Transparency and eVoting:

1
Transparency and e-Voting

• Democratic vs. commercial interests.
• Margaret McGaley NUI Maynooth
• Joe McCarthy

2
Definition
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Electronic voting (e-voting)
• Any voting system which includes an electronic
  device

3
Overview
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Technology
• Law
• Politics

4
Technology
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Not simply a change of storage medium,
• Fundamental difference

5
Paper vs. Computer
6
Paper vs. Evil Computer
7
Trusting the Computer
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Surprisingly difficult to make sure computer
  isnt evil
• Testing e.g. NASA
• Ken Thompson Reflections on Trusting Trust -
  1984
• You can't trust code that you did not totally
  create yourself. (Especially code from companies
  that employ people like me.) No amount of
  source-level verification or scrutiny will
  protect you from using untrusted code.

8
Transparency in Technology
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Transparency vital to security of voting systems
• Voter must know their vote is recorded correctly
• Must be possible to audit results
• Computers cannot offer same transparency

9
Transparency in Technology
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics
Florida 2000, difficult to recount
Electronic voting, impossible to recount
10
Transparency in Technology
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Conflict
• democratic interests (flaws become obvious)
• commercial interests (product appears flawless)

11
Solution
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Commitment by voting machine
• Currently requires paper record
• Voter Verified Audit Trail
• Paper ballot, verified by voter
• Sealed in a traditional ballot box
• Official records of votes cast

12
Solution
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT)
• Mercuri
• http//www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
• Schneier
• http//www.schneier.com/
• Dill
• http//www.verifiedvoting.org/

13
Mitigation strategies
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Minimum standards
• Careful specification
• Extensive code review (preferably by a wide
  audience)
• Concurrent testing (on election day)
• Even if adequate, these things dont happen

14
Nedap/Powervote
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Voting machines
• Ballot modules
• Not connected to internet
• Buttons, not touch-screen
• Counting s/w monolithic

15
Vulnerable Stages
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics
16
Law
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Legal position of
• Electoral rules
• Electoral results
• Vendors

17
Legal Position ofElectoral Rules (1)
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Paper voting electoral rules laid out in law
• Evoting software final arbiter
• Extraordinary situation count rules
• No longer belong to the people
• No longer public
• Subject to change without legal procedures

18
Legal Position ofElectoral Rules (2)
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Conflict
• Commercial interests (vendor ownership, secrecy
  for intellectual property and trade secrets)
• Democratic interests (openness, public
  ownership)
• Perfect example of how commercial interests win
  in general

19
Legal Position ofElectoral Results
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Only electronic evidence exists
• Electronic evidence often has less credence
• e.g. Irish intoximeter
• Legal position of electronic ballots not yet
  tested
• Legal challenge to results
• e.g. Florida

20
Legal Position ofVendors
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Must treat differently to other software/hardware
  vendors
• Restrictions as in other industries
• Law can ensure precedence of public interest
• Conflict
• Commercial interests (dont want restrictions)
• Democratic interest (restrictions necessary)

21
Politics
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Computer science meets politics
• Evoting in Ireland
• Transparency in politics

22
CompSci meets Politics
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Relatively new science (50 yrs old)
• Computers widely available
• No bridge without engineer
• Computer systems often ad hoc
• Specification for Irish evoting system clearly
  done by non-tech
• e.g. No audit mechanism, authorisation
  requirements poorly defined

23
CompSci meets Politics
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Rebecca Mercuri 10 years convincing computer
  scientists that its a hard computer science
  problem
• Convincing others
• Position of CS in public perception
• e.g. DVD crypto.

24
Evoting in Ireland
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• First enabling legislation 1999
• Public tender 2000
• 2001 legislation
• voting and vote counting at a Dáil parliament
  election may be undertaken on voting system
  equipment approved for such purposes by the
  Minister.
• Remarkably, no objective/legal criteria

25
Evoting in Ireland
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Consensus promised
• This Government will not proceed without
  unanimity and general agreement among the Members
  here. Seanad senate 2001
• No further consultation
• Oct 02 Decision to implement countrywide
• Parliamentary committee deliberation guillotined
• Public outcry

26
Evoting in Ireland
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• 5m publicity campaign
• March 2004 Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV)
  set up
• April 2004 CEV findings
• the Commission finds that it is not in a
  position to recommend with the requisite degree
  of confidence the use of the chosen system at
  elections in Ireland in June 2004.
• System not used in June 2004

27
Transparency in Politics
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Policy of secrecy evident (Ireland)
• FoI acts 1997, 2003
• Joe McCarthy spent 2,882
• e.g. vote count reconciliation failed 2002
• Complexity ?, public understanding ?
• Exacerbated by secrecy
• Concerns dismissed as politicking
• Electoral commission

28
Transparency in Politics
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Conflict
• Democratic interests (openness, national control)
• Commercial interests (secrecy, commercial control)

29
Conclusion
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics
30
Conclusion
IntroductionTechnologyLawPolitics

• Transparency is long-standing strategy
• Conflicts arise between commercial and democratic
  interests
• Law is crucial in ensuring precedence of
  democratic interests
• Businesses can move into other markets. We have
  only one democracy.