Emergency Preparedness and Response against Nuclear Disaster in Japan

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Emergency Preparedness and Response against
Nuclear Disaster in Japan
Lec. 4 (Seminar on Sharing Experience on Nuclear
Power for Development in Vietnam)

• January22, 2013
• Kenichi Wada
• The Japan Atomic Power Company
• (JAPC)

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Contents

• 1. Emergency Preparedness/Response System against
• the Nuclear Disaster in Japan
• 2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response
• against the Nuclear Disaster
• 3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC
• 4. Enhancing Response Measures against
• the Severe Accident at JAPC
• (based on Lesson Learned from
  Fukushima
• Dai-ichi Severe Accident )

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1. Emergency Preparedness/Response System
against the Nuclear Disaster in Japan
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Basic Law concerning Countermeasures against
Disasters
The Basic Law concerning countermeasures
against disasters was enacted in 1961, following
an experience of massive damages caused by
typhoons, to develop a comprehensive and
schematic system for disaster prevention. The
disaster countermeasure system has since been
reinforced and improved based on lessons learned
from the Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake and
other major disasters.
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Preparedness/Response against Nuclear Disaster
Basic Law concerning countermeasures against
disasters (enacted in 1961)
? Disasters in general
? Occurrence of a criticality accident at a
uranium reconversion plant operated by JCO
Co., Ltd. (September 30, 1999)
The Special Law on nuclear disaster
countermeasures was enacted as a special law
under the Basic Law concerning countermeasures
against disasters to enable appropriate response
by considering the factors peculiar to nuclear
accidents
(December 17, 1999)

Lesson Learned
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Main Contents of the Special Law on Nuclear
Disaster Countermeasures
? Speeding up of initial action ? Strengthening
of cooperation between national and local
governments ? Strengthening of the national
governments emergency preparedness/response
system ? Clarification of the role of the utility
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? Speeding up of Initial Action
The utility is required to report on any
abnormal event. (When the event progresses
further), the competent minister mobilizes
initial action and establishes the Nuclear
disaster countermeasures headquarters headed
by the Prime Minister. (Local governments
also establish respective countermeasures
headquarters) The national government instructs
local governments on measures necessary for
evacuation and other responses.
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? Strengthening of Cooperation between National
and Local Governments
The national government establishes the Local HQ
for nuclear disaster countermeasures
(off-site center) in the locality. The Joint
Council on countermeasures against nuclear
accidents is set up inside the off-site center to
strengthen cooperation between national and
local governments. Joint training is
conducted with the participation of the
national and local governments as well as
utilities.
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? Strengthening of the National Governments
Emergency Preparedness/Response System
Government-appointed nuclear accident prevention
officials are stationed full-time at nuclear
facility locations. Government-appointed
chief of headquarters instructs related
administrative institutions and local
governments on necessary matters, and issues
requests on the dispatching of Self-Defense
Forces. Technical advice is obtained from the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority. A system of
rapid on-site mobilization is established.
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? Clarification of the Role of the Utility
The utility is required to install radiation
measuring equipment inside the site and
disclose records. Explicitly defines the
reporting obligations. The nuclear disaster
preparedness/response organization is set up
in each site to implement emergency action
during the disaster. The nuclear disaster
preparedness/response manager is assigned to
each site. The utility is required to establish
the action plan in each site for
preparedness/response against the nuclear
disaster.
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness/Response
System (based on Experiences Lesson Learned
gained from Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe
Accident)
lt in progress gt
Clearly identification of widespread evacuation
areas and radiation protection guidelines in
the nuclear emergency Reinforcing the
environment monitoring in the nuclear emergency
Adequate identification and forecasting the
effect of released radioactive materials
Establishing a clear division of labor between
relevant central and local organizations
Enhancing communication relevant to the
accident Enhancing training responding to
severe accidents etc.


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2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response
against the Nuclear Disaster
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Contents of JAPC Action Plan
? Nuclear accident preparedness/response
system ? Establishing nuclear accident
preparedness/response organization ?
Preparation of a list of parties to be alerted ?
Implementation of education and training for
nuclear disaster preparedness/response ?
Implementation of emergency action ?
Countermeasures after a nuclear disaster ?
Cooperation with other utilities
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Nuclear Disaster Preparedness/Response
Organization at JAPC
Emergency Countermeasure Center






Technical Support Center (TSC) Staff at NPS
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Main Duties of Each Team (1/5)
? Headquarters Oversee general management
of measures and activities against the
disaster Grasp the condition of accident
Decide on working policy and issue orders to
Working Teams Communicate with and
notify outside parties Collaborate with
parties in and out of JAPC Decide on the
lifting of the state of emergency
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Main Duties of Each Team (2/5)
? Information Team Gather information on
the disaster Coordinate communication with
parties inside and outside JAPC
Compile and prepares records ? General affairs
Team Acquire personnel, material and
equipment and other items
(Cooperate with evacuation activities, etc.)
(Conduct firefighting activities)
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Main Duties of Each Team (3/5)
? Public relations Team Prepare PR-related
materials Communicate and coordinate with
PR-related institutions Respond to
media organizations ? Engineering Team
Grasp the condition of accident and conduct
evaluation Consider measures to prevent
the expansion of the accident
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Main Duties of Each Team (4/5)
? Radiation control Team Measure radiation
and radioactivity Estimate the range of the
radiation impact and control exposure to
radiation Eliminate radioactive material
Conduct action to prevent secondary
disaster ? Health and safety Team Conduct
action on medical (relief)-related services
Conduct action to prevent secondary disaster
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Main Duties of Each Team (5/5)
? Maintenance Team Conduct emergency
measures required to prevent the
expansion of the disaster ? Operation Team
Conduct emergency operational measures
required to prevent the expansion of the
disaster Maintain the security of nuclear
reactor and ancillary facilities
Conduct firefighting activities
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3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC
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Background of AM Implementation

• ?1979.3 TMI-2 Accident
• ?Japanese utilities developed the
  Existing
• Emergency Operating
  Procedure (EOP).
• ?1992.5 The Statement of the Nuclear Safety
• Commission (NSC)
• ?NSC strongly encouraged the AM
  implementation
• ?1992.7 The Request of the Ministry of
  International Trade
• and Industry (MITI)
• ?MITI requested all the licensees
  to perform PSA
• on internal events and
  improve the AM measures.

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AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR)
Function
AM measures
Shutdown
(1)Alternative reactivity control (ARI,RPT)
Water injection into
(2)Alternative water injection methods
Reactor and
(3)Automatic reactor depressurization
Containment Vessel
(4)Heat removal methods from containment
Heat removal from
vessel
containment vessel
Drywell Cooler, Recovery of failed
(
components of RHR, Hard vent)
(5)Power supply methods
Supply of electric
(High or low voltage power supply from
power
HPCS-DG, Recovery of failed components
of emergency DG)
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(2)Alternative Water Injection Methods
AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) Example
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(4) Heat Removal Methods from Containment
Vessel-Hard Vent?
AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) Example
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AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR)
Function
AM measures
Shutdown
(1)Diversification of core cooling by
secondary system
(2)Use of the turbine bypass system
(3)Alternative recirculation
Core cooling
(4)Cool down and recirculation
(5)Containment cooling by natural convection
Confinement of
(6)Containment cooling by natural convection
radioactive materials
(7)Water injection into CV
(8)Forced depressurization of the RCS
Support of
(9)Power supply from adjacent unit
Safety function
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(3)Alternative Recirculation
AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) Example
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(7)Water Injection into CV
AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) Example
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Preparation of Emergency Procedures

• AM measures to prevent SA were taken in the
  existing procedures.
• AM measures to mitigate SA were taken in the
  procedure and guideline established newly.
• This mitigative procedure introduced the flow
  chart form as existing procedures.
• The mitigative guideline introduced the form to
  select proper procedure out of various
  alternatives.

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Organization of AM Activity
Organization of Accident Management Activity
Control Room
Operation Team (operators)
Supports activity (advice, instructions etc)
TSC Room
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Information Team
Head Office
Engineering Team
Members of Head Office
The Chief of TSC ( Superintendent)
Radiation control Team
Licensed Engineer of Reactor
Maintenance Team
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Decision Making

• ?Before Core Damage ? Shift Manager
• ?After Core Damage ? Plant Manager
• In case of mitigative AM, the chief of TSC
• gives advice, instructions, or recognition of
• operators judgement.

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Education

• Phenomena and plant behavior in the Severe
• Accident (SA)
• AM measures
• The outline and the direction about Accident
  Management Guideline (AMG)
• Significant sequences of SA events
• Practice coping with supposed representative SA
  events

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Training with Simulator

• Compact simulator in our company
• ? This simulator has the functions to
• simulate the events both before and
• after the SA.
• Full scope simulator in the training centers
• ? This simulator can
• simulate some
• AM measures to
• operate for the SA .

Full scope simulator
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Integrated Emergency Countermeasure Training
Deploying communication devices inside the NPS
- Satellite phones - Transceivers - Dry
battery driven phones
etc.
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4. Enhancing Response Measures against the
Severe Accident at JAPC (based on Lesson
Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi
Severe Accident )
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Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen
Explosions (1)
ltTokai-2 (BWR)gt Install of the vent valves at
the top of the Reactor Building Securing
measures to open the blowout panels in the
Reactor Building Install of hydrogen
detectors in the Reactor Building (under
planning)
Hydrogen detector (under planning)
Reactor Building
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Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen
Explosions (2)
ltTsuruga-2(PWR)gt Securing the electric power
supply for the Annulus Exhaust Facility using
the alternative electric power supply vehicles in
case of the Station Blackout Install of the
passive autocatalytic recombiners in the
Containment Vessel (under planning)
Passive autocatalytic recombiner
(under planning)
Stack
Containment Vessel
Annulus air ventilation fan
Filter
Damper
Steam Generator
Temporary N2 cylinder (for driving damper )
Emergency Power Center bus
Temporary connecting cable
Reactor Vessel
Alternative electric power supply vehicle
Annulus
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Enhancing the Environment for the Accident
Response
Securing the electric power supply for the
emergency closed loop air ventilation system
in the Control Room using the alternative
electric power supply vehicles in case of the
Station Blackout (maintaining the radiation
shielding function in the Control Room) etc.

Circulation fan
Inside Building
Outside Building
Control Room
Alternative electric power supply vehicle
Temporary N2 cylinder (for driving damper )
Damper
Damper

Ventilation units
Temporary connecting cable
Air conditioning fan
Emergency circulation fan
Emergency Power Center bus
Filter units
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Enhancing the Radiation Control during the
Accident
Securing tungsten vests, and protective masks,
etc. for carrying out work under high radiation
dose conditions Establishment of the support
system for radiation control staff by non
radiation control staff in emergency Establishmen
t of mutual aid system that enable utilities to
share radiation protection supplies among one
another when accident response work is being
carried out
company A
company B
Sharing of the Dosimeters
The tungsten vest
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Deploying sufficient Response Equipments and
Supplies in Emergency
Alternative electric power supply vehicles in
case of the Station Blackout Large capacity
pumps for the alternative water injection into
the Reactor Core and the Spent Fuel Pool,
etc. Heavy machineries for the removal of
debris, etc. to carry out recovery work
promptly
etc.
Operating the large capacity pumps
Removing debris by the heavy machinery (the
wheel loader)
? Operating the alternative electric power
supply vehicle
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Never Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident
Again !
Thank you very much for your attention