The Aral Sea Basin

1
The Aral Sea Basin

• The Science and Politics of Freshwater Management
  
• December 2002
• Mark Verbunt Andreas Weigel

2
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

3
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

4
1. General Overview of the Aral Sea Basin
5
(No Transcript)
6
The decrease of the Water Level in the Aral Sea
7
Chronology of the Aral Sea disaster

• 1920s Decision to launch a program on
  intensifying cotton production in the Aral Sea
  basin.
• Following decades Development of an immense
  irrigation infrastructure.
• 1960 Beginning of deterioration.
• Increasing amount of water used for irrigation
  
• low irrigation efficiency
• gt Dramatic loss of inflow into Aral Sea

8
Percentage irrigated area of total land
Source http//www.fao.org
Annual withdrawal from Syr Darya and Amu Darya of
12.900 m3 although only 4900 m3 are actually used
by the crops. The losses are mainly due to
seepage into the underground.
9
Some facts about the Aral Sea Disaster

• 1960-2002
• - Original Aral Sea surface (68.000 km3) halved
  
• - Volume decreased by 80
• gt Aral Sea divided into two parts.
• Increase of salinity from 10 g/l up to 60 g/l.
• Collapse of the fishery industry and problems for
  farmers.
• Approximately 200.000 tons of salt and sand are
  carried away and discharged in a radius of 300 km
  every day.
• Health of residents severely affected

10
The decrease of the Water Level in the Aral Sea
Source http//ntserver.cis.lead.org/aral/level.ht
m
11
Consequences of unsustainable management
http//www.msf.org/aralsea/
http//www.geocities.com/areimov/images/
http//www.uzland.uz/aral/
12
Chronology of regional cooperation

• 1986 Implementation of BVO Amu Darya and BVO Syr
  Darya
• 1992 Interstate Coordinating Water Commission
  (ICWC) founded
• 1994 Nukus declaration
• ...prepare a general strategy of water
  distribution, rational water use, and protection
  of water resources in the Aral Sea Basin.
• 1997 Internat. Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS)
• gt Responsible for donor resources
• gt Implementation of Aral Sea Basin Program

13
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

14
2. Irrigation versus hydropower The Toktogul
Reservoir
15
The Syr Darya Basin
16
The Toktogul Reservoir

• Soviet regime design
• Most important reservoir at the Syr Darya with an
  annual inflow of about 11.8 km3.
• Constructed in 1974 to regulate the Syr Darya
  flow during the vegetation period.
• Additionally production of hydropower
• Releases during vegetation period 8.5 km3
• Releases during non-vegetation period 2.8 km3

17

• How it changed after 1991.
• Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan soon introduced market
  prices for their coal and gas.
• Due to energy shortages Kyrgyzstan repeatedly had
  to release 6-8 km3 water in winter.
• Consequences for the downstream countries were
  fatal
• - Lack of irrigation water in summer
• - Floodings and water losses in winter due to
  icy Syr Darya bed
• gt Tensions grew

18
The Barter Agreement of 1998 Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan (1999)

• During the vegetation period Kyrgyzstan releases
  more water than it needs for its own hydropower
  demands.
• The surplus of produced energy is equally
  distributed and transported to Kazakhstan and
  Uzbekistan.
• As compensation, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan supply
  Kyrgyzstan with energy resources (coal and gas).
• The exact amounts of water to be released and
  compen- sations for energy losses are agreed
  annually.
• Any disputes or disagreements will be resolved
  through negotiations and consultations.

19
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

20
Success- failure

• What would have been the collective optimum
  and what is in reality
• 1. The downstream countries must receive enough
  water during the vegetation period to meet their
  irrigation demands (6 km3).
• Success The actual average received water in
  1999-2001 was 5.82 km3.
• The annual agreements on the barter agreement
  must be carried out in a regular,
  uncomplicated, flexible and efficient way.
• Success The annual negotiations have indeed
  been carried out.
• Failure Agreements are always reached
  with a delay.

21
Success- failure

• Kyrgyzstan is reliably and punctually compensated
  for its energy losses due to the reduced water
  releases in winter.
• Failure The compensation payments to Kyrgyzstan
  have never been caried out according to the
  annual agreements.
• Water releases during the non-vegetation period
  must not exceed 6 km3 in order to prevent
  flooding.
• Failure Release of huge amounts of water during
  the non-vegetation period (2000-2001 average was
  8.4 km3) Un-sustainable management of Toktogul
  reservoir - if operation continues in this way
  the reservoir will reach its dead storage volume
  in 2003!

22
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

23
Influence of Non Regime Variables

• Asymmetries
• Young age of the countries
• State of economic development
• Scientific understanding

24
Asymmetries

• Geographical and climatological factors.
• Upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)
  are situated at higher altitudes and receive
  higher precipitation rates.
• -Kyrgyzstan covers 6 of the Syr Darya basin but
  provides 75 of the water inflow.
• Upstream countries contain mountainous areas
  which enables them to build reservoirs to store
  water and control the releases.
• Powerful position for the upstream countries.
• .

25
Asymmetries

• Political, economic and military strength.
• The political, economic and military strength is
  much larger in the downstream countries compared
  to the upstream ones.
• -Uzbekistan Kazakhstan
• GDP 160 billion.
• Military expenses 373 million.
• -Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
• GDP 21 billion.
• Military expenses 35 million.
• Powerful position for the downstream countries.
• Advantages of both sides are always balanced.
  Both upstream and downstream countries depend on
  each other. The barter agreement accounts for the
  different needs of the two groups.

26
Influence of Non Regime Variables

• Asymmetries
• Young age of the countries
• State of economic development
• Scientific understanding

27
Young Age of the Countries

• Only in 1991 the USSR collapsed, new countries
  arised and the main rivers became transboundary
  rivers.
• Consequences.
• Many water allocation regimes and rules are often
  still based on the old ones prescribed by the
  USSR. They fail to take into account the
  individual perspectives of economic development
  of the countries.
• As the involved countries became independent only
  a decade ago they are often fractioned and
  politically unstable and still have not fully
  realized the necessity to cooperate.
• Due to the young age of the countries, the
  debates over water are not only limited to water
  stress but also comprise ethnic rivalries, border
  disputes and other problems.
• Strong negative effect on the barter agreement.
• The treaty probably evolved more due to the
  asymmetry pressures than due to mutual respect.

28
Influence of Non Regime Variables

• Asymmetries
• Young age of the countries
• State of economic development
• Scientific understanding

29
State of Economic Development

• Bad economic and financial situation in the
  downsteam countries that prevents them from
  restoring their fragile infrastructure.
• -Replacing outdated irrigation systems could do
  much to reduce the water use.
• -Due to broken pipelines Uzbekistan is regulary
  not able to deliver gas to Kyrgyzstan.
• Tense financial situation of Kyrgyzstan.
• -Kyrgyzstan is forced to release water from the
  Toktogul reservoir as soon as fuel deliveries in
  winter are interupted.

30
(No Transcript)
31
State of Economic Development

• Different progress of economic reform.
• Privatization of coalmines in Kazakhstan prevent
  freecoal deliveries to Kyrgyzstan.
• Negative impact on the barter agreement.
• The barter agreement does not include any
  mechanisms to solve these complications in the
  context of infrastructure and economic problems.
• The barter agreement does also not account for
  the fact that the involved countries reform their
  economic structure at different speed.

32
Influence of Non Regime Variables

• Asymmetries
• Young age of the countries
• State of economic development
• Scientific understanding

33
Scientific Understanding

• The Aral Sea problem as well as the Toktogul
  dilemma are scientifically well understood.
• Precipitation data and therefore the annual
  inflow volume into the Toktogul reservoir can
  roughly be estimated.
• The outflow from the reservoir can quite exactly
  be measured.
• Measurements are likely to depend on whether the
  data are obtained from national authorities or
  from multi-national committees. The measurements
  however do not really seem to affect the barter
  agreement significantly because the huge outflows
  in winter are definitely undoubted.
• Scientific understanding and accurate
  monitoring are, though being important from a
  general point of view, not the key variables in
  the Toktogul case and the barter agreement.

34
Overview

• General background to the Aral Sea Problem
• Irrigation versus Hydropower
• The Toktogul Reservoir
• Definition of Success-Failure
• Influence of non-regime variables
• Influence of regime variables
• Conclusions

35
Influence of Regime Variables

• Decision makers
• Involvement of international organizations
• Maintenance costs
• Time planning

36
Decision Makers

• The Kyrgyz government decides when and how much
  water is released from the Toktogul reservoir and
  not as in the barter agreement the neutral Syr
  Darya BVO. Actual releases are consequently
  mainly triggered by Kyrgyz energy needs.
• The barter agreement would work more efficiently
  if a powerful integrated regional management was
  introduced.
• Liability rules could be introduced which punish
  countries failing to fulfill their part of the
  agreement and information exchange could be
  improved.
• So why is there no regional water management ?

37
Decision makers

• The countries are still very young and struggling
  to find their own identity, which makes them
  mistrustful towards any form of closer
  integration.
• The current water allocation bodies in the Aral
  Sea basin are dominated by the Uzbeks, which
  hampers a small country like Kyrgyzstan to be
  more open to the idea of regional water
  management of the Toktogul reservoir.
• The Soviet thinking still seems to be dominant
  among decision makers. Many water structures are
  still strongly influenced by former Soviet
  officials who keep to old hierarchies and do not
  seem to be open for new ideas.

38
Influence of Regime Variables

• Decision makers
• Involvement of international organizations
• Maintenance costs
• Time planning

39
Involvement of International Organizations

• Though the influence of international
  organizations on the concrete management and
  operation of the Toktogul reservoir is very
  limited the work of the United States Agency for
  International Development (USAID) has been
  essential
• Without USAID the barter agreement would probably
  not have been signed because they prepared and
  funded the negotiations which lead to the barter
  agreement in 1998.
• Today USAID is involved in the modeling of an
  optimal operation scheme for the Toktogul
  reservoir. They provided both technical and
  financial assistance.
• Positive effect on the barter agreement.

40
Influence of Regime Variables

• Decision makers
• Involvement of international organizations
• Maintenance costs
• Time planning

41
Maintenance costs

• The maintenance of the Toktogul reservoir costs
  about US 25 million per year, a sum Kyrgyzstan
  can hardly afford.
• Despite repeated requests, the downstream
  countries refuse to share the maintenance costs.
• That worsens the financial situation of
  Kyrgyzstan, which is often forced to exceed the
  agreed water releases (for domestic needs or
  export to mainly China).
• Fundamental question
• What do downstream countries actually pay for? Is
  it the price for water which precipitates in the
  upstream territory or is it the service provided
  by Kyrgyzstan to store the water and release it
  at several times.
• A solution to this question would definitely
  improve the payment behavior of the downstream
  countries!

42
Influence of Regime Variables

• Decision makers
• Involvement of international organizations
• Maintenance costs
• Time planning

43
Time Planning

• The annual barter agreements have never been
  reached before spring.
• If they were signed before the beginning of the
  year Kyrgyzstan would be able to estimate how
  much energy deliveries it expects from the
  downstream countries and therefore could release
  less water from the Toktogul reservoir
• Time planning is a key issue with respect to the
  deficiencies of the barter agreement
• Probably it can only be improved by reforming the
  structures of decision making and management

44
Conclusions (1of 3)

• Upstreamdownstream conflict emerged a decade ago
  after the collapse of the USSR when a national
  fresh- water management suddenly became an
  international one.
• After serious tensions the barter agreement was
  signed in 1998 which acknowledges both the right
  of the downstream countries to use water for
  irrigation and the upstream countries to produce
  energy.
• The barter agreement has had a stabilizing effect
  in the region.
• Many failures of the barter agreement are caused
  by the fact that it was not the mutual
  recognition which lead to the signature of the
  treaty but the pressure of counteracting
  asymmetries.

45
Conclusions (2 of 3 )

• The main problem is the management structure,
  which is still in the hands of national
  authorities rather than regional committees.
• These structures are often based on tight command
  economy principles which often do not coincide
  with economic realities.
• The 1998 barter agreement only focused on the
  quantification of water releases and fuel
  deliveries. The Toktogul dilemma is so complex
  that also aspects like irrigation efficiency,
  fragile infrastructure and maintenance costs
  should be included. This however requires a
  better cooperation and the willingness to
  understand the point of view of the other side.

46
Conclusions(3 of 3)

• The barter agreement will run out in 2003 and it
  is yet unsure whether it will be extended. The
  basis for a new barter agreement can only be a
  closer cooperation towards an integrated and
  regional water management.
• NGOs should be involved in the negotiations and
  a more flexible and automatic mechanism to
  determine form and extent of compensation should
  be introduced.
• However up to now the involved countries think
  improvement could be achieved by unilateral
  plans.
• A lot of convincing work still has to be done,
  before the Aral Sea problem can seriously and
  efficiently be tackled.
• Tragically time is very limited.