Light Weapons and Another Nakba in Palestine

1
Light Weapons and Another Nakba in Palestine

• Simone Tholens,
• MA Thesis

2
The Puzzle

• The Palestinian mobilization has changed
  dramatically over the past two decades
• First Intifada Arafat the supreme leader,
  contained the violence, opted for non-military
  Intifada
• Second Intifada A splintered insurgency, streams
  of weapons flourishing the PA statelets, more
  military means employed
• June 2007 The second Nakba

3
The Theoretical Framework

• Marsh (2007)
• A correlation between the availability of
  weapons, the internal control of the acquisition
  process, and the type of insurgency
• The more accessible weapons are to multiple
  insurgents within an insurgency, the more
  fragmented it is
• Testing the hypothesis The Palestinian
  mobilization 1987-2007

4
The Context Middle East

• WMDs
• Gun culture?
• Weak civil society
• State-centric strategic analyses dominate
• Time for a new approach that may shed light on
  the armed groups in the region
• Applying a small arms lens

5
A History of Armed Resistance

• Arab revolt (1916-1918), Arab revolt in Palestine
  (1936-1939)
• PLO 1964 Liberation through Armed Struggle
• Guerrilla operations 70s and 80s
• 1982 the battle of Beirut - PLO expelled to
  exile in Tunis

6
The First Intifada 1987

• Leadership in exile challenged by UNLU, Hamas
  the command units in the field
• Yet, inevitably, the local leadership made peace
  with the fact that it would not be allowed to
  assert its independence and that none of its
  members would ever be hailed as a hero of the
  Intifada (Schiff and Yaari 1989 91)

7
Arms Availability in the First Intifada

• Context Israeli occupation, no legal weapons in
  Palestinian hands
• Violent, but largely unarmed mode
• The Uprising spontaneous in the beginning then
  garnered international support and understanding
  that Israeli military too strong
• Yet low arms availability might have played a
  role in the design

8
The Turning Point Oslo Agreement

• Permitted (some) weapons to PA police and
  security forces
• Individuals licensed to carry arms
• Stipulated that the PA was to confiscate illegal
  weapons and control the situation regarding
  weapons in society
• Not able to control the influx of arms sought
  illicitly to acquire weapons so to consolidate
  its power base - illicit supply channels
  activated (land, sea, patrons)

9
Weaponization of Society 1995-2000

• PA Increasingly unpopular as the agent of the
  Oslo Accords (which did not end occupation)
• Recognized the threat to a) security and b) the
  30 years monopoly of governance (reverse order?)
• Popular support for other (mostly Islamist)
  organizations opposing Fatahs leadership
• Hamas allegedly received weapons from Israel, and
  through black market channels

10
Second Intifada 2000-2005

• More war-like than the first Intifada (small
  arms, light weapons, suicide bombings, rockets,
  mortars)
• Illicit supply channels revealed
• By sea Karine A, San Torino
• Under-the-border Tunnels under the Philadelphi
  road at the Rafah border crossing (Role of
  Bedouins to be scrutinized further)

11
PAs Dysfunctional Security Structure

• Critical methods of cracking down on Islamist
  organizations (torture, elimination, Dahlan)
• Obscure command lines
• Corruption, factional and clan interests

12
Fragmented Movement

• Factions advocating for new leadership and no
  negotiations with the Zionist entity
• Two larger camps (Fatah and Hamas) and a myriad
  of smaller groups, all with veto-power to
  obstruct negotiations/cease fire agreements
  (bombings, rockets)
• Factions stronger through arms accessibility

13
2005 Disengagement From Gaza

• Weak, corrupt and inefficient PA
• Arafts death November 2004
• Rise in popularity of the Islamist movements
• A plethora of active armed groups

14
2006 Election Hamas Victory

• Brought the antagonism on the streets to the
  political sphere
• Integrating armed groups in the security
  apparatus (further obfuscating command lines)
• Power (im)balance incentive for factions to arm
• Insecurity incentive for clans, families to arm
• Militarization of society

15
2007 Hamas Take-over of Gaza

• Arms build-up and splintered Palestinian movement
  caused inter-factional fighting over the course
  of a few weeks in June 2007 350 dead
• Fatah expelled from the Gaza Strip
• A tremendous blow to any aspirations of a
  peaceful outcome of the conflict

16
The Fragile Conclusions

• What was before the Oslo process a coherent
  Palestinian movement where challenges to the
  Arafat (Fatah) leadership were firmly suffocated
  (as in the first Intifada), is now no longer a
  movement, but a clearly split people with
  diverging approaches towards Israel and with
  internal grievances and deep scars which will
  continue to exacerbate the lives of Palestinians
  living in the territories

17

• The steady increase in arms availability, due
  to a dynamic cycle of demand and supply
  incentives, has facilitated the splintering
  process within the Palestinian movement, and can
  be seen as one of the causes behind the current
  situation, in which Gazans find themselves in a
  dire humanitarian crisis while Fatah (Abbas) has
  resumed peace talks with Israel

18
A New War?

• In principle an old conflict, in which Cold War
  structures are still visible
• Yet, increasingly dispatched insurgency permeable
  by (partly) market-driven supplies of weapons
• bands of fighters? Problematic cease-fires,
  peace negotiations