Russia and the West after the USSR

1
Russia and the West after the USSR
2

• A Russian opinion poll, 2007
• In talks with the US, should Putin adopt a harder
  line, or should he make more concessions?
• Harder line 47
• Make concessions 5
• Neither harder line, nor concessions, his current
  policy is just about right 31
• Hard to say 16

3

• Which of the following statements do you most
  agree with?
• Russia is part of the West, it should develop
  closer relations with Europe and the US and adopt
  Western ways 11
• Russia is a Eurasian state which has its own path
  of historical development 74
• Russia is an Eastern country which should be
  most interested in cooperation with Asian
  countries 7
• Hard to say 9

4

• How would you characterize the leading Western
  countries (in terms of their relations with
  Russia)?
• As Russias partners, which have important common
  interests with her (such as struggle against
  crime and terrorism, solving ecological problems,
  etc.) 42
• As Russias adversaries, which seek to solve
  their problems at Russias expense and damage
  Russia whenever they can 46
• Hard to say 13
• Poll of 1600 respondents conducted by Levada
  Center, July 23, 2007 - http//www.levada.ru/press
  /2007072302.html

5

• Meanings of the West in Russian political
  discourse
• 1. A model of social organization modernization,
  progress, prosperity, democracy, something to
  emulate or compete with
• 2. The core of global capitalism, which Russia
  has tried to join
• 3. A source of potential security threats
  combinations of power separate from Russia US,
  EU, NATO
• 4. All European countries to the West of Russia,
  including former Soviet republics and former
  Eastern Bloc countries
• 5. Distinctions within the West US, Western
  Europe, Eastern Europe

6

• Russia and the West during the First Post-Cold
  War Period,1991-2000
• Adoption of the Western model by Russian elites
• Russias partial integration into the core
• Russias geopolitical retreat and Western
  expansion, leading to rising sense of insecurity
  in Russia
• Beginning of work on Russian-Western security
  partnership
• All in the context of the transition crisis

7

• Contested assessments of the 1st period
• A defeated power with a ruined economy and broken
  population
• But key sections of the ruling elite gained
  massively through privatization of state assets
• Severe crisis of legitimacy
• Russia was deeply split, with episodes of civil
  war (1993, 1994-96)
• The Kremlin claimed success of reforms and
  partnership with the West
• Western leaders continued to praise and back
  Yeltsin
• In Russia, political opposition and most of
  society cited failed socioeconomic policies and
  geopolitical losses

8

• The turn 1998-2000
• 1998
• August Russia defaults on its loans. The
  financial crisis is regarded as collapse of
  Western-led economic reforms
• 1999
• February-March Boris Yeltsins authority is
  seriously challenged by opposition forces
• March Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary become
  members of NATO
• March-April NATOs war on Serbia over Kosovo
  demonstrates that Russian opposition to NATO can
  be ignored
• August President Yeltsin appoints Vladimir Putin
  Prime Minister
• October Russian army moves into Chechnya to
  restore Moscows control
• December Putins supporters win majority in Duma
  elections, Yeltsin resigns, appoints Putin Acting
  President
• 2000
• March Vladimir Putin is elected President of
  Russia

9

• Russias shift from a pro-American to a more
  independent foreign policy can be seen as a
  natural evolution, driven by
• Russias national interests
• the logic of the international system
• What can make Russia more independent
• A stronger state can it be a democracy?
• Economic recovery
• Assertion of Russias unique role in Eurasia
• A pragmatic, multi-vector foreign policy
• Regaining influence over near abroad
• Working for a multipolar world

10

• 2000s A resurgent Russia
• Backlash against Westernization, Yeltsin-style
• Search for Russias own path
• Authoritarian stabilization
• Beginning of socioeconomic recovery
• A Russia First foreign policy

11

• Western responses to Russias resurgence
• The Near West post-communist Eastern Europe
• Interested in stability and economic growth in
  Russia
• But concerned about growth of Russian influence,
  relies on the Far West for help
• Some acting as proxies for US policies of
  Russias containment

12

• Western Europe
• Growing economic interests
• Using a stronger Russia to counterbalance US
• Common security concerns
• But also
• Growing sense of competition with resurgent
  Russia
• Energy concerns about dependence on Russia
• Russian authoritarianism creates a rift
• Renewed interest in strengthening Atlantic ties

13
US and Russia under Bush and
Putin
14

• The 2 political transitions in 1999-2000
• 1. From Yeltsin to Putin (Sept. 1999 - March
  2000)
• The beginning of the restoration of a strong
  state
• stabilization of the political situation
• an economic recovery
• promotion of a neoliberal economic reform agenda
• reliance on a combination of capitalist economics
  and a reasserted political authoritarianism
• In the area of foreign policy, Putin represents
  the emergence of a new pragmatic consensus
  between Western-oriented and Eurasianist-oriented
  elites

15

• 2. From Clinton to Bush
• On the one hand, a colder, more unilateralist and
  potentially more dangerous America - a serious
  challenge to Russias interests, alarmed
  reactions in Moscow.
• On the other hand, an unusual ideological
  affinity between Moscow and Washington
• commitment to laissez-faire economics,
• emphasis on geopolitics, and
• a stronger assertion of national interests (in
  the US case, as a manifestation of strength, in
  the Russian case, as a function of weakness).
• the end of the micromanagement of Russian reforms
  - the Russians feel a little more in control of
  their countrys policies

16

• The Global War on Terror, with its implications
  of a wider global conflict between the West and
  Islamist radicalism, highlighted Russias vital
  geopolitical role. Russias stability, security
  and strength (both economic and military) have
  become important international concerns.
•  
• The US found itself in dire need of allies in the
  new global confrontation. Russias importance
• successful US operations in Eurasia required
  Russias cooperation and help
• Russia began to look like as an important
  alternative supplier of energy to the West in
  case of disruption of supplies from the Persian
  Gulf.

17

• Putins early focus on the global threat of
  Islamist terrorism was to some extent vindicated.
  This took some international pressure off
  Russias Chechnya operations.
• The refocusing of US foreign policy on the war on
  Islamist terrorism partly relieved the
  geopolitical pressures Moscow had felt before
  9/11
• many in Russias foreign policy elite were
  inclined to see the Western threat (NATO
  expansion, the New Great Game over Caspian oil,
  etc.) compounded by the Islamist threat to
  Russias interests in the Caucasus and Central
  Asia.
•  

18

• Russia gained a voice in NATO, an official status
  of a market economy, an upgrading of her status
  in G8, and support for her entry into WTO.
•  
• Russia in her new role as a key US ally gained
  some freedom to pursue its own interests in other
  areas
•  
• The political climate for Western investments in
  Russia and for Russian business activities in the
  West improved.
•  
• The new conservative security mindset, adopted by
  the Bush Administration after 9/11, was consonant
  with the political orientations of Russian
  leaders and the traditions of the Russian state.

19

• Russias acquiescence with what looked
  unacceptable before 9/11
• NATOs massive expansion eastwards,
• Americas pullout from arms control,
• direct US security involvement across the belt of
  post-Soviet states from the Baltic to Pamir,
• Russias decision to withdraw from key Cold War
  military bases in Southeast Asia and the
  Caribbean.
• The prospect of US gaining control over the
  Persian Gulf and its energy resources.

20

• Rearmament of Russia could now be legitimized in
  the eyes of the US and other leading powers much
  more effectively than before.
• Improvement of Russias relations with the US was
  supported by most Russian elites and a majority
  of the population, which was an important
  political asset for Putin and his coalition.
• SUMMING UP
• By joining the anti-terror coalition, Russia
  was able to make gains across a spectrum of
  issues.
• But these gains have entailed some costs.

21

• At issue the price Russia has paid and the value
  it has bought.
• Has Russia lost more than it gained by this
  acquiescence?
• Are the gains largely symbolic and/or transitory,
  while the losses are tangible and lasting?

22

• WESTERNIZERS
• The new American presence in Central Eurasia
  represents Russias gain, not a loss, inasmuch as
  it strengthens Russias security in areas of
  Russias vulnerability
• To try to resist the American thrust is
  imprudently risky for Russia.
• The Americans are unlikely to stay in the
  post-Soviet South for long.
• In the new common cause between Russia and the
  West, NATOs expansion is not alarming indeed,
  it is possible to view it as a process leading up
  to Russias future membership in the Western
  alliance.

23

• EURASIANISTS
• Russia cannot possibly compete with the US on
  market terms. In any kind of an open market
  relationship between the two sides, the US will
  always be the dominant partner, dictating the
  terms and reaping most benefits, while Russia
  will have to accept a subordinate, dependent,
  almost colonial status.
• Russia should use its geopolitical assets, but
  not by selling them.  
• Russia should vigorously pursue integration with
  its post-Soviet neighbors and rebuff Western
  attempts to establish permanent positions in
  post-Soviet territories. 
• America respects only strength. Russia must try
  to restore a balance of power vis-à-vis the
  United States. 
• To turn Russia into the Wests ally against China
  and the Islamic world would expose Russias
  security to great dangers. Russia should align
  with China and Islamic states in order to resist
  American hegemony.

24

• What underlies the arguments of the Westernizers
  is the notion of Russian-Western
  (Euro-Atlantic) solidarity based on both market
  and geopolitical considerations.
• What underlies the Eurasianists arguments is the
  unreconstructed realist view of world politics,
  where Russia is paying dearly for its lingering
  liberal-internationalist illusions which have
  already led her to a historic geopolitical
  defeat.

25

• Can the Westernizers win the debate?
• HARDLY SO
• They agree with the Eurasianists on some of the
  most important points in the latters position
• They have to argue within a geopolitical frame of
  reference, which the Eurasianists insist upon
• When they argue within a market frame of
  reference, they have to recognize the weakness of
  Russias market assets
• In a highly competitive global economy.
  Westernizers case for a market-geopolitical
  synthesis is easy to present as unrealistic,
  based on wishful thinking.
• The Eurasianist case for the unquestioned
  dominance of the geopolitical imperative which
  should determine Russias economic strategies
  often seems more fitting for the situation of the
  Terror War
•  

26

• Putin sought to integrate elements of Westernizer
  and Eurasianist approaches in a pragmatic foreign
  policy course. He tried to make the most of
  Russias unique geography.
• Emphasis on Russias integration into the global
  economy with recognition that this economy is a
  highly competitive place where Russia cannot
  expect any favours and must fight hard for a
  decent place under economic sun.
• Russias integration is portrayed as a
  hard-nosed, pragmatic choice
• unless Russia is a full-fledged participant among
  those who make rules for the global economy,
  those rules will be more detrimental to Russias
  interests.
• Russia must join in order to be able to compete
  with everybody else more successfully.
• If Gorbachev and Yeltsin borrowed money from the
  West, Putin was repaying the debts ahead of
  schedule.

27

• Since 2003 a new phase
• The war in Iraq heightened Moscows concerns
  about US willingness to exercise power without
  international sanction
• The second wave of democratic revolutions in
  post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan),
  supported by the US, created new fears in Moscow
• Continued NATO expansion eastwards
• Escalation of international terrorism (both
  globally and inside Russia)
• Escalation of global oil and gas prices

28

• Geopolitics returned as the main frame of
  reference
• Reassertion of the power of the Russian state -
  over the economy and society
• Shift from Westernization to Eurasian
  capitalism
• Investments in military power
• Attempts to gain maximum freedom of maneuver for
  Russia in world affairs by balancing major
  powers off each other
• Use of energy resources as a key instrument of
  foreign policy

29

• The two basic aspects of US-Russian relations
  cooperation and conflict
• The balance between the two aspects is constantly
  changing back and forth
• The overall trend under Bush and Putin
• While cooperation did develop in some areas,
• Points of conflict have been growing
• Talk of a new Cold War

30

• Are we witnessing fluctuations in an essentially
  normal relationship?
• or a slide towards a confrontational mode which
  would stay for a considerable period?
• Is a new Cold War possible?
• If so, what would make it likely?
• How can it be avoided?

31

• Negative Western perceptions of Putins Russia
• 1.Putin is leading Russia back to
  authoritarianism, with the KGB as the main
  mechanism of control
• 2.Putin wants to restore Russias influence over
  at least some of the neighbouring states,
  formerly republics of the USSR (Ukraine, Georgia,
  Central Asia)
• 3.Putin is rebuilding Russias military potential
• 4.Putin is helping rogue states (opposed invasion
  of Iraq, continues to sell nuclear technologies
  to Iran, sells missiles to Syria, arms to
  Venezuela)
• 5. Putin is stepping up Russian intelligence
  activities against US
• 6. Putin is using Russias energy resources as
  assets in foreign policy
• SUMMING UP Back to the USSR

32

• Negative Russian perceptions of Bushs America
• 1. Putin is restoring Russia as a strong, stable,
  and independent state, while forging a
  partnership with US
• 2. It may be that Washington isnt interested in
  a stronger and more independent Russia
• 3. Bush intends to defend US hegemony and
  military superiority, has adopted an aggressive
  security doctrine, wages aggressive wars
• 4. Bush is launching a global crusade against
  authoritarian regimes
• 5. The logic of Russias restoration and the
  logic of American hegemony are in an increasing
  conflict
• SUMMING UP American imperialism plus Russophobia

33

• Both Bush and Putin wanted to avoid
  confrontation, emphasized common interests, need
  to cooperate
• But both sides seemed determined to continue to
  behave in ways which have generated these
  negative mutual perceptions
• In 2001-2004, under Bush-1 and Putin-1, the
  conflictual dynamic was under control

34

• The Bush-Putin pact, constructed in 2001
• Russia continues on its neoliberal path in
  economic policy
• Restores its state while maintaining commitment
  to democracy
• Supports US in war on terror, and on other issues
• US helps Russia integrate into the global economy
• Respects Russian geopolitical interests
• Does not make Putins authoritarianism a big
  issues in US-Russian relations
• Agree to disagree on other matters (arms control,
  for instance)
• Ideological affinity
• Russia is a member of the Euroatlantic community
• War on Terror
• Conservative domestic agendas

35

• 2005-2008 the unraveling of the Bush-Putin Pact
• The growth of the conflictual dynamic is growing
• Are the two sides still capable of controlling
  it?
• What would it take to control it?
• Is there political will to control it?
• How far can the conflict go?

36

• Putin in Munich
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vZlY5aZfOgPAfeature
  user
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vZewZnZ13X-Qfeature
  user
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vvf90nezYKwYfeature
  user
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vVyBzNR-x6l8
• Medvedev in Davos
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vx5PWjcR4wzI

37
(No Transcript)
38
(No Transcript)
39
(No Transcript)
40
(No Transcript)
41
(No Transcript)
42
Arctic maritime routes the Northwest and
Northeast Passages
43
A Eurasian counterbalance to NATO?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
44

• Putin on the Ritz
• http//www.youtube.com/watch?vfnVwjw2Un4k

45
Russians and Americans Mutual perceptions
46
Do you agree or disagree that democracy is the
best way to govern a state?
Russians Americans
Fully agree 15 56
Somewhat agree 37 34
Somewhat disagree 23 5
Fully disagree 11 3
Hard to say 14 2
Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060
Americans in June-July 2006 (http//www.levada.ru/
press/2006071102.html)
47
10 years from now, will Russia be more
democratic or less democratic than today?
Russians Americans
Much more democratic 16 7
Somewhat more democratic 35 62
Somewhat less democratic 13 19
Much less democratic 8 6
Hard to say 28 6
Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060
Americans in June-July 2006 (http//www.levada.ru/
press/2006071102.html)
48
What is your attitude to US actions to promote
democratic freedoms and human rights throughout
the world?
Russians Americans
Very positive 4 14
Positive 20 58
Negative 41 21
Very negative 15 5
Hard to say 20 2
Poll conducted among 1600 Russians and 1060
Americans in June-July 2006 (http//www.levada.ru/
press/2006071102.html)
49
Is the US friendly or unfriendly
towards Russia?
Blue friendly, green unfriendly, red
hard to say
50
Is the US playing a positive or negative role in
the world today?
Blue positive, green negative, red
hard to say
51
What kind of relations between Russia and US
would you like to see in the coming years closer
than today, the same, or less close?
Blue closer, green same as now, red less
close, gray hard to say
52
Do you like or dislike President
Bush?
Blue like, green dislike, red
hard to say
53

• How do Western countries treat Russia?
• As a friend - 4
• As a partner - 32
• As a competitor - 33
• As an enemy - 7
• They mostly ignore Russia - 15
• Hard to say - 8
• http//www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

54

• Do other countries present a military threat to
  Russia? (Levada Center, June 2007)
• Definitely yes 15
• Likely yes 33
• Likely no 33
• Definitely no 11
• Hard to say 8
• http//www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

55

• What is the main threat to Russias security?
• (June 2007 poll by Levada Center)
• Irans nuclear program 8
• North Koreas nuclear weapons 8
• Deployment of US BMD systems in countries
  neighboring Russia 60
• Hard to say 24
• http//www.levada.ru/interrelations.html

56

• Public opinion, US and Russia
• ..\Arms control\Steinbruner on US-Russia
  perceptions.doc

57
Obama and Medvedev
58

• 2007-08 US-Russian relations in crisis
• Talk of a new Cold War
• 2009 Resetting the relationship
• Real improvement of relations is on
• How far can it go?
• Can tensions return?

59

• A new generation of leaders
• Graduates of law schools on both sides - like
  Wilson and Lenin
• Unprecedented a Black American as US President
• Almost unprecedented a Russian with Jewish roots
  as Russias head of state
• Unprecedented Russias President has relatives
  in the US
• Both are focused primarily on domestic reforms
• Shared perspectives on key global issues
• Post-Cold War mentality

60

• Cold War clouds gathering
• Western concerns
• Russia is authoritarian again
• A revival of Russian imperialism
• Russia is using energy resources as tools in the
  struggle for influence
• Conclusion
• Containment of Russia is necessary
• NATO is a key instrument for this
• It looks like a new Cold War

61

• Russian concerns
• The West wants to undermine the current regime
  that is, push Russia back into chaos
• The West wants to keep Russia down
• The West wants to control Russia in particular,
  to grab Russias resources
• The West is not playing fair
• NATO continues to expand, despite Russian
  objections or even because of Russian
  objections
• Conclusion Russia needs to be strong and
  vigilant. Confrontation with the West is not
  desirable, but Russia must be prepared to defend
  its interests

62

• Both sets of concerns do reflect some realities
• On both sides, there are forces which see the
  world through the prism of zero-sum games
• And they feed on each other
• And there are vested interests feeding this
  Manichean view
• And there is the organizing power of simplistic,
  binary thinking Us vs. Them
• Ironically, both believe in American omnipotence
• Perhaps, this is the cardinal flaw in this type
  of thinking because US power is increasingly
  limited

63
(No Transcript)
64
(No Transcript)
65
Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009
http//surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/
66

• The most important trend
• The accumulating weight of Western and Russian
  mutual interests
• Important changes have taken place, while
  thinking and policies on both sides were lagging
  behind these changes
• Both Russia and the West are better equipped than
  ever to develop new international policies
  through joint efforts - dialog, negotiations
  between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO

67

• Pierre Morelle, high-ranking EU diplomat, on
  Russia-West relations, March 2008
• I am struck by the contrast between our
  interdependence and the problems in our relations
  which remain unresolved. It is a contrast between
  practical cooperation and psychological
  confrontation. Ties between the two worlds are
  strengthening on a scale which was unthinkable in
  the past and yet psychological tensions remain.
  Even though experience implies that it is better
  to learn together and even if we experience
  disappointments, we will achieve a lot if we move
  forward working together.
• ???? 2008 ???? ??????. ?? ???? ??????? ?????.
• http//sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id12063
  53430archive1206354399

68
Do you have favorable or unfavorable view of US,
Russia? Pew Opinion Research, 2007
Country fav. To US fav. To Russia
Russia 41 89
Ukraine 54 81
Canada 55 52
India 59 58
South Korea 58 54
China 34 46
Britain 51 47
US 80 44
Germany 30 34
Israel 78 31
Turkey 9 17
69
2000-2008, Pew Research http//pewresearch.org/p
ubs/1059/global-opinion-bush-years
70
(No Transcript)
71

• 2008
• The lowest point in US-Russian relations in 25
  years
• Then, the Cold War trend is reversed
• The Russia-Georgia War and its political impact
• The peak of the global financial crisis
• Election of new Presidents in Russia and US
• March 2008 Dmitry Medvedev elected as President
  of Russia
• November 2008 Barack Obama elected as US
  President

72

• Medvedevs ideology
• Democratic capitalism as an ideal for Russia
• Rule of law, a liberal political outlook (rights,
  constitutionalism, accountable government)
• Russia as a great power
• Modernization of the Russian society and economy
• Close partnership with the West, coupled with
• Multivector foreign policy

73
(No Transcript)
74
(No Transcript)
75
Russian stock markets, 2008
76
(No Transcript)
77
(No Transcript)
78
of Canadians with favorable attitudes to
Russia (Pew Research)
79
of Russians having positive attitudes to
America (Pew Research)
http//pewglobal.org/database/?indicator1country
181
80
of Russians who believe that the US takes into
account other countries interests (Pew Research)
http//pewglobal.org/database/?indicator4country
181
81
Russian public opinion on relations with
the US, Levada Center
How would you characterize Russian - US relations? Oct. 2005 August 2008
Friendly 12 4
Good neighbours 9 2
Normal, calm 39 16
Cool 25 39
Tense 10 28
Hostile 2 8
Hard to say 3 4
http//webfile.ru/2612342
82
Russian public opinion on the 2008 election in
the US, October 2008, Levada Center
How closely are you following the US Presidential election campaign?
Very closely 6
Not very closely 29
Not following at all 64
Hard to say 1
http//webfile.ru/2612342
83
Russian public opinion on the 2008 election in
the US, October 2008, Levada Center
Which of the two candidates do you like better? (question to those who follow the campaign)
McCain 14
Obama 35
Neither 37
Hard to say 14
http//webfile.ru/2612342
84
http//pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less
-important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentim
ent-surges
85
http//pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less
-important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentim
ent-surges
86
http//pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less
-important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentim
ent-surges
87
http//www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/in
ternational_security_bt/444.php?nididpnt444
88
(No Transcript)
89

• No one in 1999 expected that Russias resurgence
• And no one expected that the West would be
  confronting such a formidable array of challenges
  as today from the economic crisis to
  Afghanistan to climate change without ready
  solutions to deal with them
• So, on the Western side, there has been
  discomfort and unease about Russias coming back
  as a Great Power
• And a desire to find ways to delegitimize it
  (Russia is not playing by the rules)

90

• In Russia, there was a recovery of
  self-confidence until the end of 2008
• And a belief that while being a Western client
  was bad for Russia, putting Russias own
  interests first and driving hard bargains with
  the West does bring results
• But also like winning huge in a lottery and
  scrambling to find ways to spend the money
• Assertiveness mixed with insecurity, a fear that
  this moment is fleeting, that things may change
  for the worse very quickly

91

• Russias resurgence and Western troubles can be
  too easily pictured as a zero-sum game
• But it is anything but a zero-sum game
• Tremendous exaggeration of
• The degree of differences between interests
• And of the ability to succeed without cooperation
  from the other side
• Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on
  Western troubles
• Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting
  Russias resurgence
• Win-win is possible but both sides do need new
  thinking

92
(No Transcript)
93
(No Transcript)
94

• The Reset
• Prioritizing the US-Russian relationship
• Resumption of dialog and consultation
• Rebuilding arms control New START
• Shelving NATO expansion
• Restoration of NATO-Russia ties
• Changes in the Ballistic Missile Defense plan
• Different missiles
• Including Russia
• Expanding cooperation on Afghanistan use of
  Russian territory
• Closer cooperation on Iran

95

• The Obama-Medvedev statement, London, April 1,
  2009
• Reaffirming that the era when our countries
  viewed each other as enemies is long over,
• and recognizing our many common interests,
• we today established a substantive agenda for
  Russia and the United States to be developed over
  the coming months and years. We are resolved
• to work together
• to strengthen strategic stability,
• international security,
• and jointly meet
• contemporary global challenges,
• while also addressing disagreements openly and
  honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and
  acknowledgement of each others perspective.

96

• Scenarios
• Progress, definitely
• A US-Russian alliance?
• Russias integration with NATO?
• Significant deterioration arising from
  competition?
• Drift?

97
(No Transcript)