3 Fregean Thoughts

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3Fregean Thoughts
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Some thesis on sense and reference

• (cf. Dummett 1973 ch. 6)
• 1. The sense of a complex is compounded out of
  the sense of the constituents
• Compositionality we understand the sense of a
  complete expression (e.g. a sentence, compounds
  names) by understanding the sense of its
  constituents and the way they are put together.

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• The sense of a complete sentence is a thought,
  which is the bearer of truth value.
• As such thoughts play the same role than
  propositions within the British tradition (cf.
  Frege-Russell correspondence thought vs.
  singular propositions).

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• senses/thoughts
• (i) Timeless entities. A thought isnt true at a
  given time and false at another.
• (ii) Objective entities. Everyone can grasp the
  same thought.
• (iii) Immutable entities. Do not change across
  time/space.

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• 2. The sense of a word doesnt consist of
• a mental image
• vs. empiricist tradition -e.g. Locke- and
  rationalist tradition -e.g. Descartes-)
• A sense/thought is objective, communicable, while
  a mental image is private and incommunicable (Cf.
  Freges anti-psychologism)

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• 3. The reference of an expression is determined
  by the reference of the components
• The truth value (reference) of a sentence depends
  on the referents of its constituents parts
• Sense determines reference, while reference
  doesnt determine sense we may associate the
  same referent with different expressions.

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• 4. An expression can have sense but lack
  reference
• vs. Russell who, like Meinong, postulated the
  distinction between being and existence (narrow
  concept).
• Russells theory of descriptions has been
  introduced to handle, among other things, the
  problem of empty terms.

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• For Russell proper names, being disguised
  definite descriptions arent singular terms
  anymore the only singular terms, genuine names,
  are this and that which, referring to sense
  data, cannot be empty.
• For Frege if an expression lacks reference, the
  sentence in which it occurs lacks reference as
  well, it lacks truth value.

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• 5. The reference of an incomplete expression is
  itself incomplete
• The referent of a predicate expression is a
  concept, which is incomplete, unsaturated.
• The identity relation, i.e. co-extensiveness,
  between concepts (the referents of predicate
  expressions) is analogous to the identity
  relation between objects, the referents of proper
  names.

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• The analogue of a a is (x)(Fx ? Gx)
• The identity relation between predicate words is
  of co-extensiveness (F and G are coextensive)
• The predicates F and G have different senses
  but the same concept as referent.
• Hence, predicates, like proper names have sense
  and reference.

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• A functional expression, upon being completed is
  no longer a functional expression, but a proper
  name.
• When a concept (the referent of a predicate) is
  saturated by an object (the referent of a
  singular term) it becomes a referent
• Sentences are compound proper names whose
  referents are objects (the Truth or the False).

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• 6. The sense of a proper names fixes the
  criterion of identity of the object named
• Criterion of identity
• to grasp what object a name is being used to
  stand in for, is to know how to recognise the
  object as the same again.
• Identification presupposes re-identification
  (Strawson).

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• 7. Truth-values are the referents of sentences
• Expressions which form logical units possess
  reference.
• So the referent of a sentence can only be a
  truth value. For the referent must be something
  that remains invariant under any replacement of a
  part of a sentence with another expression having
  the same referent the substitution alters the
  sense/thought but not the reference.

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• 8. Expressions within indirect speech (oratio
  obliqua) dont have their ordinary reference
• No substitution salva veritate of co-referring
  expression within oratio obliqua constructions.
• Oblique reference vs. ordinary reference the
  oblique reference of a that-clause is the
  ordinary thought (ordinary sense vs. indirect
  sense).
• Attitude ascriptions are relations between
  agents and thoughts.

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• 9. Only in the context of a sentence does
• a word stand for anything
• Freges context principle.
• Tension between the context principle and
  compositionality i.e. between the view that a
  word has meaning only in the context of a
  sentence and the view that the meaning of the
  sentence depends on the meaning of its
  compounding parts.

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• 10. The referents of our words are
• what we talk about
• Freges realism (vs. Idealism of his days).
• Things in the external (real) world make what we
  say true or false. And the only way we can
  apprehend the external world is via language we
  apprehend concepts, relations, ... via predicates.

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Thoughts

• (cf. Dummett, 1973, ch. 11)
• A thought is the sense expressed by an assertoric
  sentence.
• A thought is made up by the senses of its
  components parts of the latter (compositionality).
  
• The difference between assertoric sentences and
  questions, imperatives, ... is explained by force.

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Eternal Sentences and Context

• eternal sentence
• it expresses a thought and is true or false
  independently of the context in which it is
  uttered/used.

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• Because of contextual features (e.g. indexicals)
  a sentence usually expresses a thought only
  relative to a given context (e.g. It is
  raining, Im happy, ).
• The same sentence in different contexts may
  express different thoughts which can be either
  true or false (E.g. Today is sunny said today
  may be true while uttered tomorrow may say
  something false).

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• Since a thought must always be true or false
  absolutely, the context in which a sentence is
  used may contribute to the expression of the
  thought.
• There arent (semantically) underdetermined
  thoughts.

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Main features of a thought

• 1. Thoughts are bearers of truth value
• A sentence may be said to be true/false only in
  a derivative way.

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• A thought would be true even if we were unable to
  express/grasp it (Platonism).
• So what is true cannot be something whose
  existence depends on us.
• Fregean thoughts (like senses) are
  mind-independent

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• 2. Thoughts are the objects of propositional
  attitudes
• The existence of a thought, qua bearer of
  cognitive value, is essential for an account of
  beliefs and other attitudes understood as
  relations to thoughts.

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• 3. Thoughts are eternal
• So sentences containing token-reflexive
  expressions (indexicals) ought to be
  eternalised to express a given thought which
  truth value is timeless, eternal, ....