eVoting

1
eVoting

• 23 October 2006

2
What is included in e-voting

• Range of Systems
• Optically scanned paper
• Touch screen systems
• Internet voting
• All Processes (what is the weakest link?)
• Registration
• Ballot design
• Voting
• Counting of votes
• Recounts

3
Major concerns raised

• Correctness
• Certification process
• Digital divide
• System set up
• Auditing (recounts)
• Accessibility
• Internet vulnerability

4
Correctness

• Should code be open source?
• What is open source?
• Belief that more eyes are valuable
• Easier to hack
• Corruption
• Vulnerability improved by open source
• Checking for errors that hackers can exploit
• Malicious changes primarily a concern of which
  version is running

5
Certification process

• More than 40 states require certification
• But what does it mean?
• Need to guarantee certification of last minute
  fixes or changes not always possible
• Both California and Indiana found themselves
  using uncertified code

6
A New Literacy Test?

• Intimidation
• Difficulty executing
• California recall
• Less than 1 missed (under voted) for yes/no
• But nearly 10 under voted in the candidate
  selection

7
System Set Up

• Lack of local technical skills
• Large number of local polling stations
• Short set up time

8
Auditability vs. Privacy

• Storing the full record means that someone could
  get at the information
• Acceptable in England
• Secret Ballot Act of 1872
• Requires that each ballot be tied to the voter
• Records held as a state secret

9
Auditing (recounts)

• Voter Verified Audit Trail
• Print a copy
• Voter verifies
• Puts it into a ballot box
• Used for
• Routine audits (random)
• Recounts
• Problems
• Cost Australia opted out
• Training

10
Why do an audit?

• If you can only identify a problem, what is the
  remedy?
• If audit can also produce the corrected results,
  more valuable

11
Broward County, Florida

• special election to fill a state House seat
• victor won by only 12 votes
• 137 of the electronic ballots were blank
• Florida law requires a manual recount
• but no paper ballots
• recount isn't possible

12
Are there other options?

• Code can be verified against manipulating
• Example encryption within the system
• But, needs to get into the system
• User interface is the vulnerable spot
• Assuming no program errors, can we be sure that
  people will read a screen version correctly if
  they made a voting mistake?
• Depends
• Primarily on the quality of the ballot design

13
Partial Solutions

• Turnout separate track of how many people voted
• Number of votes cast should match
• Need to count abstentions
• Need to track people who quit in the middle
• Does not help to determine if the vote went to
  the right person

14
Accessibility

• Florida ban on plastic templates with holes for
  use by the visually impaired because NOT
  CERTIFIED
• How do you address this problem without
  compromising privacy?
• How is it done today?
• Generally, advocates for the visually impaired
  prefer electronic voting
• Techniques to support them, primarily audio
• What about the paper audit trail?

15
New Mexico last year

• Only two voting machines certified by the federal
  government for disabled and non-English speaking
• Neither measures up to state law that requires
  voter-verified paper record
• Upgrade would require 1000/machine