGuard SIGCOMM06
  • SybilLimit Oakland SP 08
  • SybilInfer NDSS08
  • SumUp NSDI09
  • Whanau NSDI10
  • MOBID INFOCOM10

6
But, many unanswered questions
  • All schemes make two common assumptions
  • Honest nodes they are fast mixing
  • Sybils they do not mix quickly with honest nodes
  • But, each uses a different graph analysis
    algorithm
  • Unclear relationship between schemes
  • Is there a common insight across the schemes?
  • Is there a common structural property these
    schemes rely on?
  • Such an insight is necessary to understand
  • How well would these schemes work in practice?
  • Are there any fundamental limitations of Sybil
    detection?

7
Common insight across schemes
  • All schemes find local communities around trusted
    nodes
  • Roughly, set of nodes more tightly knit than
    surrounding graph
  • Accept service from those within the community
  • Block service from the rest of the nodes

8
Are certain network structures more vulnerable?
Trusted Node
Trusted Node
  • When honest nodes divide themselves into multiple
    communities
  • Cannot tell apart Sybils non-Sybils in a
    distant community
  • How often do social networks exhibit such
    community structures?

9
How often do non-Sybils form one cohesive
community?
  • Not often!
  • Many real-world social networks have high
    modularity
  • They exhibit multiple well-defined community
    structures

10
Facebook RICE undergraduates network
  • Exhibits densely connected user communities
    within the graph
  • Other social networks have even higher modularity

11
How often do non-Sybils form one cohesive
community?
  • Traditional methodology
  • Analyze several real-world social network graphs
  • Generalize the results to the universe of social
    networks
  • A more scientific method
  • Leverage insights from sociological theories on
    communities
  • Test if their predictions hold in online social
    networks
  • And then generalize the findings

12
Group attachment theory
  • Explains how humans join and relate to groups
  • Common-identity based groups
  • Membership based on self interest or ideology
  • E.g., NRA, Greenpeace, and PETA
  • Tend to be loosely-knit and less cohesive
  • Common-bond based groups
  • Membership based on inter-personal ties, e.g.,
    family or kinship
  • Tend to form tightly-knit communities within the
    network

13
Dunbars theory
  • Limits the of stable social relationships a
    user can have
  • To less than a couple of hundred
  • Linked to size of neo-cortex region of the brain
  • Observed throughout history since hunter-gatherer
    societies
  • Also observed repeatedly in studies of OSN user
    activity
  • Users might have a large number of contacts
  • But, regularly interact with less than a couple
    of hundred of them
  • Limits the size of cohesive common-bond based
    groups

14
Prediction and implication
  • Strongly cohesive communities in real-world
    social networks will be necessarily small
  • No larger than a few hundred nodes!
  • If true, it imposes a limit on the number of
    non-Sybils we can detect with high accuracy
  • Will be problematic as social networks grow large

15
Verifying the prediction
  • In all networks, groups larger than a few 100
    nodes do not remain cohesive
  • Small cohesive groups tend to be family and
    alumni groups
  • Large groups are often on abstract topics like
    music or politics

Real-world data sets analyzed
16
Implications
  • Fundamental limits on social network-based Sybil
    detection
  • Can reliably identify only a limited number of
    honest nodes
  • In large networks, limits interactions to a small
    subset of honest nodes
  • Might still be useful in certain scenarios, e.g.,
    white listing email from friends
  • But, what to do with nodes not in the honest node
    subset?

17
One way forward Sybil tolerance
  • Rather than detect bad nodes, lets limit bad
    behavior
  • Sybil detection Use network to find Sybil nodes
  • Accept / receive unlimited service from
    non-Sybils
  • Refuse to interact with Sybils
  • Sybil tolerance Use network to limit nodes
    privileges
  • Interact with all nodes, but monitor their
    behavior
  • Limit bad behavior from any node, Sybil or
    non-Sybil

18
Illustrative example Applying Sybil tolerance
to email spam
x
x
  • Key idea Link privileges to credit on network
    links
  • Once the credit is exhausted, the node stops
    receiving service
  • Does not matter if the node is a Sybil or not

19
Illustrative example Applying Sybil tolerance
to email spam
  • Creating multiple node identities does not help
  • So long as they cannot create links to arbitrary
    honest nodes
  • No assumption about connectivity between
    non-Sybils

20
Such Sybil tolerant systems already exist
  • Ostra NSDI08 Limiting unwanted communication
  • SumUp NSDI09 Sybil-resilient voting
  • Their properties were not well understood before

21
Sybil detection versus tolerance
  • Sybil detection
  • Assumes network of honest nodes is fast mixing
  • Does not require anything beyond network topology
  • Sybil tolerance
  • No assumption about connectivity between honest
    nodes
  • Requires user behavior to be monitored and
    labeled

22
Summary A comprehensive approach to social
network-based Sybil defense
  • Think beyond good and evil
  • Sybil tolerance complements Sybil detection
  • Use Sybil detection to white list nodes in local
    communities of trusted nodes
  • Use Sybil tolerance when interacting with nodes
    outside the local communities
  • Currently exploring applications of the approach
  • E.g., to deter site crawlers

23
Thank you!Questions?
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com