Rational Engagement, Emotional Response,

1
Rational Engagement, Emotional Response, the
Prospects for Moral Progress in Animal Use
Debates

• Ethicists have increasingly turned their
  attention to moral questions about the treatment
  of non-human animals. Arguments from a range of
  perspectives have been given for the conclusion
  that routine uses of animals in agriculture, the
  fashion industry, and experimentation are morally
  wrong.
• Defenses of these practices, however, have been
  far fewer, and generally less developed, than the
  cases in favor of animals.
• My aim in this presentation is to encourage
  development of stronger arguments in favor of
  animal use and provide methodological guidance on
  how to do so.
• Nathan Nobis For Animal Research in Theory
  Practice,
• ed. Jeremy Garrett, Rice, Philosophy

2
Harms Moral Justification

• Many fields and occupations involve harming
  animals, making them worse off.
• Animals for our purposes, mammals birds
  least controversial cases for discussion.
• Typically, people in these fields will agree that
  animals are being harmed.
• They claim, however, that these harms are morally
  justified not all harms are wrong, and these
  harms arent wrong (indeed, perhaps some are
  morally obligatory).

3
Common experimental procedures include

• drowning,
• suffocating,
• starving,
• burning,
• blinding,
• destroying their ability to hear,
• damaging their brains,
• severing their limbs,
• crushing their organs

• inducing
• heart attacks,
• cancers
• ulcers
• paralysis,
• Seizures
• forcing them to inhale tobacco smoke, drink
  alcohol, and ingest various drugs, such as
  heroine and cocaine.

4
A few commonly overlooked observations about harm

• (1) Painless killing can be (and often is)
  harmful for the one who is killed it is bad for
  him/her.
• Why? They are deprived of whatever goods they
  would have experienced. No interests can be
  satisfied.
• Thus, the common if painlessly killed, then
  humane, so nothing morally objectionable views
  need defense.

• (2) Recent ethological research shows that just
  being in a laboratory, and undergoing routine
  procedures, is stressful (and thus harmful) for
  animals.

5
Balcombe JP, Barnard ND, Sandusky C, Laboratory
routines cause animal stress, Contemporary
Topics in Laboratory Animal Science, 2004, Nov,
43 (6)42-51

• Abstract Eighty published studies were appraised
  to document the potential stress associated with
  three routine laboratory procedures commonly
  performed on animals handling, blood collection,
  and orogastric gavage . . .
• Significant changes in physiologic parameters
  correlated with stress . . were associated with
  all three procedures in multiple species in the
  studies we examined.
• The results of these studies demonstrated that
  animals responded with rapid, pronounced, and
  statistically significant elevations in
  stress-related responses for each of the
  procedures . . .
• We interpret these findings to indicate that
  laboratory routines are associated with stress,
  and that animals do not readily habituate to
  them. The data suggest that significant fear,
  stress, and possibly distress are predictable
  consequences of routine laboratory procedures,
  and that these phenomena have substantial
  scientific and humane implications for the use of
  animals in laboratory research.

6
Balcombe JP, Laboratory environments and
rodents behavioural needs A review, Laboratory
Animals (in press)

• Abstract Laboratory housing conditions have
  significant physiological and psychological
  effects on rodents, raising both scientific and
  humane concerns.  Published studies of rats, mice
  and other rodents were reviewed to document
  behavioural and psychological problems
  attributable to predominant laboratory housing
  conditions.
• Studies indicate that rats and mice value
  opportunities to take cover, build nests,
  explore, gain social contact, and exercise some
  control over their social milieu, and that the
  inability to satisfy these needs is physically
  and psychologically detrimental, leading to
  impaired brain development and behavioural
  anomalies (e.g., stereotypies). To the extent
  that space is a means to gain access to such
  resources, spatial confinement likely exacerbates
  these deficits. Adding environmental
  enrichments to small cages reduces but does not
  eliminate these problems, and I argue that
  substantial changes in housing and husbandry
  conditions would be needed to further reduce them.

7
Many ethicists have argued that its wrong to use
animals these ways theyve given reasons for
their views and defended them

• utilitarianism and other consequentialisms,
• rights-based deontologies,
• ideal contractarianisms (veil of ignorance,
  Golden rule ethics),
• virtue ethics,
• common-sense (least harm, needless harm)
  moralities,
• religious moralities, feminist ethics,
• and more indeed almost every major, influential
  perspective in moral theory.

8
Even Kants, Rawls, and other moral theories
have been modified to be friendly to non-rational
moral patients (not moral agents)

• Improve the theory so there are direct duties to
  baby ( other non-rational powerless humans
  shes of moral value not because others care
  about her, despite her not being a
  moral agent, rational, etc.

9
If the theory is now not Bad for Baby (and other
vulnerable humans), it is now not Bad for
Animals?
10
Thus, an abundance of ethical resources in
defense of animals.

• However, this hasnt made much of a difference in
  thought or deed regarding uses of animals.
• Possible explanations
• big changes are always slow trickle-down is
  slow
• philosophers (and other thinkers and authors)
  typically just arent very influential,
• personal, financial, legal, political,
  institutional barriers to doing the right thing,
• ???

11
A competing explanation

• There are strong arguments that morally justify
  (much of) the current treatment of animals.
• Since these arguments are strong / sound / very
  reasonable to accept, the defenses of animals are
  weak / unsound / unreasonable.
• Im going to suggest that this explanation is
  unlikely, because these arguments are weak.
• I encourage development of more and stronger
  arguments in favor of, defending, animal use and
  provide methodological guidance on doing so.

12
Emotional responses to moral issues

• It sometimes appears that the quality of our
  thought on a topic is inversely proportional to
  the intensity of our emotions concerning that
  topic.
• -- Fred Feldman, Confrontations With the Reaper
  A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of
  Death (Oxford, 1994).

13
Rational engagement of moral issues

• Identify some past instances of moral progress
  in thought, attitude, deed
• Hopefully, rational evaluation of arguments
  contributed to this, somewhat!
• We can identify some basic logical skills that
  can help us improve the quality of our thought.
• Apply these skills to some recent arguments
  made by scientists and philosophers regarding
  animals.
• This is important because it seems that not
  enough people consistently use these skills this
  is not good.

14
Formerly controversial issues and simple
arguments

• Women shouldnt be allowed to go to university
  because women are so emotional that abstract
  thought is so difficult for them.
• "Slavery is morally right because we slave-owners
  benefit greatly from slavery."
• "Since animals are not rational, it's morally ok
  to raise them to be killed and eaten."
• These are arguments what are their faults?

15
Women (1)

• Conclusion
• Women shouldnt be allowed to go to university.
• Why think that?
• Women are such emotional beings that abstract
  thought is difficult for them.
• Imprecise! SOME? or ALL?
• Some women are so emotional that abstract
  thought is difficult. True, and true for some
  men!
• All women are so emotional False,
  empirically indefensible claim, so unsound
  argument

16
Women (2)

• Some women are so emotional that abstract
  thought is difficult. True, and true for some
  men!
• Therefore, no women should be allowed to go to
  university.
• But how do you get from (1) to (2)? Whats the
  missing linking premise?
• A question How would some womens emotionality
  justify restricting educational opportunities
  from all women? Not clear.

17
Women (3)

• However, even if some or even all women are so
  emotional and have difficulty with abstract
  thought why would that justify denying any women
  the opportunity to improve themselves through
  education?
• If my cup won't hold but a pint, and yours holds
  a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have
  my little half measure full?
• Sojourner Truth, Ain't I A Woman? 1851

18
Slavery

• "Slavery is morally right because we slave-owners
  benefit greatly from slavery.
• (1) Slave-owners benefit from slavery. True
• (C) Therefore, slavery is morally right. ?
• --------------------------------------------------
  ------------
• How do you get from (1) to (2)?
• Whats the missing, assumed linking premise?
• Slave-owners benefit from slavery. True
• If some group benefits from some arrangement,
  then that arrangement is right. ?
• Therefore, slavery is morally right.

19
Animals

• "Since animals are not rational, it's morally ok
  to raise them to be killed and eaten.
• Animals are not rational.
• Therefore, its OK to kill them
• Observations and questions
• (1) is imprecise some, or all, animals are not
  rational? Which animals?
• Ambiguity, lack of clarity what is meant by
  rational?
• Missing-link premise needed to make argument
  logically valid If a being is not rational,
  then its ok to kill it. False?

20
Logical skills The (moral) value of basic
predicate logic

• Attending to the intended meanings of unclear or
  ambiguous words
• what do you mean?
• animal, human, being human, human being,
  person, human person, humanity
• Precision regarding , quantity some, all?
• Assumed, unstated premises that link stated
  reason(s) to conclusion. (Logical validity).

21
It seems these logical skills are generally
useful.

• A bioethicist disagrees about the value of these
  skills for professional ethics
• Frankly, science students would have very little
  patience for the abstract argumentation and
  reasoning that one finds in your paper and is
  standard fare in philosophy journals.

22
Apply these ( other) logical skills to some
recent arguments

• Scientists
• Stuart Derbyshire, Ph.D., U Birmingham UK (used
  to be at Pitt) pain researcher.
• Mark Mattfield, Ph.D., Research Defense Society,
  UK
• Colin Blakemore, Ph.D., Medical Research Council,
  UK
• Adrian Morrison, Ph.D., DVM, U Penn, sleep
  disorders

• Philosophers
• Carl Cohen
• Neil Levy, Cohen Kinds A Response to Nathan
  Nobis, JoAP)
• Tibor Machan, Putting Humans First
• Matthew Liao, Virtually All Human Beings as
  Rightholders A Non-Speciesist Approach

23
The issue neednt be whether animals have
rights

• Moral or legal rights?
• Which moral rights? (be specific)
• Rights conflicts right to smoke, right to
  a smoke-free environment
• Rights appeals can conceal details.
• Common invalid argument
• If animals have rights, then serious change is
  needed. But they dont have rights, so change
  isnt needed.
• Logically invalid conclusion doesnt follow
  and avoids the concrete questions.

24
The issue neednt be whether animals have
rights

• Better to consider
• (1) whether various (specific) uses of animals
  are morally permissible or not, whether any ways
  of treatment are morally obligatory and
• (2) why or why not.
• Keep this the focus on these deontic categories
  is helpful for many practical and theoretical
  reasons.

25
The issue also neednt be whether animals are
equal to humans

• Are any animals equal to humans? Are all humans
  equal? Hard to answer
• What is meant by equal? Not obvious.
• Which humans, which animals? (What is meant by
  humans and animals?). (fetus, baby, adult,
  100 y/o?)
• Common invalid argument avoids the concrete
  questions.
• If animals are equal to humans, then serious
  change is needed. But they arent equal, so
  change isnt needed.
• Equal consid. vs.No consid.vs. mid-level
  consid?
• Again, ideal Qs are about moral permissibility.

26
Objection An abundance of resources is a
philosophical embarrassment?

• Many philosophers argue that animals are treated
  wrongly, but disagree on why (e.g., Peter Singer
  demolishes Tom Regan and Regan demolishes
  Singer). Therefore, there is no justification for
  thinking that animals are treated wrongly.
• Adrian Morrison Richard Vance, JAMA

27
A parallel argument

• Many thinkers argue that animals are not treated
  wrongly, but disagree on why (e.g., Carl Cohen
  demolishes Jan Narveson Narveson demolishes
  Cohen). Therefore, there is no justification for
  thinking that animals are not treated wrongly.

28
The false, unstated assumption

• If you believe p, and for reasons X, Y, Z, but
  others believe p for reasons A, B, C, etc. and
  these reasons are logically incompatible (and you
  recognize this), then either you have no (good)
  reason to believe p or there is no good reason to
  believe p.
• At the very least, this principle isnt one
  typically accepted or universally applied (e.g.,
  global warming is bad).

29
Appeals to evolution / biological perspectives

• Morrison to refrain from exploring nature in
  every possible way would be an arrogant rejection
  of evolutionary forces.
• Evolution has endowed us with a need to know as
  much as we can. (Nicoll, Russell).
• Humans evolved therefore, morally we should .
  Does not follow.
• Constraints on using other humans to advance our
  own genetic line, when its in our interest?

30
Benefits Arguments / Arguments from Necessity

• animal experiments are vital to the future
  well-being of humans and, as long as they are
  conducted to high ethical standards, they are
  entirely justifiable. Mark Matfield
• The argument Benefits for humans justify animal
  experimentation (and other uses)
• The are necessary.

31
Is animal use necessary? (1)

• Depends on what you mean by necessary.
• In one sense, yes!
• To do animal experiments, it is necessary to do
  animal experiments. To make these exact
  scientific discoveries using animals, it is
  essential to use animals if animals werent
  used, the experiments would be different.

32
Is animal use necessary? (2)

• In other senses, perhaps not. Is animal necessary
  for making medical progress and for, more
  generally, bettering human welfare?
• Necessary for the well-being of humans, but
  which humans? A few? (Maybe!). Everyone? Doubtful
  that every human benefits from (every) animal
  experiment.
• There are other ways of bringing about goods for
  humans
• clinical research, epidemiology, in vitro
  research, uses of technology, autopsies,
  prevention, etc.
• feeding people, getting existing medical care to
  them, etc.. Its been argued that these would
  yield greater human utility.

33
Defenses of the low (human) utility of animal
experimentation

• RC Greek N Shanks, Animal Research in Light of
  Science (2006? Rodopi)
• N Shanks LaFollette, Brute Science (Routledge
  1997)
• RC Greek J Greek DVM, Sacred Cows Golden
  Geese (Continuum 2000), Specious Science (2002),
  What Will We Do if We Dont Experiment on
  Animals? (2004)
• They argue that other methods of research are
  more effective at addressing human needs.

34
Benefits argument

• Animal experiment yields some benefits.
• If some action benefits someone (or some group),
  then that action is right. false needs
  refinement and serious defense
• Therefore, animal experimentation (and other
  uses) are right.
• What about direct harms (to animals, to humans,
  esp. indirect harms from opportunity costs)? How
  are these weighed? A careful methodology would be
  nice, at least is necessary for serious defense.

35
Want benefits?

• Whatever benefits animal experimentation is
  thought to hold in store for us, those very same
  benefits could be obtained through experimenting
  on humans esp. vulnerable ones instead of
  animals. Indeed, given that problems exist
  because scientists must extrapolate from animal
  models to humans, one might think there are good
  scientific reasons for preferring human
  subjects.
• Philosopher Ray Frey

36
Why not use these humans?Blakemores answer

• The only firm line to make moral distinctions
  on genetic and morphological grounds is between
  our own species and other species.
• Suggested if something is of our species, then
  it is more morally valuable than any animals.
• But he says a human embryo, certainly before the
  nervous system begins to develop, is just a
  bundle of cells.
• Suggested being of our species does not
  necessarily confer moral value.
• We should have a special attitude toward other
  humans, so crucial to this argument is how we
  define a person. He did not do this.

37
Why not use these humans?Derbyshires answer

• Animals lack the capacity for reflection (and
  therefore an inner world) and the capacity for
  reasoning (So do many humans!!)
• Its remarkable that we have to consider the
  question.
• Not remarkable if someone suggests that whats
  required for a presumption against harm are
  properties that many, many human beings lack.
• Society cares about vulnerable humans.
• All of them? What about secret experiments? What
  if they could be re-educated? Why do they care?
  (Harms)

38
Avoiding objections from non-rational human
beings.

• A common claim
• Its wrong to seriously harm a being only if that
  being is rational, autonomous, makes moral
  choices, is creative, intelligent, contributes to
  society, etc.
• OK, animals arent like that, but neither are
  lots of (conscious, feeling) humans. This
  principle suggests its not seriously wrong to
  harm them. Is this principle correct?

39
Some odd inferencesCohen, Levy Kinds

• Cohen NEJM Moral rights depend on moral
  agency, the ability to respond to moral claims.
  A being has rights only if its a of a kind
  characterized by moral agency.
• Finnis to be a person is to belong to a kind of
  being characterized by rational (self-conscious,
  intelligent) nature.
• Scanlon the class of beings whom it is possible
  to wrong will include at least all those beings
  who are of a kind that is normally capable of
  judgment-sensitive attitudes.

40
Cohen, Levy Kinds

• Cohen All humans are of a kind capable of moral
  agency, but
• animals are not beings of a kind capable of
  exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals
  therefore have no rights, and they can have
  none.
• What kind are animals? How are humans who are not
  moral agents of the kind moral agent? Cohen
  doesnt explain.

41
Cohens possible answer?

• Humans who are non-moral agents are of this kind
  because they are members of a set e.g., the
  kind, a species some of which are moral agents.
  
• Response But animals are also members of a set
  e.g., the kind, sentient beings some of whom
  are moral agents also! They have rights too, on
  Cohens account!
• Humans and animals are of many kinds, some
  overlapping, some not. Inconsistent conclusions
  follow from Cohen-esque reasoning.

42
Levys attempt to find the right kind the
narrowest natural kind

• If (1) an individual A is a member of some
  species S and (2) some, most or all of the other
  members of that species have some property C and
  (3), on the basis of having property C, they have
  moral property R, then individual A has moral
  property R as well, even though A lacks property
  C.

43
If (1) an individual A is a member of some
species S and (2) some, most or all of the other
members of that species have some property C and
(3), on the basis of having property C, they have
moral property R, then individual A has moral
property R as well, even though A lacks property
C.

• C non-moral property of "having doneno serious
  crimes
• R "not deserving lifeimprisonment."
• Implications for lone criminal?

• C "intelligent" and "aware
• R "being such that one ought to be allowed to
  make decisions to direct one's own life."
• Implications for young children and others?

44
Machans Arguments from Whats Normal

• A being has moral rights (presumably making it
  wrong to harm it) only if it a moral nature, a
  capacity to see the difference between right
  and wrong and choose accordingly.
• It is this moral capacity that establishes a
  basis for rights, not the fact that animals, like
  us, have interests or can feel pain.
• Humans are of the kind of being that have such
  a moral nature and animals are not thus humans
  have rights and animals do not.

45
What about humans who seem to lack this moral
capacity?

• We must consider humans as they exist normally,
  not abnormally and focus on the healthy cases,
  not the special or exceptional or borderline
  ones.
• We do need to deal with borderline cases. But we
  can do so only by applying and adapting the
  knowledge we acquire from the normal case. We
  cant start with the exception and infer the
  rule.

46
The suggested argument

• Humans who lack moral capacities are human.T!
• If someone is human, then they have all the
  (moral) properties that normal, healthy,
  typical humans have.
• Therefore, these humans have moral capacities,
  and so they have rights.
• Reply 2 is, at least, unsupported, and is an
  instance of a generally false principle for moral
  non-moral properties. (e.g., 4 limbs Ted Bundy)

47
Matthew Liao, Virtually All Human Beings as
Rightholders The Species-Norm Account

• to be a rightholder (a being with the highest
  moral status), something need not
• be a moral agent
• have the potential to be a moral agent
• be of the kind (species) that normally is a moral
  agent
• be actually sentient, conscious, etc. or even
  have the potential, i.e., that its possible in
  some sense
• Could be tinkered into a pro-animal exper. view.

48
The correct answer is

• A being has rights iff the entity has
  incorporated into it the genetic basis for the
  species capacity for moral agency (i.e. the
  relevant bits of DNA that normally allow for
  moral agency) or the functional equivalent
  thereof (e.g. software and/or hardware that would
  normally allow for moral agency in an artificial
  being). The intrinsic value that resides in the
  relevant genetic bits grounds rightholding even
  when that genetic material is blocked from
  developing and cannot allow for moral agency.
• If X is like that, then X has moral rights.

49
Liaos reasoning in favor of the view, it seems

1. There are moral duties only if there are moral
   agents. T
2. There are moral agents only if there are beings
   with the genetic basis for moral agency. OK
   accept this for sake of argument
3. Therefore, there are moral duties only if there
   are beings with the genetic basis for moral
   agency.
4. Therefore (?), any being with the genetic basis
   for moral agency is a rightholder.

50
A parallel argument

1. There are moral duties only if there are living
   beings, or beings that can perceive, or . T
2. There are living beings, or beings that can
   perceive only if there are beings with the
   genetic basis for life, perception, etc. OK
3. Therefore, there are moral duties only if there
   are beings with the genetic basis for life,
   perception, etc.
4. Therefore (?), any being with the genetic basis
   for life, perception, is a rightholder.

51
Objections from Chris Grau, FIU

• If the species-norm account is true, then
• A cabbage that has "integrated" the relevant
  genetic bits but is damaged such that the
  capacity for moral agency is permanently blocked.
  (this cabbage has rights even though it lacks
  moral agency and the potential for it.)
• A (future) computer with the relevant hardware.
  software "integrated" but blocked. This computer
  has rights even though it would lack both moral
  agency and the potential for moral agency.
• Cabbage or computer vs. sentient animals and
  sentient humans lacking the relevant genetic
  material for moral agency?
• The species norm account seems entirely ad hoc.

52
Conclusions / Summary

• Presented a basic method for thinking about moral
  issues demonstrated its use applied it to some
  recent arguments defending current animal use
  and/or criticizing pro-animal arguments.
• Suggested that these arguments are weak.
• My hope since these methods are generally
  useful, perhaps future defenders of current uses
  of animals will utilize them for better
  arguments.
• To make moral progress and contribute to
  reasonable debate it is important that this is
  done.

53
For an overview of the recent literature on
ethics and animals issues, see Angus Taylors
Ethics Animals An Overview of the
Philosophical Debate (Broadview, 2003). For
arguments from utilitarianism, see, among other
sources, Peter Singers Practical Ethics, 2nd
Edition (Cambridge UP, 1993) and his Animal
Liberation, 3rd Edition (Harper, 2001) although
the former is, strictly speaking, not an argument
from utilitarianism. From rights-based
deontology, see, among other sources, Tom Regans
The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd Edition (U
California Press, 2004), as well as his more
accessible Empty Cages Facing the Challenge of
Animal Rights (Rowman Littlefield, 2004) for
Rawlsian-style ideal contractarianism, see among
other sources, Mark Rowlands Animals Like Us
(Verso, 2002) from virtue ethics, see among
other sources, Rosalind Hursthouses Ethics,
Humans and Other Animals (Routledge, 2000), from
common-sense morality, see, among other sources,
Mark Bernsteins Without a Tear Our Tragic
Relationship With Animals (U Illinois Press,
2004) and David DeGrazias Animal Rights A Very
Short Introduction (Oxford, 2002) for religious
moralities, see, among other sources, Matthew
Scullys Dominion The Power of Man, the
Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (St.
Martins, 2003) from feminism, see Carol Adams
and Josephine Donavan (eds.) Beyond Animal
Rights A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment
of Animals (Continuum, 1996).
54
Stuart Derbyshire,an animal experimentation
advocate

• It is not possible to advocate animal welfare
  and at the same time give animals untested drugs
  or diseases, or slice them open to test a new
  surgical procedure. . .
• The Scientist, 3/06, Time to Abandon the Three
  Rs
• Submitting to refinement, reduction, and
  replacement risks the future of animal research
  
• Once the perspective of the animal is adopted,
  it is inevitable that all experimentation will be
  seen negatively, as no animal experiments are in
  the interest of the animal
• - Why Animals Rights Are Wrong (p. 39)