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What makes official statistics trusted by users?

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What makes official statistics trusted by users? Heinrich Br ngger Director, Statistical Division United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: What makes official statistics trusted by users?


1
What makes official statistics trusted by users?
  • Heinrich Brüngger
  • Director, Statistical Division
  • United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
    Geneva

2
Economic Globalisation A Challenge for Official
Statistics
  • Joint EFTA/ECE/SSCU Seminar
  • Kiev, 3-6 July 2007

3
Whose trust?
  • FP Reference to UN Fundamental Principles of
    Official Statistics
  • Trust by the various user categories is only one
    element of trust
  • Other elements
  • Trust by respondents (in exclusively statistical
    use and non-disclosure of unit-level information)
    FP6
  • Trust by budgetary authorities, esp. Parliament,
    that official statistics, which uses tax-payers
    money, provide good value for the society as a
    whole, and has a sound legitimacy FP1/FP5

4
User categories
  • Public at large (and mass media as their
    intermediaries) citizens right for information
    in a democracy FP1
  • Governmental and related public sector users (at
    national, regional and local levels)
    evidence-based decision making
  • Business and financial community (national and
    international) NGOs
  • Research community
  • Educational institutions
  • International organisations

5
Trust by users
  • Trust by users can be subdivided
  • Trust in results and products of official
    statistics
  • Trust in the institutions that act as producers
    of official statistics and in their senior
    management
  • Trust in the specific institutional set-up for
    official statistics and the respect by everybody
    of the legal framework for official statistics

6
Trust in results
  • Relevance of outputs (including adaptation of the
    system to evolve and address new phenomena such
    as globalisation) FP 1
  • Authoritativeness of results (derived from
    processes and institutions, plus from
    coordination of dissemination process across the
    system) FP 8
  • Quality (timeliness, accuracy, comparability over
    time, space and between groups etc.) FP 5
  • Accessibility of data (including comments for
    non-expert users) and of metadata FP1/FP3

7
Trust in producers of official statistics,
notably NSO
  • Integrity (all FPs that address ethical behaviour
    and professionalism depends on institutional
    framework and senior management)
  • Professional expertise of staff
  • Proven ability to meet ad hoc requests for
    additional tabulation
  • Transparency about methods and sources and
    processes of decision-making FP 3/FP 7

8
Trust in producers (ctd.)
  • Networks for regular contacts with user groups
    FP1
  • Impartiality (perceived as being outside partisan
    political games) FP1
  • Adherance to international standards and
    internationally recognised good practices FP 9
  • NSO not being in charge of non-statistical tasks
    that may create conflicts of interests with
    impartiality or confidentiality

9
Trust in producers (ctd.)
  • System of quality management and monitoring
  • Comments by the NSO that transform released
    figures into information
  • Regular analytical activities by the NSO that add
    insights without being policy-prescriptive
  • Way to react to critics
  • Way to address and communicate errors
  • Limited but effective use of the right to react
    to erroneous interpretations and misuse of
    statistics FP4

10
Chief Statistician (CS)
  • For the trust in the NSO and the statistical
    system as a whole, personality and status of the
    CS is key
  • He/she personifies professionalism and integrity,
    especially impartiality, to users, the public,
    respondents and staff
  • Selection and appointment process has to reflect
    these particular roles and can therefore differ
    in certain aspects from the general process that
    is applicable in the government for this level

11
Trust in institutional set-up
  • Specific legal framework for official statistics
    (statistical law)
  • Statistical law has to ensure professional
    independence for NSO and all other producers FP2
  • Government has to refrain from any interference
    into professional issues of official statistics
    (the  how ), and back the NSO (and other
    producers) against attempts of interference into
    professional decisions from other sides

12
Trust in institutional set-up (ctd.)
  • Dissemination and release process is key for
    independence
  • No clearance procedure by any authority that is
    outside the statistical system
  • Simultaneous release for all users no advance
    information for governmental users
  • Advance communication of release dates fixed by
    CS
  • Strict separation between comments made by the
    NSO and comments made by users, especially
    government users

13
Trust in institutional set-up (ctd.)
  • Once appointed, CS has to have legal protection
    against threats of being fired or removed to
    another position during his term
  • For this reason, CS should be appointed for a
    fixed term of at least 4 years, irrespective of
    changes in governments
  • These rules have be enshrined at the level of law
  • Government has to refrain from attempts to
    sidestep or circumvent these protections

14
Trust in institutional set-up (ctd.)
  • NSO should have the legal rigth to accept funding
    from other budgets than its own for certain
    statistical activities, including from
    international donors, but not in exchange of
    compromising on the FPs
  • As a consequence, the results of such activities
    have to be in the public domain
  • A Statistical Council as advisory body, composed
    of main users, can add credibility in monitoring
    compliance with FPs and ensuring relevance and
    adaptation to user needs

15
Trust in official statistics 3 asymmetries
  • timewise it takes a long time to build up traust
    and credibility, but it can be destroyed rapidly
  • throughout the national system of official
    statistics the credibility of the NSO is not
    easily extended to other producers, but any
    serious misconduct in the system can undermine
    the trust into the system as a whole

16
3 asymmetries (ctd.)
  • international trust and credibility cannot be
    imported from neighbours, but in a closely
    integrated system like the ESS, any scandal
    affecting one member sends shock waves across the
    whole system (example Greek scandal)
  • Regular reviews and global assessments of the
    statistical system, or of key statistics, by
    international peers are important for
    credibility, if the results are public and
    communicated to the government, and if gaps
    identified are addressed subsequently

17
Summary
  • Take care of your capital of trust and
    credibility, use all opportunities to add to this
    capital, but have a continuous policy of
    prevention against anything that might undermine
    it concerning all elements listed (watchdog
    function)
  • Have regular contacts with all user groups, and
    repeat explaining the role of modern official
    statistics to them

18
Summary (ctd.)
  • For users
  • Do not judge the NSO by whether a new release
    supports your policy and advocacy positions, but
    rather by whether you would trust the results as
    being unbiased irrespective of your present
    political and other preferences, on the ground
    that they are produced and disseminated by
    institutions which credibly adhere to the
    international standards of official statistics

19
Thank you for your attention
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