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1 Descartes (1596-1650)

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Title: 1 Descartes (1596-1650)


1
1Descartes (1596-1650)
2
Introduction
  • Main (philosophical) works
  • Discourse (1637)
  • Meditations (1641)
  • Principia Philosophicae (1644)

3
Methodology
  • Introspection and anti-elitism
  • My plan has never gone beyond trying to reform
    my own thoughts and construct them upon a
    foundation which is all my own. (Discourse on the
    Method CSM I 118)
  • Good sense is the best distributed thing in the
    world the power of judging well and of
    distinguishing the true from falsewhich is what
    we properly call good sense or reasonis
    naturally equal in all men, and consequently that
    the diversity of our opinions does not arise
    because some of us are more reasonable that
    others but solely because we direct our thoughts
    along different paths and do not attend to the
    same things. (Discourse on the Method CSM I 111)

4
  • Break away from the Scholastic tradition
  • And if I am writing in French, my native
    language, rather than Latin, the language of my
    teachers, it is because I expect that those who
    use only their natural reason in all its purity
    will be better judges of my opinion than those
    who give credence only to the writings of the
    ancients. (Discourse on the Method CSM I 151)

5
Cartesian Feminism
  • Poullain de la Barre (1647-1723)
  • Published anonymously in 1673 On the Equality of
    the Two Sexes.
  • (Poullain de la Barre (2002). Three Cartesian
    Feminist Treatises. U. of Chicago Press)
  • He brings Cartesian objectivity to gender issues
    in addressing cultural inequalities between the
    sexes.
  • By systematically employing Cartesian methodology
    Poullain rejected tradition as a means of dealing
    with the issues of feminism.

6
  • Based on Descartes cogito argument that
    establishes the superiority o the mind over the
    body, Poullain extended the challenge of rational
    thinking to the polemic of sex and gender.
  • Since the mind has no sex, discrimination between
    the sexes could not be accepted as the truth
    whether enshrined by tradition or not.
  • The female gender carried as much intellectual
    potential as its male counterpart because a lack
    of physical strength had no correlation with a
    weaker mind.
  • Only customs and traditions have predetermined
    women subordinate status.

7
  • Fallacious argument
  • This is the way things have always been done,
    therefore they should be done this way.
  • Had women been allowed to engage in public
    responsibilities, they would never have been
    excluded from it in the first place.
  • To hold to custom and usage because they are
    sanctioned by time (and male privilege) is pure
    prejudice.
  • Poullain arguments apply to class distinction as
    well
  • How many peasants might have become renewed
    scholars if they had been given a chance?

8
Descartes Innovation/Main Contribution
  • Mathematics is Central
  • Scientific Revolution
  • Break away from Scholastics
  • Philosophical Knowledge
  • (i) unity
  • (ii) purity and
  • (iii) certainty

9
The Method of Doubt
  • Descartes Method. Anti-elitist truth is not
    reserved to highly trained minds.
  • Method of Doubt. An epistemological enterprise.
    The malicious demon and the dream argument.
  • So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinion,
    it will be enough if I find in each of them
    opinions at least some reason for doubt. And to
    do so I will not need to run through them all
    individually, which would be an endless task.
    Once the foundations of a building are
    undermined, anything built on them collapses of
    its own accord so I will go straight to the
    basic principles on which my former beliefs
    rested. (First Meditation CSM II 17)

10
  • I thought it necessary to do the very opposite
    and reject as if absolutely false everything in
    which I could imagine the least doubt, in order
    to see if I was left believing anything that was
    entirely indubitable. Thus, because our senses
    sometimes deceive us, I decided to suppose that
    nothing was such as they led us to imagine. And
    since there are men who make mistakes in
    reasoning, committing logical fallacies
    concerning the simplest questions in geometry,
    and because I judged that I was as prone to error
    as anyone else, I rejected as unsound all the
    arguments I had previously taken as demonstrative
    proofs. Lastly, considering that the very
    thoughts we have while awake may also occur while
    we sleep without any of them being at that time
    true, I resolved to pretend that all the things
    that had ever entered my mind were no more true
    than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately
    I noticed that while I was trying thus to think
    everything false, it was necessary that I, who
    was thinking this, was something. And observing
    that this truth I am thinking, therefore I
    exist was so firm and sure that all the most
    extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were
    incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could
    accept it without scruple as the first principle
    of the philosophy I was seeking. (Discourse on
    the Method CSM I 126-7)
  • Within the methodology of doubt, the malicious
    demon is merely supposed/posited for the sake of
    the argument.

11
The Cogito Argument
  • The First Principle. This brings a stop to the
    doubt.
  • I have convinced myself that there is absolutely
    nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no mind,
    no bodies. Does it follow tat I too do not exist?
    No if I convinced myself of something then I
    certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of
    supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and
    constantly deceiving me. In that case I too
    undoubtedly exist if he is deceiving me and let
    him deceive me as much as he can, he will never
    bring it about that I am nothing so long as I
    think that I am something. So after considering
    everything very thoroughly, I must finally
    conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is
    necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me
    or conceived in my mind. (Second Meditation CSM
    II 16-7)

12
  • At least as I have discovered itthought this
    alone is inseparable from me. I am, I existthat
    is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am
    thinking. For it could be that were I totally to
    cease from thinking, I should totally cease to
    exist. (Second Meditation CSM II 18)
  • The cogito argument does not rest on the standard
    syllogistic reasoning
  • (1) Whatever is thinking exists
  • (2) I am thinking
  • So (3) I exist
  • When someone says I am thinking, therefore I
    am, or I exist, he does not deduce existence
    from thought by means of a syllogism, but
    recognizes it as something self-evident by a
    simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from
    the fact that if he were deducing it by means of
    a syllogism, he would have to have had previous
    knowledge of the major premiss. (Second Set of
    Replies CSM II 100)

13
  • Why not I see, I exist or I walk, I exist?
  • For example, I am not seeing light, hearing a
    noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this
    is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear,
    and to be warmed. This cannot be false what is
    called having a sensory-perception is strictly
    just this, and in this restricted sense of the
    term is simply thinking. (Second Meditation CSM
    II 19)
  • It seems that I see ? I think
  • It seems that I see, so I exist ? I think,
    so I am

14
Is the Cogito an Inference?
  • When someone says I am breathing, therefore I
    exist, if he wants to prove he exists from the
    fact that there cannot be breathing without
    existence, he proves nothing, because he would
    have to prove first that it is true that he is
    breathing, which is impossible unless he has also
    proved that he exists. But if he wants to prove
    his existence from the feeling of the belief he
    has that he is breathing, so that he judges that
    even if the opinion were untrue he could not have
    it if he did not exist, then his proof is sound.
    For in such a case the thought of breathing is
    present to our mind before the thought of our
    existing, and we cannot doubt that we have it
    while we have it. (Letter to Reneri for Pollot,
    April or May 1638 CSMK III 98)
  • Qualia (sensations)
  • are central, self-reflection, introspection

15
External World
  • If external objects exist, their true nature is
    perceived by the intellect, not by the senses
    (which can deceive us). Hence introspection is
    crucial.
  • Thus, the importance in Descartes of the system
    of ideas.

16
Grasping/Entertaining Ideas of Substances
  • One does not grasp a substance per se one grasps
    a property of that substance.
  • When we come to the mind qua substance, though,
    the property one grasps of that substance is its
    thinking property.
  • An idea may not represent a thing in the real
    world, yet when one entertains an idea one cannot
    not seem to have an idea.

17
  • Reply to Gassendi
  • You Gassendi make an incidental criticism as
    follows although I have not admitted that I have
    anything apart from a mind, I nevertheless speak
    of the wax which I see and touch, and yet this is
    impossible without eyes and hands. But you should
    have noticed that I had carefully pointed out
    that I was not here dealing with sight and touch,
    which occur by mean of bodily organs, but was
    concerned solely with the though of seeing and
    touching, which, as we experience every day in
    our dreams, does not require these organs. (Reply
    to Gassendi Fifth Set of Replies CSM II 249)
  • Scepticism From It seems that I perceive we
    cannot infer the existence of the external world.

18
  • I think, I am qua Scientific Starting Block
  • Ontological Commitment. Ontology deals with the
    part of metaphysic concerning the question what
    kind of things there are.
  • Quines slogan to be is to be the value of a
    variable.
  • Entities of a given sort are assumed by a
    theory if and only if some of them be counted
    among the values of the variables, in order that
    the statements affirmed in the theory be true.
    (Quine 1953)

19
  • Quining Descartes
  • With the cogito argument one is ontologically
    committed to the existence of oneself qua
    thinking thing.
  • In order to be successful in committing
    ourselves to the existence of other things our
    theory must ultimately rely on the first
    principle (the cogito) and brings in only other
    indubitable, necessary, truths.
  • Descartes will appeal to God and this appeal can
    be seen to be scientifically driven.

20
The Self
  • Myself qua Substance
  • From the mere fact that each of us understands
    himself to be a thinking thing and is capable, in
    thoughts, of excluding from himself every other
    substance, whether thinking or extended, it is
    certain that each of us, regarded in this way, is
    really distinct from every other thinking
    substance and from every corporeal substance.
    (Principles of Philosophy 1. 60 CSM I 213)
  • Main Question. How do we escape from the realm of
    subjective-self awareness?
  • God enters the picture.
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