Extended Area Protection

1
Extended Area Protection Survivability

• Mr. Bill Nourse
• Program Manager, Extended Area
• Protection Survivability
• Aviation Missile Research, Development
  Engineering Center
• Email bill.nourse_at_us.army.mil
• Phone [phone]

2
Overview

• Objectives
• Provide an Overview of the Extended Area
  Protection Survivability Science Technology
  Program
• Scope
• The Problem
• The Threat
• Notional Concept
• System Drivers
• Trade Space
• Potential Solutions
• Technology Barriers
• Program Plan

3
The Problem
Transforming the ForceFrom Korea to Today Major
General (Retired) Robert H. Scales, Jr. Historian
and Former Commandant of the Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Quote From Field Artillery, July-August 2001
Another fact historically in limited liability
wars, most Americans killed in combat were killed
by rudimentary weapons the greatest killer of
Americans on the battlefield is the mortar. A
distant second is automatic weapons. Mines are a
very distant third. I think the historical
pattern will continue Most Americans killed in
combat will die from the effects of simple
weapons while facing an enemy fighting on equal
terms in the close fight. That was true for the
Russians in Afghanistan, and it is true for the
Israelis today. One of the ironies today is that
a B-2 bomber can fly 8,000 miles to destroy a
building with one bomb from a safe distance, yet
a platoon under mortar fire is relatively
helpless.
The Greatest Killer on the Battlefield is the
Mortar
Currently, no existing or programmed system with
a capability to negate RAM projectiles after they
are launched. Limited capability to negate UAV
reconnaissance capabilities at sufficient range
to preclude detection, identification, and
targeting. Need for more cost-effective systems
solutions for cruise missile (CM) defense.
4
The Threat

• Low RCS
• Low Trajectories
• Short Flight Times
• Thick, Hard Projectile Cases
• High Rate of Fire

5
Notional Concept
External Sensors
High Altitude Air Defense
Low Altitude Air Defense
External Networks
TBM
CM
Directed Energy
RW
MMR
Outer Tier Leakers
Mortars
Artillery
Rockets
UAV
Extended Area Air Defense
Rockets
Outer Tier Leakers
Kinetic Energy
Outer Tier
Fire Control
Short Range Inner Tier
Long Range Inner Tier
500m
2km
10km
40km
6
Functional Architecture
7
System Drivers

• Asset survivability in an intense RAM barrage is
  dependent upon
• Asset dispersion, maneuver, concealment and
  counter-fire
• Engagement of only the potentially threatening
  RAM
• Effective engagement is dependent upon
• Impact Point Prediction (IPP), which identifies
  must engage threats by
• Precision tracking of incoming threats
• Precision tracking of dispersed assets (both
  stationary and moving)
• Accurate prediction of tracked threats damage
  potential to the dispersed assets
• High Threat Kill Rate
• Large Shooter Magazine

8
Inner Tier Options
Protection of dispersed assets may be achieved by
- Many Short Range Inner Tier (SRIT)
Shooters - A Few Long Range Inner Tier (LRIT)
Shooters - A Mix of Short and Long Range
Shooters
Long Range RAM Trajectory
Defendable Radius Of SRIT Shooter
RAM Launcher deployed at short range from asset
SRIT Shooter
Asset Defended only By LRIT
LRIT Shooter
Asset Defended Only By SRIT
Defendable Radius of LRIT Shooter
Attribute
Advantage Earliest Fielding
SRIT Lowest Unit Cost SRIT Protect
Moving Assets LRIT Engage Short Time of
Flight Threats SRIT Most Cost-Effective
MIX?
Asset Defended by LRIT SRIT
A mix of Short Range and Long Range Shooters may
be the best solution.
9
Interceptor Trade-Space

• Homing Missile with Seeker
• Active RF
• Semi-Active RF
• Passive IR
• Active Laser
• Semi-Active Laser

• Command-Guided Missile
• Active RF Fire Control
• Passive IR or TV Fire Control (CLOS)

• Warhead Options
• Hit to Kill
• Multi-Fragment Radial Warhead
• Isotropic Blast-Frag. Warhead

• Control Options
• Thruster Based Controls Moving Fin Controls
• C.G. Thrusters/Direct Divert Canard Fins
• Canard Thrusters Tail Fins

10
Inner Tier Interceptors

• Short Range Inner Tier (SRIT)
• Low-Cost Short Range Fire Control Radar Appears
  Feasible
• Unguided and Guided Bullet Concepts were Examined
• Sensor/Shooter Combinations Evaluated in
  Simulation
• Most Promising Technique is a Single Guidance
  Command
• Long Range Inner Tier (LRIT)
• Long Range Pulse Doppler Fire Control Radar
  Analyzed
• Investigating Guidance Concepts for Rocket
  Interceptor
• Investigating Closed-Loop Simulation (GENSS) of
  Intercept
• Small Rocket with Semi-Active Guidance appears
  feasible

Low Cost Monopulse Fire Control Radar Command
Guided Bullet Programmable Gun
MMW Pulse Doppler Fire Control Radar
Semi-Active 70mm Rocket Rocket Launcher
11
Technology Barriers

• KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
• EFFECTIVENESS COST
  TECHNOLOGY LEVEL

Barriers
Technology

• Sensors for Acquisition of Small, Short Range,
  and Low Trajectory RAM Threats
• Miniature Sensors Control Mechanisms for Low
  Cost Guidance
• Lethal Kill Mechanisms for Defeating Tough
  Diverse RAM Threat
• Algorithms/Network for Timely Impact Point
  Prediction/Preferential Engagement of RAM Threats
• Efficient and Mobile Hemispheric Protection From
  Engagement of Multiple RAM Threats Arriving
  Simultaneously

• Low Cost Sensor

• Guidance

• Lethality

• Fire Control

• Shooter Trade-off Studies

12
Program Plan